This paper is a comparative study of Alfred Schutz and Jose Ortega y Gasset, with special attention to their respective characterization of social reality. For this purpose, the author draws on the explicit references Schutz and Ortega directed towards one another and develops a critical comparison of their theoretical systems. In addition to the reciprocal references which appear in their published works, valuable documentary evidence is provided by Schutz's letters and, first and foremost, by his marginal notes preserved in his (...) own copy of Ortega y Gasset's Man and People. As far as the critical comparison of Schutz's and Ortega's theories is concerned, the weight of the discussion falls on Ortega's Man and People. A careful reading of this essay allows us to successively invoke the key components of Schutz's phenomenological characterization of the structures of the life-world. According to this strategy, and after some preliminary sections devoted to contextual, biographical, and sociocultural matters, the following topics are comparatively discussed: (1) the philosophical foundations of sociology, with particular attention to Ortega's doctrine of the Other as potential danger; (2) the taken-for-granted dimensions of the social world; (3) the multiple spheres of reality, and their structuration around the fundamental core of the radical reality of the I (for Ortega) or the paramount reality of everyday life, as the intersubjective world of culture (for Schutz); (4) the influence of pragmatism on their theoretical systems; (5) their strikingly similar characterization of the perspectivist stratification of the social world; (6) the inexhaustible complexity of the problem of intersubjectivity. Obviously, the common influence of Husserl, Weber, Scheler, and Bergson casts light upon the comparative consideration of any of these issues. (shrink)

After justifying its centrality in the Schützian project of founding interpretive sociology, I present the theory of relevance as the cornerstone of Schütz’s constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude, conceived of as the investigation of the meaningful construction and the structures of the lifeworld. Through what I call the life-plans approach, I contend that the essence of every sociocultural world has to be found in a thick network of intersubjective and hierarchized relevance structures upon which personal life-projects are built. This (...) proposal is based on Schütz’s subordination of the theory of action to the theory of relevance, which challenges every atomistic view of social action. The interplay of relevance structures in the field of consciousness and especially the focus on imposed relevances encourage us to reflect on the scope of human freedom. Lastly, I examine the everlasting tension in Schütz’s thought between the anti-rationalistic potential of the theory of relevance and the methodological rationalism inherited from Weber and the Austrian marginalists. (shrink)

Este ensayo parte de una experiencia disruptiva en un aula de bachillerato de un instituto español. En el transcurso de una clase ordinaria de filosofía, un incidente inesperado rompe la definición de la situación, haciendo añicos el consenso de trabajo entre los alumnos y el profesor. Para reconstruir su trasfondo de expectativas, los alumnos se ven forzados a emplear estrategias de acomodación y normalización. En el análisis de esta experiencia disruptiva convergen la fenomenología del mundo social de Alfred Schütz, la (...) etnometodología de Harold Garfinkel y el interaccionismo simbólico de Erving Goffman.This essay starts from a disruptive experience in a Spanish high school classroom. In the course of an ordinary philosophy lesson, an unexpected incident breaks the definition of the situation, smashing the working consensus among students and teacher to smithereens. In order to rebuild their background expectancies, the pupils are forced to resort to accommodation and normalization strategies. The analysis of this disruptive experience is based upon the convergence of Alfred Schütz’s phenomenology of the social world, Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, and Erving Goffman’s symbolic interactionism. (shrink)

