The increasing effort, both lay and academic, to encourage a transition from an “I-It” to an “I-Thou” relation to nature is located within a typology of ways of “knowing nature.” This typology provides the context for a particular understanding of human conversation which sees the relation as a cyclical process of “immersion” and “realization” from which a model of the dialectic between “I-It” and “I-Thou” relations to nature can be developed. This model can be used to identify practical measures that (...) can be taken as first steps toward a balance between these relations, both in general and in the context of science-oriented nature conservation organizations such as English Nature in Britain. (shrink)

We construct a class of relations on computable structures whose degree spectra form natural classes of degrees. Given any computable ordinal and reducibility r stronger than or equal to m-reducibility, we show how to construct a structure with an intrinsically invariant relation whose degree spectrum consists of all nontrivial r-degrees. We extend this construction to show that can be replaced by either or.

Mr. T. H. Mcpherson has given, in a recent article in PHILOSOPHY , various reasons for supposing that there was a development in Butler's ethics from the Sermons to the Analogy . He argues that Butler was in the Sermons a “rational egoist” or “Ethical Eudaemonist,” and in the Analogy an Intuitionist. By “Ethical Eudaemonism” he seems1 to mean that “the ground or criterion of rightness is conduciveness to the agent's interest” or that “it is the happiness-producing character of acts (...) that makes them right” . I shall use the phrase “McPherson's view” to denote the theory that this was Butler's view in the Sermons. (shrink)

I believe that Moore's appeal to common sense has been misunder-stood both by his defenders and his critics. Besides the mistakes of the latter, there is one enormous howler which, in my opinion, the former have committed. This is to confuse or coalesce two quite distinct appeals which he made, namely the appeal to common sense and the appeal to ordinary language.

The paternalism, autonomy debate was influenced by traditional ideas that reasons are either objective (based on values existing independent of any particular person) or subjective (based on values tied to individual's personal histories). This dichotomy has been rewarding for the health care community. However, the tenets of this debate have influenced the nature of deliberation in a way that seriously compromises the ability of health care professionals and patients to bring reflection (the search for justified reasons) to a successful end. (...) It sets up the moral landscape not as one of unity and reciprocity, but as one of divisiveness and distance-where one person (the physician) does something to another (paternalism) or for another (patient autonomy), rather than with another. This distance and divisiveness undermines the unity of wills and genuine reciprocity that I argue is indispensable for genuinely good relationships and necessary for successfully establishing what reasons there are to act. It has created an abyss in communication that even recent suggestions for change cannot bridge. In this paper, I discuss the nature of this abyss and the problems it has created by demonstrating that traditional theoretical ideas about the nature of reasons have influenced the nature of deliberation in health care. I argue that recent suggestions for “justified paternalism” fail to bridge the abyss. Finally, I suggest that to be successful, we must change the framework; we must reject the ideas of objective and subjective value and embrace instead the idea that values are intersubjective. (shrink)

As clinical trials end, little is understood about how participants exiting from clinical trials approach decisions related to the removal or post-trial use of investigational brain implants, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) devices. This empirical bioethics study examines how research participants experience the process of exit from research at the end of clinical trials of implanted neural devices. Using a modified grounded theory study design, we conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 16 former research participants from clinical trials of DBS (...) and responsive neurostimulation (RNS). Open-ended questions elicited motivations for joining the trial, understanding of study procedures at the time of initial informed consent, the process of exiting from research, and decisions about device removal or post-trial device use. Thematic analysis identified categories related to: limited preparedness for the end of research participation, straightforwardness of decisions to explant or keep the device, reconciling with the end of research participation, reconciling post-trial expectations, and achieving a sense of closure after exit from research. A preliminary theoretical model describes contextual factors influencing the process and experience of exit from research. Experiences of clinical trial participants should guide research practices to enhance the ethical design and conduct of clinical trials in DBS and other brain devices. (shrink)

Feldman and Levin present a model for movement control in which the system is said to seek equilibrium points, active movement being produced by shifting frames of reference in space. It is argued that whatever merit this model might have is limited to an understanding of “the how” and not “the why” we move. In this way the authors seem to be forced into a dualistic position leaving the upper level of the proposed control hierarchy “floating.”.

In many research studies, tumor biopsies are an unavoidable requirement for achieving key scientific aims. Yet some commentators view mandatory research biopsies as coercive and suggest they should be optional, or at least optional until further data are obtained regarding their scientific usefulness. Further complicating the ethical picture is the fact that some research biopsies offer a potential for clinical benefit to trial participants. We interviewed and surveyed a convenience sample of participants in phase I clinical trials at a single (...) institution. Our primary aim was to describe phase I participants’ understanding of whether a research biopsy offered them the prospect of medical benefit. We also endeavored to describe participants’ views about biopsies—specifically, the benefits of biopsies, if any, and whether biopsies were acceptable, risky, or discouraged trial participation. Finally, we collected data on demographics and attitudes to see if any strong correlations with misunderstanding, acceptability, or riskiness existed. Overall, the respondents tended to view research biopsies as acceptable, though they did not succeed in identifying the lack of benefit of a research biopsy. These findings call for renewed efforts in consent conversations and documents to carefully describe the benefits, or lack thereof, of research biopsies. (shrink)

Gray takes an information-processing paradigm as his departure point, invoking a comparator as part of the system. He concludes that consciousness is to be found “in” the comparator but is unable to point to how the comparison takes place. Thus, the comparator turns out not to be an entity arising out of brain research per se, but out of the logic of the paradigm. In this way, Gray both reinvents dualism and remains trapped in the language game of his own (...) model – ending up dealing with the unknowable. (shrink)