A growing body of literature critical of ethics review boards has drawn attention to the processes used to determine the ethical merit of research. Citing criticism on the bureaucratic nature of ethics review processes, this literature provides a useful provocation for (re)considering how the ethics review might be enacted. Much of this criticism focuses on how ethics review boards _deliberate,_ with particular attention given to the lack of transparency and opportunities for researcher recourse that characterise ethics review processes. Centered specifically (...) on the conduct of ethics review boards convened within university settings, this paper draws on these inherent criticisms to consider the ways that ethics review boards might enact more communicative and deliberative practices. Outlining a set of principles against which ethics review boards might establish strategies for engaging with researchers and research communities, this paper draws attention to how _Deliberative communication_, _Engagement with researchers_ and the _Distribution of responsibility_ for the ethics review might be enacted in the day-to-day practice of the university human ethics review board. This paper develops these themes via a conceptual lens derived from Habermas’ (The theory of communicative action. Volume 1: Reason and the rationalization of society, 1984 ) articulation of ‘communicative action’ and Fraser’s (Social Text, 25(26), 56–80, 1990 ) consideration of ‘strong publics’ to cast consideration of the role that human ethics review boards might play in supporting university research cultures. _Deliberative communication_, _Engagement with researchers_ and the _Distribution of responsibility_ provide useful conceptual prompts for considering how ethics review boards might undertake their work. (shrink)

Why did Bernhard Riemann, arguably the most original mathematician of his generation, spend the last year of life investigating the mechanism of hearing? Fighting tuberculosis and the hostility of eminent scientists such as Hermann Helmholtz, he appeared to forsake mathematics to prosecute a case close to his heart. Only sketchy pages from his last paper remain, but here we assemble some significant clues and triangulate from them to build a broad picture of what he might have been driving at. Our (...) interpretation is that Riemann was a committed idealist and from this philosophical standpoint saw that the scientific enterprise was lame without the “poetry of hypothesis”. He believed that human thought was fundamentally the dynamics of “mind-masses” and that the human mind interpenetrated, and became part of, the microscopic physical domain of the cochlea. Therefore, a full description of hearing must necessarily include the perceptual dimensions of what he saw as a single manifold. The manifold contains all the psychophysical aspects of hearing, including the logarithmic transformations that arise from Fechner’s law, faithfully preserving all the subtle perceptual qualities of sound. For Riemann, hearing was a unitary physical and mental event, and parallels with modern ideas about consciousness and quantum biology are made. A unifying quantum mechanical model for an atom of consciousness—drawing on Riemann’s mind-masses and the similar “psychons” proposed by Eccles—is put forward. (shrink)

Patient consent has been formulated in terms of radical individualism rather than shared benefits. Medical education relies on the provision of patient consent to provide medical students with the training and experience to become competent doctors. Pelvic examination represents an extreme case in which patients may legitimately seek to avoid contact with inexperienced medical students particularly where these are male. However, using this extreme case, this paper will examine practices of framing and obtaining consent as perceived by medical students. This (...) paper reports findings of an exploratory qualitative study of medical students and junior doctors. Participants described a number of barriers to obtaining informed consent. These related to misunderstandings concerning student roles and experiences and insufficient information on the nature of the examination. Participants reported perceptions of the negative framing of decisions on consent by nursing staff where the student was male. Potentially coercive practices of framing of the decision by senior doctors were also reported. Participants outlined strategies they adopted to circumvent patients’ reasons for refusal. Practices of framing the information used by students, nurses and senior doctors to enable patients to decide about consent are discussed in the context of good ethical practice. In the absence of a clear ethical model, coercion appears likely. We argue for an expanded model of autonomy in which the potential tension between respecting patients’ autonomy and ensuring the societal benefit of well-trained doctors is recognised. Practical recommendations are made concerning information provision and clear delineations of student and patient roles and expectations. (shrink)

Andrew Davis; 7. Matching, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 107–121, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.00080.

This paper discusses the current fashion for brain-based learning, in which value-laden claims about learning are grounded in neurophysiology. It argues that brain science cannot have the ‘authority’ about learning that some seek to give it. It goes on to discuss whether the claim that brain science is relevant to learning involves a category mistake. The heart of the paper tries to show how the contribution of brain science to our grasp of the nature of learning is limited in principle. (...) Finally the paper explores the potential of brain science to illuminate specific learning disabilities. (shrink)

Andrew Davis; Ability and Learning, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 45–55, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1988.t.

The paper argues that no criterion-referenced assessment system can achieve both reliability and validity at one and the same time. It shows that the reasons for this are conceptual, and hence that empirical research into the‘problem’ is a waste of money and effort. Considerable discussion is devoted to ideas of knowledge and understanding, and to proper educational objectives pertaining to these. Much reference is made to the current National Curriculum context in the United Kingdom, and conclusions are drawn for appropriate (...) educational policy in this area. (shrink)

Teachers are no longer simply being told what to teach, but also how to teach it. It is important therefore to examine whether some prescriptions of teaching methods are acceptable while others are not, and to justify opposition to certain forms of prescription. I show that some attempts to prescribe teaching methods are either empty, or incompatible with holding teachers to account for the pupil learning which is supposed to result. My argument does not depend on making any value assumptions (...) about ultimate educational aims. Examples from the National Literacy and Numeracy Strategies are discussed. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: I II.