Resumen En esta discusión expongo algunas objeciones a las siguientes tesis de Velázquez 2020: 1) que tanto Descartes como Frege sostienen que las entidades aritméticas son irreductibles a procesos empíricos; 2) que, en el caso de Descartes, dichas entidades son “perennes, inherentes a la propia constitución y funcionamiento de la mente” y 3) que Frege impugnó la filosofía matemática de Mill por psicologista. Sostengo que la segunda tesis no es, per se, controversial, pero que sí lo es en el contexto (...) del artículo de Velázquez.In this discussion I present objections to the following theses in Velázquez 2020: 1) that both Descartes and Frege maintain that arithmetic entities are irreducible to empirical processes; 2) that, in the case of Descartes, these entities are “perennial, inherent to the very constitution and functioning of the mind”, and 3) that Frege contested Mill’s mathematical philosophy for being psychologistic. I argue that the second thesis is not, per se, controversial, but that it is controversial in the context of Velázquez’s article. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P, then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x. The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defined in terms of it, (...) which we call tolerant truth and strict truth. We characterize the space of consequence relations definable in terms of those and discuss the kind of solution this gives to the sorites paradox. We discuss some applications of the framework to the pragmatics and psycholinguistics of vague predicates, in particular regarding judgments about borderline cases. (shrink)

To what degree can language be acquired from linguistic input alone? This question has vexed scholars for millennia and is still a major focus of debate in the cognitive science of language. The complexity of human language has hampered progress because studies of language–especially those involving computational modeling–have only been able to deal with small fragments of our linguistic skills. We suggest that the most recent generation of Large Language Models (LLMs) might finally provide the computational tools to determine empirically (...) how much of the human language ability can be acquired from linguistic experience. LLMs are sophisticated deep learning architectures trained on vast amounts of natural language data, enabling them to perform an impressive range of linguistic tasks. We argue that, despite their clear semantic and pragmatic limitations, LLMs have already demonstrated that human-like grammatical language can be acquired without the need for a built-in grammar. Thus, while there is still much to learn about how humans acquire and use language, LLMs provide full-fledged computational models for cognitive scientists to empirically evaluate just how far statistical learning might take us in explaining the full complexity of human language. (shrink)

RésuméAu cœur de la théorie de Sophia Moreau sur la discrimination répréhensible réside le devoir moral de traiter les autres comme des êtres égaux. Cet essai soulève quelques questions sur les contours de ce devoir et suggère des moyens de renforcer la théorie. En particulier, il suggère d'intégrer une vision cosmopolite de la portée de ce devoir, d’éclairer les caractéristiques à la base du statut moral égal des personnes afin d'en identifier les fondements, ainsi que d'identifier certaines considérations relatives à (...) des intérêts d'importance afin d'en préciser le contenu. La relation entre la théorie de Moreau et le discours sur les droits humains est également brièvement examinée, et une discussion plus approfondie de ce dernier est recommandée. (shrink)

This paper presents and defends a way to add a transparent truth predicate to classical logic, such that and A are everywhere intersubstitutable, where all T-biconditionals hold, and where truth can be made compositional. A key feature of our framework, called STTT (for Strict-Tolerant Transparent Truth), is that it supports a non-transitive relation of consequence. At the same time, it can be seen that the only failures of transitivity STTT allows for arise in paradoxical cases.

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 634-645, July 2022.

Some plausibly necessary a posteriori theoretical claims include ‘water is H 2 O’, ‘gold is the element with atomic number 79’, and ‘cats are animals’. In this paper I challenge the necessity of the third claim. I argue that there are possible worlds in which cats exist, but are not animals. Under any of the species concepts currently accepted in biology, organisms do not belong essentially to their species. This is equally true of their ancestors. In phylogenetic systematics, monophyletic clades (...) such as the animal kingdom are composed of an ancestral stem species and all of its descendants. If the stem species had not existed, neither would the clade. Thus it could have been the case that all the organisms which actually belong to the animal kingdom might have existed yet not have been animals. (shrink)

