Catholic Philosophy has long acknowledged the primary place of Metaphysics, and a primary question of metaphysicians is “what is Metaphysics about?” This paper engages this primary metaphysical question through the lens of Scholastic dispute over the adequate subject matter of Metaphysics. Chrysostom Iavelli defended the position that the subject of Metaphysics is real being common to God and creatures against the position of his predecessor Dominic Flandrensis who had argued that it is categorical being to the exclusion of uncreated being. (...) I find Flandrensis’s position represented in the writings of notable contemporary Thomists, but not Iavelli’s. This paper, offers a sixteenth-century Thomist’s position on the subject matter of Metaphysics as a challenge to current Thomist consensus. It attempts to prompt a re-investigation of the reasons behind the current consensus both as a philosophical position and as an interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

This article considers the attempt by a prominent fifteenth-century follower of Thomas Aquinas, Dominic of Flanders, to address John Duns Scotus’ most famous argument for the univocity of being. According to Scotus, the intellect must have a concept of being that is univocal to substantial and accidental being, and to finite and infinite being, on the grounds that an intellect cannot be both certain and doubtful through the same concept, but an intellect can be certain that something is a being (...) while doubting whether it is a substance or accident, finite or infinite. The article shows how Flandrensis’ reply in defence of analogy of being hinges on a more fundamental disagreement with Scotus over the division of the logically one. It also shows how Flandrensis’ answer to this question commits him to a position on the unity of the concept of being that lies between the positions of Scotus and of Flandrensis’ earlier Thomistic sources. (shrink)

Since the first decade of the 14th Century, Thomas Aquinas’s disciples have struggled to explain and defend his doctrine of analogy. Analogy after Aquinas: Logical Problems, Thomistic Answers relates a history of prominent Medieval and Renaissance Thomists’ efforts to solve three distinct but interrelated problems arising from their reading both of Aquinas’s own texts on analogy, and from John Duns Scotus’s arguments against analogy and in favor of univocity in Metaphysics and Natural Theology. The first of these three problems concerns (...) Aquinas’s at least apparently disparate statements on whether a name is said by analogy through a single concept or through diverse concepts. The second problem concerns the model of analogy suited for predicating names analogously across the categories of being or about God and creatures. Is “being” said analogously about God and creatures, or substance and accidents, on the model of how “healthy” is said of medicine and an animal, or on the model of how “principle” is said of a point and a line? The third problem comes from outside challenges to Aquinas’s thought, in particular Scotus’ claims that univocal names alone can mediate valid demonstrations, and any demonstration that failed to use its mediating terms univocally would fail by the fallacy of equivocation. Analogy after Aquinas makes a unique contribution to the study of philosophical theology in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas by showing the historical and philosophical connection between these three problems, as well as the variety of solutions proposed by leading representatives of this tradition. Thomists considered in the book include: Hervaeus Natalis (1250-1323), Thomas Sutton (1250-1315), John Capreolus (1380-1444), Dominic of Flanders (1425-1479), Paul Soncinas (d. 1494), Thomas dio vio Cajetan (1469-1534), Francis Silvestri of Ferrara (1474-1528), and Chrysostom Javelli (1470-1538). (shrink)

