The classic ‘privation theory’ of evil defines evil as an absence (or ‘privation’) of a good that ought to obtain. Despite its historical importance, privation theory is faced with a number of serious difficulties. I outline two of these difficulties and argue that they continue to pose a threat. I then present ‘corruption theory’, an alternative theory of evil reconstructed from some of Augustine's writings on the subject. I argue that this theory shares the strengths of privation theory, while evading (...) its problems. (shrink)

The good as the object of wanting. Suárez on the appetitive and cognitive conditions of rational action: This paper discusses Suárez’s characterization of the formal object of wanting, i.e. the good. Wanting, in all its possible forms, is based on cognition, in its various possible forms. But the starting point for wanting something is given in a judgement about its goodness. What is wanted, in its turn, provides the starting point for deliberation. The ratio boni marks the first (...) transtion, the ratio finis the second one. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE SPECIES AND UNITY OF THE MORAL ACT CHAD RIPPERGER Rome, Italy IN AN ARTICLE written by Gerard Casey in the New Scholasticism,1 the problem of a lack of unity among the constituents of the moral act in St. Thomas's action theory is posed. The question he asks is a valid one: where does the moral act receive its unity? I believe St. Thomas answers that question, but before (...) we take a look at his answer, it is necessary first to discuss what the constituents of the moral act are. This in itself is not without its complications, for what the constituents of the moral act are for Aquinas is likewise open to debate. In order to answer Casey's question, the article will take the following form: first, we will consider what the constituents of the moral act are; then, we shall try to answer Casey's question: "Where does the moral act receive its unity? " I. The Constituen:ts of the Moral Act One of the difficulties with Aquinas's treatment of the species of the moral act is that of understanding precisely what he means by the object of the moral act. Later on we shall see that Aquinas uses the term "object" in a variety of ways referring to a number of different things. However, one of the ways he uses the term "object" is in reference to the end. Therefore, it will be necessary to point out how Aquinas uses this term in reference to the will so that, in considering the object of the moral act, a proper distinction can be made between the end and the object of the moral act in the strict sense. 1 See Gerard Casey, "A Problem of Unity in St. Thomas's Account of Human Action," New Scholasticism, 61, no. 2 (1987) : 146-161. 69 70 CHAD RIPPERGER Aquinas refers many times to the end as the object of the will. However, the main idea he has in mind is in reference to his theory of powers and their objects. For Aquinas, every human power has its proper object,2 and since the will is a power or faculty of man, it has its proper object. Often, Aquinas simply refers to the end as the object of the will: "the good and the end is the proper object of the will." 3 Other times, however, Aquinas refers to the end as that which is under the ratio boni. Those which know the end are always ordered toward the good as to an end: for the will, which is the appetite of the end already known, does not tend toward something except under the aspect of the good (ratio boni), which is its object.4 What Aquinas is saying here is that the intellect apprehends some being and presents it to the will under a certain aspect or concept of the good. Now since the proper object of the will, which is an appetitive power, is the good, then the particular thing must be " seen " in a certain way so that the will will tend toward it. Aquinas is pointing out that, materially, the object for the intellect and the object of the will do not differ. For instance, a piece of candy may be the object of the intellect but it may also be the object of the will once it has been apprehended by the intellect and presented to the will as desirable or under the aspect of the good. However, the ratio boni is more than just a way in which the intellect presents the will with its object. The good by nature has a universal or formal character about it. Because the intellect and will are immaterial powers for Aquinas, the objects of the these respective powers must be universals, forms or essences. The will is presented with a form of the particular thing apprehended and this form is none other than the end. 2 See S.T. I, 77, 3. 