In this paper I argue that the way in which we revise and change our beliefs is different from that in which we revise and change our judgments of value; this is due to the fact that judgments of value, unlike beliefs, have no truth-values. Changes of judgments of value do not answer in the same way to the restrictions that apply to changes of beliefs and that are determined by the norms that govern beliefs. I argue that, first when (...) we revise and change our beliefs, we should be in a posi-tion to suspend judgments, and when trying to remove doubts, we should try to avoid falsehood and, second when changing beliefs, we should be in a position to assign probabilities to those conjectures we are in suspense about. These two conditions apply to the case of changes of attitudes with truth-values, such as beliefs; I argue that these two charac-teristics do not apply to cases of changes of judgments of value. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSince 2007, when Mexico City decriminalized abortion during the first trimester, a debate has been taking place regarding abortion and the right to conscientious objection. Many people argue that, since the provision of abortions is now a statutory duty of healthcare personnel there can be no place for “conscientious objection.” Others claim that, even if such an objection were to be allowed, it should not be seen as a right, since talk about a right to CO may lead to a (...) slippery slope where we may end up recognizing a right to disobey the law. In this paper, I argue that there is a right to CO and that this may be justified through the notions of autonomy and integrity, which a liberal democracy should respect. However, it cannot be an absolute right, and in the case of abortion, it conflicts with women’s reproductive rights. Therefore, CO should be carefully regulated so that it does not obstruct the exercise o... (shrink)

Several countries have implemented COVID-19 health passes or certificates to promote a safer return to in-person social activities. These passes have been proposed as a way to prove that someone has been vaccinated, has recovered from the disease, or has negative results on a diagnostic test. However, many people have questioned their ethical justification. This article presents some practical and ethical problems to consider in the event of wishing to implement these passes. Among the former, it is questioned how accurate (...) diagnostic tests are as a means of ensuring that a person is not contagious, whether vaccination guarantees immunity, the fact that health passes can be forged, whether they encourage vaccination, and the problem that there is no universally recognized health pass. Among the ethical issues, it is discussed whether health passes promote discrimination and inequality and whether they violate rights to privacy and freedom. It is concluded that health passes have enough ethical justification to be implemented. (shrink)

Para muchos filósofos y poetas, la poesía es una forma de conocimiento. A esta tesis la llamo cognoscitivismo poético. Aquí analizo qué podemos entender por esta tesis, proponiendo diferentes interpretaciones y tratando de responder a las preguntas acerca de qué conocemos y cómo lo conocemos. Argumento que hay formas de conocimiento que difícilmente pueden ser cuestionadas y que, tal vez por lo mismo, han hecho aparecer la tesis como trivial. Sin embargo, tradicionalmente esta tesis se ha tratado de extender a (...) objetos que nos darían tipos discutibles de conocimiento: aquí el cognoscitivismo poético debe ser seriamente cuestionado. Finalmente, argumento que el modo en que la poesía puede ser fuente de conocimiento es a través de las perspectivas que nos da de la realidad, y en este sentido también puede tener un impacto cognoscitivo sobre nosotros y sobre nuestra comprensión del mundo. (shrink)

El presente trabajo investiga las tesis sobre el poder civil de Alonso de la Veracruz que buscan incorporar en la comunidad política española a los habitantes autóctonos del Nuevo Mundo, tesis que suelen relacionarse con F. de Vitoria y el tomismo español, y que últimamente son consideradas parte del republicanismo novohispano elaborado desde la periferia americana. Se busca demostrar que su propósito era aplicar una teoría de derechos naturales, sin que ello implique participación política de los indios americanos. Se analiza (...) la postura del fraile frente a la diversidad cultural y la guerra contra los indios. The paper explores Alonso de la Veracruz's theses on civil power, which sought to integrate the native inhabitants of the New World into the Spanish political community. These theses, which have usually been associated with F. de Vitoria and Spanish Thomism, have recently come to be considered part of a Novohispanic republicanism developed in the American periphery. The article seeks to show that the purpose of such theses was to apply a theory of natural rights that did not entail the political participation of the indigenous population, as well as to analyze Veracruz's position regarding cultural diversity and the war against the indigenous peoples. (shrink)