Fifty-plus years ago, Ralph McInerny’s The Logic of Analogy characterized Francis Silvestri of Ferrara’s doctrine of analogy as a confusing hybrid of the thought of Thomas Aquinas and of Thomas Cajetan. Since then, scholarship on fifteenth-century Thomism has flourished, thanks especially to the efforts of Ashworth, Bonino, Hochschild, Riva, and Tavuzzi. In light of these decades of scholarship, in this article I reconsider Francis Silvestri’s doctrine of analogy. I attempt to show the merits of his contribution to the Thomist tradition’s (...) ongoing reflection on analogy, especially the dispute among Thomists and with Scotists over abstracting an analogous concept, the unity of the concept used analogously, and the use of analogy in demonstration. I argue that Francis’s hybrid succeeds in finding a place for analogy of attribution in names said analogously of God and creatures while still meeting Cajetan’s standards for answering Scotist objections to demonstration through analogous terms. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Aristotle identifies four modes of unity: numerical, specific, generic, and proportional or analogous. Recent scholarship has renewed the Renaissance and early Modern Thomist critique that John Duns Scotus's (d. 1308) doctrine of the univocity of being is based on a failure to appreciate proportional unity. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the copious literature on Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being by presenting and offering an analysis of the texts where Scotus addresses the topic of proportional or (...) analogous unity. The paper argues that Scotus's early and mature works consistently reject the notion that an analogous or proportional unity can serve as the foundation for greater than equivocal unity between concepts, and that Scotus's developed position represents an alternative to Aristotle's division of unity into the modes of numerical, specific, generic, and analogous. Nonetheless, Scotus's early remarks on an analogous unity that is mind-independent provide both an internal justification for the dispute that ensues between Thomists and Scotists over whether a single concept can signify analogously—a dispute that features such distinguished participants as Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534) and Bartolomaeus Mastrius (1602–73)—and an avenue for further investigation into the thought of the Subtle Doctor. (shrink)

Thomas de Vio Cajetan produced a highly influential Thomistic treatise on analogy entitled De nominum analogia. The merits of this work have been contested since the sixteenth century. Notable twentieth-century Thomists who adopted many of the teachings of De nominum analogia include Jacques Maritain and Yves Simon. Joshua Hochschild’s The Semantics of Analogy highlighted the significance of chapter ten, where Cajetan applies his theory to resolve the problem of demonstrations that use analogous terms, with the explicit purpose of addressing a (...) serious challenge from Scotists regarding the use of analogy in metaphysics. This paper examines the criticism of Cajetan’s way of using analogous terms in demonstrations by the seventeenth-century Franciscan Scotist Bartolomeo Mastri. It shows how the Thomist differs from the Scotist and analyzes these rival positions. (shrink)

At the beginning of his influential De Nominum Analogia, Thomas de Vio Cajetan mentions three mistaken positions on analogy. He does not attach names to these positions, but each one was held by distinguished Thomists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Furthermore, their proponents were responding to the same set of challenges from John Duns Scotus that set the agenda for the De Nominum Analogia. In this paper, I would like to do something that Cajetan did not do, and that (...) is, directly consider the merits of the first position in his list of mistaken accounts of analogy; namely, the position that analogy is constituted by disjunction. More specifically, this paper investigates the polemical use for which Hervaeus Natalis deployed analogy of disjunction; the reply of John Duns Scotus; and the implications of this back and forth for understanding the Thomist-Scotist dispute over the concept of being. (shrink)

La logique cartésienne est introuvable parce qu’on a cherché une logique qui n’existe pas, c’est-à-dire une logique classique sur le modèle des manuels de la tradition réformée. La puissance transgressive de Descartes, même dans ce domaine, a été radicale : il a bafoué l’Arbre de Porphyre, vidé de sens la théorie des catégories, montré l’inutilité du syllogisme pour la recherche scientifique. Sans efficacité, à son avis, fut le renouveau d’une logique fondée sur des normes préconstituées. Il se « limite » (...) pourtant à suggérer, sur le modèle des procédés mathématiques, une attitude de pensée centrée sur l’intuitus et dont les relations sont garanties par les notions de « série » et de respectus. La transgression cartésienne a été si bouleversante que « Descartes logicien » devient un auteur maudit et l’attitude qu’il aurait voulu inspirer n’a connu aucune fortune, à telle enseigne que même la Logique de Port-Royal qu’on voudrait cartésienne consacre un grand espace à la syllogistique.Undiscoverable is the Cartesian logic, because scholars looked for a logic that does not exist, i.e. a classical logic after the model of traditional, more or less reformed, manuals. Descartes’ transgressive power was radical even in this domain : he scorned Phorphyrius Tree, voided the theory of categories of all meaning, showed the uselessness of syllogism for scientific research. Just as totally ineffective was, in his view, the renewal of a logic founded on preconstituted norms. He therefore « limits » himself to suggest, after the model of mathematical procedures, an attitude of thought centered on intuitus and whose relationships are guaranteed by the notions of « series » and respectus. The Cartesian transgression turned out to be so upsetting that « Descartes the logician » became a wicked author and the attitude he had meant to inspire had no fortune whatsoever, to such a point that even the Logic of Port-Royal – purportedly Cartesian – leaves much room to syllogistics. (shrink)

