J. Wackernagel and E. Löfstedt have both drawn attention to Pindar's ‘Neigung, das Futurum zu setzen bei Verben, die eine jetzt vorhandene, aber auf zukünftiges Tun abzielende Willensrichtung ausdrücken’. But they regarded this as a purely grammatical phenomenon, and did not note that the Pindaric use is practically limited to statements of the type, ‘I shall sing, glorify, testify, etc.’. It was E. Bundy who first drew attention to the conventional nature of these futures and so ended years of misunderstanding. (...) So, for example, Wilamowitz considered that P. 1.75 represented an optative with while Slotty, following Breyer, thought that N. 9. 10 was an aorist subjunctive ‘auf Grund des pindarischen Sprachgebrauches’! Postgate, following Gildersleeve, thought that 0. 8. 57 represented though the contrary would appear to be more true, cf. 0. 13. 11: and also Hoekstra sees in the future ‘den Nebenbegriff des Konnens’. (shrink)

The commentators for the most part observe a religious silence on pars extrema; yet there is a difficulty, as the meaning required ‘the least important part’, or ‘the merest fringe’, is hardly justified by usage. The words should mean ‘the last part’ (cf. Cic. Verr. 2. 1. 36. 92 ‘in codicis extrema cera’, 2. 2. 78.

In writing on a subject in which the most significant words have been used in quite different senses by modern authors, I think it most prudent to begin by defining my terms. By rhythmical prose I mean all prose in which the writer consciously follows a definite scheme in order to obtain particular cadences at the close of the period or within it, and this whether the favoured cadences are marked by quantity or by accent. I subdivide rhythmical prose into (...) metrical and accentual. The latter term explains itself. In spite of Aristotle's familiar opposition of ṕÅθμóσ and μτρ¿ν, I use the word ‘metrical’ of quantitative prose, both because the term ‘quantitative prose’ seems to me cumbrous, and because to the speakers of any modern language metre is the natural opposite of stress accent, whether in prose or in verse; and Aristotle's terminology, which takes no account of stress accent, may reasonably be displaced by the modern distinction. (For the beginnings of this later usage in post-classical theoreticians cf. (shrink)

Most modern editors adopt one or other of two readings: quot gradibus domus ista Remi se sustulit! olim / unus erat etc.; qua gradibus domus ista Remi se sustulit, olim / unus erat etc. It is true that a large number of steps leading up to a temple is an indicationof its magnificence; cf. Ovid, Pont. 3. 2. 49 f. templa manent hodie vastis innixa columnis, / perque quater denos itur in ilia gradus. Nevertheless in this context qua is more (...) probable than quot, in view of the local relative clauses in line 1 and line 3. (shrink)

Most modern editors adopt one or other of two readings: quot gradibus domus ista Remi se sustulit! olim / unus erat etc.; qua gradibus domus ista Remi se sustulit, olim / unus erat etc. It is true that a large number of steps leading up to a temple is an indicationof its magnificence; cf. Ovid, Pont. 3. 2. 49 f. templa manent hodie vastis innixa columnis, / perque quater denos itur in ilia gradus. Nevertheless in this context qua is more (...) probable than quot, in view of the local relative clauses in line 1 and line 3. (shrink)

Objectives The objectives of the study are to understand the current practice of informed consent in medical research in public hospitals in Shanghai, and to share our views with other countries, especially developing countries. Methods In the study, 145 consent forms (CFs) of the selected research projects in eight public hospitals with ethics committees in Shanghai were audited, and the principle investigators (PIs) of these research projects and 40 student subjects who had participated in clinical drug tests were surveyed by (...) questionnaires. Results The CFs of medical researches in public hospitals with ethics committees in Shanghai were generally acceptable. However, there were some defects in the CFs. Although most of the surveyed PIs had correct recognition of informed consent, some processes of informed consent were not in accordance with generally accepted requirements. A large number of the PIs considered the greatest difficulty with informal consent was lack of correct recognition of subjects or legally authorised representatives on medical research. Discussion Informed consent in medical research should consider the research ethics, the background of potential subjects, the local resources and culture of medical research. In addition, special protection is needed for student subjects in informed consent as well as efforts for building and restoring the public's trust in biomedical research. Conclusion The informed consent in Shanghai's public hospitals with ethics committees was generally acceptable and the achievement of adequate informed consent is influenced by many factors. (shrink)

1. The use of the imperfect τικτε ‘was the mother of’, with τíκτουσα; νίκων, ο νικντες; διδος is well known, and no doubt correctly explained. Reference is frequently made to Virgil's quem dat Sidonia Dido, but δίδου seems not to be used, no doubt because it is so extensively used in the sense of ‘offered’. In T. 7. 56. 3 περιεγíγνοντο seems to be a substitute for νíκων, ‘were victorious’; cf. φερε in Find. O. 10 , 74 ‘was prizewinner’ —the (...) other winners all have an aorist. So too Pyth. 3. 44. (shrink)

1. The use of the imperfect τικτε ‘was the mother of’, with τíκτουσα; νίκων, ο νικντες; διδος is well known, and no doubt correctly explained. Reference is frequently made to Virgil's quem dat Sidonia Dido, but δίδου seems not to be used, no doubt because it is so extensively used in the sense of ‘offered’. In T. 7. 56. 3 περιεγíγνοντο seems to be a substitute for νíκων, ‘were victorious’; cf. φερε in Find. O. 10, 74 ‘was prizewinner’ —the other (...) winners all have an aorist. So too Pyth. 3. 44. (shrink)

For the senseless inira some manuscripts have inire or in arva, and the latter stands in the text of Baehrens . The attempts at emendation may be divided into two groups, those altering only inira and those tampering with ibat as well. I pass over the latter group, as Robinson Ellis, in his commentary, p. 125, has defended ibat sufficiently by reference to the frequent ñει in Babrius, Avianus’ model. The former group is represented by Withof and Robinson Ellis himself (...) ; and the editors of the Loeb text of the Minor Latin Poets, in 1934, had the verse printed with this in ora. Nobody seems to have seen that the verse-maker had to express the idea of the panther's pride. Therefore I propose ibat in (astra, a metaphorical phrase for the animal's conceit. For this metaphor cf. Horace's famous feriam sidera, for ibat Virg. Aen. 9. 641 sic itur ad astra, for in astra at the same place of the pentameter after a verb of motion Prop. 3. 18, 34 cessit in astra; Ov. Fast. 2. 478 and 3. 186 venit in astra. Avianus himself has this in astra before the last word of the pentameter in two more passages, 15. 8,19. 6. (shrink)

In many contexts a retraction of commitment isfrowned upon. For instance, it is not appreciated,generally, if one withdraws a promise or denies anearlier statement. Critical discussion, too, caneasily be disrupted by retractions, if these occur toofrequently and at critical points. But on the otherhand, the very goal of critical discussion –resolution of a dispute – involves a retraction,either of doubt, or of some expressed point of view.A person who never retracts, not even under pressureof cogent arguments, would hardly qualify as (...) areasonable discussant. Also, inconsistencies in one'sposition, once they have been pointed out, must bedealt with by some kind of retraction. The problem ofretraction is to find a suitable model of dialoguethat allows retractions where they seem reasonable, oreven required, and rules them out (or puts sanctionsupon them) whenever they would become disruptive of awell-organized process of dialogue.The present paper tries to point to a solution basedon the following principles: (1) Retraction rulesdetermine what retractions are permissible, and (2) ifpermissible what the consequences of retraction are.(3) Retraction rules vary according to the type ofdialogue and (4) according to the type of commitmentretracted. For instance, assertions and mereconcessions need to be distinguished, as well aslight-side and dark-side commitments. (5) To accountfor our contradictory intuitions on the issue ofretractions, one may best resort to a complex type ofdialogue in which different retraction rules hold fordifferent parts.The paper explains, summarizes, and expands upon thediscussion of retraction in Commitment inDialogue by Douglas Walton and the present author(cf. Walton and Krabbe 1995). (shrink)