En este artículo argumento que la distinción entre los términos “ética” y “moral” es estipulativa y que nada nos impone un cierto significado de los términos: ni su etimología ni la tradición filosófica. Argumento específicamente en contra de una estipulación según la cual “ética” se refiere a la afirmación de la conciencia individual autónoma o auténtica, mientras que “moral”, a la esfera de la observancia de reglas impuestas por la sociedad. Si el propósito de la estipulación es mostrar la mayor (...) importancia relativa de la primera sobre la segunda, por sí sola, esta distinción no nos da ninguna justificación de por qué la conducta ética es superior a la moral. Nada realmente significativo, fuera del ámbito de la teoría que hace la distinción, depende de la estipulación terminológica entre “ética” y “moral”. (shrink)

Bioethics should pay more attention to globalization and some of its consequences than it has done so far. The COVID-19 pandemic would not have been possible without globalization, which has also increased some of its negative consequences. Globalization has intensified wildlife trade in the world. One of the main hypotheses about the origin of this pandemic is that it originated in illegal forms of wildlife trade in China. In the last 30 or 40 years, there have been zoonotic outbreaks at (...) a much frequent pace than before, many of those have been related to wildlife trade. Legal and illegal wildlife trade has grown in the shadow of globalization. Second, globalization has had a huge impact on the redistribution of wealth in the world. Since 1990 income inequality has increased in most high- and in many middle- and low-income countries. A country’s level of pre-COVID income inequality is the best predictor of the COVID death rate. These two issues are not unrelated. People living in poverty in LMIC tend to suffer more from infectious diseases and tend to be marginalized from the health sector. Additionally, poverty tends to reproduce the conditions under which zoonotic diseases can more easily spread. (shrink)

Hay ocasiones en que los valores que un agente sostiene entran en conflicto, tiene una presión para decidir y actuar y no sabe qué hacer. En ese momento se encuentra en un aprieto. De hecho, nuestros valores entran en conflicto constantemente, a veces es fácil decidir qué hacer porque tenemos una jerarquía de valores bien establecida, tenemos criterios que nos ayudan a decidir y preferimos cosas que valoramos más por sobre otras que valoramos menos. Todo el tiempo estamos tomando este (...) tipo de decisiones y nos resolvemos fácilmente por un curso de acción entre muchos otros que incesantemente se nos presentan. No obstante, en otras ocasiones la situación es más difícil ya sea porque tenemos que elegir entre dos o más cosas que valoramos mucho o porque existen dos obligaciones que nos demandan actuar en sentidos opuestos, no podemos satisfacer ambas demandas, no tenemos criterios o procedimientos que dirijan claramente nuestras decisiones y, con frecuencia, tenemos que sacrificar alguna de las opciones. Para la persona que se encuentra en este tipo de situaciones, estas no son agradables, sin embargo, para la filosofía son precisamente este tipo de situaciones difíciles las que son más atractivas. Y lo son porque nos revelan mucho acerca de nuestros sistemas normativos, de nuestros juicios de valor, de nuestras experiencias evaluativas y también de los sacrificios que a veces se demandan de nosotros. (shrink)

Mark Platts is responsible for the first systematic presentation of truth-conditional semantics and for turning a generation of philosophers on to the Davidsonian program. He is also a pioneer in discussions of moral realism, and has made important contributions to bioethics, the philosophy of human rights and moral responsibility. This book is a tribute to Platts's pioneering work in these areas, featuring contributions from number of leading scholars of his work from the US, UK and Mexico. It features replies to (...) the individual essays from Platts, as well as a concluding chapter reflecting on his philosophical career from Oxford to Mexico City. Mind, Language and Morality will be of interest to philosophers across a wide range of areas, including ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of law, and philosophy of language. (shrink)

