This article aims to explore the philosophical approach to faith after deconstruction as manifested in the work of Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-Luc Nancy. By taking the saturated phenomenon as its focus, the analysis seeks to demonstrate that whilst Marion’s thinking proves to be an innovative re-imagining of the possibilities of phenomenology, its problematic recourse to a supplementary hermeneutic means that saturation can never be adequately applied to faith without simultaneously compromising the excessive intuition upon which it relies. The article then (...) explores whether Nancy’s suggestion that saturation be re-framed as faith can offer a viable alternative approach. Whilst the post-phenomenological modality within which Nancy operates means it may be problematic to retain the term ‘saturation’ in the exact sense Marion gives it, it is argued that Nancy’s version of saturated faith allows us to approach the binary divide between philosophy and theology from a different direction, resulting in a vision of faith that cuts across theism and atheism, destabilising them from within. Although Nancy’s thought in this area certainly does nothing to respond to persistent questions surrounding the place of institutionalized religion within secular modernity, it nevertheless serves as a powerful tool for thinking the possibilities of faith in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

In this article I explore how a philosophical conception of love may be used to draw debate on the death of God beyond the binary opposition between theology and philosophy through a comparative study of the work of Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-Luc Nancy. Although Marion’s reading of love—in both its theological and phenomenological guises—proposes an innovative phrasing of a non-metaphysical notion of divinity, I argue that it is ultimately unable to maintain its coherence in nominal discourse due to Marion’s insistence (...) on keeping love and being separate. In contrast, through his unique thinking on ontology, Nancy’s philosophy allows us to reposition love at the heart of being, from whence it may serve as a means of disrupting the very principle governing the atheist and theist world-views. Far from dismantling Marion’s core proposition, I conclude that the two thinkers may in fact be more closely aligned than previous scholarship has acknowledged, coming together in the need to affirm an experience of the impossible that takes place in the present rather than in any eschatological fulfillment to come. At this intersection between two nominally very different thinkers, love forms an ontological limit-point for thought that poses a challenge to both theology and philosophy alike as they continue to grapple with the question of religion in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the presence of Spinoza within Jean-Luc Nancy’s deconstruction of Christianity project. Although the debt Nancy owes to other philosophers such as Derrida and Heidegger has been recognized, less well known is his reliance on a Spinozist frame of reference throughout his writings on Christianity. Analyzing Nancy’s reading of key moments within the deconstruction of Christianity—the doctrines of creation ex nihilo and the incarnation—I explore how the coupling of transcendence and immanence in a Heideggerian ontological mode (...) can be enlightened by Spinoza’s philosophy. What takes shape is a profoundly embodied and affective relationality that I argue is the central resource Nancy wishes to expose at the heart of both Christianity and the secular West. (shrink)

When read alongside the great command of Deuteronomy, ‘love the Lord your God with all your heart, mind, and strength,’ the Judeo-Christian directive to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’ is perhaps one of the most theologically and ethically charged phrases in the Bible. In these two mutually reliant commandments lies a meeting point between the divine and the human that has important implications for our understanding of the nexus between theological conceptions of love and philosophical engagement with worldly existence. This (...) point of intersection is explored in a particularly unique way in the thinking of Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Nancy. In this article, I conduct the first sustained comparative analysis of their respective philosophies, using an exploration of the role of love and affectivity in their work to better understand the philosophical opportunity represented by the commandment to love God and neighbour. (shrink)

This article seeks to explore the implications of Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading of the subject for educational philosophy by connecting his re-interpretation of Descartes to his later thinking on what he names the ontological singular plural. Nancy’s re-imagining of the Cogito coalesces around the figure of the mouth through which the subject enunciates itself within the world. Reading this extension of the ego through the mouth as an enunciation of ontological singular plurality exposes a speaking subject that communicates via a sharing (...) of its own being with other singular subjects. The article concludes that Nancy’s singular plural holds potential for affirming a substance-less subjectivity that can nevertheless serve as a locus of meaning in the classroom. (shrink)