3 S.C.G. III, 1. See also Sent., II, 40, 1, 1; Sent. IV, 16, 3, 2; S.T. I, 1, 4, ad 3; S.T. I-II, 11, 1, and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON THE EVALUATION OF HUMAN ACTIONS WILLIAM H. MARSHNER Christendom College Front Royal, Virginia AMONG THE questions dealt with in the Prima Secundae are those of what moral goodness "is" and on what basis it is attributed to some human actions but denied of others. Aquinas's answers are currently a matter of contention between the proportionalists and their critics, as is his answer to the question of how (...) human actions are classified. The presentation in the Prima Secundae does give rise to problems, thanks in part to Aquinas's pedagogical procedure. That procedure can be described as bit-by-bit exposition. Rather than set forth his whole view of a topic in one place, in a synthesis of some sort, and applying it piecemeal thereafter as subsequent questions may demand, the Common Doctor keeps his whole view back, exposing no more of it than is needed to resolve the particular issue at stake in a given article. The result of this, quite often, is that qualifications crucial to a fair comprehension of what he holds are scattered over places far removed from each other. Because what he holds on the classification and evaluation of human actions consists of several parts, each complicated, and all connected, his solution is unsuited to bit-by-bit exposition. Genuine doubts as to what the parts are, and how they come together, can arise. The purpose of the present paper is to present a synthesis that lets the whole picture emerge; as it emerges, certain attempts to read Aquinas in a manner supportive of the proportionalist position will be shown to conflict with the design of the whole. In his preface to qq. 18-20 in the Prima Secundae, Aquinas 347 348 WILLIAM H. MARSHNER describes their subject matter as the goodness or badness (bonitas vel malitia) of human actions. These abstract nouns are derived from the corresponding adjectives, "good" and "bad," and the very first thing Aquinas tells us (in the first sentence of q. 18, a. 1) is that "good" and "bad" are to be asserted of human actions in the same way as they are asserted of other things.' So how is that? A BACKGROUND TOPIC: 'GOOD' AND 'BAD' IN GENERAL If one should take up any item at all-an apple, a shoe-and say that the item is good, would one be purporting only to describe it as it is, or would one be purporting also to evaluate it in light of how it ought to be? Differently posed, does a proposition of the form "x is good" represent a product of speculative reason alone, or does it include an element, at least, from practical reasoning? Recent analytical philosophy is quite clear that the latter option is correct. "Good" and "bad" are terms which express evaluation rather than some sort of disinterested, theoretical description. 2 Aquinas can be read, at least, as holding the same view. In a text in which he defined a completely general sense of "good" (more general, for example, than just "human good"), he said: ratio boni est quod aliquid sit appetibile.3 To make out what this dictum means, two remarks are in order. First, the ratio of a term "T" is the reason anything is called T. Aquinas identified it as the aspect of things which the mind grasps and signifies through "T."4 He meant the aspect which would be "what it takes" for a thing to merit or verify the term, in case the term is applied to it. Thus the ratio of "good" is what it takes for 1 Respondeo dicendum quod de bono et malo in actionibus oportet loqui sicut de bono et malo in rebus.... ' The analytical philosophers derive a portion of their clarity on this issue from the celebrated remarks of David Hume on the difference between "is" and "ought": A Treatise on Human Nature, III, i,l. 3 See ST I, q. 5, q. 1. corpus, and many other places. Aquinas often quoted Aristotle's definition of "good" as what all things seek or tend toward (appetunt); the Stagirite's text is in the Nicomachaean Ethics, book I, chapter 1. 4 Ratio enim significata per... (shrink)