En este artículo analizo los principales argumentos del libro Tauroética de Fernando Savater. Él afirma que existen argumentos morales a favor de las corridas de toros, por lo que ser taurino es una opción ética legítima. Aquí sostengo que está en un error y que los argumentos morales no tienen la fuerza que él les adjudica; puede haber razones económicas, políticas o de otro tipo a favor de las corridas, pero no hay razones morales. Afirmo, en cambio, que sí hay (...) razones morales fuertes en contra de las corridas que se basan en que los toros son objeto de consideración moral, es decir, tienen un estatus moral independiente de nuestros intereses. A partir de esta premisa examino y objeto, bajo una perspectiva ética, otros argumentos de Savater. (shrink)

The 2016 Royal Society of Chemistry’s report Future of the Chemical Sciences presents four different scenarios for the future of chemistry: chemistry saves the world; push-button chemistry; a world without chemists; and free market chemistry. In this paper we ethically assess them. If chemistry is to solve many of the greatest challenges facing the contemporary world, prioritization of research topics will need to be done explicitly on the basis of moral values, ​​such as solidarity and equity, but also environmental justice, (...) which will have to be central in determining a research agenda for chemistry. The decentralization of chemistry will also present ethical challenges to the research standards established by the scientific community. Ethical education in chemistry may help counteract these risks. We also argue that if chemistry and its subdisciplines are to fulfil their goal of generating knowledge and helping us solve the great challenges of the contemporary world, then it is ethically imperative that scientists from different disciplines be more open to interdisciplinary work. Finally, if the future of chemistry is in free market forms, then it is necessary that we pay more attention to the possible risks that this model has. We call attention to two: first, it is likely that problems that affect the lowest income countries or the most disadvantaged sectors of society, who do not have the means to pay for some of the goods and services, will not be addressed; second, the free market tends to foster unsustainable forms of development. (shrink)

This article aims at raising awareness about the intersection of populism and bioethics. It argues that illiberal forms of populism may have negative consequences on the evolution of bioethics as a discipline and on its practical objectives. It identifies at least seven potential negative effects: (1) The rise of populist leaders fosters “epistemological populism,” devaluing the expert and scientific perspectives on which bioethics is usually based, potentially steering policies away from evidence-based foundations. (2) The impact of “moral populism” is evident (...) in legislative prioritization of the “morality of common people,” often solicited through popular consultations on issues like abortion, drug legalization, or LGBT issues. (3) Populist distrust in autonomous governmental agencies and advisory bodies, including national bioethics commissions, can compromise expert advice, challenging both their authority and decisions. (4) Populists may erode transparency by undermining institutions responsible for it, hindering access to vital information for bioethical research. (5) “Medical populism” creates adversarial dynamics, prompting politicians to make simplistic healthcare policy decisions based on political rather than informed criteria, adversely affecting vulnerable populations. (6) Radical-right populist parties’ “welfare chauvinism” may shape healthcare policies, impacting service access and resource allocation, disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups such as migrants, but indirectly affecting the rest of the population. (7) Nationalist sentiments associated with populism may obstruct international collaborations, posing challenges for global bioethics that seeks to address ethical concerns beyond national borders. In summary, these dynamics raise significant bioethical concerns encompassing evidence-based decision-making, transparency, healthcare equity, and global collaboration. How bioethicists may respond to these challenges is discussed. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the way in which we revise and change our beliefs is different from that in which we revise and change our judgments of value; this is due to the fact that judgments of value, unlike beliefs, have no truth-values. Changes of judgments of value do not answer in the same way to the restrictions that apply to changes of beliefs and that are determined by the norms that govern beliefs. I argue that, first when (...) we revise and change our beliefs, we should be in a position to suspend judgments, and when trying to remove doubts, we should try to avoid falsehood and, second when changing beliefs, we should be in a position to assign probabilities to those conjectures we are in suspense about. These two conditions apply to the case of changes of attitudes with truth-values, such as beliefs; I argue that these two characteristics do not apply to cases of changes of judgments of value.Neste artigo eu argumento que o modo pelo qual nós revisamos e mudamos nossas crenças é diferente daquele pelo qual revisamos e mudamos nossos juízos de valor; isto se dá porque juízos de valor, ao contrário de crenças, não possuem nenhum valor de verdade. Mudanças de juízos de valor não estão sujeitas às mesmas restrições que se aplicam às mudanças de crenças e que são determinadas pelas normas que governam estas. Eu argumento que, primeiro, quando revisamos e mudamos nossas crenças, nós deveríamos ser capazes de suspender juízos e, ao tentarmos suprimir dúvidas, deveríamos tentar evitar a falsidade e, segundo, ao mudarmos as crenças, nós deveríamos ser capazes de atribuir probabilidades àquelas conjecturas sobre as quais nós estamos em dúvida. Estas duas condições se aplicam aos casos de mudanças de atitudes com valores de verdade, tais como crenças; eu argumento que estas duas características não se aplicam aos casos de mudanças de juízos de valor. (shrink)

