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Alva Noë
The City University Of New York Graduate Center
  1. Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
    "Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...
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  2. A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  3.  6
    Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons From the Biology of Consciousness.Alva Noë - 2009 - Hill & Wang.
    A noted philosopher and member of the Institute for Cognitive and Brain Science examines flaws in current understandings about consciousness while proposing a radical solution that argues that consciousness must not be limited to the confines of the brain.
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  4.  18
    Action in Perception. [REVIEW]Alva Noë - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (5):259-272.
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  5.  5
    Varieties of Presence.Alva Noë - 2012 - Harvard University Press.
    Introduction: free presence -- Conscious reference -- Fragile styles -- Real presence -- Experience of the world in time -- Presence in pictures -- On over-intellectualizing the intellect -- Ideology and the third realm.
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  6. Against Intellectualism.Alva Noë - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):278-290.
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  7. Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness?Alva Noë & Evan Thompson - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.
    In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No (...)
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  8. Neural Plasticity and Consciousness.Susan Hurley & Alva Noë - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):131-168.
    and apply it to various examples of neural plasticity in which input is rerouted intermodally or intramodally to nonstandard cortical targets. In some cases but not others, cortical activity ‘defers’ to the nonstandard sources of input. We ask why, consider some possible explanations, and propose a dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis. We believe that this distinction is important and worthy of further study, both philosophical and empirical, whether or not our hypothesis turns out to be correct. In particular, the question of how (...)
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  9. Neural Plasticity and Consciousness: Reply to Block.Susan Hurley & Alva Noë - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (8):342.
    Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley1111 andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë2222.
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  10. Experience Without the Head.Alva Noë - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 411--433.
    Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. (...)
     
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  11. Finding Out About Filling-In: A Guide to Perceptual Completion for Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception.Luiz Pessoa, Evan Thompson & Alva Noë - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):723-748.
    In visual science the term filling-inis used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to theoretical issues about neuralignoring an absencejumping to a conclusionanalytic isomorphismCartesian materialism, a particular (...)
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  12. Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?Alva Noë - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):1-12.
    In this paper I explore a brand of scepticism about perceptual experience that takes its start from recent work in psychology and philosophy of mind on change blindness and related phenomena. I argue that the new scepticism rests on a problematic phenomenology of perceptual experience. I then consider a strengthened version of the sceptical challenge that seems to be immune to this criticism. This strengthened sceptical challenge formulates what I call the problem of perceptual presence. I show how this problem (...)
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  13. Real Presence.Alva Noë - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):235-264.
  14.  5
    Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?Alva Noë (ed.) - 2002 - Imprint Academic.
    There is a traditional scepticism about whether the world "out there" really is as we perceive it. A new breed of hyper-sceptics now challenges whether we even have the perceptual experience we think we have. According to these writers, perceptual consciousness is a kind of false consciousness. This view grows out of the discovery of such phenomena as change blindness and inattentional blindness, which show that we can all be quite blind to changes taking place before our very eyes. Such (...)
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  15. Causation and Perception: The Puzzle Unravelled.Alva Noe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):93-100.
  16. Experience of the World in Time.Alva Noë - 2006 - Analysis 66 (1):26-32.
  17. Conscious Reference.Alva Noë - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):470-482.
    The world shows up to perceptual consciousness in virtue of the deployment of distinct sensorimotor and also conceptual skills. The availability of the world to thought is, in contrast, to be explained in connection with the different sorts of skills put to work in thought. I show that thought and experience are varieties of skilful access to the world. The aim of the paper is to present the outlines of a general theory of access.
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  18. Beyond the Grand Illusion: What Change Blindness Really Teaches Us About Vision.Alva Noë, Luis Pessoa & Evan Thompson - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7 (1-3):93-106.