Over the last two decades the traditional conception of intelligence and other mental powers as stable individual assets has been challenged by approaches in psychology emphasising context and ‘situated cognition’. This paper argues that the debate should not be seen as an empirical dispute, and relates it to discussions in philosophy of mind between methodological solipsists and varieties of externalists. In the light of this I argue that attempts to conceptualise the identity over time of mental powers qua individual assets (...) run into intractable difficulties. Hence ‘individual asset’ views of many abilities should be abandoned. Implications for education policy particularly in regard to assessment are explored. (shrink)

Teachers are no longer simply being told what to teach, but also how to teach it. It is important therefore to examine whether some prescriptions of teaching methods are acceptable while others are not, and to justify opposition to certain forms of prescription. I show that some attempts to prescribe teaching methods are either empty, or incompatible with holding teachers to account for the pupil learning which is supposed to result. My argument does not depend on making any value assumptions (...) about ultimate educational aims. Examples from the National Literacy and Numeracy Strategies are discussed. (shrink)

This paper discusses the current fashion for brain-based learning, in which value-laden claims about learning are grounded in neurophysiology. It argues that brain science cannot have the ‘authority’ about learning that some seek to give it. It goes on to discuss whether the claim that brain science is relevant to learning involves a category mistake. The heart of the paper tries to show how the contribution of brain science to our grasp of the nature of learning is limited in principle. (...) Finally the paper explores the potential of brain science to illuminate specific learning disabilities. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Harmonial Philosophy: A Compendium and Digest of the Works of Andrew Jackson Davis, the Seer of Poughkeepsie His Natural and Divine Revelations, Great Harmonia, Spiritual Inter course, Answers to ever-recurring Questions, Inner Life, Summer. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst (...) repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Social externalism implies that many competences are not personal assets separable from social and cultural environments but complex states of affairs involving individuals and persisting features of social reality. The paper explores the consequences for competence identity over time and across contexts, and hence for the predictive role usually accorded to competences.

Andrew Davis; Learning and Belief, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 7–20, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1986.tb0.

Andrew Davis; 3. Understanding and Holism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 41–55, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.

Over the last two decades the traditional conception of intelligence and other mental powers as stable individual assets has been challenged by approaches in psychology emphasising context and ‘situated cognition’. This paper argues that the debate should not be seen as an empirical dispute, and relates it to discussions in philosophy of mind between methodological solipsists and varieties of externalists. In the light of this I argue that attempts to conceptualise the identity over time of mental powers qua individual assets (...) run into intractable difficulties. Hence ‘individual asset’ views of many abilities should be abandoned. Implications for education policy particularly in regard to assessment are explored. (shrink)

Criterion referenced assessment, if high stakes is not compatible with the development of rich knowledge and understanding in schools.

Andrew Davis; 2. Accountability and the Economy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 19–39, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467.

Andrew Davis; 2. Accountability and the Economy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 19–39, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467.

Andrew Davis; Bibliography, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 153–155, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.00083.

Andrew Davis; Bibliography, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 153–155, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.00083.

Andrew Davis; 4. Belief and Language-based Assessment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 57–65, https://doi.org/10.111.

Andrew Davis; 4. Belief and Language-based Assessment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 57–65, https://doi.org/10.111.

Andrew Davis; 4. Belief and Language-based Assessment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 57–65, https://doi.org/10.111.

Andrew Davis; 5. Implications for Assessment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 67–74, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-97.

Andrew Davis; 2. Accountability and the Economy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 19–39, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467.

Andrew Davis; 9. Is there a Future for Assessment and Accountability?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 145–152, http.

Andrew Davis; 7. Matching, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 107–121, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.00080.

Andrew Davis; 8. Reliability, Validity and Criterion-referencing, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 123–143, https://d.

Andrew Davis; 8. Reliability, Validity and Criterion-referencing, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 123–143, https://d.

Andrew Davis; 7. Matching, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 107–121, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.00080.

Andrew Davis; 6. Transfer, Abilities and Rules, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 75–106, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467.

Andrew Davis; 6. Transfer, Abilities and Rules, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 75–106, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467.

Andrew Davis; 1. The Need for a Philosophical Treatment of Assessment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 1–18, https:/.

Andrew Davis; 1. The Need for a Philosophical Treatment of Assessment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 1–18, https:/.

Conflicts of interest pose special problems for the professions. Even the appearance of a conflict of interest can undermine essential trust between professional and public. This volume is a comprehensive and accessible guide to the ramifications and problems associated with important issue. It contains fifteen new essays by noted scholars and covers topics in law, medicine, journalism, engineering, financial services, and others.