Tienen razón Francisco Lara y Olga Campos en afirmar en la introducción de su libro que “un mérito importante de este libro es que, de manera muy divulgativa, pretende dar respuestas filosóficas al debate sobre nuestra relación con los animales al aplicar ideas bási- cas a cuestiones prácticas como si debemos ser o no vegetarianos, si hay que experimentar con animales o hasta qué punto son justifica- bles las corridas de toros” (p. 15). Y efectivamente, de una manera muy clara, (...) el libro no sólo pretende, sino que en efecto da respuestas a cuestiones centrales sobre nuestra relación con los animales, en particular a la cuestión acerca de cuál es su estatus o su valor moral y, por ende, sobre si tenemos obligaciones morales hacia ellos. Su tesis es que los animales sí tienen un estatus moral independiente de los intereses humanos, que tienen derechos y que es nuestra obligación moral respetarlos. Parte de ese respeto consiste en no tratarlos como meros instrumentos o recursos al servicio de los inte- reses de los humanos. (shrink)

En esta discusión abordo la hermenéutica analógica de Mauricio Beuchot comparándola con la hermenéutica filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Argumento que Beuchot vuelve a la idea clásica de la hermenéutica como método de interpretación y no la juzga, como Gadamer, como una fenomenología de la comprensión. Sin embargo, Beuchot no atiende las razones de Gadamer en contra de concebir la hermenéutica como una metodología. Si se considera como metodología centrada en la analogía, la hermenéutica analógica deja de lado otros recursos interpretativos (...) importantes. Finalmente, Beuchot adopta una teoría correspondentista de la verdad contra la que argumenta Gadamer y que es incompatible con una hermenéutica filosófica. In this paper I analyze Mauricio Beuchot's analogical hermeneutics by contrasting it with Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. I argue that Beuchot goes back to the classical idea of hermeneutics as a method of interpretation, and does not see it, as Gadamer does, as a phenomenology of understanding. However, Beuchot does not address Gadamer's arguments against using hermeneutics as a methodology. Considered as a methodology centered on analogy, analogical hermeneutics overlooks other important interpretation resources. Finally, Beuchot adopts a correspondence theory of truth, which Gadamer objects and is incompatible with philosophical hermeneutics. (shrink)

En este ensayo discuto si deberíamos entender la objetividad que predicamos de juicios evaluativos en los mismos términos en que lo hacemos de juicios epistémicos. Argumento a favor de un entendimiento de dominio específico de la objetividad, según el cual deberíamos ver a la verdad como central para la objetividad epistémica, pero no para la objetividad evaluativa. Sin embargo, esta posición tradicionalmente ha conducido a ver los juicios evaluativos como subjetivos. Aquí argumento que la carencia de valores de verdad no (...) necesariamente conduce al subjetivismo; no, si no se conciben los juicios evaluativos como expresiones de sentimientos o deseos sin ninguna restricción racional. Más que en el concepto de verdad, en el caso de la objetividad de juicios evaluativos, el énfasis debe ponerse en el de justificación. Sin embargo, este concepto por sí solo no es garante de objetividad (del mismo modo en que tampoco lo es el de verdad). Trato de ahondar en algunas de las condiciones para predicar objetividad de juicios evaluativos y para ello también distingo entre tipos de objetividad. (shrink)

En Vértigos argumentales, Carlos Pereda propone una clasificación de teorías fundacionistas sobre la justificación epistémica y sugiere que algo similar se puede hacer para la justificación práctica. Aquí desarrollo una clasificación de teorías acerca de la justificación moral en los mismos términos. Finalmente, analizo cómo sería lo que Pereda llama una teoría multifundacionista de la justificación en ética.