James of Viterbo’s ethical writings focus mostly upon happiness and virtue. His basic approach is Aristotelian. Although he is not a Thomist in the sense that some of his contemporary Dominicans were, he frequently quotes or paraphrases Thomas while arguing for his own positions, especially in response to views defended by such figures as Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Henry of Ghent. James departs from Thomas by arguing that all acquired virtue is based on an ordered self-love. James’s (...) emphasis on self-love is in turn supported by his own understanding of willing and happiness, which involves a Neoplatonic account of the ratio boni as consisting in unity. Consequently, many aspects of James’s Aristotelian moral thought are ultimately based upon an understanding of the good that has roots in Neoplatonic authors. (shrink)

The author states that the very idea of human dignity lies in human relationships in the form of mutual recognition of one another. She emphasizes the ‘daily’ commitment to dignity as an essential feature of intersubjectivity and insists on the bodily dimension as the fundamental mode of relationships to the other. Thus human dignity is first of all the dignity of the body.

This paper provides a rich reconstruction of the notion of dignity and rights of people and individuals in its Assyrian origins in ancient Mesopotamia. It analysis several particular positions. Among them, Bardaisan, Yacoub Aphraates (Aphrahat), Michael the Syriac, as well as, much later, the missionary policy of the Eastern Church in Asia and the influential of the Nestorian church in Asia.

Anarchy and utopia have traditionally had a contentious relationship throughout the history of political thought. Although some anarchic thinkers have occasionally verged on the utopian genre – for instance, French anarchists Joseph Déjacque and Jean Grave, or anarcho-syndicalists Émile Pataud and Émile Pouget – the anarchic mindset has generally shown a deeply-rooted mistrust towards any representation of systematically planned ideal societies, often seen as intellectualist and fundamentally authoritarian projects.

This paper asks a simple and yet extremely relevant question for scholars of religion: what is sacrifice? Rejecting monothetic definitions of sacrifice, I argue that the phenomenon must be understood as a polythetic class. In its two first sections, the paper discusses the evidence from African religions and Chinese religions, respectively. The last section is devoted to a comparative exercise through which I highlight the polythetic nature of sacrifice.

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Nouvelles clés, n° 14, été 1997. Il a été écrit à partir des deux articles d'Eric Bony parus dans Science Frontières et des déclarations de Joël Sternheimer au Festival Science Frontières 1997. En juin 1992, Joël Sternheimer, professeur à l'Université européenne de la recherche, a déposé le brevet du « Procédé de régulation épigénétique de la synthèse protéique », une théorie révolutionnaire qui permettrait d'expliquer, entre autres, l'influence de la musique sur des organismes vivants. (...) - Biologie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

The newborn opens its eyes when it comes into the world. We close the eyes of the dead because they are no longer part of the world of the living. It is through looking that we enter the world, that we take possession of it, and that we leave it. We open or close our eyes to the living beings and things that surround us. Of prime importance among these living beings are other humans, who may resemble or be different (...) from us, but whose eyes also look. From this perspective, to live is to look at other people and at ourselves. Artists, particularly those who work with light and looking, such as painters, photographers, or film-makers, show us that art is above all seeing life: we look at the other who has been painted, photographed, or filmed. At the same time a photograph or painting of this other tells us who we are and what type of relationship we have with the world. For looking is never neutral. Every look, from wherever it comes, is imbued with culture. In art, looking is part of writing. But, when we look at others, how do we see them? Do we see them? The blind may have poor sight, yet, because they have bodies, sensibilities, minds, and other faculties that enable them to enter into relations with others, they have a way of looking. (shrink)

Women's alienation seems to cling to their bodies like destiny. But what is a woman? An absurd question if ever there was one, since a man's virility seems so self‐evident that it would never occur to him to wonder what makes him a man. As a man, he is both the positive and the neuter term representing all humanity, while doubt is permitted in the case of woman, the negative pole whose elusive “femininity” we continue to pursue. In fact, the (...) problem comes from elsewhere because “Only the mediation of another can constitute an individual as an Other.” But what is the Other? This is a question we have not gotten beyond. The absolute Other might be the Black woman encountered in Africa, whom Simone de Beauvoir mentions in Letters to Nelson Algren. (shrink)

No presente número, reservado à Filosofia Medieval, há uma linha que perpassa quase todos os textos: o da recepção do pensamento antigo pelos pensadores do medioevo cristão.

No presente artigo examina-se aposição do franciscano Pedro de João Olivi ante a Filosofia. Seu texto De perlegendisphilosophorum libris' serve de guia. Constata-seque a critica de Olivi não se volta para o uso emsi dos textos filosóficos pagãos, mas para o modocom que eles podem ser lidos e comentados nomundo cristão, ignorando a subordinação dosaber mundano à sabedoria da revelação.