Neuroscience hasn’t shown how quite similar sensory circuits encode quite different colors and other qualia, nor how the unified pictorial form of images is encoded, nor how these codes yield conscious images. Neuroscience’s fixation here on cortical codes may be the culprit. Treating conscious images partly as retinal substances may avoid these problems. The evidence for conscious retinal images is that (a) the cortical codes for images are quite problematic, (b) injecting retinas with certain genes turns dichromats into trichromats without (...) cortical help, (c) retinas can discern colors by themselves without cortex, (d) retinal distortions appear in images but cortical distortions don’t, (e) retinal detectors support finely detailed colors, but V4 detectors don’t, due to their big receptive fields, (f) retinal activity has pictorial form, but viable cortical codes for pictorial form don’t exist. So, the colors and unified pictorial form of images arguably arise mainly across arrays of retinal detectors—not from abstract cortical codes. Images may be hidden in retinal activity beyond what EEGs show of it (cf. Strawson’s monism). Also, cortex refines these retinal images but cortical impairment (anesthesia, lesions, etc.) blocks awareness of them, for they’re no longer accessible to the mind’s subject-centered consciousness, resident in cortex. This proposal is largely testable and based in recent evidence. It avoids neuroscience’s elusive, problematic coded images and enigmatic explanations of how they become conscious. (shrink)

This paper attempts to relax the tension between Adam Smith's claim that sympathy involves an evaluative act of imaginative projection and his claim that sympathy involves a non-evaluative act of imaginative identification. The first section locates the tension specifically in the two different ways Smith depicts the stance adopted by the sympathizer. The second section argues that we can relax this tension by finding an important role for a non-evaluative stance in Smith's normative account of moral evaluation. This solution protects (...) the continuity in Smith's account of sympathy (cf. Griswold 1999: 99–103). Because of the particular way in which it renders intelligible the relationship between the evaluative and non-evaluative stances, this solution also emphasizes the importance that respect for the agent's conscience has in Smith's conception of an ideal moral judge (cf. Darwall 2004; 2006). The third section investigates a possible systematic basis for Smith's normative commitment to respectful moral judgment. (shrink)

Philosophers of social science have emphasized mechanistic approaches to causal inquiry for some time now, showing why focusing on the mechanisms behind correlations is preferable to focusing on correlations alone (cf. Johnson 2006, Little 1991, Reiss 2007, 2009, Steel 2004, see also King, Keohane, and Verba 1994 for an example of purely correlational research). In Process Tracing: from Metaphor to Analytic Tool, political scientists Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel present a concrete method for finding evidence of causal mechanisms, process tracing. (...) Process tracers give evidence for causal relations in terms of the observable implications of the underlying causal mechanisms through which a putative cause affects some effect of interest. Such observable implications often take the form of a chain of events, or process, which connects cause and effect. Though Process Tracing contains applications of mechanistic reasoning unfamiliar to philosophers, and as such will be of interest to those working in the mechanist tradition, Bennett and Checkel’s own discussion of the philosophical foundations of process tracing is limited. The reader will have to delve deep into the volume’s contributed chapters for links between the literature on causation and this new method. (shrink)

βρυχεδανς : πολυφγος, ο δ μακρς. For μακρς read μργος. ζγγος· τν μελισσν χος, κα τν μοων. L. and S. translate literally, ‘humming of bees, etc.’; but to buzz or hum is not a common property of insects, it is peculiar to a few. For τν μοων I suggest τν μυιν. ζγγος refers especially to the buzz, or ‘ping’, of a mosquito , LL. zanzara; cf. Cassiodorus ‘Ciniphes genus est culicum, fixis aculeis permolestum, quas vulgus consuevit vocare zinzalas’; and in (...) the Appendix, De Wit adds: ‘zinzala; parva musca, id est culex; unde zinzalarium, conopeum ad eas arcendas, Gloss. Ugut. ’—i.e. a mosquito-net. Culex, by the way, is an interesting and a homely word; we lack mosquitoes in Scotland, but we know the angry bite of a ‘horse-fly’ and call it a ‘cleg’. (shrink)

I. In Skr. medín we have an Indo-Iranian -in derivative of a proethnic start-form met-sdos ‘co-sedens,’ whose initial s may have been lost by haplology, but cf. Av. mat ‘μετά.’ Homeric xs1F02oζoς ‘attendant’ is a like compound, meaning co-sedens and not ‘mitgänger’ , but has suffered psilosis. Out of composition, unless the ‘suffix’ conceals a posterius, we may have a further cognate in Lat. sodalis ‘boon-companion,’ wherein sodā- may have meant something like ‘session’.

I. Latin interpres, miles etc. and the confix -et-, ‘errans,’ cf. -etum ‘allee.’In Am. Jr. Phil. 28, 413 I derived the suffix in Gothic fram-aps ‘alienus’, Latin com-et- ‘socius– and Greek τ ‘comites’ from the root et- ‘errare, ire’; and I proposed the name ‘confix’ for a suffix whose origin could be traced back to an original compounding element. I now find further evidence for the confix -et- in Latin interpret-, ‘go-between’; and I explain pr-et- as a fusion-product of the (...) synonymous roots PER- and ET- ‘errare, ire’. Nor is this explanation in conflict with the current comparison between interpres and Gothic frops ‘klug, verstandig’: it is simply that ‘go-between’ is nearer the meaning. The wisdom attributed to the wanderer, to the traveller in far lands,–an idea forever embalmed for English folk in Shakespeare's counter-turn. (shrink)

Latin ‘plvs.’—To begin somewhat remotely, I am not satisfied with the current explanation of Lat. plus. As regards pleores, to pass over Cuny's mistaken derivation in MSL. 16. 322, the explanation from plēyōses is correct— IE. plēyo. : plēyos–:: Sk. návya: compv. návyas, cf. pánya: pányas and távya: távyas. IE. plēyes also appears, not only in Sanskrit as prắyas and in πλε–ων , but, by a quite rigorous phonetic, in O.Norse fleiri, from a primate flaiz-an (...) ‘sow,’ borrowed from a North Germanic verb-stem sā–ya shrink)

Three famous sophists are referred to together in the Apology of Sokrates as still practising their enviably lucrative itinerant profession in 399 b.c. : Gorgias of Leontinoi, Prodikos of Keos and Hippias of Elis. The last of these was the least well known to the Athenian demos, having practised mainly in I Dorian cities. There is no extant reference to him in Old Comedy, but we can assume that he was sufficiently famous – especially for his fees – to justify (...) his inclusion as the third of this ‘triad’; cf. the triad Protagoras – Hippias – Prodikos in the Protagoras, considered further below. Gorgias was by now a grand old man of about ninety , the last survivor of the first generation of fee-taking educators, associated first and foremost in the popular mind with the suspect arts of political and forensic persuasion. Prodikos and Hippias were probably in their sixties. (shrink)

This is the reading of M. presumably arose from a dittography . has been generally accepted. The adverbial use of an adjective qualifying the subject of an imperative appears to be at least unusual; no examples are quoted by Kühner–Gerth, i. 274–6. Robortello, followed by Tucker, preferred : but the earliest certain appearance of the adverb seems to be in Aristotle. I would propose : cf. Supp. 1015, Th. 34. This is no less satisfactory palaeographically, and the participle is demonstrably (...) idiomatic Greek. (shrink)

This verb is of quite general signification in Plautus ‘facit, reddit, comparat,’ and the like. Minuter definitions are given by the glossists, e.g. συνκᾱττúει ‘sews together’ , arte facit aut componit, conflectit; cf. also concinnatura κόλλσις . In view of Latin ciet ‘moves, stirs, shakes; excites, rouses; causes, occasions,’ and of Greek κινεȋ ‘sets in motion, moves, removes; changes, alters, sets agoing, causes, calls forth,’ we might define concinnat by ‘moves, draws, puts together, joins.’.