    Experiments on scene perception and change blindness suggest that the visual system does not construct detailed internal models of a scene. These experiments therefore call into doubt the traditional view that vision is a process in which detailed representations of the environment must be constructed. The non-existence of such detailed representations, however, does not entail that we do not perceive the detailed environment. The “grand illusion hypothesis” that our visual world is an illusion rests on (1) a problematic “reconstructionist” conception (...)
     
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  19. The Critique of Pure Phenomenology.Alva Noë - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):231-245.
    The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be.
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  20.  88
    On What We See.Alva Noë - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):57--80.
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  21. Magic Realism and the Limits of Intelligibility: What Makes Us Conscious.Alva Noë - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):457–474.
    In the “Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience‘ and “Sense Data‘", Wittgenstein endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected. I will attempt to explicate the difference between the innocuous and dangerous scenarios, to give arguments in favor of the coherence of the dangerous scenario, (...)
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  22. Precis of Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    The main idea of this book is that perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do. Think of a blind person tap-tapping his or her way around a cluttered space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is. The world makes itself available to (...)
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  23. Experience and the Active Mind.Alva Noë - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):41-60.
    This paper investigates a new species ofskeptical reasoning about visual experience that takesits start from developments in perceptual science(especially recent work on change blindness andinattentional blindness). According to thisskepticism, the impression of visual awareness of theenvironment in full detail and high resolution isillusory. I argue that the new skepticism depends onmisguided assumptions about the character ofperceptual experience, about whether perceptualexperiences are ''internal'' states, and about how bestto understand the relationship between a person''s oranimal''s perceptual capacities and the brain-level orneural processes (...)
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  24. Reply to Campbell, Martin, and Kelly. [REVIEW]Alva Noë - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):691–706.
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  25. Perceptual Completion: A Case Study in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science.Evan Thompson, Alva Noë & Luiz Pessoa - 1999 - In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press. pp. 161--195.
  26. Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual?Alva Noë - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):185-194.
    As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do. This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self- consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self- consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.
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  27. Perception, Attention, and the Grand Illusion.Alva Noë & Kevin J. O'Regan - 2000 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6.
    This paper looks at two puzzles raised by the phenomenon of inattentional blindness. First, how can we see at all if, in order to see, we must first perceptually attend to that which we see? Second, if attention is required for perception, why does it seem to us as if we are perceptually aware of the whole detailed visual field when it is quite clear that we do not attend to all that detail? We offer a general framework for thinking (...)
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  28.  13
    Phenomenal Consciousness Explained (Better) in Terms of Bodiliness and Grabbiness.J. Kevin O’Regan, Erik Myin & Alva NOë - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.
    How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do (...)
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  29.  28
    Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind.Alva Noë - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):434.
    Perhaps the most influential compatibilist response to this question is Fodor's strategy of levels. Fodor argues that although psychological laws range over world-involving propositional attitudes and their contents, these laws are implemented in computational mechanisms that supervene on the individual's intrinsic states.
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  30. Sorting Out the Neural Basis of Consciousness: Authors' Reply to Commentators.Alva Noe & Evan Thompson - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):87-98.
    Correspondence: Alva Noë, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-2390, USA. _Email: [email protected]_ Evan Thompson, Philosophy Department, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. _Email: [email protected]_.
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  31. Experience and Experiment in Art.Alva Noë - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):8-9.
    A significant impediment to the study of perceptual consciousness is our dependence on simplistic ideas about what experience is like. This is a point that has been made by Wittgenstein, and by philosophers working in the Phenomenological Tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, it is an observation that has been brought to the fore in recent discussions of consciousness among philosophers and cognitive scientists who have come to feel the need for a more rigorous phenomenology of experience. The central (...)
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  32.  9
    Reply to Campbell, Martin, and Kelly.Alva Noë - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):691-706.
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  33.  66
    Skill, Corporality and Alerting Capacity in an Account of Sensory Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë - 2006 - In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
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  34. On the Brain-Basis of Visual Consciousness: A Sensorimotor Account.Alva Noë & J. Kevin O'Regan - 2002 - In A. Noe & E. Thompson (eds.), Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. MIT Press. pp. 567--598.