Nancy Jecker’s essay Nothing to be Ashamed of: Sex Robots for Older Adults with Disabilities 1 presents a provocative application of the capabilities approach. Her ethical argument for providing access to sex robots for older adults with disabilities proceeds in five parts: 1. Older adults frequently suffer disabilities that impair sexual functioning. 2. The ability to function sexually is linked to central human capabilities, including: the ability to generate a personally meaningful life narrative; be physically, mentally and emotionally healthy; experience (...) bodily integrity; feel and express a range of human emotions; affiliate deeply with others; and reflect on and choose a plan for their life. 3. Society should take reasonable steps to support these human capabilities at a minimal threshold as part of a broader duty to respect human dignity. 4. Providing access to sex robots comprises part of reasonable efforts to support the six capabilities at a minimal threshold. 5. Therefore, society ought to make reasonable efforts to ensure access to sex robots for older adults with disabilities that impair sexual functioning. I am sympathetic to this line of reasoning, having proposed a series of legal reforms that would facilitate sexual expression among older adults with cognitive impairments as well.2 3 …. (shrink)

At Universitat Politècnica de València, Meridies, an internship programme that places engineering students in countries of Latin America, is one of the few opportunities the students have to explore the implications of being a professional in society in a different cultural and social context. This programme was analyzed using the capabilities approach as a frame of reference for examining the effects of the programme on eight student participants. The eight pro-public-good capabilities proposed by Melanie Walker were investigated through semi-structured interviews. (...) The internship is an environment in which students can put into practice the knowledge they have acquired in undergraduate studies and to find practical relevance in what they studied. Occasionally, this also entails a critical questioning of what they have learned, a greater awareness of the limits of the contents of their studies and of the way things were taught, and interest in less explored issues that are closely linked to social justice. However, tensions can arise between the pro-public-good oriented perspectives of this programme, and a more instrumental vision. One way to overcome these tensions is to foster consideration of reflexivity, that is, the dynamic relationship between technology and society. To do so, the programme must create space before and during the internship, and upon the return of the students, to discuss and collectively reflect upon their lived experience. Additionally, it ought to engage supervisors in this educational journey, both at the university and in the host institutions, and also involve socially committed organisations in this task. (shrink)

In contemporary African cultures women are going beyond domestic areas and getting involved in public affairs. They are acting in the social sphere. They are taking an active part in campaigns during the election process. Although in contemporary Africa these new ways of participating in public affairs are still closely associated with the religious domain, women are a major factor of social change in today's Africa.

Primeira Carta Prezado Padre Frei Bernardo: Com todo o respeito que devo demonstrar-vos devido aos méritos dos frades franciscanos, desejo apresentar nesta carta algumas dúvidas e mesmo, como parece a alguns, os absurdos evidentes - que parecem seguir-se de vossas afirmações. Com a solução de tais dúvidas espero que a mim e a outros se demonstre com mais clareza a verdade. Li em alguns textos que apresentastes na escola dos frades menores, e aos quais permitistes acesso a todo o verdadeiramente (...) interessado, as proposições que seguem: A primeira, colocada por vós nos Comentários às Sentenças, diz o seguinte: "O conhecimento intuitivo e claro é aquele pelo qual julgamos que uma coisa existe, independente do fato de ela existir ou não." A segunda proposição, colocada no mesmo lugar, afirma: "Na sentença: 'O objeto não existe, logo não é visto', não vale a consequência, como não vale também esta: 'Isto é visto, logo existe'. Ambas aliás são falsas, como o são estas: 'César está na mente, logo César existe; César não existe, logo não está na mente'." A terceira proposição, também no mesmo lugar, diz: "O conhecimento intuitivo não requer necessariamente a existência da coisa." Uma quarta proposição creio poder inferir destas três: "Toda a impressão que temos da existência de objetos exteriores pode ser falsa," pois, segundo vós, ele pode dar-se quer o objeto exista, quer não. (shrink)