continent. 1.3 (2011): 201-207. “Poetry is experience, linked to a vital approach, to a movement which is accomplished in the serious, purposeful course of life. In order to write a single line, one must have exhausted life.” —Maurice Blanchot (1982, 89) Nikos Karouzos had a communist teacher for a father and an orthodox priest for a grandfather. From his four years up to his high school graduation he was incessantly educated, reading the entire private library of his granddad, comprising mainly (...) the Orthodox Church Fathers and the ancient classics. Later on in his life he sold the library for money, only to buy a little more time before he went broke again: “I carry sorrow like a cage/ I got no birds/ as I come back from her hair/ I see the profit emptied/ cool from terror.” (1993, Ι, 101) Nowadays—and ridiculously recently—we are more than apt to speak of a certain insouciance pertaining to the Greek form of expenditure: expenditure without any type of investment, sometimes not (even) symbolic. In the vaults of the European unconscious, this imprudent stance still conjures a “capital punishment” in the form of de-capitation, reflecting back the fear of excess and the terror of its consequences.1 Thus the Greek way of living is very close to what a stranger could have termed as “the Greek way of dying.” Yet, what is not often understood is that the Greek esprit , the same one that invented the maxim μηδ?ν ?γαν (“nothing in excess”), does not experience death solely as an imminent fear of bankruptcy. For it miraculously combines its unconditional acceptance with the promise of a resurrection that is always there in the scents of Spring, from Dionysus to the orthodox Christ: “Everyone resurrects himself through dying [….] Resurrection is the switching of mortalities.” (2002, 94) Hence, if an entire library was imprudently traded for a plate with seven olives, a sliced tomato and some fresh goat cheese, let us not be fooled: this is not the meal of the pauper, but that of “an aristocrat from God” (1993, II, 491) feeding his eloquent loudmouth, ridiculously cut open in an otherwise rock-solid caput . *** To speak of the Greek experience is to speak about a half-dead language that still utters in life what is seemingly excluded from it and thus forbidden to be talked about: death. Death as anything that is out of this world, as something that will never return . Still, along with an experience of death that recently waned as a worn-out academic fashion, the Greek experience is dead too. Nearly 2300 years of written words separating Homer from the fall of Byzantium equal 500 books on a library traded for money: “I am with the killed. Hence my deepest solitude. I do not feel this tremendous macho society, beyond from the fact that it is a ruthlessly consuming one. It is me who pays all the time .” (2002, 57) Let us do the math and see how much this dealing with the Greek experience is costing the poet and how much dealing with the Greek experience might cost us today. *** “I do not guarantee a single word.” (Karouzos, 1993, II, 454) Through its various dialects and forms, the Greek language speaks through an incessant historical dissemination. Anyone who is aware of this terrifying polymorphy and still calls himself a poet, must stand against a white sheet of paper, pen-in-hand, with a very particular duty: to be as fully inconsistent as possible. In the formally ironic uniqueness of the poem, the poet functions as “a band-aid for lesser and greater antinomies.” (1993, I, 251) Of course these antinomies are not exhausted in language—they are historical, political and, alas, existential. Yet, beyond appearances , it is language that ruthlessly encodes them through history, submitting the poet to the temptation of placing them one next to the other on a single white sheet. The closer their neighboring, the greater the scattering of the writer in the ironic uniqueness of the paper. In a work where poetic license is described as a “freedom-impasse” (2002, 51), this task is undertaken in full conscience of its personal consequences: “what I am interested in is to escape my individuality (envisioning the non-ego) […] Nevertheless, my dissociations never achieve duration.” (2002, 74-75) Hence, though poetry is the “deserted direction of will,” (1998, 62) the stance of the poet is not that of a Nietzschean “great man.”2 Whereas drunkenness provides a thread between the poem and the excess it both presupposes and infuses (“Poetry always enlarges. ‘Drunkenness’ is nothing more than that,” (2002, 85)), whereas language flashes in loudmouth spurts of déraison (“When I am alone I do something else. I utter words. For example, while having my ouzo and listening to music I am most likely capable of randomly shouting ‘Electricity!’” (2002, 138)), the poet never gives in to the double affirmation that would eventually risk the “element of pleasure in discourse.” (2002, 80)” It is exactly because the gap of the antinomies is so vast that poetry is not meant to be written with a hammer. Neither does writing consist in a reevaluation of those elements. In short, poetry is not an affirmation of difference, but the surprising beauty of chiming antinomies. We might never transcend them, but it is up to us to put them together. Yet again, this voisinage is not to be identified with the necessity of chance as an eternal return.4 On the contrary it is a return from that very return : Let us treat Yes as a No to No and No as a Yes […] And let us not forget that this pissed affirmation crumbled down Nietzsche’s intellect in the dark paths of this world. (2002, 88) This return from the “vicious circle” should in no way be taken as a form of artistic prudence. Rather it can be seen as a dribble of demonic inconsistency as Dionysus transforms himself into a Christ that is in turn de-theologized: “Who can forbid that? Every man is capable of his own theology, nothing can stop him.” (2002, 73-74) This is a turn towards an existential vision of the world, historically coinciding with a particular political defeat of the Left, to which the poet devoted all his life: after the defeat of the popular front I raised the question “why do we exist?” while others were asking “why we failed.” (2002, 57)5 But most of all it is a return to poetry that exceeds the existential question itself, going beyond the issue of faith. Poetry comes in as a question of return after a defeat that is confessed in full profanity. Though it accepts the necessity of the defeat, it does not affirm it. Though it negates it, the negation is not in the name of a promise to be delivered in the kingdom of heavens. Following a historical and existential defeat, poetry is born post mortem . It signals a return to Christ as “groundless religiousness in the surprise of the real as such” (2002, 72) which is at once a return to the refuge of childhood. It is not a question of endurance towards an eternal return. Rather it is a question on the possibility of an existential return. Returning in a world as someone who cannot enjoy any returns exactly because he is averse to guarantees. A return without returns. *** PHOTOCOPY OF HAPPINESS When I was young I used to pin down cicadas and step on ant nests. I used to stand there silent for hours. With threads I decapitated bees. Now I am a dead man breathing. (Karouzos, 1993, II, 336.) The return to the “paradise of childhood” (2002, 68) constitutes the devouring refuge of its own memory when defeat becomes the synonym of adulthood. The political struggles of a young communist in a country torn up by a civil war right after World War II fraught with incarcerations and exiles. Historically they resulted in the defeat of the communist movement in Greece and opened up a long turbulent road that would peak in the dictatorship of 1967. Existentially they led to a series of disillusionments: mental breakdown, divorce, abandonment of studies in law school. To the question “why do we exist” the answer was poetry. Still this exposé should not be read as a sweeping chronography of a man. For it actually happens to coincide with the historical fate of a nation that after its modern constitution never stopped dreaming of the glories of its past youth, in a present that was (and is) sweepingly disappointing. But isn’t this return to youth finally a way of compensating for a loss of youth that necessarily results in a losing adulthood? Will Greeks, the eternal children of Plato and Nietzsche, ever learn? How to return without dying, how to remember without wasting time? WE ARE IN THE OPEN MEANING Living the coldest mauve night right across Parthenon I went to take a piss on some foliage and I was enjoying the foliage as it was steaming. (Karouzos, 1993, II, 340) Beyond the historical tragedies of modern Greece and away from any personal disappointments, the relation that this land holds with language and history is mediated through the Greek light—whose omnipresence is the very condition of its transcendence. All historical contradictions from Dionysus to Christ took place under this light; all those disseminated dialects were spoken beneath its warmth. To paraphrase Lévinas,6 light is both the condition of the world and of our withdrawal from it—a withdrawal towards the invisibility of God, of the dead, of meta-physics, resulting from the temptation that all is still here, behind this light the visibility of which they once evaded: “birds, the allurement of God.” (1993, I, 17) Under that luminous sky, if Greeks can do anything at all, it is to envision a return that will never come. All they can do is write poetry—which is doing nothing; other than lending an ear to a disseminated language whispering a unity that cannot be promised, as an adulthood in defeat is ready to recognize. Trying “to trap the invisible in visibility” (1993, II, 483) they forget that they have grown up and one day they die—with the promise of return. Hence an additional meaning must be given to this return to childhood. It does not signal salvation but rather its promise. To the ears of an aged continent it means that the return to/of poetry is a losing game, a return without returns. “Europe, Europe… you are nothing more than the continuation of Barabbas.” (1993, I, 295) *** “Life is not there to verify theories.”7 The records show that Karouzos was finally given a second-class pension from the Greek government, at the time when he was being recognized by the literary press as one of Greece’s major contemporary poets. Being neither a bourgeois nor a nobelist, he proclaimed himself to be an anarcho-communist, unconditionally faithful to the utopia of a classless society. He also drank, heavily. “Capitalism made an animal out of man/ Marxism made an animal out of truth/ Shut up.” (1993, II, 369) Perhaps one of the most scandalous divides of our times has been the one between the living and the dead, the latent prohibition that the living should not be concerned with the dead based on the mere impossibility of the dead to be concerned with the living in the first place. What adds to this scandal is that this divide abuses anything that cannot return to us by subsuming it under the same futility. Hence death is no longer “loss” in the usual sense. It no more refers to the things we lost but to our “loss” (of time, money and well-being) as we insist to dwell on them. Death is a waste —of time. It is this waste that we find in the insouciance of Greek expenditure; the waste in dealing with a language that most of its historical part is no longer spoken (a dead language); the waste in translating a poet who is ex definitio untranslatable; the waste of his vision, his money, his life. The waste of dealing with anything that cannot return and that cannot bring in any returns . But it is also the waste of life that poetry itself presupposes, the waste of dealing with invisibility, with anything that is out of this world and thus invokes the fear of death that is in turn—and surprisingly— nowhere to be found. Instead of death, what is there, beyond the light, is the being without us (to recall the Lévinasian il y a ), the mumble of our own nothingness which constitutes the price to be paid for writing poetry under an evergreek light. To understand this to-and-fro, is to realize that poetry is something out of this world that nevertheless takes place in this world, by virtue of this world. But to ridiculously equate this to-and-fro with death as non-existence, is to exile poetry along with its own possibility from this same old world: I do not believe that poetry will ever disappear from this world. […] But I am also sure that it does not have many chances of playing, as you say, a redemptive role in our vertiginous technological future. Without being endangered as a creative need, it will be placed on the side of history. (2002, 32) It is mainly there that we would like to locate the meaning of Nikos Karouzos’s poetry today. If we are willing to include the Greek original it is because we consider that it will be both a waste of time for us to do so (since most of you cannot read Greek) and because it might induce you to the even larger waste of learning it. We would additionally be glad if this small introduction served as an equally wasteful, academically useless piece of reading, gesturing towards a taboo of investing in anything Greek—that is in anything dead among the living, in anything that will never come back and maybe was never here in the first place. This is the only way to reserve for ourselves the possibility of poetry and preserve the light of its promise. “To return: that is the miracle.” (1993, I, 17) Athens, Greece July 10, 2011 NOTES 1 “ Capitale (a Late Latin word based on caput “head”) emerged in the twelfth to thirteenth centuries in the sense of funds, stock of merchandise, sum of money or money carrying interest.