Cet article retrace la carrière des publications d’Ettore Majorana en analysant les citations dont elles ont fait l’objet depuis le début des années 1930. Cette approche met en évidence la redécouverte, au milieu des années 1960, de l’article de 1937 portant sur les particules de spin quelconque et permet d’identifier les personnes à l’origine du travail de promotion de l‘œuvre de Majorana, dont la visibilité s’est accrue depuis le milieu des années 1970. L’étude des co-citations fait voir le réseau conceptuel (...) dans lequel les travaux de Majorana s’insèrent. (shrink)

« Il valore delle leggi statistiche nella fisica e nelle scienze sociali » est le seul article d'Ettore Majorana qui ne soit pas de science mais sur la science. Il critique le déterminisme classique au nom du caractère intrinsèquement probabilitaire des lois en mécanique quantique et en sciences sociales entre lesquelles il établit une analogie formelle. Nous analysons son argumentation sur les plans métaphysique, physique et sociologique, avant d’évaluer la pertinence de cette épistémologie transversale.

Al giorno d’oggi, non esiste ancora una psicologia quantistica univoca e riconosciuta da un punto di vista accademico. Alcune espressioni virtuose hanno poca voce e visibilità. L’ambito di studi è, infatti, nuovo ed è spesso visto con sospetto, come se si trattasse di una cosa poco seria o come se nascondesse trame oscurantiste e metafisiche, se non addirittura esoteriche e magiche. Per alcuni di questi autori, anzi, una simile psicologia non sarebbe scientifica ma solo commerciale. Sicuramente, simili impressioni sono riduttive (...) e ingenerose. Soprattutto, esse non sono rigorose e lasciano il tempo che trovano. Tali impressioni paiono, infatti, più il prodotto di una certa chiusura dogmatica, o paradigmatica, senza una vera e piena conoscenza delle tesi proposte. Esse difettano dal punto d vista della logica e dell’argomentazione. Sostenere, ad esempio, che la psicologia quantistica sia non scientifica è un errore banale, frutto di ignoranza, perché tale psicologia fonda sulla scienza quantistica. Sostenere, inoltre, che la psicologia quantistica sia magica o esoterica è, invece, un errore capzioso e tendenzioso. Essa è, invece, olistica, ovvero onnicomprensiva ed eclettica. Probabilmente, per chi è abituato a lavorare con le minuzie, ciò può sembrare magico. D’altra parte, però, bisogna pure ammettere che molti esponenti della psicologia quantistica di oggi sono, effettivamente, poco rigorosi. Essi sembrano, anzi, intenzionati ad alimentare la loro immagine esoterica e le finalità commerciali non sono, in questo caso, da escludere. Questi contributi non devono, però, essere considerati come vera espressione di una psicologia e una psicoterapia quantistiche, come qui intese. Essi, piuttosto, possono essere definiti come espressioni di una certa New Age quantistica. Questo è, certamente, un uso diverso del paradigma quantistico, di cui non terremo conto. In fondo, anche la scienza deve, oggi, ben distinguersi dai tentativi di sostituirla, ad esempio, alla religione, quale unica fonte di verità. In ogni caso, questa intricata situazione, dove chi denigra s’oppone a chi cavalca questa stessa denigrazione, fomenta l’incomprensione e, soprattutto, impedisce alla psicologia quantistica d’imporsi con tutta la sua forza esplicativa e scientifica. L’intento del presente lavoro è quello di spezzare l’attuale circolo vizioso in merito al paradigma quantistico e alle sue applicazioni in psicologia. In questo modo, sarà possibile tacitare i denigratori poco sapienti, magari aprendo le loro prospettive, e sarà, inoltre, possibile smentire e smascherare i falsi possessori di un sapere arcano ed esoterico, magari avviandoli verso prospettive più realistiche e praticabili. Al fine di argomentare con rigore le proprie tesi, credo sia sempre essenziale muoversi nel rispetto di certi criteri condivisi e condivisibili. Innanzitutto, credo sia necessario affrontare le questioni con logica e razionalità. La logica si pone oltre le sue possibili espressioni, perché coincide con il tentativo di dare una spiegazione razionale ai fenomeni osservati. In tal senso, la logica diventa uno stile, il quale può essere assunto per qualsiasi ambito di studio. Anche la psicologia quantistica può, quindi, essere sottoposta a una lettura logica, per scoprire quanto questa sia diversa dalla lettura logica della psicologia ordinaria. Come, però, questa psicologia ordinaria, oggi predominante, fonda sulla sua logica, allo stesso modo anche la psicologia quantistica, qui presentata, fonda sulla sua logica. Ne risultano, inevitabilmente, due psicologie diverse ma, a loro modo, logiche e, quindi, oggetto della ragione. Inoltre, credo sia altrettanto necessario affrontare le questioni con scienza e metodo. In tal senso, il riferimento a una certa letteratura diviene indispensabile e basilare. Questa letteratura, nel caso della psicologia quantistica, fa riferimento a scienziati di diverse discipline che hanno contribuito e contribuiscono alla definizione dei suoi principi. Tra questi figurano premi nobel nel campo delle scienze fisiche, innovatori nel campo delle scienze psicologiche e pensatori dallo spessore indiscusso. Essendo, inoltre, il campo di studi qui definito quello della psicologia quantistica applicata alla psicoterapia cognitiva, credo che l’atteggiamento clinico debba, infine, direzionare gli altri precedenti. In questo caso, infatti, ogni questione, elaborazione, valutazione o argomentazione deve sempre essere ricondotta alla sua applicabilità pratica, nel merito dell’intervento clinico sulla persona. Nel presente testo, questa necessità diventa un parametro importante di conferma delle tesi esposte. Da un punto di vista clinico, ciò che conta di più è l’efficacia di un certo intervento. La sua verifica sperimentale può essere solo susseguente e non necessaria. L’importante, cioè, è che quanto si fa sia utile per la persona e sia in grado di apportare benessere, consapevolezza e auto-determinazione. In tal senso, la prima verifica della psicologia quantistica applicata alla psicoterapia cognitiva sta proprio nell’evidenza pratica e clinica. (shrink)

