Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Klara and the Sun (2021) philosophizes on how in the current technologically saturated culture, the gradual evolution of the empathetic humanoids has, on one hand, problematized our normative notions of cognitive and affective categories, and on the other, has triggered an order of emotional uncanniness due to our reliance on hyperreal real objects for receiving solace and companionship. The novel may be conceived to be a commentary on the emerging discourse in the domain of cognitive and emotional (...) computing that aspires to transform the inner life and social relationships of the human community. The novelty of the paper lies in its ability to showcase how Kazuo Ishiguro’s Klara and the Sun (2021) creates a rupture in the existing research and literary narrative by critiquing the theoretical underpinnings of emotional computing that optimistically foresees a future where simulated empathetic minds will be able to decode the complexities of the human emotions. It discusses how literature turns into an apt tool to reflect on the limitations of the programmed machines to decode the elusiveness of the human mind that defies the one-to-one correlation between words, multiple connotations, and their underlying emotions. Through the lenses of the fictional narrative, the paper foregrounds how the concept of the social robot designed to offer empathy, care, and companionship turns into a failed project. The paper draws on critical perspectives from disposability theory, posthuman affect, and immaterial bodies to foreground the noncodified feature of affective experientialities that emerge as a result of the interface between humans and nonanimate beings. (shrink)

Graham Priest has influentially claimed that the Sorites paradox is an Inclosure paradox, concluding that his favored dialetheic solution to the Inclosure paradoxes should be extended to the Sorites paradox. We argue that, given Priest’s dialetheic solution to the Sorites paradox, the argument purporting to show that that paradox is an Inclosure is unsound, and discuss some issues surrounding this fact.

Horwich defends an epistemic account of vagueness that wants to preserve the Law of Excluded Middle and, consequently, claims Horwich, the Principle of Bivalence. He defends, thus, that vague predicates have sharp boundaries which we are not capable of knowing. Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall present what they call ‘Semantic Epistemicism’, an application of Horwich’s account of vagueness to the Liar paradox within the frame of Minimalism; according to SE the Liar is either true or false, but we cannot know (...) its truth value; in this sense, says Horwich, the Liar is indeterminate. I want to argue that Horwich’s theory of truth cannot include all the non-paradoxical instances of the T-schema, which is what he claims that can be done. Some liar-like propositions built with indeterminate sentences show that some non-paradoxical propositions are not to be included in Horwich’s theory of truth. (shrink)

This inspiring and practical manual shows how applying yoga's timeless principals to modern life can lead to radiant health and inner peace. Using engaging anecdotes from her students and her own challenges on the path, author Kali Om shares accessible and simple tools for self-transformation that have a deep and lasting impact.

One of the main problems that Paul Horwich’s Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich’s response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich’s proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified. -/- L’un des principaux problèmes auxquels la théorie (...) minimaliste de la vérité de Paul Horwich doit faire face est le problème de la généralisation. Horwich soutient que le minimalisme a un rôle explicatif fondamental, mais le problème de la généralisation montre que cette théorie est trop faible pour tenir ce rôle. Dans cet article, je défends la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation à partir d’une objection soulevée par Bradley Armour-Garb. Je prétends également que ma réponse à Armour-Grab nous permet de formuler d’une manière plus simple la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation. (shrink)

In this paper I introduce Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth, called ‘Minimalism’, and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which instances of the T-schema are to be excluded from Minimalism. Horwich has presented, in an informal way, one construction that specifies the Minimalist theory. The main aim of the paper is to present and scrutinize some (...) formal versions of Horwich’s construction. (shrink)

On educational philosophy in Puranas, Hindu mythological classics.

Introduction to the Special Issue resulting from the XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia (XII TIF).

Jamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment for the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to deal with these two paradoxes he proposed using the Strong Kleene semantic scheme. This strategy left unexplained our tendency to regard as true certain sentences which, according to this semantic scheme, should lack truth value. Tappenden tried to solve this problem by using a new speech act, articulation. Unlike assertion, which implies truth, articulation only (...) implies non-falsity. In this paper I argue that Tappenden’s strategy cannot be successfully applied to truth and the Liar. (shrink)

Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden'sview with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I (...) will present my own worries about Tappenden's account. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to participate in a discussion about metaphysics today. I claim that metaphysic now seems silenced or taken for granted. Machiavelli’s idea of fortuna or fate represents question and perception that cannot be recognized empirically. My aim is to place Machiavelli into an ongoing discussion about the distinction between nature and culture and perception of reality as organic or harmonic. As part of this, I will discuss fortuna’s place in modern research based teacher education, which places (...) our fate in the hand of science, the institutionalization of learning and the lack of virtue. In conclusion, I wish to express some critical remarks on this development, not taking into account the metaphysical speculation. (shrink)

Indledning til “Om spørgsmålet: Hvad er oplysning?” af Moses Mendelssohn.

Videnskabsteori handler om krav til videnskabelig viden, og disse krav hviler på forudsætninger, der kan ekspliciteres yderligere. -/- Specielt i dag er der dog brug for en bog, der ikke blot analyserer den klassiske videnskabsteori, men i samme diskurs også forholder sig til de meget forskellige tankegange, der i dag giver sig ud for at være videnskabsteori. -/- Om videnskabelig viden til dem, der ønsker et bedre videnskabsteoretisk overblik, og til dem som ønsker at gå mere i dybden med den (...) egentlige filosofiske videnskabsteori. Bogen henvender sig til studerende og færdige kandidater inden for især samfundsvidenskab og humaniora. -/- Asger Sørensens ambition med bogen er at bidrage til klarhed og fornuft i en verden, hvor ideologisk forblændelse ikke blot sker gennem massemedier og underholdningsindustri, men også gennem en akademisk teoriproduktion, der udvikler og anerkender alle mulige programmer for videnskab. (shrink)

Det er eit uttalt mål å gjøre grunnskulelærarutdanninga forskingsbasert. I det dominerande tankemønsteret i grunnskulelærarutdanninga er det konstruert ei motsetning mellom vitskapleg kunnskap og erfaringskunnskap. Vitskapleg kunnskap vert skildra som noko positivt, medan erfaringskunnskap får ei negativ omtale. Dette filosofiske essayet vil framskrive ei re-oppfatning av denne dikotomien. Målet med arbeidet er å redusere dikotomien mellom desse to kunnskapsformene og vise ei forståing som er meir jambyrdig, og som samlande kan bli kalla for lærarens levande kunnskap. Teorien om levande kunnskap (...) tar utgangpunkt i mennesket si heilskapande erkjenningsevne. Mennesket sin kognitive kapasitet inneheld både rasjonelle, etiske, emosjonelle og motoriske erkjenningar. Eit avgjørande aspekt med den levande kunnskapen er lærarens etiske- emosjonelle kunnskap og sensibilitet i tillegg til den logisk rasjonelle evna. (shrink)

In dit boek neemt de Tsjechisch-Nederlandse geleerde Jan Amos Comenius (1592-1670) een centrale plaats in. Met zijn filosofie en onderwijsleer wilde hij de menselijkheid in de samenleving bevorderen. Hij kwam ervoor op dat mensen met verschillende levensbeschouwelijke visies konden samenwerken om dit doel te helpen realiseren. Ook komen rozenkruisers en vrijmetselaars aan de orde, die reeds in de zestiende en zeventiende eeuw van zich lieten horen. Anders dan de kerken deden, manifesteerden zij een onafhankelijkheid van denken en een streven naar (...) meer menselijkheid in de cultuur.0In hun denken en spreken spelen ook de ideeën van Comenius een rol, direct of indirect, kritisch ondervragend of opbouwend, maar altijd inspirerend. (shrink)