[…] The word and the reality it stood for appear in the sermons of St. Bernardino of Siena (1380-1444) ‘… quamdam seminalem rationem lucrosi quam communiter capitale vocamus ’, ‘that prolific cause of wealth that we commonly call capital’” (Braudel, 1992, 232-233). 2 “A great man – a man whom nature has constructed and invented in the grand style – what is he? First : there is a long logic in all of his activity, hard to survey because of its length, and consequently misleading; he has the ability to extend his will across great stretches of his life and to despise and reject everything petty about him, including even the fairest, ‘divinest’ things in the world.” (Nietzsche, 1968, 505, §962) 3 Cf. Deleuze, 1986, 186-9. 4 “Return is the being of becoming, the unity of multiplicity, the necessity of chance: the being of difference as such or the eternal return.” (Deleuze, 189)5 In this 1982 interview Karouzos refers to the defeat of the communist movement in Greece after the civil war of 1946-1949 between the Governmental Army and the Democratic Army of Greece, the military division of the Greek communist party. Karouzos’s father was a member of the communist National Liberation front (EAM) members of which formed the mainl resistance movement (ELAS) in Greece during WWII. The poet was a member of the United Panhellenic Organization of Youth (EPON), which was a youth division of EAM. After the end of the war, ELAS was called to disarmament in view of the formation of a National Army. The members of EAM resigned from the government of national unity and a series of protests led to a 3 year civil war between ELAS and the Government Army. After the defeat of ELAS the Communist party was outlawed and many communists were exiled in deserted Greek islands. Karouzos, who took action in the Greek resistance and was active during the Greek civil war, was exiled in Icaria on 1947 and in Makronisos on 1953 where he was called two years earlier to do his military service. 6 “Existence in the world qua light, which makes desire possible, is then, in the midst of being, the possibility of detaching oneself from being. To enter into being is to link up with objects; it is in effect a bond that is already tainted with nullity. It is already to escape anonymity. In this world where everything seems to affirm our solidarity with the totality of existence, where we are caught up in the gears of a universal mechanism, our first feeling, our ineradicable illusion, is a feeling or illusion of freedom. To be in the world is this hesitation, this interval in existing, which we have seen in the analyses of fatigue and the present.” (Lévinas, 1988,43-4) 7from a TV interview. THE POETRY OF NIKOS KAROUZOS From Redwriter [ Ερυθρογρ?φος ], in Collected Works, Vol . II, Athens: Ikaros. 1993, 463-4. [Athens: Apopeira, 1990, 9-10.] JESUS ANTI-OEDIPUS* Why were we once saving till the fifth day the Paschal lamb? The scriptures say: with this victim’s meat we ought to cleanse all of our senses. To give life to the whitest wave miraculous odors in the extension of the chest. Ideals to death. For us to witness the illustrious dawns of Absinthe and for the soul to be a deeply carved ornament on the fore we named will. Then many deer running amidst the evergreen growth with watery hymns, then, the unintended angels descending with heights spiraling in their momentum offer themselves to the luminous Adventure. Whence the need for speech and our sufferings covered with flags like the glorified dead. An incorporeal finger pointing at the flamboyant and fragrant holocausts within the tired horizons and the exhausted breadths with joys of the mistletoe on fire and shivering all of the green-leaved love. Something would have chirped again had we not driven it away— maybe the ewe’s grass. Something would have called us to the eternal resurrection— maybe the grace of spring. But now our heart is fiercely blinded, withdrawn to the appearances of Hades. Silence and ice incessantly cover the Infant Spirit in thatched times. While the cherry trees are dreaming faintly glowing in absolute darkness there’s nothing the Babylonians can contemplate in labs with automatic colored lights. How to rejoice now in the fifth day of the lamb? We have forked the stars. We’ve gradually become supposedly sublime with plucked chimeras in our hands. Avenged relentlessly by science. *Though the poem appears in a 1990 collection, it was actually written in 1968. Hence the reader must be aware in not associating Karouzos’ Anti-Oedipus with the famous 1972 work of Deleuze and Guattari, given that the former precedes the latter. ΙΗΣΟΥΣ ΑΝΤΙ-ΟΙΔΙΠΟΥΣ Γιατ? κρατο?σαμε κ?ποτε ?ς την π?μπτη μ?ρα το πασχαλιν? πρ?βατο; Τα κε?μενα λ?νε: μ’ αυτο? του θ?ματος το κρ?ας ?πρεπε να καθαρ?σουμε ?λες τις αισθ?σεις. Για να δ?σουμε κ?μα στη ζω? λευκ?τατο θαυμ?σιες ευωδι?ς στην ?κταση του στ?θους. Ιδανικ? στο χ?ρο. Για να βλ?πουμε τα λαμπρ? χαρ?ματα του ?ψινθου και να ’ναι η ψυχ? στ?λισμα βαθυχ?ρακτο της πλ?ρης που την ε?παμε θ?ληση. Τ?τε πολλ?ς δορκ?δες τρ?χοντας αν?μεσα στην καταπρ?σινη φ?ση με τους υδ?τινους ?μνους, τ?τε, κατεβα?νοντας οι αθ?λητοι ?γγελοι με κυλινδο?μενο το ?ψος στην ορμ? τους χαρ?ζονται της αστραφτερ?ς Περιπ?τειας. ?θεν η μιλι? γι’ αυτ? χρει?ζεται και τα δειν? σκεπ?ζονται ωσ?ν τους τιμημ?νους νεκρο?ς με σημα?ες. Ασ?ματο δ?χτυλο δε?χνει τα φλογ?δη και μοσχοβ?λα ολοκαυτ?ματα στους κουρασμ?νους ορ?ζοντες στα εξουθενωμ?να πλ?τη καθ?ς αν?βουν οι χαρ?ς του νερα?δ?ξυλου και τρ?μει ολ?κληρη η πρασιν?φυλλη αγ?πη. Κ?τι θα κελαηδο?σε π?λι αν δεν το δι?χναμε— μπορε? της προβατ?νας το χορτ?ρι. Κ?τι θα μας καλο?σε στην απ?ραντη αν?σταση— μπορε? του ?αρος η χ?ρη. Μα η καρδι? μας ?γρια τυφλ?θηκε π?ρασε στα φαιν?μενα του ?δη. Σιγ? και π?γος αδι?κοπα σκεπ?ζει στους αχυρ?νιους καιρο?ς το Ν?πιο Πνε?μα. Την ?ρα που ονειρε?ονται οι βυσσινι?ς και λ?μπουν αμυδρ? μεσ’ στο απλ?τατο σκοτ?δι τ?ποτα δε στοχ?ζονται οι βαβυλ?νιοι στα εργαστ?ρια με τ’ αυτ?ματα χρωματιστ? φ?τα. Π?ς να χαρο?με πια την π?μπτη μ?ρα του προβ?του; Φουρκ?σαμε τ’ αστ?ρια. Γ?ναμε σιγ?-σιγ? δ?θεν υπ?ροχοι με μαδημ?νες χ?μαιρες στα χ?ρια. Μας ν?μεται σκληρ? η επιστ?μη. From: Redwriter [Ερυθρογρ?φος], in Collected Works, Vol. II, Athens: Ikaros. 1993, 472. [Athens: Apopeira, 1990, 18.] DIALECTΙCS OF SPRING Christ the straight angle; Christ the Pythagorean theorem. Christ the infinitesimal calculus from above the blessed Sets Christ. Christ the tessellation of massive particles Christ the zero mass. Hence we spray numbers and fields of lust. We are carabineers of diseased logic plus something— Observed means observer and Hekate The darkness luminous and light in the dark Astarte banqueters demons from today. ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΗ ΤΟΥ ΕΑΡΟΣ Χριστ?ς η ορθ? γων?α· Χριστ?ς το πυθαγ?ριο θε?ρημα. Χριστ?ς ο απειροστικ?ς λογισμ?ς ?νωθεν ?λβια Χριστ?ς τα Σ?νολα. Χριστ?ς η ψηφιδογραφ?α στα μαζικ? σωμ?τια Χριστ?ς η μ?ζα μηδ?ν. ?ρα ψεκ?ζουμε αριθμο?ς και πεδ?α λαγνε?ας. Ε?μαστε τυφεκιοφ?ροι νοσο?σης λογικ?ς και κ?τι-- παρατηρο?μενο σημα?νει παρατηρητ?ς και Εκ?τη σκ?τος το π?μφωτο και φως εν τ? σκοτ?? η Αστ?ρτη συνδαιτημ?νες δα?μονες απ’ ?ρτι. From: Redwriter [Ερυθρογρ?φος], Athens: Apopeira, 1990, 18. [1993, II, 472]. CREDO (as we are used to say in Latin) Α I believe in one Poet expelled from heavens / fugitive from the god and vagabond, Empedocles / and here on earth / exile on the earth etc. of Baudelaire /. Β I believe in one Computer inside thunder and through matter. Γ Suffering undefiled / substantive / the Poet uplifts himself slow-burning suicidal implying lengthy sleeps. Δ Cutting down on prospective mistakes. Ε Of all things visible and invisible officiating the onion-peelings. Ζ The Poet has nothing / see the departed /. Η I believe in one Poet that says: madness I enjoy; he ridicules existence; let me light up from my mana. Θ Syntax he doesn’t care about when musicality commands him. Along with still more licenses, and Ts are played according to the concept sound anywhere. E.g. the winters here, he winters there; it will not come—I will not rest, etc. etc. Ι The Poet exercises thought until it’s stripped down. Κ And if he’s Greek he must always study the fineness of Attica, in light, mountains, fields and sea. For this fineness teaches language. Λ And if he’s deeply destined the Poet expresses the unexplainable of the explained; he happens to be a rightful heir to the scientist and his predecessor. Μ On the froth he does not last; the Poet blusters at the bottom of the pot. Ν Flamebred and never redeemed. Ξ The Poet must sometimes say: what a consumption of presence — be a bit lonely for a change! Ο The Poet is twilit. Π He is susceptible of deaths and resurrections. Ρ He looks from the corner of his eye and exists in a glance. Σ He follows behind the mother. Τ Eveningless when it comes to age. Υ I believe in one Poet who says: let the purities coincide. Until the Corinth of the Universe or even further. Φ In a higher despair. Χ In a brighter quintessence. Ψ In one sensation that lifts off. Ω Forgiving everyone. CREDO (ως ε?θισται να λ?με λατινιστ?) Α Πιστε?ω εις ?να Ποιητ?ν εκτ?ς ουρανο? / φυγ?ς θε?θεν και αλ?της, Εμπεδοκλ?ς / και επ? της γης / εξ?ριστος π?νω στη γη κ.λπ. του Βωδελα?ρου /. Β Πιστε?ω εις ?να Υπολογιστ?ν εντ?ς κεραυνο? και δια της ?λης. Γ Υποφ?ροντας ?χραντα / ουσιαστικ?ν / ο Ποιητ?ς ανατε?νεται βραδυφλεγ?ς αυτ?χειρας εξυπακο?οντας πολ?ωρους ?πνους. Δ Τα υποψ?φια λ?θη λιγοστε?οντας. Ε Ορατ?ν τε π?ντων και αορ?των ιερουργ?ντας την αποκρομμ?ωση. Ζ Ο Ποιτ?ς ?χει τ?ποτα / βλ?πε τους αναχωρ?σαντες /. Η Πιστε?ω εις ?να Ποιητ?ν που λ?ει: η τρ?λα μ’ αρ?σει· γελοιοποιε? την ?παρξη· ας αν?ψω απ’ τη μ?να μου. Θ Συνταχτικ? δεν το γνοι?ζεται στην προσταγ? της μουσικ?τητας. Μαζ? και μ’ ?λλες ακ?μη λευτερι?ς, και τα νυ πα?ζονται κατ? την ?ννοια ?χος οπουδ?ποτε. Π.χ. τον χειμ?να εδ?, το χειμ?να εκε?· δε θ? ’ρθει – δεν θα καταλαγι?σουμε, κ. λπ. κ.λπ. Ι Ο Ποιητ?ς γυμν?ζει τη σκ?ψη σε απογ?μνωση. Κ Κι αν ε?ναι ?λληνας οφε?λει να σπουδ?ζει π?ντοτε της Αττικ?ς τη λεπτ?τητα, σε φως, βουν?, χωρ?φια και θ?λασσα. Διδ?σκει γλ?σσα η λεπτ?τητα το?τη. Λ Κι αν ε?ναι βαθι? πεπρωμ?νος ο Ποιητ?ς εκφρ?ζει το ανεξ?γητο του εξηγητο?· τυγχ?νει ν?μιμος δι?δοχος του επιστ?μονα και προκ?τοχ?ς του. Μ Στον αφρ? δεν ?χει δι?ρκεια· στο πατοκ?ζανο μα?νεται ο Ποιητ?ς. Ν Φλογοδ?αιτος και ποτ? ξελυτρωμ?νος. Ξ Ο Ποιητ?ς κ?ποτε πρ?πει να λ?ει: μεγ?λη καταν?λωση παρουσ?ας – γενε?τε και λ?γο μοναξι?ρηδες! Ο Ο Ποιητ?ς ε?ναι αμφ?φλοξ. Π Επιδ?χεται θαν?τους και αναστ?σεις. Ρ Ακροθωρ?ζει και υπ?ρχει σε ξαφνοκο?ταγμα. Σ Ε?ναι ουραγ?ς της μητ?ρας. Τ Αν?σπερος απ? ηλικ?α. Υ Πιστε?ω εις ?να Ποιητ?ν που λ?ει: να συμπ?σουν οι αγν?τητες. Μ?χρι την Κ?ρινθο του Σ?μπαντος ? μακρ?τερα. Φ Σε αν?τερη απελπισ?α. Χ Σε φαειν?τερη πεμπτουσ?α. Ψ Σε μια α?σθηση που πτηνο?ται. Ω Συγχωρ?ντας τους π?ντες. From Large Sized Logic [ Λογικ? μεγ?λου σχ?ματος ], Athens: Erato, 1989, n.p. [1993, II, 521-3]. (shrink)