El esteticismo y el moralismo son dos vicios de desmesura en los que se sobredimensionan los valores estéticos o morales en situaciones en las que están en juego otros valores que también deberían tomarse en cuenta, pero se subvaloran. Carlos Pereda sostiene que son patologías del juicio y argumenta que la literatura ha sido víctima de distintas variantes de estos vicios. Para ello, distingue entre diferentes formas de esteticismo y de moralismo, y analiza cómo algunas de ellas tienen implicaciones a (...) nivel semántico y de comunicación. Pereda propone un “modelo reflexivo” que contrarrestre el vértigo simplificador que representan estas patologías. En esta nota, examino críticamente la teoría de Pereda y propongo otros modos que puede tomar el análisis del esteticismo y del moralismo. (shrink)

En el debate entre el positivismo y el no-positivismo el argumento del relativismo tiene un papel fundamental. Tal y como es presentado, por ejemplo, por Hans Kelsen, este argumento señala, en primer lugar, que una conexión necesaria entre el derecho y la moral presupone la existencia de elementos morales objetivos, absolutos y necesarios, y, en segundo lugar, que estos elementos morales objetivos, absolutos y necesarios no existen. Mi respuesta a esto es que los elementos morales absolutos, objetivos y necesarios existen, (...) porque los derechos humanos existen, y éstos existen porque son fundamentables. In the debate between positivism and non-positivism the argument from relativism plays a pivotal role. The argument from relativism, as put forward, for instance, by Hans Kelsen, says, first, that a necessary connection between law and morality presupposes the existence of absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements, and, second, that no such absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements exist. My reply to this is that absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements do exist, for human rights exist, and human rights exist because they are justifiable. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Argentina Mexico The Southern Cone The Northern Part of South America and Central America Conclusion References Further Reading.

This article enquiries whether normative bioethics can be a science. The article aims to address the conditions of possibility for bioethics to be considered a science, without directly answering the question. The article focuses on two conditions that we typically associate with our common concept of science: truth and knowledge, on the one hand, and naturalization, on the other. Bioethics should be able to provide moral truths and therefore moral knowledge so that we could consider it as a science. On (...) the other hand, the normative character of bioethics raises the question of whether it is possible to naturalize it and make it compatible with a scientific perspective. The article argues that, for normative bioethics to be considered a science, a cognitive and naturalistic stance should be taken on ethics. (shrink)

En este artículo analizo la idea de que se puede hacer filosofía a través de la poesía y trato de darle sentido a la expresión “poesía filosófica”. Sostengo que hay básicamente dos modos de entender esta expresión: 1) como ejemplificación, es decir, la poesía puede servir como ejemplo filosófico de distintas maneras; y 2) como articulación de una teoría filosófica. Aquí analizo la idea de que se puede obtener un tipo de conocimiento sui generis a través de la poesía, así (...) como la de que la poesía puede justificar supuestas verdades filosóficas. Rechazo estas dos ideas y, con ellas, la tesis de que se puede articular una teoría filosófica a través de la poesía. Sin embargo, acepto que no hay nada intrínseco a la poesía que le impida hacerlo, aunque, en general, esto no sucede. (shrink)

In this paper I comment on several aspects of Martin Seel’s paper “The Ability to Deliberate”, mainly on his claims that deliberation is a form of action, on his not very clear distinction between deliberation and thought, and on the relation between normativity and deliberation. There are also some comments on practical and theoretical reasoning, as well as on Seel’s characterization of reasons.