The opposition between learning as a process of self-cultivation and learning as a form of vocational training for the workplace is becoming ever more deeply entrenched in the twenty-first-century university. In language education in particular, the distinction between these two competing aims influences the way in which educators approach curriculum design and inevitably shapes the attitudes learners bring to the classroom. In this article, we contest what we see as the overly simplistic opposition between Bildung and Ausbildung by deploying a (...) conception of play that suspends the pragmatic demands of everyday existence. We argue that when learning activities are envisaged as a form of free-flowing, playful exploration, skills-based language training can be understood as an experience of Bildung in which the language learner creatively renegotiates their own identity through an encounter with both their own values and those of the target culture. (shrink)

Although cognitive science started in the 1970s as a multidisciplinary field with the goal of becoming an interdisciplinary one over time, it is now dominated by cognitive psychology. The question becomes whether this matters, and if it does, what should cognitive scientists do about it? I propose that the multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity of cognitive science does matter because it leads to potential generation of new ideas, models, and methods. I offer a few recommendations for reforming cognitive science based, in part, (...) on the recent 41st annual meeting of the Cognitive Science Society that sought to reopen cognitive science to minority disciplines comprising cognitive science. (shrink)

This chapter introduces values-based practice as a resource for working with individually diverse values in health and social care, and describes its origins in an on-going development through the resources of philosophy. The chapter is in two main sections. Section I, Values-Based Practice, builds on two brief interactive exercises to introduce and explain the key features of values-based practice. As a relatively recent addition to the range of resources for working with values in health and social care, values-based practice is (...) distinctive in focussing on the diversity of values comprising individual lived experience. Like evidence-based practice, values-based practice is a process-driven rather than an outcome-driven methodology. That is to say, rather than offering prescribed answers, both approaches offer processes that support decision-makers in coming to answers for themselves based on the particular circumstances presented by the situation in question. Although entirely complementary, the processes involved are of course different. Where evidence-based practice relies on meta-analyses of the results of high-quality clinical trials to inform a consensual model of decision-making, values-based practice builds on learnable clinical skills and other process elements to inform a dissensual model of decision-making rather than seeking to overcome value-conflicts in reaching consensus. Working within a premise of mutual respect for differences of values, and guided by three key principles linking values and evidence, values-based practice, as described in the chapter, supports dissensual decision-making, balanced according to the circumstances presented by the decision in question, within frameworks of locally-set frameworks of shared values. Section II, The Theory-Practice Dynamic, then outlines the theory-practice dynamic on which values-based practice is based. The origins of values-based practice in mid-twentieth century ordinary language philosophy of the Oxford School are outlined. As the chapter illustrates, although a limited area of analytic philosophy, many aspects of values-based practice are informed by ordinary language philosophy, ranging from its premise, through the training exercises and other process elements described in Section I, to its role in hybrid empirical studies supporting its model of service delivery. The development of values-based practice, furthermore, as section II goes on to describe, is ongoing, with key initiatives drawing not only on both analytic and Continental traditions of European philosophy, but also on non-European philosophies such as those of Africa and the Caribbean. (shrink)

In “A Tension in the Strong Program: The Relation between the Rational and the Social”, Shahram Shahryari (2021) advances the following thesis: In his Strong Program in the sociology of science, David Bloor blames traditional philosophy of science for adopting a dualist strategy in explaining scientific developments, as it employs rational explanation for successful science and social explanation for flawed science. Instead, according to Bloor, all scientific developments should be explained monistically, i.e. in terms of social causes. This is also (...) referred to as the Symmetry Principle, and it is a key tenet in the Strong Program. The author detects a tension here, as Bloor apparently asserts that traditional philosophy of science deploys two kinds of explanation, and simultaneously insists that there is only one kind, i.e. social explanation. (shrink)

. With an overall objective of establishing association between air pollutants and incidence of respiratory diseases, the environmental professionals and medical practitioners have made significant contribution, using statistical mechanics in modelling epidemiological data, population characteristics, and pollution parameters. Broadly speaking, the studies have shown that the increase in vehicular traffic has been one of the causes of respiratory diseases. However, the WHO Centre for Environment and Health, Europe in its 2005 document states: “There is little evidence for a causal relationship (...) between asthma prevalence/incidence and air pollution in general, though the evidence is suggestive of a causal association between the prevalence/incidence of asthma symptoms and living in close proximity to traffic”. Decision making process in a real world is invariably based on perceptions which are expressed in words or may be in numeric terms and not in probability terms. In the paper, we made an attempt to model the perceptions of experienced pulmonologists in arriving at their combined degree of belief/plausibility/ignorance for all the possible combinations of identified respiratory diseases, using evidence theory and fuzzy relational calculus without collecting sizeable parametric data accumulated over a period of years. Tightening pollution norms by the regulatory authorities is an overall objective of the global efforts on greenhouse gases reduction in general, and air pollution mitigation in particular. The concept of solar battery operated electric vehicles for road transport is advocated, initially for two/three wheelers, and extending it to four wheelers, especially in the developing countries. (shrink)

Is corporate giving a matter of sporadic and altruistic generosity? Or should it be seen more as “a product to be marketed to the public”? The author is Lecturer in International Business in the Department of Commerce of the University of Birmingham, Ashley Building, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT.

