TOT states may be viewed as a temporary and reversible microamnesia. We investigated the effects of lorazepam on TOT states in response to general knowledge questions. The lorazepam participants produced more commission errors and more TOTs following commission errors than the placebo participants . The resolution of the TOTs was unimpaired by the drug. Neither feeling-of-knowing accuracy nor recognition were affected by lorazepam. The higher level of incorrect recalls produced by lorazepam participants may be due to the fact that they (...) were more frequently temporarily unable to access a known item. For some of these items, the awareness of the retrieval failure resulted in a commission TOT . The resolution of the TOT conflict is discussed in the light of the anxiolytic and anticonflict effects of lorazepam. The data are discussed in terms of contemporary theories of TOTs and the effects that benzodiazepines have on semantic memory. (shrink)

Les deux ouvrages conjoints de 1960 et 1962, Mathématiques et métaphysique chez Descartes et La Philosophie de l’algèbre, marquent dans l’oeuvre de Vuillemin un tournant qui peut éclairer le sens philosophique de la classification des systèmes. Nous présentons successivement la contribution de ces ouvrages à la définition de la méthode dite génétique en philosophie, le nouvel arbitrage « structural » attendu entre les deux histoires des sciences et de la philosophie, le rodage de l’idée de classe de systèmes entre annonce (...) et rejet de l’« intuitionnisme » ultérieur. (shrink)

Condillac a tenu à souligner l’originalité radicale de la thèse défendue dans l’ Essai au sujet du statut des signes dans leur rapport originaire à la pensée. Il la maintiendra jusque dans l’ Art de penser inchangée malgré de profonds remaniements intervenus avec le Traité des sensations quant au contenu de cette interaction, que sa Grammaire et sa Logique lui semblent avoir pourtant « achevé de démontrer ». Ce statut des signes se trouve soumis à la critique dès les Lettres (...) à Gabriel Cramer. Condillac y répond à une question concernant la prérogative des signes arbitraires sur les signes naturels par rapport à la maîtrise de nos opérations de pensée. Et il y voit une objection formelle au caractère « embrouillé » de cette origine, une difficulté de fond qu’il n’avait pas prévenue, et enfin « le point le plus délicat de mon système sur la nécessité absolue des signes ». On peut supposer 1) que cette difficulté est liée à, mais distincte de la question formelle, comme des difficultés de contenu qu’y voit alors Condillac travaillant à son Traité des sensations, 2) que ce « point le plus délicat » ne s’éclaire et ne se spécifie qu’au regard de l’arrière-plan leibnizo-wolffien commun à Condillac, Cramer et Mlle Ferrand, et 3) n’est surmonté que par l’évocation de quelques références absentes de l’ Essai, à la Grammaire de Du Marsais dans l’ Encyclopédie et à la méthode de l’Abbé de l’Épée, comme exemples de la méthode analytique mise au service d’une genèse naturelle des signes artificiels sur le modèle de l’art d’une Nature qui commence tout en nous à notre insu. Ainsi s’achève bien le système « démontré » d’une présupposition mutuelle de la Nature et de l’Art, dont le premier ouvrage avait offert l’essai inaugural. (shrink)

resumo No chama do período do “estrutura l i s mo” defendeu-se a id é ia de que havia uma oposição ent re essa filosof ia e o idealismo, especia l mente o ide a l i s mo subjetivo. O propósito deste texto é defender a tese oposta, de que há um forte elo interno entre o criticismo kantiano e o método estrutural em história da filosofia. Esse elo é partic u l a r me nte visível no estrutura (...) l i s mo e na Dia no e m á t ica de Gueroult e também pode ser ilustrado na obra do grande intérprete da filosofia kantiana que é Louis Guillermit. Este aplicou seu método de “elucidação crítica” à interpretação da sistematicida de de todo o período crítico de Ka nt e especia l me nte da constituição pro g ressiva da Estética transcendental nas três Críticas. A eluc idação da gênese das estruturas perma nece int e r na ao sistema ka ntia no, de i xando em aberto a questão da natureza de sua ligação com os sistemas pós-kantianos, mas essa neutralida de é mais apare nte que real, e cons o a nte com a escolha do idealismo kantia no em detrimento do idealismo hegeliano. palavras- chave Estrutura l i s mo; Dia no e m á t ica; elucidação crítica; Ma r t ial Gueroult; Louis Guillermit; Idealismo alemão. (shrink)