Several countries have implemented COVID passports or health certificates to promote a safer return to in-person social activities. These certificates have been proposed as a way for people to prove that they have been vaccinated, that they have recovered from the disease, or that they have negative results on a diagnostic test. However, many people have questioned its ethical justification. This article presents some practical and ethical problems to consider if we want to implement these passports. Among the former, it (...) is discussed how accurate diagnostic tests are to ensure that a person is not contagious; whether vaccination guarantees immunity; what are the levels of immunity after infection, vaccination and protection against variants; the fact that passports can be forged; if they encourage vaccination and the problem that there is no universally recognized passport. Among the ethical issues it is discussed whether passports promote discrimination and inequality, and whether they violate the rights to privacy and freedom. It is concluded that passports have enough ethical justification to be implemented. (shrink)

Benjamin J.B. Lipscomb, The Women Are up to Something. How Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch Revolutionized Ethics, Oxford University Press, New York, 2022, 326pp., ISBN 978–0–19–754107–4.

Plagiarism is a serious, yet widespread type of research misconduct, and is often neglected in developing countries. Despite its far-reaching implications, plagiarism is poorly acknowledged and discussed in the academic setting, and insufficient evidence exists in Latin America and developing countries to inform the development of preventive strategies. In this context, we present a longitudinal case study of seven instances of plagiarism and cheating arising in four consecutive classes of an Epidemiology Masters program in Lima, Peru, and describes the implementation (...) and outcomes of a multifaceted, “zero-tolerance” policy aimed at introducing research integrity. Two cases involved cheating in graded assignments, and five cases correspond to plagiarism in the thesis protocol. Cases revealed poor awareness of high tolerance to plagiarism, poor academic performance, and widespread writing deficiencies, compensated with patchwriting and copy-pasting. Depending on the events’ severity, penalties included course failure and separation from the program. Students at fault did not engage in further plagiarism. Between 2011 and 2013, the Masters program sequentially introduced a preventive policy consisting of: intensified research integrity and scientific writing education, a stepwise, cumulative writing process; honor codes; active search for plagiarism in all academic products; and a “zero-tolerance” policy in response to documented cases. No cases were detected in 2014. In conclusion, plagiarism seems to be widespread in resource-limited settings and a greater response with educational and zero-tolerance components is needed to prevent it. (shrink)

Sobre la doctrina de los transcendentales de Aquinas, 700 años después, se han proyectado fines muydistintos: el intento de refundar un nuevo estilo de hacer metafísica o filosofía primera, como propuso JanA. Aertsen; de ampliar un posible uso antropológico aún más compartido, como sugiere Leonardo Polo;de lograr una recomposición lógica de la articulación existente entre los conceptos metafísicos, comoahora propone Millán Puelles. A su vez en la conclusión se trata de justificar una posible complementariedadentre ellas.On the doctrine of the (...) «transcendentals» of Aquinas, —700 years later—, very different aims haveprojected: the attempt to «re-found» a new style to make metaphysics or first philosophy, as Jan A. Aertsenproposed; to extend a possible anthropological use still more shared, as it suggests Leonardo Polo; toobtain a logical resetting of the existing joint between the Metaphysical concepts, as now Millán Puelles proposes. To its time in the conclusion one is to justify a possible complementariness between these three programmatic projects. (shrink)

En esta discusión abordo la hermenéutica analógica de Mauricio Beuchot comparándola con la hermenéutica filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Argumento que Beuchot vuelve a la idea clásica de la hermenéutica como método de interpretación y no la juzga, como Gadamer, como una fenomenología de la comprensión. Sin embargo, Beuchot no atiende las razones de Gadamer en contra de concebir la hermenéutica como una metodología. Si se considera como metodología centrada en la analogía, la hermenéutica analógica deja de lado otros recursos interpretativos (...) importantes. Finalmente, Beuchot adopta una teoría correspondentista de la verdad contra la que argumenta Gadamer y que es incompatible con una hermenéutica filosófica. In this paper I analyze Mauricio Beuchot's analogical hermeneutics by contrasting it with Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. I argue that Beuchot goes back to the classical idea of hermeneutics as a method of interpretation, and does not see it, as Gadamer does, as a phenomenology of understanding. However, Beuchot does not address Gadamer's arguments against using hermeneutics as a methodology. Considered as a methodology centered on analogy, analogical hermeneutics overlooks other important interpretation resources. Finally, Beuchot adopts a correspondence theory of truth, which Gadamer objects and is incompatible with philosophical hermeneutics. (shrink)