Substructural approaches to paradoxes have attracted much attention from the philosophical community in the last decade. In this paper we focus on two substructural logics, named ST and TS, along with two structural cousins, LP and K3. It is well known that LP and K3 are duals in the sense that an inference is valid in one logic just in case the contrapositive is valid in the other logic. As a consequence of this duality, theories based on either logic are (...) tightly connected since many of the arguments for and objections against one theory reappear in the other theory in dual form. The target of the paper is making explicit in exactly what way, if any, ST and TS are dual to one another. The connection will allow us to gain a more fine-grained understanding of these logics and of the theories based on them. In particular, we will obtain new insights on two questions concerning ST which are being intensively discussed in the current literature: whether ST preserves classical logic and whether it is LP in sheep’s clothing. Explaining in what way ST and TS are duals requires comparing these logics at a metainferential level. We provide to this end a uniform proof theory to decide on valid metainferences for each of the four logics. This proof procedure allows us to show in a very simple way how different properties of inferences (unsatisfiability, supersatisfiability and antivalidity) that behave in very different ways for each logic can be captured in terms of the validity of a metainference. (shrink)

Life is a self-maintaining process based on metabolism. Something is said to be alive when it exhibits organization and is actively involved in its own continued existence through carrying out metabolic processes. A life is a spatio-temporally restricted event, which continues while the life processes are occurring in a particular chunk of matter (or, arguably, when they are temporally suspended, but can be restarted at any moment), even though there is continuous replacement of parts. Life is organized in discrete packages, (...) particular cells and multicellular organisms with differing degrees of individuality. Biological species, too, have been shown to be individuals, and not classes, as these collections of organisms are spatio-temporally localized, restricted, continuous, and somewhat cohesive entities, with a definite beginning and end. Assuming that all life on Earth has a common origin, all living organisms, cells, and tissues descending from this origin exhibit continuity of the life processes at the cellular level, as well as many of the features that define the individual character of species: spatio-temporal localization and restriction, continuity, historicity, and cohesiveness. Therefore, life on Earth is an ontological individual. Independent origins of life will have produced other such individuals. These provisionally called ‘life-individuals’ constitute a category of organization of life which has seldom been recognized. The discovery of at least one independent life-individual would go a long way toward the project of the universality of biology. (shrink)

Animalism is prima facie the most plausible view about what we are; it aligns better with science and common sense, and is metaphysically more parsimonious. Thought experiments involving the brain, however, tend to elicit intuitions contrary to animalism. In this paper, I examine two classical thought experiments from the literature, brain transplant and cerebrum transplant, and a new one, cerebrum regeneration. I argue that they are theoretically possible, but that a scientifically informed account of what would actually happen shows that (...) in none of the cases would the person be separated from the animal. Our intuitions in these cases, when adequately informed by neuroscience, do not conflict with animalism – rather, they suggest a correction of the animalist position: the persisting animal should be at least minimally sentient. Sentience animalism is a new formulation of the animalist account of personal identity that allows us to reconcile facts about our biological persistence conditions with the intuition that human persistence should involve some kind of psychological continuity. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 02, August 2022. We show that every definable nested family of closed and bounded subsets of a P-minimal field K has nonempty intersection. As an application we answer a question of Darnière and Halupczok showing that P-minimal fields satisfy the “extreme value property”: for every closed and bounded subset [math] and every interpretable continuous function [math] (where [math] denotes the value group), f(U) admits a maximal value. Two further corollaries are obtained as a (...) consequence of their work. The first one shows that every interpretable subset of [math] is already interpretable in the language of rings, answering a question of Cluckers and Halupczok. This implies in particular that every P-minimal field is polynomially bounded. The second one characterizes those P-minimal fields satisfying a classical cell preparation theorem as those having definable Skolem functions, generalizing a result of Mourgues. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Barrio, Tajer and Rosenblatt establish a correspondence between metainferences holding in the strict-tolerant logic of transparent truth ST+ and inferences holding in the logic of paradox LP+. They argue that LP+ is ST+’s external logic and they question whether ST+’s solution to the semantic paradoxes is fundamentally different from LP+’s. Here we establish that by parity of reasoning, ST+ can be related to LP+’s dual logic K3+. We clarify the distinction between internal and external logic and (...) argue that while ST+’s nonclassicality can be granted, its self-dual character does not tie it to LP+ more closely than to K3+. (shrink)

En este artículo discuto la relevancia que tiene el autorrespeto en la teoría de la justicia de Rawls. Para alcanzar dicho objetivo, en primer lugar examino las nociones de valor moral y mérito y su vinculación con el autorrespeto como forma de autovaloración. En segundo lugar, especifico las bases que sustentan el autorrespeto al interior de su teoría. Finalmente, discuto la función que tiene el autorrespeto en la justificación de los principios de la justicia como equidad.