The few abbreviations employed in the body of the article are explained in the bibliography.

_Traces the roots of logos in different cultural milieux._.

A prominent approach to scientific explanation and modeling claims that for a model to provide an explanation it must accurately represent at least some of the actual causes in the event's causal history. In this paper, I argue that many optimality explanations present a serious challenge to this causal approach. I contend that many optimality models provide highly idealized equilibrium explanations that do not accurately represent the causes of their target system. Furthermore, in many contexts, it is in virtue of (...) their independence of causes that optimality models are able to provide a better explanation than competing causal models. Consequently, our account of explanation and modeling must expand beyond the causal approach. (shrink)

In the energy–momentum density expressions for a relativistic perfect fluid with a bulk motion, one comes across a couple of pressure-dependent terms, which though well known, are to an extent, lacking in their conceptual basis and the ensuing physical interpretation. In the expression for the energy density, the rest mass density along with the kinetic energy density of the fluid constituents due to their random motion, which contributes to the pressure as well, are already included. However, in a fluid with (...) a bulk motion, there are, in addition, a couple of explicit, pressure-dependent terms in the energy–momentum density, whose presence to an extent, is shrouded in mystery, especially from a physical perspective. We show here that one such pressure-dependent term appearing in the energy density, represents the work done by the fluid pressure against the Lorentz contraction during transition from the rest frame of the fluid to another frame in which the fluid has a bulk motion. This applies equally to the electromagnetic energy density of electrically charged systems in motion and explains in a natural manner an apparently paradoxical result that the field energy of a charged capacitor system decreases with an increase in the system velocity. The momentum density includes another pressure-dependent term, that represents an energy flow across the system, due to the opposite signs of work being done by pressure on two opposite sides of the moving fluid. From Maxwell’s stress tensor we demonstrate that in the expression for electromagnetic momentum of an electric charged particle, it is the presence of a similar pressure term, arising from electrical self-repulsion forces in the charged sphere, that yields a natural solution for the notorious, more than a century old but thought by many as still unresolved, 4/3 problem in the electromagnetic mass. (shrink)

With the current problems surrounding the unethical behaviour of companies and the growth in public awareness of environmental issues, it was inevitable that governments would introduce legislation covering sensible company obligations. This paper examines the issues surrounding legislation in corporate social responsibility and attempts to relate them to stakeholder management. In the long run, companies that take an active interest in such legislation will be in a particularly strong position to develop strong market positioning strategies.

We investigate in detail the electromagnetic fields of a uniformly accelerated charge, in order to ascertain whether such a charge does ‘emit’ radiation, especially in view of the Poynting flow computed at large distances and taken as an evidence of radiation emitted by the charge. In this context, certain important aspects of the fields need to be taken into account. First and foremost is the fact that in the case of a uniformly accelerated charge, one cannot ignore the velocity fields. (...) This then leads to other equally vital points. The net field energy turns out to be exactly the same as that of a non-accelerated charge having a uniform velocity equal to the instantaneous velocity of the uniformly accelerated charge. Further, the Poynting vector, seen with respect to the ’present’ location of the uniformly accelerated charge, during the deceleration phase, possesses everywhere a radial component pointing inward toward the charge, becoming nil when the charge becomes momentarily stationary, and during the acceleration phase, points away from the charge position. Last, but not least, when the leading spherical front of the relativistically beamed Poynting flux, advances forward at a large time t to a far-off distance \, the charge too is not lagging far behind. In fact, these relativistically beamed fields, increasingly resemble fields of a charge moving in an inertial frame with a uniform velocity \, with a convective flow of fields in that frame along with the movement of the charge. There is no other Poynting flow in the far-zones that could be termed as radiation emitted by the charge which, in turn, is fully consistent with the absence of radiation reaction and is also fully conversant with the strong principle of equivalence. (shrink)