La Correspondance publiée entre Tracy et Maine de Biran présente un intérêt de premier plan pour l'interprétation de l'œuvre des Idéologues, dont elle permet de saisir le mouvement constitutif en un point particulièrement significatif, celui qui précède immédiatement l'éclatement du mouvement, et la rupture de Biran avec ses maîtres. Dans une première partie on trace les étapes principales de l'échange des idées, sur la question centrale du jugement; on cherche ensuite à en cerner l'incidence sur le problème idéologique du jugement (...) dont Biran offre une variante devenue incompatible avec l'entreprise plusieurs fois reprise de Condillac d'un « nouveau Traité des sensations »; enfin, l'aspect logique du problème du jugement met à découvert l'enjeu de cet échange de lettres et les limites indépassables qui se trouvent par là même éclairées, d'une Idéologie comme philosophie critique de la sensibilité exprimée dans les formes du langage. (shrink)

RésuméL'héritage kantien dans la philosophie fregéenne de la connaissance est aujourd'hui largement reconnu. La présente analyse porte sur la point, déjà réputé central par J. Vuillemin , du jugement de recognition. On tente de montrer: °) le style transcendantal du traitement fregéen du problème des objets logiques, dont la nécessité s'introduit a partir des Grundlagen avec celle des extensions de concept, absentes de la première idéographie; style dont on tente d'expliquer les changements qu'il opére dans le modèle de la Begriffsbildung (...) kantienne. 2°) l'ambiguité de la recognition fondée par la source logique de connaissance d'objets logiques, ou par un principe d'image logique, qu'explicitera Wittgenstein, des invariants les plus généraux des opérations de pensée dans l'idéolographie. 3°) le lien du principe de recognition avec une supposition de détermination complète et son ultime formulation dans la théorie de la source géométrique; ses racines dans la formation mathématique de Frege. On conclut par la question posée par l'algébrisation de la logique, étrangére au style transcendantal de l'une des œuvres qui lui ont, fût‐ce de manière voilée par un principe de recognition, donné naissance. (shrink)

Entre la première philosophie cavaillésienne de « l’expérience mathématique » et son réexamen au sein de l’œuvre posthume (Sur la logique et la théorie de la science), nous suggérons qu’il existe une différence radicale de statut, qui différencie de l’intérieur la philosophie du concept de celle de l’œuvre publiée. Le sens testamentaire du livre posthume comme sa conclusion hégélienne tiennent à cette différence. Le nouveau cadre construit pour la philosophie mathématique est celui d’un « Traité de logique », qui prend (...) la forme d’une histoire orientée par l’exigence de reconstruire le lien de la logique avec l’ontologie, alors que la première philosophie pouvait, à son niveau, sembler ignorer, ou même écarter cette exigence. Cette histoire de la logique n’annonce pas plus qu’elle n’offre la construction d’une dialectique identifiable à celle que Cavaillès avait d’abord reconnue dans la nécessité de l’expérience mathématique. Ses étapes, non chronologiquement ordonnées, sont celles de la préparation effective d’un passage de la conscience au concept en tant que principes de la doctrine de la science. Ce passage n’est pas un passage nécessité par la préexistence de contradictions à dépasser et la libre et créative réponse qu’elles demandent à la pensée humaine en mathématiques ; il est celui qui anime le libre choix de chercher, dans une Logique entendue comme théorie des formes de l’être, la liberté créatrice qui est définitoire de la pensée en tant que telle. (shrink)