The wrong version of my article ‘Aspects of the Infinite in Kant’ was printed in the last issue of Mind (pp. 205–23). I should like to correct an error that thereby appeared on page 207. In A430–2/B458–60 of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant does not deny that what is (mathematically) infinite should be what I called an actual measurable totality—if, by its measure, we mean ‘the multiplicity of given units which it contains’. His point is simply that what makes (...) it infinite cannot be the fact that its measure is the greatest possible; for there is no such thing. What he has in mind here can be illustrated as follows. Take the infinite multiplicity of hours that have elapsed up to a given moment; then the multiplicity of minutes that have elapsed, and indeed the multiplicity of hours that will have elapsed an hour later, are both greater. No multiplicity is so great that it cannot be increased in this way. (Of course, standard contemporary formal work on the infinite has superseded Kant here. A modern mathematician would want either to quarrel with this or at least to refine it.) He also refuses to allow that an infinite multiplicity is a number (cf. BIII and A526–7/B554–5). In the end, he thinks, there is no saying what it is for something to be (mathematically) infinite without falling back on ‘the true transcendental concept of infinitude,’ namely ‘that the successive synthesis of units required for the enumeration of a quantum can never be completed’. (shrink)

Regret and disappointment have in common the fact that they are experienced when the outcome of a decision is unfavourable: They both concern “what might have been”, had things been different. However, some regret and disappointment theorists regard the differences between these emotions as important, arguing that they differ with respect to the conditions under which they are felt, and how they affect decision making. The goal of the present research was to examine whether and how these emotions also differ (...) with respect to the way in which they are experienced. Participants were asked torecall aninstance of intense regret or disappointment andto indicate what they felt, thought, felt like doing, did, and were motivated to do during this experience (cf. Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Significant differences between regret and disappointment were found in every category. These differences were most pronounced for “action tendencies” (what participants felt like doing) and “emotivations” (what they were motivated to do). These results suggest that the two emotions have differential implications for future behaviour. (shrink)