En este artículo discuto la importancia que tiene para la teoría de la justicia de Rawls el desarrollo del sentido de la justicia como condición para la estabilidad social. Para cumplir con dicho objetivo analizo la interpretación que Rawls ofrece de nuestra psicología moral con la finalidad de evaluar su rol en la aceptación de los principios de justicia, así como las razones para fundar dicha estabilidad en determinados sentimientos morales. El análisis anterior me permitirá concluir que la búsqueda de (...) bases naturales para fundar los sentimientos morales constituye para Rawls una vía alternativa tanto al deductivismo moral, así como a cualquier forma de fundamentación metafísica de los principios que guían nuestras prácticas sociales. (shrink)

This paper analyzes Davidson´s classical version of the principle of charity,in order to suggest a reformulation from which it is possible to extractsome consequences regarding the nature of understanding. Thus, it is putforward an abandonment of the intencionalist hermeneutics as well as theCartesi..

A considerable number of books and papers have analyzed normative concepts using new techniques developed by logicians; however, few have bridged the gap between the English legal culture and the Continental tradition in legal philosophy. This book addresses this issue by offering an introductory study on the many possibilities that logical analysis offers the study of legal systems. The volume is divided into two sections: the first covers the basic aspects of classical and deontic logic and its connections, advancing an (...) explanation of the most important topics of the discipline by comparing different systems of deontic logic and exploring some of the most important paradoxes in its domain. The second section deals with the role of logic in the analysis of legal systems by discussing in what sense deontic logic and the logic of norm-propositions are useful tools for a proper understanding of the systematic structure of law. (shrink)

“But surely if it's not irrational, it can’t be OCD!” my friend exclaimed, when I told them about the paper Carolina Flores and Brent Kious provided their excellent comments for. In all fairness, my friend is not working in philosophy, or psychiatry, or in psychology. Still, I take their sentiment to be expressive of a widely held view: if you have a certain mental illness, then you must be irrational. Conversely, rationality guarantees mental health; the sane life is the rational (...) life. -/- In my paper, I attempted to complicate this picture. My main line of thought was that if the sane life is the rational life, we do not have a good conception of rationality yet. For, our best theories of rationality fail to capture what is going wrong in some cases of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Addressing the criticisms raised by my commentators will allow me to clear up some misunderstandings and sketch avenues for further work. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer an account of affective experiences within Predictive Processing, a novel framework that considers the brain to be a dynamical, hierarchical, Bayesian hypothesis-testing mechanism. We begin by outlining a set of common features of affective experiences that a PP-theory should aim to explain: feelings are conscious, they have valence, they motivate behaviour, and they are intentional states with particular and formal objects. We then review existing theories of affective experiences within Predictive Processing and delineate two families (...) of theories: Interoceptive Inference Theories and Error Dynamics Theories. We highlight the strengths and shortcomings of each family of theories and develop a synthesis: the Affective Inference Theory. Affective Inference Theory claims that valence corresponds to the expected rate of prediction error reduction. In turn, the particular object of a feeling is the object predicted to be the most likely cause of expected changes in prediction error rate, and the formal object of a feeling is a predictive model of the expected changes in prediction error rate caused by a given particular object. Finally, our theory shows how affective experiences bias action selection, directing the organism towards allostasis and towards optimal levels of uncertainty in order to minimise prediction error over time. (shrink)