On se propose de montrer d’abord l’effectivité du concept d’intentionnalité dans la revendication par l’Aufbau de la pratique husserlienne de la réduction, et de son programme de constitution, alors même que ce programme débouche chez Carnap sur une neutralisation terminale du sens métaphysique de la relation intentionnelle. On précise ensuite le rôle que joue le concept philosophique de constitution, dans la mise en œuvre des méthodes logiques. On suggère l’effectivité d’une constitution intentionnelle au sens husserlien, mais armée des méthodes de (...) la logique mathématique, sur trois séries d’indices, pris dans l’exercice même des méthodes logiques dans l’Aufbau. Mais on voit par là que cette référence de l’intentionnalité carnapienne à la distinction aristotélicienne entre l’objet et le vécu intentionnel de la sensation et de la pensée en neutralise la dimension ontologique liée chez Aristote au concept métaphysique d’energéia, tout autant qu’à l’analyse catégoriale de la relation ici drastiquement réduite à une unique «relation fondée». Ainsi se trouve en définitive neutralisé plutôt que constitué dans l’Aufbau le sens d’un legs aristotélicien en matière d’intentionnalité. (shrink)

Cognitive science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the traditional representation-centered framework toward a view that focuses on understanding cognition as "enactive." This enactive view holds that cognition does not produce models of the world but rather subserves action as it is grounded in sensorimotor skills. In this volume, experts from cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, robotics, and philosophy of mind assess the foundations and implications of a novel action-oriented view of cognition. Their contributions and supporting experimental evidence show that (...) an enactive approach to cognitive science enables strong conceptual advances, and the chapters explore key concepts for this new model of cognition. The contributors discuss the implications of an enactive approach for cognitive development; action-oriented models of cognitive processing; action-oriented understandings of consciousness and experience; and the accompanying paradigm shifts in the fields of philosophy, brain science, robotics, and psychology. ContributorsMoshe Bar, Lawrence W. Barsalov, Olaf Blanke, Jeannette Bohg, Martin V. Butz, Peter F. Dominey, Andreas K. Engel, Judith M. Ford, Karl J. Friston, Chris D. Frith, Shaun Gallagher, Antonia Hamilton, Tobias Heed, Cecilia Heyes, Elisabeth Hill, Matej Hoffmann, Jakob Hohwy, Bernhard Hommel, Atsushi Iriki, Pierre Jacob, Henrik Jörntell, Jürgen Jost, James Kilner, Günther Knoblich, Peter König, Danica Kragic, Miriam Kyselo, Alexander Maye, Marek McGann, Richard Menary, Thomas Metzinger, Ezequiel Morsella, Saskia Nagel, Kevin J. O'Regan, Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Giovanni Pezzulo, Tony J. Prescott, Wolfgang Prinz, Friedemann Pulvermüller, Robert Rupert, Marti Sanchez-Fibla, Andrew Schwartz, Anil K. Seth, Vicky Southgate, Antonella Tramacere, John K. Tsotsos, Paul F. M. J. Verschure, Gabriella Vigliocco, Gottfried Vosgerau. (shrink)

I propose a distinct type of robustness, which I suggest can support a confirmatory role in scientific reasoning, contrary to the usual philosophical claims. In model robustness, repeated production of the empirically successful model prediction or retrodiction against a background of independentlysupported and varying model constructions, within a group of models containing a shared causal factor, may suggest how confident we can be in the causal factor and predictions/retrodictions, especially once supported by a variety of evidence framework. I present climate (...) models of greenhouse gas global warming of the 20th Century as an example, and emphasize climate scientists’ discussions of robust models and causal aspects. The account is intended as applicable to a broad array of sciences that use complex modeling techniques. (shrink)

Natural selection causes adaptation, the fit between an organism and its environment. For example, the white and grey coloration of snowy owls living and breeding around the Arctic Circle provides camouflage from both predators and prey. In this Element, we explore a variety of such outcomes of the evolutionary process, including both adaptations and alternatives to adaptations, such as nonadaptive traits inherited from ancestors. We also explore how the concept of adaptation is used in evolutionary psychology and in animal behavior, (...) and the adequacy of methods used to confirm evolutionary accounts of human traits and behaviors. (shrink)