  35.  53
    Ideology and the Third Realm (Or, a Short Essay on Knowing How to Philosophize).Alva Noë - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 196.
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  36. Thought and Experience.Alva Noe - 1999 - American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):257-65.
  37. The Deferential Brain in Action.Alva Noë & Susan Hurley - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (5):195-196.
    binding of colour and alphanumeric form in synaesthesia. Nature 410.
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  38.  29
    The Writerly Attitude.Alva Noë - 2017 - In Sabine Marienberg (ed.), Symbolic Articulation: Image, Word, and Body Between Action and Schema. De Gruyter. pp. 73-88.
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  39.  61
    What Does Change Blindness Teach Us About Consciousness?Alva Noë - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):218.
  40. Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action and The Embodied Mind, by Andy Clark.Alva Noë - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):611-618.
    Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action and The Embodied Mind, by ClarkAndy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
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  41.  77
    Acting Out Our Sensory Experience.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1011-1021.
    The most important clarification we bring in our reply to commentators concerns the problem of the “explanatory gap”: that is, the gulf that separates physical processes in the brain from the experienced quality of sensations. By adding two concepts (bodiliness and grabbiness) that were not stressed in the target article, we strengthen our claim and clarify why we think we have solved the explanatory gap problem, – not by dismissing qualia, but, on the contrary, by explaining why sensations have a (...)
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  42.  54
    Extending Our View of Mind.Alva Noë - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (6):237-238.
    In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark defends the idea that cognition depends constitutively on structures that are literally outside the body. Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? According to Clark, it is prejudice to think that the limits of the cognitive system must be those of the organism. Artifacts, symbols or tools (e.g. maps, landmarks, systems of writing, the abacus) might be no less linked with cognitive operations than what is internal. For example, the (...)
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  43. Understanding Action in Perception: Replies to Hickerson and Keijzer.Alva Noë - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):531 – 538.
    In this short essay I respond to the criticism of Action in Perception (2004) advanced by Ryan Hickerson and Fred Keijzer. In particular, I provide a brief precis of the main argument of Action in Perception. I seek to clarify the claims made in the book about the relation between perception and action, the importance of sensorimotor knowledge. I discuss the problem of "sensorimotor chauvinism," that of the "ping-pong playing robot," and the problem of perceptual presence.
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  44. Can Hunter-Gatherers Hear Color?Susan Hurley & Alva Noe - 2007 - In Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.), Common Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 55--83.
     
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  45.  50
    Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature: A Précis.Alva Noë - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):211-213.
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  46.  13
    Précis of Action In Perception: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.Alva Noë - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):660-665.
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  47.  46
    Seeing Beyond the Modules Toward the Subject of Perception.Alva Noë & Evan Thompson - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):386-387.
    Pylyshyn's model of visual perception leads to problems in understanding the nature of perceptual experience. The cause of the problems is an underlying lack of clarity about the relation between the operation of the subpersonal vision module and visual perception at the level of the subject or person.
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  48. Perception, Action, and Nonconceptual Content.Alva Noe - manuscript
    profile deforms as we move about it. As perceivers we are masters of the patterns of sensorimotor contingency that shape our perceptual interaction with the world. We expect changes in such things as apparent size, shape and color to occur as we actively explore the environment. In encountering perspective-dependent changes of this sort, we learn how things are quite apart form our particular perspective. Our possession of these skills is constitutive of our ability to see . This is confirmed by (...)
     
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  49.  69
    Perception and Content.Alva Noë - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):154-155.
    It is argued that to have an experience is to be in a phenomenal state with A-conscious content. Perceptual contents are always both P-conscious and A-conscious.
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  50. Précis of Action in Perception: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. [REVIEW]Alva Noë - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):660–665.
    The main idea of this book is that perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do. Think of a blind person taptapping his or her way around a cluttered space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is. The world makes itself available to (...)
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