The philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and the later Wittgenstein are shown to yield a common position opposing 'realist' attempts to reduce appearance, sense, and meaning to perception-independent objects and relations. Their 'Gestalt Philosophy' thus constitutes a new form of 'anti- realism'.

Harms and risks to groups and third-parties can be significant in the context of research, particularly in data-centric studies involving genomic, artificial intelligence, and/or machine learning technologies. This article explores whether and how United States federal regulations should be adapted to better align with current ethical thinking and protect group interests. Three aspects of the Common Rule deserve attention and reconsideration with respect to group interests: institutional review board (IRB) assessment of the risks/benefits of research; disclosure requirements in the informed (...) consent process; and criteria for waivers of informed consent. In accordance with respect for persons and communities, investigators and IRBs should systematically consider potential group harm when designing and reviewing protocols, respectively. Research participants should be informed about any potential group harm in the consent process. We call for additional public discussion, empirical research, and normative analysis on these issues to determine the right regulatory and policy path forward. (shrink)

BackgroundReconciling results obtained using different types of sensory measures is a challenge for autism sensory research. The present study used questionnaire, psychophysical, and neurophysiological measures to characterize autistic sensory processing in different measurement modalities.MethodsParticipants were 46 autistic and 21 typically developing 11- to 14-year-olds. Participants and their caregivers completed questionnaires regarding sensory experiences and behaviors. Auditory and somatosensory event-related potentials were recorded as part of a multisensory ERP task. Auditory detection, tactile static detection, and tactile spatial resolution psychophysical thresholds were (...) measured.ResultsSensory questionnaires strongly differentiated between autistic and typically developing individuals, while little evidence of group differences was observed in psychophysical thresholds. Crucially, the different types of measures appeared to be largely independent of one another. However, we unexpectedly found autistic participants with larger auditory Tb ERP amplitudes had reduced hearing acuity, even though all participants had hearing acuity in the non-clinical range.LimitationsThe autistic and typically developing groups were not matched on cognitive ability, although this limitation does not affect our main analyses regarding convergence of measures within autism.ConclusionOverall, based on these results, measures in different sensory modalities appear to capture distinct aspects of sensory processing in autism, with relatively limited convergence between questionnaires and laboratory-based tasks. Generally, this might reflect the reality that laboratory tasks are often carried out in controlled environments without background stimuli to compete for attention, a context which may not closely resemble the busier and more complex environments in which autistic people’s atypical sensory experiences commonly occur. Sensory questionnaires and more naturalistic laboratory tasks may be better suited to explore autistic people’s real-world sensory challenges. Further research is needed to replicate and investigate the drivers of the unexpected association we observed between auditory Tb ERP amplitudes and hearing acuity, which could represent an important confound for ERP researchers to consider in their studies. (shrink)

In his book Wittgenstein’s Metaphysics, John Cook argues that from 1912 until his death Wittgenstein was a proponent of neutral monism. This involves, according to Cook, Wittgenstein’s espousal of phenomenalism---the view that there can be nothing beyond immediate experience---and the consequent elimination of matter, causality, and other minds. I argue that this conflicts with almost everything that Wittgenstein wrote after 1932, including the passages cited and systematicalIy misinterpreted by Cook.

Critical analyses of the audit profession have become more common in recent years. Many of these analyses focus on the entire audit profession in developing their criticisms and concerns. In this paper, the scope of analysis is narrowed to examine in depth the auditing profession's use of the concepts of reasonable assurance and materiality in audit performance and audit communications. Reasonable assurance and materiality are the terms that auditors use to describe the scope of their responsibility to the public. Similarly, (...) reasonable assurance and materiality are the key determinants of audit effort. An overview of official guidance, practitioner reports, and academic research reveals that these two key concepts are not well specified nor are they consistently applied in audit practice. These findings are evaluated from two competing perspectives on professions – the traditional, functionalist perspective and the critical theorists' perspective. Evaluation from the latter perspective leads to a conclusion that the profession's use of these key terms to guide practice and communication leaves the profession open to charges of mystification and unjustified paternalism. (shrink)

In his book Wittgenstein’s Metaphysics, John Cook argues that from 1912 until his death Wittgenstein was a proponent of neutral monism. This involves, according to Cook, Wittgenstein’s espousal of phenomenalism---the view that there can be nothing beyond immediate experience---and the consequent elimination of matter, causality, and other minds. I argue that this conflicts with almost everything that Wittgenstein wrote after 1932, including the passages cited and systematicalIy misinterpreted by Cook.

In his book Wittgenstein’s Metaphysics, John Cook argues that from 1912 until his death Wittgenstein was a proponent of neutral monism. This involves, according to Cook, Wittgenstein’s espousal of phenomenalism---the view that there can be nothing beyond immediate experience---and the consequent elimination of matter, causality, and other minds. I argue that this conflicts with almost everything that Wittgenstein wrote after 1932, including the passages cited and systematicalIy misinterpreted by Cook.

This book is a foray into the thorny interpretive issue of what to make of Kant's so-called "Metaphysical Deduction" of the categories. As with many of the arguments in the first Critique, the claim of the Metaphysical Deduction is easier to make out than its argument. The claim is that by some or other reference to "general logic," one may obtain a "transcendental logic," i.e., a justification (or "deduction") of the categories (of the understanding) necessary to the (very) possibility of (...) experience. But how? By, Kant says, discerning, in general logic, a "clue" to transcendental logic. But what sort of clue? And then what clue exactly? We need a meta-clue to get a clue.Herein lies the very mixed reception the .. (shrink)

Bottom line on top: this is a wonderful book.

Bottom line on top: this is a wonderful book.

In the pre-postmodern era, subtitles were truly and merely “sub” and were reserved for books. They served to characterize and categorize a book so as to let the innocent consumer know what he was getting into if he could not tell from the title proper; thus, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics or Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. But the proper subtitle has evolved into an entire second title, is routinely used for journal articles and conference presentations, (...) and not every author can stop herself at merely the second title. The new style subtitle—the second title—is still supposed to shed light on the first title, but not by way of a categorizing characterization the way old style subtitles did. The first title of John Searle’s latest book is Mind, Language and Society. The second title is Philosophy in the Real World. It is not immediately clear what this new style subtitle means. It is too subtile. It needs an old-style subtitle to shed light on it that it may shed light on the first title. And, in his introduction, Searle very nearly supplies such. (shrink)

In the introduction to her book, Kathleen V. Wider states that her "primary concern is not with defending Sartre but with defending a position he has developed through phenomenology that helps to illuminate the nature of consciousness". This is a bit of a head-scratcher. Is it really possible to defend a position Sartre has developed without defending Sartre? One's scratching is immediately followed by sniffing, as a strong piscine odour wafts by: "I hope to show that science-based accounts of consciousness (...) can strengthen and clarify Sartre's phenomenology-based account of consciousness". Perhaps someone else's account of consciousness may be strengthened and clarified by "science-based" accounts of consciousness, but Sartre's account surely could not be. What is Wider up to? (shrink)