The emphasis on the limitations of objectivity, in specific guises and networks, has been a continuing theme of contemporary analytic philosophy for the past few decades. The popular sport of baiting feminist philosophers — into pointing to what's left out of objective knowledge, or into describing what methods, exactly, they would offer to replace the powerful objective methods grounding scientific knowledge — embodies a blatant double standard which has the effect of constantly putting feminist epistemologists on the defensive, on the (...) fringes, on the run.This strategy can only work if objectivity is transparent, simple, stable, and clear in its meaning. It most certainly is not. In fact, taking objectivity as a sort of beautiful primitive, self-evident in its value, and all-powerful in its revelatory power, requires careless philosophy, and the best workers in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science have made reworked definitions of objectivity absolutely central to their own projects. In fact, classic feminist concerns with exploring the impact of sex and gender on knowledge, understanding, and other relations between human beings and the rest of the world fall squarely within the sort of human and social settings thatare already considered central in most current analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. I argue that the burden of proof is clearly on those who wish toreject the centrality and relevance of sex and gender to our most fundamental philosophical work on knowledge and reality. (shrink)

Elisabeth Pacherie is a research fellow in philosophy at Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. Her main research and publications are in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychopathology and action theory. Her publications include a book on intentionality (_Naturaliser_ _l'intentionnalité_, Paris, PUF, 1993) and she is currently preparing a book on action and agency.

Today's climate models are supported in a couple of ways that receive little attention from philosophers or climate scientists. In addition to standard 'model fit', wherein a model's simulation is compared to observational data, there is an additional type of confirmation available through the variety of instances of model fit. When a model performs well at fitting first one variable and then another, the probability of the model under some standard confirmation function, say, likelihood, goes up more than under each (...) individual case of fit alone. Thus, two instances of fit of distinct variables of a global climate model using distinct data sets considered collectively will provide stronger evidence for a model than either one of the instances considered individually. This has consequences for model robustness. Sets of models that produce robust results will, if their assumptions vary enough and they each are observationally sound, provide reasons to endorse common structures found in those models. Finally, independent empirical support for aspects and assumptions of the model provides an additional confirmational virtue for climate models, contrary to what is implied by some current philosophical writing on this topic. (shrink)

When natural selection theory was presented, much active philosophical debate, in which Darwin himself participated, centered on its hypothetical nature, its explanatory power, and Darwin's methodology. Upon first examination, Darwin's support of his theory seems to consist of a set of claims pertaining to various aspects of explanatory success. I analyze the support of his method and theory given in the Origin of Species and private correspondence, and conclude that an interpretation focusing on the explanatory strengths of natural selection theory (...) accurately reflects neither Darwin's own self-consciously held views, nor the nature of his support. Darwin's methodological and philosophical arguments were at once consistently empiricist and more sophisticated than such interpretations credit to him. (shrink)

The theory of evolution by natural selection is, perhaps, the crowning intellectual achievement of the biological sciences. There is, however, considerable debate about which entity or entities are selected and what it is that fits them for that role. This article aims to clarify what is at issue in these debates by identifying four distinct, though often confused, concerns and then identifying how the debates on what constitute the units of selection depend to a significant degree on which of these (...) four questions a thinker regards as central. (shrink)