Selection operates at many levels. Some of the most obvious cases are organismic, such as changes in coloration under the influence of predation (cf. Kettlewell 1973; also Endler 1986). It also operates at other levels. Meiotic drive involves selection for a gene, independently of its effect on the organism. At a higher level, there may also be selection for patterns of colony growth in social insects, again under the influence of predation (cf. Wilson 1971). The appropriate level of selection is (...) a matter of the causal patterns exhibited, or the target of selection. It can also be understood as a question of the appropriate level at which to seek explanatory laws.Robert Brandon (1982, 1990) first clearly distinguished the question of the level of selection from debates over the units of selection. In doing so, he argued that the phenotype is commonly the target of selection, whatever the unit of selection might be. (shrink)

In nearly every modern society, patriotism, as a form of love related to one’s homeland, possesses its own specific semantic colours. This is so due to historical and cultural differences between nations. In recent debates about the condition of patriotism in Poland as well as political disputes, patriotism is often mentioned as, alongside with others, a civilian virtue. According to various research on public opinions, patriotism is recognised as one of the most distinctive characteristics of the Poles (beside religiousness and (...) resourcefulness). It is a virtue as well as an attitude which Poles manifest in various ways (from the so-called “football” patriotism to simple daily work solidly done with honesty and diligence for the good of one’s homeland). This paper presents a conception of patriotism from the Catholic Social Teaching viewpoint. This teaching, taking into account both Divine Revelation and past experiences of mankind (the socalled “hermeneutical arch” of Moral Theology, perceives the phenomenon of patriotism in a wider context such as nation, homeland, country and international community). The Church insists on upbringing and education of love towards one’s homeland, while distances its teaching clearly and decisively from racial prejudice and hypernationalism (cf. Ad Gentes, 15). (shrink)

The paper contains introductory remarks and is conceived of as a part of a larger project. First of all decisions are made as to the choice of an adequate concept of philosophy (which does not exclude other concepts of this field of interest). Among others philosophy as a very general domain of considerations is contrasted to logic and mathematics. Methods for philosophy are described in the way the natural sciences do it: methods are schemes for repeatable actions which in similar (...) circumstances result in similar or identical outcomes irrespective of the philosopher's (the performer's) views. Philosophers very often neglect repeatability and similarity of effects. Kazimierz Twardowski's method of the elimination of contradiction (cf. his paper „On the so-called relative truths”) is put forward as a paragon of further important methods of philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to consider the notions of economy, redundancy and optimality, with regard to language structure and its functioning in time and with regard to certain principles of the Universal Grammar. I argue that the notion of optimality needs not to be congruent with economy, and at odds with redundancy. On the contrary, if we hold realistic premises regarding the ontology of language (as Chomsky does) and think of language as a natural system existing in time, (...) then we should expect similar principles of organization in language as in other natural systems (cf. system theories: von Bertalanffy, Laszlo, Kauffman). In that approach, connecting optimality with economy is untenable. That stance is contrary to Chomsky's Minimalist Program, in which economy has become the actual principle of the Universal Grammar. I discusses a major inconsistency in Chomsky's assumptions about the nature of the language faculty and trace its possible origin. Key words: language system; language faculty; systems theory; economy principle; redundancy; optimality; edge-of-chaos theory; Minimalist Program. (shrink)

This article consisting of four points, shows the subject of multiple relationships between the realities of politics, ethics and the Catholic Church. The issue was presented on the basis of the writings and speeches of Joseph Ratzinger, the current Pope Benedict XVI. Article begins with a presentation of the relationship between politics and ethics as seen in historical perspective. The second section presents the so-called „political ethics” of the first Christian communities in the light of the indications contained in some (...) of the New Testament writings (cf. 1 Thess; 1 Peter) being the basis for the Christian way of acting in the area of policy. The third section indicates some realities like: progress, science and freedom – considered sometimes as an unquestioned idols and that`s why named once by Ratzinger „myth of modernity” – as a threat to connectivity between politics and ethics. The fourth section discusses the teaching of the Catholic Church on politics and the need for its ethical practice. In addition it contains some concrete proposals of Ratzinger that can be used in contemporary debates on the fundamental values of a democratic state in contemporary pluralistic societies. It also refers to Pope Benedict XVI appeals for more ethics of politics. (shrink)

The authors of this collection fail to make clear the distinction between naturalistic and purely logical/methodological approaches to the philosophy of science. I also criticise Thomas Nickles's attempt to devise an explanatory method for discovery in science using programs that produce trial and error explorations of a domain, which he thinks replaces the need for a conjecture a refutation approach (cf. Popper and Campbell). Such programs embody undeclared conjectures in the way they are set up.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:86 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY lamblichi Chalcidensis ex Coele-Syria de vita Pythagorica liber, lamblichos, Pythagoras. Legende--Lehre---Lebensgestaltung. Griechisch und Deutsch, herausgegeben, iibersetzt und eingeleitet von Michael yon Albrecht. (Ziirich & Stuttgart: Artemis, 1963. Pp. 280. = Die Bibliothek der Alten Welt, Reihe Antike und Christentum.) The present edition and translation again makes available one of the texts most valuable for the understanding of the world of late antiquity. The earlier editions, (...) especially that of L. Deubner (1937), are out of print. The fact that this document has been translated into German for the first time is also very helpful, since Iamblichos is sometimes difficult to understand. A brief but nevertheless informative introduction rightly emphasizes that Iamblichos intended to present an introduction and initiation into the Pythagorean way of life rather than a biography of Pythagoras based upon historically trustworthy materials. Although the biography of Pythagoras is certainly a part of the book, it serves only as the ideal example of the Pythagorean way of life, as Iaznblichos sees it. However, more than merely a work of Iamblichos, it ought to be recognized as a "fundamental document of the image of man in later antiquity" (p. 11). The text is based upon L. Deubner's edition, but occasionally it takes up older conjectures or returns to the tradition (for a more detailed discussion cf. W. Burkert, Gnomon 37, 1965, 24ff.). The index and the explanatory notes are also helpful, although the latter prove to be too brief and do not adequately call the reader's attention to the problems of sources, tradition, and composition. One can only agree with von Albrecht that we still need a modem commentary (p. I1). H. D. BETZ Claremont, CaliIornia Agrippa and the Crisis o] Renaissance Thought. By Charles G. Nauert, Jr. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965. Pp. vi W 374. $8.00.) One of the most influential and widely read thinkers of the early sixteenth century was the German Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettisheim (1486-1535). His many works were reprinted often, as well as being translated into several vernacular languages. The De incertitudine et vanitate omnium scientiarum et atrium of 1526, for example, went through at least 16 printings before 1700 and appeared in Italian (1547), English (1569), French (1582), and Dutch (1651) translations, which were themselves often reprinted. Although interest in Agrippa has waned somewhat since the seventeenth century, there is still a significant amount of scholarly debate regarding his importance and the meaning of his writings. Professor Nauert's monograph is the fruit of many years' study of Agrippa's life, thought, and milieu. In it he clearly places Agrippa in his historical context, accurately sketching his background and influence. After a brief introduction (pp. 1-7), the study is essentially divided into two parts: The first (pp. 8-115) traces Agrippa's life and intellectual development, the second (pp. 116-334) discusses in some detail a number of the key themes developed in his writings. There is also a substantial bibliography (pp. 335-,355) and a quite complete and accurate index (pp. 357-374). Although the mass of material which Nanert brings to our attention indicates the opposite, one sometimes gets the impression that the author tends to underestimate the importance of his subject. For example, he says, "Agrippa von Nettisheim is now a forgotten figure in the intellectual history of the West" (p. 322), but this does not seem to be the case. Although much work remains to be done, at least five books have been devoted to Agrippa in the past half century and, indeed, at least seven articles have appeared in the past ten years on one or another aspect of his life and thought. The very fact that Nanert can argue with so much vigor against the views of contemporary scholars like Lynn Thomdike and Paola Zambelli indicates that it is anything but a dead issue. As it is, Nauert's book clearly and accurately describes Agrippa's place in the intellectual ambiance of the sixteenth century. It gives the first detailed analysis of Agrippa's life and thought in English in recent BOOK REVIEWS 87 times and is the first full*scale attempt to exhaustively treat... (shrink)