Come migliore introduzione ad un manuale di logica deduttiva pensato per le scienze psicologiche, crediamo sia necessario definire i seguenti termini: logica, logica deduttiva e logica come arte. Crediamo, infatti, che la chiara conoscenza di tali concetti predisponga e prepari allo studio di una materia complessa come la logica e allo studio delle relazioni, forse ancor più complesse, tra logica e psicologia. Possiamo dare della logica almeno due definizioni, una più ampia ed una più ristretta. Secondo un’accezione estesa, possiamo allora (...) definire la logica come lo studio dei processi inferenziali del ragionamento umano. La logica studia, cioè, la struttura e le funzioni della ragione nel momento in cui essa produce giudizi o argomentazioni sul mondo. Invece, secondo un’accezione ristretta del termine, possiamo definire la logica come lo studio della validità dei ragionamenti umani, così come essi sono espressi linguisticamente. La logica studia, cioè, le forme corrette della ragione distinguendole dalle forme scorrette, o fallaci. La logica, infine, deve essere distinta da tutte le scienze che, come la psicologia, possono condivide- re il medesimo oggetto di studio, il ragionamento umano. Esiste, infatti, una parte cospicua della psicologia che studia proprio il ragionamento. Mentre, però, la psicologia considera quest’ultimo nella sua complessità psichica e mentale, la logica considera, invece, solo i suoi prodotti finali e formali, senza occuparsi dei suoi contenuti. La logica deduttiva è, invece, una branca della logica focalizzata sullo studio delle inferenze certe che, a partire da premesse vere e note, conducono a conclusioni, prima ignote, che sono altrettanto vere. Il senso della deduzione è, infatti, proprio il movimento che la ragione umana svolge quando cerca conferma alle proprie conoscenze acquisite e alle proprie generalizzazioni. La deduzione procede, cioè, dal generale, espresso nelle premesse, al particolare, espresso invece nella conclusione. In senso ri- stretto, perciò, la logica deduttiva studia la validità di tali forme di ragionamento e argomentazione. Deduzione e logica deduttiva devono, infine, essere distinte da induzione e logica induttiva, da un lato, e da abduzione e logica abduttiva, d’altro lato. L’induzione, infatti, procede dal particolare al generale, in senso contrario rispetto alla deduzione, da premesse parziali e non certe a conclusioni sempre incerte ma generali. L’abduzione, invece, è una modalità di ragionamento del tutto ipotetica, lontana dalle certezze conoscitive della deduzione o dalle certezze agognate dall’induzione. Concludiamo con il concetto di logica come arte. L’arte è, qui, da intendersi come sublime saper fare e produrre, estetica che diviene pragmatica. L’arte è, però, anche uno straordinario strumento di massima espressività estetica al servizio dell’artista che ne fa uso per rappresentare il mondo, la vita e se stessi. La logica come arte è, allora, da intender- si come sublime ragionare, pensiero forte che diviene pratica. La logica come arte è, inoltre, un potente strumento di massima espressività razionale al servizio dello scienziato o dello studioso che ne fa uso per spiegare come funzionano il mondo, la vita e se stessi. In questo manuale, useremo pertanto la logica come strumento di massima espressività razionale al servizio dello psicologo, che è lo scienziato e studioso della psiche. La logica come scienza, invece, è concentrata su se stessa, sulle proprie conoscenze esclusive, tutte legate al tema della dimostrazione, e sui propri progressi, così incurante di ogni altra scienza, se non collateralmente. La logica come arte deriva dalla logica come scienza ma se ne distacca nelle finalità ultime, privilegiando e potenziando le sue qualità applicative e strumentali. (shrink)