A leitura do Itinerarium mentis in Deum de S. Boaventura requer que se leve em consideração a diferença que existe entre o pensamento dele e o de outros autores, principalmente Tomás de Aquino. Nesse sentido, o presente artigo aborda, em primeiro lugar, a teologia trinitária de S. Boaventura. Este não possui um tratado sobre a unidade de Deus, anterior ao De trinitate. Nisso ele se aproxima da tradição bíblico-antioquena, bem como da catequese e da liturgia da Igreja primitiva e abre (...) espaço para uma teologia que repense o significado fundamental da Trindade para a fé cristã. Em segundo lugar, a questão do Cristocentrismo. Com efeito, Cristo, como intermediário em todas as coisas, é visto como o médium metaphysicum que explica a produção e a compreensão dos seres, e que se coloca como princípio, meio e término da História. Em terceiro lugar, o artigo reflecte sobre o exemplarismo em S. Boaventura. As coisas são sinais, imagens, símbolos de uma realidade maior, à qual se referem; e o verdadeiro metafísico é aquele que sabe que tudo procede de um exemplar primeiro. Finalmente, a noção de transitus. A saída do Egipto e a peregrinação pelo deserto, rumo à Terra Prometida, são imagem da caminhada da Igreja e de cada um dos cristãos em direcção ao descanso do oitavo dia, o dia da paz sem fim. /// A reading of the Itinerarium mentis in Deum of Saint Bonaventure requires that we take into consideration the difference that exists between his thinking and the thought of other authors, especially Thomas of Aquinas. Taking this into consideration, the article analyses, in the first place, Bonavenrure's Trinitarian theology. He does not have a treatise on the unity of God that antecedes the De trinitate. In this, he is close to the biblical-antiochean tradition, as well as to the catechesis and the liturgy of the Primitive Church and opens space for a theology that restores the fundamental meaning of the Trinity for the Christian faith. Secondly, the question of Christocentrism. As a matter of fact, Christ, as intermediary in all things, is seen as the medium metaphysicum that explains the production and the comprehension of all beings, recognized as principle, median and end of History. In the third place, the article also reflects on the exemplarism in Saint Bonaventure. According to his thought, the things of the world are signs, symbols of a greater reality, to which they refer; therefore, the true metaphysician is the one who knows that everything proceeds from a first exemplar. Finaly, the notion of transitus. The exodus of Egypt and the peregrination through the desert, in the direction of the Promised Land, are for Bonaventure images of the peregrination of the Church and of each and every Christian in direction to the rest of the seventh day, the day of peace without end. (shrink)

I'll say first why I write. It intrigues me, I wonder why I write. How it is that I write and why it's so important. I take this as an act of life. One thing that scares me as a writer is a Lari song “ndombi ku ndombi sadidi mukanda komanda diandi Matsoua Ndele.” That can be translated as “even a black can write, hey, things are progressing. “ In the beginning going to school was considered an enormous act, it (...) was civilization, it was the very center of civilization, and writing a letter for a black person, a poor black, was a grandiose thing. It was in Matsoua's time, in the forties, that people sang this song in the pool to make rubber. (shrink)

The role of information systems and technology in stimulating interest in privacy is discussed, with an emphasis on the move towards regarding privacy as an economic right. Current proposals are shown to derive from pragmatic, problem-driven analyses, rather than clear philosophical foundations: they are therefore inflexible and limited in scope, and advances in technology are likely to render them obsolete. The need for a clear philosophical basis for privacy as an economic rather than a social/human right is therefore identified and (...) the Hegelian concept of privacy is shown to provide such a basis. (shrink)

Os franciscanos dos séculos XIII e XIV contaram entre seus membros com filósofos de renome. Procura-se, no presente trabalho, ver até que ponto pode-se falar de uma 'escola franciscana Para tanto é tomado o período que medeia entre Boaventura e Ockham, sendo examinados alguns dos principais temas debatidos durante a época.