An important function in all scholarly and academic activities is the participation in the peer review system. One aspect of this peer review evaluation is service on committees judging candidates for important awards, prizes and fellowships. Some reflective observations on this process are made in which a number of factors determining the final choice are identified. It is pointed out that the decisions of such committees are based not only on relevant and objective criteria but are also influenced by a (...) number of irrelevant criteria; caution must be exercised to minimize the effect of the latter factors in order to maintain the highest ethical standards in the selection process. The ranking practices of awards committees, national academies and learned societies are briefly reviewed by pointing out some ethical pitfalls, anecdotal incidents, and the ways to avoid the tarnishing of the selection process. (shrink)

In this paper, I first argue against various attempts to justify idealizations in scientific models that explain by showing that they are harmless and isolable distortions of irrelevant features. In response, I propose a view in which idealized models are characterized as providing holistically distorted representations of their target system. I then suggest an alternative way that idealized modeling can be justified by appealing to universality.

Some patients who have been diagnosed as “dead by neurologic criteria” continue to exhibit certain brain functions, most commonly, neuroendocrine functions. This preservation of neurologic function after the diagnosis of “brain death” or “brainstem death” is an ongoing source of controversy and concern in the medical, bioethics, and legal literatures. Most obviously, if some brain function persists, then it is not the case that all functions of the entire brain have ceased and hence, declaring such a patient to be “dead” (...) would be a false positive, in any nation with so-called “whole brain death” laws. Furthermore, and perhaps more concerning, the preservation of any brain function necessarily entails the preservation of some amount of brain perfusion, thereby raising the concern as to whether additional areas of neural tissue may remain viable, including areas in the brainstem. These and other considerations cast significant doubt on the reliability of diagnosing either “brain death” or “brainstem death.”. (shrink)

Brain dead organ donors are the principal source of transplantable organs. However, it is controversial whether brain death is the same as biological death. Therefore, it is unclear whether organ removal in brain death is consistent with the ‘dead donor rule’, which states that organ removal must not cause death. Our aim was to evaluate the public9s opinion about organ removal if explicitly described as causing the death of a donor in irreversible apneic coma. We conducted a cross-sectional internet survey (...) of the American public (n=1096). Questionnaire domains included opinions about a hypothetical scenario of organ removal described as causing the death of a patient in irreversible coma, and items measuring willingness to donate organs after death. Some 71% of the sample agreed that it should be legal for patients to donate organs in the scenario described and 67% agreed that they would want to donate organs in a similar situation. Of the 85% of the sample who agreed that they were willing to donate organs after death, 76% agreed that they would donate in the scenario of irreversible coma with organ removal causing death. There appears to be public support for organ donation in a scenario explicitly described as violating the dead donor rule. Further, most but not all people who would agree to donate when organ removal is described as occurring after death would also agree to donate when organ removal is described as causing death in irreversible coma. (shrink)

Ashok Aklujkar, Indian Sanskritist and Indologist; contributed articles.

The meanings in which the word "word" can be taken, the interpretations that the relevant meanings would necessitate of the "word-equals-world" thesis, and the extent to which Bhartṛhari can be said to be aware of or receptive to these interpretations are considered. The observation that more than one interpretation would have been acceptable to Bhartṛhari naturally leads to a discussion of his notion of truth, his perspectivism, and his understanding of the nature of philosophizing as an activity in which language (...) plays a basic role and epistemology and ontology are interdependent. The difference of Bhartṛhari's thinking from that of the Vedāntins of Śaṅkara's tradition is identified, and a brief comment on the history of vivarta and pariṇāma as philosophical terms is offered. (shrink)

Many accounts of scientific modelling assume that models can be decomposed into the contributions made by their accurate and inaccurate parts. These accounts then argue that the inaccurate parts of the model can be justified by distorting only what is irrelevant. In this paper, I argue that this decompositional strategy requires three assumptions that are not typically met by our best scientific models. In response, I propose an alternative view in which idealized models are characterized as holistically distorted representations that (...) are justified by allowing for the application of various modelling techniques. (shrink)

An original argument about how scientific models often times distort reality rather than accurately reflect it. And it's this distortion that often gives scientific models their epistemic power.