La storia della follia assume i tratti di uno straordinario racconto, laddove trame e personaggi s’intrecciano in uno svolgimento comune e condiviso. Questa storia, però, perturba gli animi, poiché essa alterna disumane crudeltà a rivoluzionarie pre- se di consapevolezza. In certi periodi e contesti storici, infatti, il folle diviene beffarda maschera del male, da allontanare, internare o, addirittura, perseguitare. Su di lui s’abbatte la crudeltà umana, dietro il velo menzognero di un’improbabile cura. La follia diviene malattia, demone, male assoluto da (...) estirpare a ogni costo, finanche sacrificando alcune sue vittime. In tal senso, la storia della follia ricorda quella dello schiavismo, o quella delle deportazioni e dei genocidi. In altri periodi e contesti stori- ci, invece, il folle diviene emblema di lotta sociale e culturale, per l’affermazione del- la soggettività umana e del suo assoluto rispetto. Egli diviene, così, il simbolo della rinascita culturale e spirituale, con gesta simboliche, come la rottura delle catene nei manicomi, sino addirittura a mettere in dubbio, o negare, l’esistenza stessa della follia. In tal senso, la storia della follia ricorda quella delle rivoluzioni, o dei moti insurrezionali, o dei radicali cambiamenti del paradigma scientifico. Nel mezzo, infine, tra estremismi così netti, s’inserisce lo scorrere della storia stessa della follia, con modali- tà spesso più sfumate e altre meno. Questa storia assume multidimensionalità, come fosse l’insieme di tante storie parallele. C’è, infatti, una storia dei luoghi della follia: dai più indegni e disumani, come i lebbrosari convertiti, le navi dei folli e i manicomi, ai più accoglienti e sensibili, come le case morali e le comunità terapeutiche. C’è, inol- tre, una storia delle idee sulla follia: da quelle che la definiscono una malattia simile a una sostanza agente, come l’organicismo, a quelle che la definiscono, invece, una proprietà o condizione esistenziale dell’individuo, contingente e risolvibile, come il mentalismo; o da quelle che la definiscono una disarmonia spirituale e una forza avversa, come l’animismo, a quelle che la definiscono, invece, una compromissione di natura ambientale, come l’ambientalismo. C’è, infine, una storia dei trattamenti della follia: da quelli più bruti e ciechi, come la bara d’acqua e la lobotomia, a quelli più umani e terapici, come l’arte della consolazione e la buona relazione. (shrink)