Abstract‘High stakes testing’ is to be understood as testing with serious consequences for students, their teachers and their educational institutions. It plays a central role in holding teachers and educational institutions to account. In a recent article Randall Curren seeks to refute a number of philosophical arguments developed in my The Limits of Educational Assessment against the legitimacy of high stakes testing. In this reply I contend that some of the arguments he identifies are not mine, and that others survive (...) his critique. (shrink)

Accountability involves not only schools answering to society, but parents and governments doing the same. In particular, governments should answer for the appropriateness of the educational aims they seek to promote. Making schools accountable to society through examination results is fundamentally flawed. Teachers must be able to account for how the specifics of their job relate to wider educational and social aims. The best approach to holding schools to account through external inspection is that of ‘audited self review’. The notion (...) of an agency of inspectors who are ‘superior’ to those they inspect is fundamentally inappropriate. (shrink)

Accountability involves not only schools answering to society, but parents and governments doing the same. In particular, governments should answer for the appropriateness of the educational aims they seek to promote. Making schools accountable to society through examination results is fundamentally flawed. Teachers must be able to account for how the specifics of their job relate to wider educational and social aims. The best approach to holding schools to account through external inspection is that of ‘audited self review’. The notion (...) of an agency of inspectors who are ‘superior’ to those they inspect is fundamentally inappropriate. (shrink)

What do Elliot Eisner's discussions of objectivity mean for the strength of the link between consistency and truth in educational research? Following his lead, I pursue this question by comparing aspects of qualitative educational research with appraising the arts. I argue that some departures from the highest levels of consistency in assessing the arts are compatible with truth and objectivity, and that this is at least suggestive for how consistency in qualitative educational research should be viewed. In the final part (...) of the paper I look at some problems inherent in comparing the value of works of art, and consider whether similar issues arise when we attempt to grade different kinds of educational research. (shrink)

This book discusses both the philosophy of mathematics and of mathematics education. The first part is a critique of existing approaches and a new philosophy of mathematics. Chapters include: (1) "A Critique of Absolutist Philosophies of Mathematics," (2) "The Philosophy of Mathematics Reconceptualized," (3) "Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of Mathematics," (4) "Social Constructivism and Subjective Knowledge," and (5) "The Parallels of Social Constructivism." The second part of the book explores the philosophy of mathematics education and shows that many aspects (...) of mathematics education rest on underlying, usually implicit, philosophical assumptions. Making these assumptions explicit puts a critical tool into the hands of teachers and researchers. Chapters in this section are: (6) "Aims and Ideologies of Mathematics Education," (7) "Groups with Utilitarian Ideologies," (8) "Groups with Purist Ideologies," (9) "The Social Change Ideology of the Public Educators," (10) "Critical Review of Cockcroft and the National Curriculum," (11) "Hierarchy in Mathematics, Learning, Ability and Society," (12) "Mathematics, Values and Equal Opportunities," and (13) "Investigation, Problem Solving and Pedagogy." Each chapter contains notes. (Contains 654 references.) (MKR). (shrink)

Social externalism implies that many competences are not personal assets separable from social and cultural environments but complex states of affairs involving individuals and persisting features of social reality. The paper explores the consequences for competence identity over time and across contexts, and hence for the predictive role usually accorded to competences.

This paper defends my argument that criterion-referenced assessment should not be used to render an education system accountable to the state. Winch and Gingell's reply to my original paper understands me as denying the ‘plasticity’ of abilities. Considerable space is devoted to further discussion of this issue.‘Plasticity’ is not denied, but problems about the ‘identity’ of capacities, abilities, processes and rules are explored in some depth. Winch and Gingell defend certain kinds of pedagogy such as rote learning and ‘teaching to (...) the test’. I remind them that I was not actually discussing pedagogy in the original paper. (shrink)

In England, Higher Education institutions, together with the schools whose staff they train, are being required to incorporate synthetic phonics as one of the key approaches to the teaching of reading. Yet even if synthetic phonics can be identified as one of the component ‘skills’ of reading, an assumption vigorously contested in this paper, it does not follow that it can or should be taught explicitly and independently of reading for meaning. Imposing such a ‘method’ is, at a deep level, (...) incompatible with teachers acting as teachers and potentially constitutes a kind of abuse of early readers. Moreover, because of the conceptual difficulties confronting any attempt to specify synthetic phonics as an approach, there cannot exist, in principle, empirical research that actually supports its value. Current policy in England since the Rose Report, at least, assumes the opposite. All this cannot be dismissed as a little local difficulty for England concerning the teaching of reading English with all its spelling irregularities: there are broader implications for the relationship between research and teaching, together with continuing tendencies to impose ‘teacher proof’ approaches on schools and their staff in many countries. (shrink)

Andrew Davis; 3. Understanding and Holism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 41–55, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.

The Common School should promote a sense of the distinctive worth of all human beings. How is the respect thus owed to every individual to be properly understood? This familiar question is explored by discussing ‘lookism’, a form of discrimination on the grounds of appearance. The treatment is located within a wider analysis of stereotyping. Ultimately stereotyping overlooks persons as sources of actions with moral significance and as potential owners of moral virtues. The Common School could profitably approach traditionally emotive (...) issues such as racism indirectly by helping students to understand in some depth how ‘lookist’ attitudes deny agency. It could then encourage students to apply these insights to traditional forms of discrimination. (shrink)