When Russell argued for his ontological convictions, for instance that there are negative facts or that there are universals, he expressed himself in English. But Wittgenstein must have noticed that from the point of view of Russell's ideal language these ontological statements appear to be pseudo-propositions. He believed therefore that what these statements pretend to say, could not really be said but only shown. Carnap discovered a way out of this mutism: what in the material mode of speech of the (...) object language looks like a pseudo-proposition can be translated into a perfectly meaningful proposition in the formal mode of speech (in the metalinguistic mode of speech of the logical syntax of language). But is this ascent into the metalanguage necessary? Taking advantage of Lésniewski's logical system there exists another way outwe can expand the number of categories of our ideal language. But Leniewski's formulas raise another profound problem, the problem of semantical muteness (cf. W. G. Lycan Semantic Competence and Funny Functors Monist 64 (1979), 209–222). (shrink)

The completeness w.r.t. Kripke frames with equality (or, equivalently, w.r.t. Kripke sheaves, [ 8 ] or [4, Sect. 3.6]) is established for three superintuitionistic predicate logics: ( Q - H + D *), ( Q - H + D *&K), ( Q - H + D *& K & J ). Here Q - H is intuitionistic predicate logic, J is the principle of the weak excluded middle, K is Kuroda’s axiom, and D * (cf. [ 12 ]) is a (...) weakened version of the well-known constant domains principle D . Namely, the formula D states that any individual has ancestors in earlier worlds, and D * states that any individual has $${\neg\neg}$$ -ancestors (i.e., ancestors up to $${\neg\neg}$$ -equality) in earlier worlds. In particular, the logic ( Q - H + D *& K & J ) is the Kripke sheaf completion of ( Q - H + E & K & J ), where E is a version of Markov’s principle (cf. [ 12 ]). On the other hand, we show that the logic ( Q - H + D *& J ) is incomplete w.r.t. Kripke sheaves. (shrink)

This translation of καì ατɂυ υπŵυτα gives the sense we need. But the words mean something different: ‘and it too was dirty ’. Cf. VH 12.1 πευομέυη δέ ༐καì τρεøομέυη ὑπɂ πατρì καì ατŵι πέυητι . See LSJ ατóc 1.8, KG 1.653.

Artykuł ma na celu wskazanie filozoficznych źródeł zarówno akcesu Martina Heideggera do ruchu nazistowskiego, jak i późniejszego zerwania przez myśliciela z zaangażowaniem politycznym. Drogę Heideggera do i od narodowego socjalizmu należy uchwycić nie tylko poprzez biografię filozofa, lecz przede wszystkim na szerszym tle procesu kształtowania się jego rozumienia polityki jako obszaru bytu wydzielonego i zagospodarowanego przez zachodnią metafizykę, co stanowi przejaw wypełnienia istoty metafizyki jako zapomnienia o byciu. Filozofię Heideggera wielokrotnie diagnozowano (por. np. Löwith, Adorno) jako głęboko powiązaną ze światopoglądem (...) faszystowskim; przyjęta tutaj linia argumentacji podkreśla, przeciwnie, integralność etycznej linii argumentacji dzieła Heideggera, akcentującej w odniesieniu do polityki jej charakter eksploatacji bytu, podobnie jak uniformizacji człowieka i przemiany go w zasób. Konkluzja odsłania zatem głęboko antyfaszystowski wydźwięk pism Heideggera z lat 1936 – 1946 i podkreśla zarazem niepokojącą indyferencję w stosunku Heideggera do totalitarnych i nietotalitarnych systemów politycznych. Overcoming Metaphysics, Overcoming Politics. Martin Heidegger’s Path to and from National Socialism: This paper aims to equally pinpoint the philosophical origins of Martin Heidegger’s entry into the Nazi movement and the thinker’s subsequent break with political involvement. Heidegger’s path to and from National Socialism should be apprehended not only through the philosopher’s biography but, above all, within the broader framework of the process of the development of his understanding of politics as an area of being set apart and accommodated by Western metaphysics, which marks the fulfillment of the essence of metaphysics as a forgetting of being. Heidegger’s philosophy has been repeatedly diagnosed (cf., e.g., Löwith, Adorno) as deeply linked to the fascist worldview; the line of reasoning taken up in this paper insists, on the contrary, on the integrity of the ethical reasoning behind Heidegger’s work, which emphasizes, concerning politics, its character of exploiting being, in the same way as it uniformizes people and transforms them into a resource. The conclusion, therefore, reveals the profoundly anti-fascist overtones of Heidegger’s writings from 1936–1946 and, simultaneously, underscores a worrying indifference to Heidegger’s relationship to totalitarian and non-totalitarian political systems. (shrink)

It may appear that in order to be any way at all, a thing must exist. A possible – worlds version of this claim goes as follows: (E) For every x, for every possible world w, Fx at w only if x exists at w. Here and later in (R), the letter ‘F’ is used as a schematic letter to be replaced with a one – place predicate. There are two arguments against (E). The first is by analogy. Socrates is (...) widely admired now but he does not exist now. So, it is not the case that for every x, for every time t, Fx at t only if x exists at t. Possible worlds are analogous to times. Therefore, (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1973: 503 – 05 and Salmon 1981: 36 – 40). For the second argument, replace ‘F’ with ‘does not exist’. (E) then says that for every x, for every possible world w, x does not exist at w only if x exists at w. This is obviously false. Therefore (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1977: 498). Despite their considerable appeal, these arguments are not unassailable. The first argument suffers from the weakness inherent in any argument from analogy; the analogy it rests on may not.. (shrink)

Holism is the notion that all the elements in a system, whether physical, biological, social or political, are interconnected and therefore should be appreciated as a whole. Consequently, the meaning or function of the total system is irreducible to the meaning or function of one or more of the system’s constituent elements. The whole is, on the holist’s account, prior to its parts. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle captures the idea of holism in his statement that “the whole is more than (...) the sum of the parts.” The term holism was coined by South African statesman and scholar Jan Smuts. Etymologically, it comes from a Greek root meaning total, whole, entire or everything. In political thought, the idea is commonly associated with organicism, the view that the state is a living whole (the so-called “body politic”) and therefore studies of the how it functions should be treated systematically rather than piecemeal (cf. Plato, G.W.F. Hegel and Henry Maine). (shrink)