Il s’agit d’affronter la « figure » d’Ettore Majorana et d’en proposer un premier « profil philosophique ». La question des « fictions » apparaît alors centrale chez Majorana. On établit ensuite la dimension surrationaliste et européenne de ses affinités électives avec Giovanni Gentile Junior. Les deux oeuvres sont restituées dans le cadre d’un mathématisme constructif et inductif (Gaston Bachelard, puis Robert Blanché) qui s’oppose au géométrisme classique (Emile Meyerson) et au pythagorisme spiritualiste (Arthur Eddington).

Les comédies à l’italienne des années 1958-1980 rejouent à leur façon les grands thèmes de la morale nietzschéenne, telle est l’hypothèse de cet article. À travers des oeuvres essentielles comme Le Fanfaron de Dino Risi, et La plus belle soirée de ma vie d’Ettore Scola, le fatalisme joyeux de ce courant cinématographique teste la méthode de l’inversion des valeurs, et engage une critique radicale du sacré et des morales de la dette. On ne lui reconnaîtra pas une portée nihiliste, mais (...) au contraire la reconnaissance des vertus de la finitude, affirmant l’amour modeste de l’existence terrestre, assumant son caractère tragique et sa puissance d’exister. Les personnages de la comédie italienne apparaissent ainsi comme des prototypes d’esprits libres, à la fois « minables » et surhumains, capables enfin de transmuter les valeurs. (shrink)

Il s’agit d’affronter la « figure » d’Ettore Majorana et d’en proposer un premier « profil philosophique ». La question des « fictions » apparaît alors centrale chez Majorana. On établit ensuite la dimension surrationaliste et européenne de ses affinités électives avec Giovanni Gentile Junior. Les deux oeuvres sont restituées dans le cadre d’un mathématisme constructif et inductif (Gaston Bachelard, puis Robert Blanché) qui s’oppose au géométrisme classique (Emile Meyerson) et au pythagorisme spiritualiste (Arthur Eddington).

Vers la moitié du XVIII-ème siècle la crise de la théodiocèe de Leibniz provoque le remplacement du Dieu-créateur par ľ homme-createur et depuis c’est l'homme qui sera coupable du mal existent dans le monde. A partir de ce moment-lá l'homme est oblige á se justifier perpetuellement. Il en reśulte l'evasion d l'homme dans le doméne dont il ne se sent pas responsable, par exemple: l'evasion dans la Nature-vierge, dans les voyages, dans la maladie, dans ľ'esthétique.

What becomes of our clearest theories of explanation, when faced with the unpalatable quantum phenomena that seem to undermine the direct conceptual connection between the fundamental material entities and the self-standing material objects of everyday parlance? The general explanatory theory advocates unification of explanatory concepts with everyday discourse, identification of essentially similar characteristics between direct experience and the hypothesised explanatory ontology, and a conceptualisation of phenomena in terms of objects enduring causally regulated change. On the other hand quantum theory feeds (...) antirealist suspicions about the worth of realist explanatory endeavour with examples of phenomena in which the structure of material separation and individuation based on spatial extension is insufficient for construction of deeper explanatory narratives. An example from history of science, that of Newton’s law-constitutive definition of objects in response to D escartes problem of bodies is used to suggest a possible strategy for explanations unifying the quantum and common-sense conceptual domains, provided the anti-realist challenge to such enterprise is read as questioning the epistemological justification of interpretation of experience in both cases.Što se događa s najjasnijim dostupnim teorijama objašnjenja kada se suoče s problematičnim kvantnim pojavama koje naizgled potkopavaju neposrednu konceptualnu poveznicu između fundamentalnih materijalnih entiteta i samoopstojnih materijalnih predmeta iz svakodnevnog govora? Opća teorija objašnjenja preporuča objedinjenje teoretskih eksplanatornih pojmova sa svakodnevnim govorom, određenje esencijalno sličnih karakteristika između neposrednog iskustva i hipotetske eksplanatorne ontologije te konceptualizaciju pojava kroz predmete koji istraju kroz uzročno regulirane promjene. S druge strane, kvantna teorija potkrjepljuje antirealistične sumnje o valjanosti eksplanatornog nastojanja realizma primjerima pojava u kojima je struktura materijalne razdvojenosti i individuacije temeljene na prostornoj protežnosti nedovoljna za izgradnju dubljih eksplanatornih narativa. Primjerom iz povijesti znanosti, Newtonovom definicijom predmeta temeljenom na zakonima kao odgovorom na Descartesov problem materijalnih tijela, daje se moguća strategija izgradnje objašnjenja koja objedinjuju kvantne i “zdravorazumske” konceptualne domene, ukoliko se antirealistična kritika te izgradnje u oba slučaja shvati kao propitivanje epistemološkog opravdanja tumačenja iskustva. (shrink)