My contribution to this Symposium focuses on the links between sexuality and reproduction from the evolutionary point of view.' The relation between women's sexuality and reproduction is particularly importantb ecause of a vital intersectionb etweenp olitics and biology feminists have noticed, for more than a century, that women's identity is often defined in terms of her reproductive capacity. More recently, in the second wave of the feminist movement in the United States, debates about women'si dentityh ave explicitlyi ncludeds exuality;m uch (...) feminist argument in the late 1960's and early 1970's involved an attempt to separate out an autonomous female sexuality from women's reproductive functions. It is especially relevant, then, to examine biological arguments, particularlye volutionarya rgumentst, o see what they say about whether and how women's sexuality is related to reproduction. We shall find that many evolutionarya rgumentss eem to supportt he direct linkingo f female sexualitya nd reproductionY. et I will argue that this supporti s not well-groundedI. n fact, I think evolutionarye xplanationso f female sexuality exemplify how social beliefs and social agendas can influence very basic biological explanations of fundamental physiological processes. In this paper, I shall spend some time spelling out a few examples in which assumptions about the close link between reproduction and sexuality yield misleading results, then I shall conclude with a discussion of the consequences of this case study for issues in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Climate change assessments rely upon scenarios of socioeconomic developments to conceptualize alternative outcomes for global greenhouse gas emissions. These are used in conjunction with climate models to make projections of future climate. Specifically, the estimations of greenhouse gas emissions based on socioeconomic scenarios constrain climate models in their outcomes of temperatures, precipitation, etc. Traditionally, the fundamental logic of the socioeconomic scenarios—that is, the logic that makes them plausible—is developed and prioritized using methods that are very subjective. This introduces a fundamental (...) challenge for climate change assessment: The veracity of projections of future climate currently rests on subjective ground. We elaborate on these subjective aspects of scenarios in climate change research. We then consider an alternative method for developing scenarios, a systems dynamics approach called ‘Cross-Impact Balance’ (CIB) analysis. We discuss notions of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’ as criteria for distinguishing appropriate scenario methods for climate change research. We distinguish seven distinct meanings of ‘objective,’ and demonstrate that CIB analysis is more objective than traditional subjective approaches. However, we also consider criticisms concerning which of the seven meanings of ‘objective’ are appropriate for scenario work. Finally, we arrive at conclusions regarding which meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’ are relevant for climate change research. Because scientific assessments uncover knowledge relevant to the responses of a real, independently existing climate system, this requires scenario methodologies employed in such studies to also uphold the seven meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity.’. (shrink)

I argue that four of the fundamental claims of those calling themselves `genic pluralists'Philip Kitcher, Kim Sterelny, and Ken Watersare defective. First, they claim that once genic selectionism is recognized, the units of selection problems will be dissolved. Second, Sterelny and Kitcher claim that there are no targets of selection. Third, Sterelny, Kitcher, and Waters claim that they have a concept of genic causation that allows them to give independent genic causal accounts of all selection processes. I argue that each (...) one of these claims is either false or misleading. Moreover, the challenge that arises from the availability of genic causal accounts, namely, the inability to choose on rational grounds among genic and higher-level accounts, is unsupported. (shrink)

Climate scientists have been engaged in a decades-long debate over the standing of satellite measurements of the temperature trends of the atmosphere above the surface of the earth. This is especially significant because skeptics of global warming and the greenhouse effect have utilized this debate to spread doubt about global climate models used to predict future states of climate. I use this case from an understudied science to illustrate two distinct philosophical approaches to the relations among data, scientist, measurement, models, (...) and theory. I argue that distinguishing between “direct” empiricist and “complex” empiricist approaches helps us understand and analyze this important scientific episode. I introduce a complex empiricist account of testing and evaluation, and contrast it with the basic hypothetico-deductive approach to the climate models used by the direct empiricists. This more developed complex empiricist approach will serve philosophy of science well, as computational models become more widespread in the sciences. (shrink)

climate scientists have been engaged in a decades-long debate over the standing of satellite measurements of the temperature trends of the atmosphere above the surface of the earth. This is especially significant because skeptics of global warming and the greenhouse effect have utilized this debate to spread doubt about global climate models used to predict future states of climate. I use this case from an under-studied science to illustrate two distinct philosophical approaches to the relation among data, scientists, measurement, models, (...) and theory. I argue that distinguishing between 'direct' empiricist and 'complex' empiricist approaches helps us understand and analyze this important scientific episode. I also introduce a complex empiricist account of testing and evaluation, and contrast it with the basic Hypothetico-Deductive approach to the climate models used by the direct empiricists. This more developed complex empiricist apporach will serve philosophy of science well, as computational models become more wide-spread in the sciences. (shrink)

this requirement for adaptations. Emergent characters are always potential adaptations. Not all selection processes produce adaptations, however. The key issue, in delineating a selection process, is the relationship between a character and fitness. The emergent character approach is more restrictive than alternative schemas that delineate selection..