This Article uses age as an entry point for examining how temporal and methodological issues in egalitarianism make substantive equality an unattractive goal for vulnerability theory. Instead, vulnerability theory should adopt a continuous doctrine of sufficiency, which is a better fit with vulnerability theory’s underlying aims and rhetoric. Instead of evaluating what individuals have in relation to others, sufficiency refocuses the inquiry on whether we have enough throughout the lifecourse. In the context of vulnerability theory, enough should be defined as (...) the capability to be resilient as guaranteed by the responsive state. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 3, December 2023, Page 359-363.

Résumé La pratique de la solidarité familiale est un fait dans les sociétés africaines même si les personnes sont confrontées à toutes sortes de risques dès leur plus jeune âge, bien avant qu’elles n’exercent une activité leur permettant de se prendre en charge. Ainsi, le manque de protections civiles de même que la « sécurité sociale » qui couvre les individus en cas de maladie et d’autres risques transforment les sociétés africaines contemporaines en scènes où règnent violences et insécurité sociale. (...) Dans ces conditions, c’est la liberté de l’individu qui est en question mais aussi la protection des citoyens, la prise en compte des risques liés à la vie, au travail, à l’éducation, à la santé, à l’environnement. C’est tout le rôle social que doit jouer un Etat de droit qui est en question. Mais le lien de solidarité est d’abord d’ordre éthique. Il lie un humain à un autre, par-delà les lois et les institutions sociales. (shrink)

Major depression is associated with a decrease of 1st person visual perspective in autobiographical memory, even after full remission. This study aimed to examine visual perspective in healthy never-depressed subjects presenting with either genetic or psychological vulnerability for depression. Sixty healthy participants performed the Autobiographical Memory Test with an assessment of visual perspective. Genetic vulnerability was defined by the presence of at least one S or LG allele of the polymorphism of the serotonin-transporter-linked promoter region . Psychological vulnerability was defined (...) by high scores of harm avoidance measured by the Temperament and Character Inventory. Life stress exposure, depressive mood, rumination, and familial history of depression were assessed through standardized procedures. Visual perspective for positive memories was independently predicted by both harm avoidance and a gene by environment interaction between the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism and life stress exposure. Visual perspective and vulnerability for depression may share some biological bases. (shrink)

The pastoral role is a significant leadership function within the global evangelical church and is critical to the ongoing health, nurturing and spiritual development of the church and its members. There is limited literature and reflection on hiring for the church, yet the selection of a pastoral leader is more than an employment exercise as it involves important Christian values, perceptions and priorities of the church and the denomination. This article records a study on pastoral hiring process within a significant (...) evangelical denomination in Canada. It uses a descriptive, multiple case-study approach involving four churches engaged in a pastoral search process. Findings revealed a convergence between church practices and typical organisational processes with pragmatic strategies for hiring decisions. In a secularising society of Canada, it is especially important that the church critically reflects on maintaining scriptural values on its hiring practices and not be shaped by the commercially driven business context to distinguish ethical practice and maintain its Christian witness. Contribution: This study provides new knowledge in the field of congregational studies on a much-neglected area of Christian practice, motivating for critical reflection and scriptural integrity within pastoral hiring processes. (shrink)

La pratique de la solidarité familiale est un fait dans les sociétés africaines même si les personnes sont confrontées à toutes sortes de risques dès leur plus jeune âge, bien avant qu’elles n’exercent une activité leur permettant de se prendre en charge. Ainsi, le manque de protections civiles de même que la « sécurité sociale » qui couvre les individus en cas de maladie et d’autres risques transforment les sociétés africaines contemporaines en scènes où règnent violences et insécurité sociale. Dans (...) ces conditions, c’est la liberté de l’individu qui est en question mais aussi la protection des citoyens, la prise en compte des risques liés à la vie, au travail, à l’éducation, à la santé, à l’environnement. C’est tout le rôle social que doit jouer un Etat de droit qui est en question. Mais le lien de solidarité est d’abord d’ordre éthique. Il lie un humain à un autre, par-delà les lois et les institutions sociales. (shrink)