Everything we do relies on causation. We eat and drink because this causes us to stay alive. Courts tell us who causes crimes, criminology tell us what causes people to commit them. D.H. Mellor shows us that to understand the world and our lives we must understand causation. _The Facts of Causation_, now available in paperback, is essential reading for students and for anyone interested in reading one of the ground-breaking theories in metaphysics. We cannot understand the world and our (...) place in it without understanding causation. Yet a complete account of the nature and implications of causation does not exist. D.H Mellor's new book is that account. (shrink)

Everything we do relies on causation. We eat and drink because this causes us to stay alive. Courts tell us who causes crimes, criminology tell us what causes people to commit them. D.H. Mellor shows us that to understand the world and our lives we must understand causation. _The Facts of Causation_, now available in paperback, is essential reading for students and for anyone interested in reading one of the ground-breaking theories in metaphysics. We cannot understand the world and our (...) place in it without understanding causation. Yet a complete account of the nature and implications of causation does not exist. D.H Mellor's new book is that account. (shrink)

'Why did the window break when it was hit by the stone? Because the window is brittle and the stone is hard; hardness and brittleness are powers, dispositional properties or dispositions.' Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. This book is a record of the debate on the nature of dispositions between three distinguished philosophers - D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place - who have been thinking about dispositions all their working lives. Their distinctive (...) accounts cover many of the issues surrounding dispositions such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation. Dispositions illuminates this central topic in analytic philosophy and at the same time highlights deeper concerns of metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concept and role of ‘institutional racism’ in contemporary discussions of race should be reconsidered. It starts by distinguishing between ‘intrinsic institutional racism’, which holds that institutions are racist in virtue of their constitutive features, and ‘extrinsic institutional racism’, which holds that institutions are racist in virtue of their negative effects. It accepts intrinsic institutional racism, but argues that a ‘disparate impact’ conception of extrinsic conception faces a number of objections, the most serious being that it (...) has no plausible account of what it is that makes extrinsically racist institutions racist. It also argues that claims about the explanatory indispensability of institutional racism are overstated (individual racism is at least as important), critiques structural approaches to racial inequality, and suggests that there is reason to doubt whether institutional reform can provide us with all that morality may require in the racial domain. (shrink)

Objective—To determine the prevalence of, and attitudes towards, observed and personal research misconduct among newly appointed medical consultants. Design—Questionnaire study.Setting—Mersey region, United Kingdom.Participants—Medical consultants appointed between Jan 1995 and Jan 2000 in seven different hospital trusts (from lists provided by each hospital's personnel department). Main outcome measures—Reported observed misconduct, reported past personal misconduct and reported possible future misconduct.Results—One hundred and ninety-four replies were received (a response rate of 63.6%); 55.7% of respondents had observed some form of research misconduct; 5.7% of (...) respondents admitted to past personal misconduct; 18% of respondents were either willing to commit or unsure about possible future research misconduct. Only 17% of the respondents reported having received any training in research ethics. Anaesthetists reported a lower incidence of observed research misconduct (33.3%) than the rest of the respondents (61.5%) (p<0.05). Conclusion—There is a higher prevalence of observed and possible future misconduct among newly appointed consultants in the UK than in the comparable study of biomedical trainees in California. Although there is a need for more extensive studies, this survey suggests that there is a real and potential problem of research misconduct in the UK. (shrink)