Given the recent explosion of interest in applications of evolutionary biology to understanding human psychology, we think it timely to assure better understanding of modern evolutionary theory among the psychologists who might be using it. We find it necessary to do so because of the very reducd version of evolutionary theorizing that has been incorporated into much of evolutionary psychology so far. Our aim here is to clarify why the use of a reduced version of evolutionary genetics will lead to (...) faulty science and to indicate where other resources of evolutionary biology can be found that might elevate the standard of the evolutionary component of evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

Since the fundamental challenge that I laid at the doorstep of the pluralists was to defend, with nonderivative models, a strong notion of genic cause, it is fatal that Waters has failed to meet that challenge. Waters agrees with me that there is only a single cause operating in these models, but he argues for a notion of causal ‘parsing’ to sustain the viability of some form of pluralism. Waters and his colleagues have some very interesting and important ideas about (...) the sciences, involving pluralism and parsing or partitioning causes, but they are ideas in search of an example. He thinks he has found an example in the case of hierarchical and genic selection. I think he has not. (shrink)

I address the controversy in evolutionary biology concerning which levels of biological entity (units) can and do undergo natural selection. I refine a definition of the unit of selection, first presented by William Wimsatt, that is grounded in the structure of natural selection models. I examine Elliott Sober's objection to this structural definition, the "homogeneous populations" problem; I find that neither the proposed definition nor Sober's own causal account can solve the problem. Sober, in his solution using his causal view, (...) imports precisely the information needed to make the structural definition effective. Finally, I indicate how the proposed definition can clarify which sorts of evidence could be brought to bear on the controversial case of the Myxoma virus. (shrink)

Modern science’s ability to produce, store, and analyze big datasets is changing the way that scientific research is practiced. Philosophers have only begun to comprehend the changed nature of scientific reasoning in this age of “big data.” We analyze data-focused practices in biology and climate modeling, identifying distinct species of data-centric science: phenomena-laden in biology and phenomena-agnostic in climate modeling, each better suited for its own domain of application, though each entail trade-offs. We argue that data-centric practices in science are (...) not monolithic because the opportunities and challenges presented by big data vary across scientific domains. (shrink)

A reading of Feyerabend in Against Method, and a comparison of C.S. Peirce.

The aim of this paper is to compare two authors: Hans Kelsen and Leo Strauss. More specifically, it will compare Kelsen’s “What is Justice?”—his Farewell Lecture given at Berkeley in 1952—and Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History—one of the main works on political philosophy published in twentieth century America. Both are key texts dealing with the same subject, justice. Although the two texts were written around the same time by authors who shared a similar history, they seem to defend radically (...) opposed points of view. However, despite and beyond their otherwise real differences, the two texts articulate the same important idea: if one wants to think about political issues, one has to address the question of justice. This chapter will attempt to illustrate through a comparison of these two texts the importance of addressing the question of justice, especially in our modern democracies. (shrink)

In this talk I do three things. First, I review what I take to be fruitful applications of the semantic view of theory structure to evolutionary theory. Second, I list and correct three common misunderstandings about the semantic view. Third, I evaluate the weaknesses and strengths of Horan's paper in this symposium. Specifically, I argue that the criticisms leveled against the semantic view by Horan are inappropriate because they incorporate some basic misconceptions about the semantic view itself.

Food safety problems in China, such as deadly tainted milk, have attracted growing attention from a corporate social responsibility perspective. To examine the forces that potentially drive CSR behavior within the Chinese food industry, our study is organized as follows. First, a review is conducted on the unique history of CSR in China as well as some of the major Chinese food scandals that have taken place. The primary drivers of CSR in China that have been suggested in the literature (...) are then summarized. Next, new institutional theory perspectives are drawn upon to analyze three forces that potentially affect the behavior of Chinese firms: coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes, and normative pressures. Based on a questionnaire survey of 164 Chinese managers and employees, the CSR behavior of firms operating in the Chinese food industry is found to only be significantly affected by the institutional factor of normative pressures. The study concludes with its limitations as well as the implications of the findings. (shrink)