It was proposed that the data from Monte Carlo statistical investigations be subjected to analysis of variance methods rather than the conventional techniques of tabling, graphing, and inspecting the data. Two examples in which analysis of variance methods were applied to published Monte Carlo studies were presented. It was suggested that balanced factorial designs should be used whenever possible in Monte Carlo studies so that analysis of variance methods would be directly applicable. Finally, three advantages of analysis of variance methods (...) over conventional techniques were described and analysis of variance methods were contrasted with a possible alternative analytical method, multiple regression analysis. (shrink)

Purpose. The research is devoted to the analysis of the urgent problem of the information society: the overload of a person with information and, as a result, the impossibility of adequate formation and development of the personality; as well as the problem of "digitization" of human existence and the formation of a new reality of dataism. Theoretical basis. A lot of modern scientific works are devoted to the analysis of the information society, its problems and features. The information society is (...) a logical continuation of the scientific and technological revolution, which led to the rapid growth of scientific knowledge and the technology development. In the 20th century, technologies have touched the sphere of knowledge and information, as a result of which the formation and development of the information society, or "knowledge society", takes place. Information becomes the main resource in it, and, one way or another, a person’s life is inextricably connected with the information space. With the information society formation, the problem of information search and processing becomes one of the most urgent. It turns out that despite the abundance and availability of information, it is very difficult to determine its relevance. A lot of effort is spent on developing information retrieval algorithms. Another problem is related to the person’s inability to process large amounts of data. This situation begins to influence not only the education process and professional activity, but also the formation of a person’s personality. A person is "lost" in the information space and gradually loses his/her "I". Algorithms for data analysis come to the rescue, but gradually, instead of giving a person material for thought, they begin to make decisions on their own, and therefore, live life instead of a person. With the advent of Big Data processing algorithms, a new ideological paradigm appears – dataism, which predicts the merger of a person with the general data flow. Originality. The authors make assumptions that the dataistic future is "natural". A lot of works, including in the framework of philosophy, are focused on the problem of "dissolving" a person in the information space and finding ways to overcome it. But, in our opinion, this process is a completely logical continuation of human evolution. Conclusions. Existence of a person as a data flow is not a problem and a threat, but a new dimension of his/her being, and, therefore, requires a careful study and formulation of the main principles of this form of existence. (shrink)

A guide for scientists who would like to contribute to the professional development of science teachers for elementary schools. Based on information from over 180 programs, describes what activities work and why, and suggests how to identify programs teachers have found to be effective and take the initial steps to become involved. Also provides vignettes illustrating the daily work of science teachers. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

The physician-patient relationship has changed over the last several decades, requiring a systematic reevaluation of the competing demands of patients, physicians, and families. In the era of genetic testing, using a model of patient care known as the family covenant may prove effective in accounting for these demands. The family covenant articulates the roles of the physician, patient, and the family prior to genetic testing, as the participants consensually define them. The initial agreement defines the boundaries of autonomy and benefit (...) for all participating family members. The physician may then serve as a facilitator in the relationship, working with all parties in resolving potential conflicts regarding genetic information. The family covenant promotes a fuller discussion of the competing ethical claims that may come to bear after genetic test results are received. (shrink)

This paper suggests that empirical educational research has not, on the whole, been treated well by philosophers of education. A variety of criticisms have been offered, ranging from triviality, conceptual confusion and the impossibility of empirically studying normative processes. Furthermore, many of those who criticise, or dismiss, empirical research do so without subjecting any specific examples to careful scholarly scrutiny. It is suggested that both philosophy of education, and the empirical research enterprise, stand to profit if philosophers pay more attention (...) to real cases—and this attention is especially important at present, when research funding is being based on spurious scientistic criteria such as the use of ‘gold standard’ randomised experimental research designs. (shrink)

The interface of health care and insurance requires not just the medical, legal and financial perspectives, but a clear ethical analysis. A varied team of contributors ranging from experts in philosophy, law, medicine and ethics to actuarial science, underwriting and insurance have contributed a series of essays. The ….