‘Tiberium Neronem et Claudium Drusum priuignos imperatoriis nominibus auxit [sc. Augustus]’’, i.e. honoured them with salutations as ‘imperatores’’. So I took it in my commentary , supposing argument needless. I must now defend my view against R. Syme, Historia antiqua, Commentationes Louanienses in honorem W. Peremans , p.239. Syme asserts ‘Avoiding a technical term, he [Tacitus] describes the stepsons of the Princeps as invested with imperatoriis nominibus . That is, a grant of imperium proconsular .’’ He adds in a footnote (...) ‘As emerges clearly from Dio 54.33.5 , cf. 34.4 . The matter must be stated firmly, since both Koestermann and Goodyear are totally inadequate.’’ Let me make amends. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 475 whereas in some texts Aquinas explicitly teaches that the higher senses of vision and hearing are the ones that mainly (praecipue, principaliter) lead to aesthetic experience.t5 Moreover, the statement that only in the thirteenth century was the question of the distinction between the higher and lower senses explicitly raised (p. l13f.), is true only if the author meant to exclude the pre-medieval or patristic as well (...) as the ancient period of philosophy.16 Finally, there is one technical weakness in this book that cannot be left unmentioned. The overwhelming majority of references are not to the original medieval texts treated and/or quoted in the three-volume edition, but to the number of volume and page in that edition. Thus the reader must be both familiar with French and in possession of the original three-volume work, or remain hopelessly frustrated every time he wishes to consult the original texts or at least know which texts are being mentioned. Yet, if one knows French, he does not need the English translation; and if he is also fortunate enough to have access to the original three-volume version, he will not need the abridged version of the original work at all. For this reason, should there be a second edition of this translation, the references should be changed from the l~tudes to the original medieval works. Although the negative remarks are more lengthy in this review than the positive evaluation is, it would be a grave mistake to conclude from this that the defects outweigh the value of the book. As a matter of fact, upon finishing the reading of this translation of De Bruyne's work, this reviewer was left with the conviction that, in the final balance, the reader can only greatly benefit from this work, and we all owe gratitude to the translator for having made this highly informative work available in the English language. FRANCIS J. KOVACH University of Oklahoma 1~ Summ. theol. I-II,27,1,ad 3; In Psalm. 44,2. ~6 Cf. Plato, Hipp. maL 298 A; Gorg. 474 D; Leg. XII, 961 D; Aristotle, De an. III,3, 429a 3; Augustine, De lib. arb. II,7, 16-19; 14,38; De ord. II,ll, etc. Le origini del metodo analitico: il Cinquecento. By Angelo Crescini. (Udine: Del Bianco, 1965. Published by the Istituto di Filosofia, Facnlt~ di Lettere e Filosofia of the Universit~ degli Studi di Trieste. Pp. 340. L 5,000) Professor Crescini has certainly picked a topic of great interest upon which to write. Recent students of Renaissance logic such as N. W. Gilbert, V. Mufioz Delgado, W. Ong, G. Papuli, W. Risse, and C. Vasoli have pointed out the vitality and significance associated with the development of the logical thought of the period. The general question of methodology has produced an enormous scholarly literature in recent years,I but much remains to be done before we fully understand how various methodologies have evolved and what relation philosophical discussions of method have had to the actual practice of science. Therefore, it would be most desirable to have a 1 For further information see Laurens Laudan, "Theories of Scientific Method from Plato to Mach: A Bibliographical Review," History of Science 7 (1968), 1-63. 476 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY detailed, comprehensive, and accurate study of the evolution of analytic method during the sixteenth century, particularly in view of the significance taken on by such a methodology with the 'rise of modern science'. With such a background in view the reviewer comes to this volume in anticipation of being generally enlightened on various matters. Unfortunately, Crescini's book is on the whole disappointing, although nearly everyone will find the odd bit of information of which he was not previously aware. It definitely does not, however, establish a solid foundation for later studies. The book is organized into three principal parts, dealing with the development of the analytic method in logic (pp. 21-188), in the natural sciences (pp. 189-284), and in mathematics (vv. 285-328). The first section treats discussions of the topic among writers on logical subject, under which heading are included 'humanist' logicians such as... (shrink)

Dogmatic Metaphysics and Tschirnhaus's M ethodology MARTIN SCHONFELD ACCORDING TO STANDARD COMMENTARIES, Tschirnhaus's main work, Medicina mentis, ~ supposedly furnished the methodological basis for the Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics. ~ Christian Wolff and his disciples, at any rate, preferred to think so. Wolff taught classes on Tschirnhaus and claimed that he had developed his own tenets on the basis of Tschirnhaus's ideas; Johann Christoph Gottsched praised the Medicina mentis as the basic methodology of the Wolffian enlightenment.3 Mirroring these views, W. Wundt and (...) H. J. de Vleeschauwer saw in Tschirnhaus the inventor of the "geometric method" adopted by the School Philosophers.4 According to M. ' Medicina Mentis, sive Tentamen genuinae Logicae, in qua disseritur de Methodo detegendi incoKaitas veritates, Amsterdam, 1687. Second and revised edition, Medicina Mentis, sive Artis inveniendi Praecepta generalia, Leipzig, 1695. ~For example, cf. Wilhelm Windelband, Geschichte der Philosophie, 3~o-33 and 356; Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, III: ~95-97, 3 x~ 34o-43; A. Robert Caponigri, A History of Western Philosophy (Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame.. (shrink)

Las fuentes principales para la reconstrucción de la teoría del conocimiento de Hegel en su Sistema maduro son la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo y la Lógica subjetiva o Lógica del Concepto. En este respecto, la filosofía del Espíritu Absoluto ocupa en principio, dentro de la estrategia general adoptada por Hegel para exponer su pensamiento gnoseológico, un lugar periférico; sin embargo, toda vez que las formas del Espíritu Absoluto, esto es, el Arte, la Religión y la Filosofía, son para Hegel resultados (...) de la progresiva explicitación del tipo de contenidos que implica la lógica interna de los sucesivos actos cognitivos del sujeto, en el marco de la exposición de la filosofía del Espíritu Absoluto Hegel desarrolla y precisa ulteriormente su teoría general sobre los actos de conocimiento. En este contexto, el tratamiento del concepto de la religión en las lecciones berlinesas sobre filosofía de la religión ofrece una oportunidad privilegiada -por regla general inadvertida- para profundizar en el análisis de las reflexiones de Hegel sobre el fenómeno del conocimiento humano. En sus cuatro cursos berlineses -1821, 1824, 1827 y 1831- sobre filosofía de la religión, Hegel divide a esta disciplina en tres partes, a saber: el Concepto de la Religión, la Religión Determinada y la Religión Consumada; en la primera de esas partes, esto es, en la que dedica al concepto de la religión, Hegel desarrolla las diferentes formas subjetivas de la conciencia religiosa sin considerar su contenido (de su contenido versarán las dos partes siguientes), es decir, analiza los actos cognitivos del sujeto de un modo puramente formal, tal como lo había hecho antes en el marco de la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo. En esta medida, la exposición del concepto de la religión ofrece una verdadera filosofía del espíritu subjetivo en compendio en la que se retoman, pero también se complementan las tesis expuestas en la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo -más precisamente, en la Psicología- en sentido estricto. El objetivo de nuestro trabajo es analizar la teoría de los actos de conocimiento presente en las Lecciones sobre Filosofía de la Religión; en razón de los requisitos de extensión que debe cumplir este trabajo, nos limitaremos a analizar los desarrollos que Hegel ofrece en el manuscrito que usa como texto base para el dictado de su primera Lección sobre Filosofía de la Religión en el semestre de verano de 1821 (cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte. Bd. 3. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. 1. Einleitung und Begriff der Religion, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1983, pp. 95-163). (shrink)

There exist important deductive systems, such as the non-normal modal logics, that are not proper subjects of classical algebraic logic in the sense that their metatheory cannot be reduced to the equational metatheory of any particular class of algebras. Nevertheless, most of these systems are amenable to the methods of universal algebra when applied to the matrix models of the system. In the present paper we consider a wide class of deductive systems of this kind called protoalgebraic logics. These include (...) almost all (non-pathological) systems of prepositional logic that have occurred in the literature. The relationship between the metatheory of a protoalgebraic logic and its matrix models is studied. The following results are obtained for any finite matrix model U of a filter-distributive protoalgebraic logic : (I) The extension U of is finitely axiomatized (provided has only finitely many inference rules); (II) U has only finitely many extensions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:364 BOOK REVIEWS opening of natural law into the Christian economy of salvation for which May argues. It should be noted that May displays an admirable openness to further development along these lines with his appreciation of some of the questions raised by Aurelio Ansaldo (see pp. 97-98, n. 135). In spite of some limitations, this is a significant work well-deserving of consideration by any student of moral theology. (...) It highlights the ongoing contribution of an authentic and well-grounded Thomism to current efforts toward the renewal of moral theology-a contribution also recommended by the Second Vatican Council (cf. Optatum Totius, n.16). The Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. JOHN S. GRABOWSKI From Existence to God; A Contemporary Philosophical Argument. By BARRY MILLER. London and New York: Routledge, 1992. Pp. x +206. $42.50 (cloth). Can the existence of God be proved from the existence of any con· crete individual thing? Many religious thinkers-theists as well as atheists-might regard this as a vain project. The criticisms of Hume and Kant, as well as a certain suspicion of the validity of the principles of sufficient reason and intelligibility, appear to have demolished all grounds for such an argument. Many find no contradiction in affirming the existence of the whole universe while denying the existence of God. Barry Miller, on the contrary, does find a contradiction in affirming the existence of even one concrete individual unless the existence of God is also affirmed. His book is a sustained and intriguing attempt to show that contradiction. His argument is based not on the principles of sufficient reason or intelligibility, but strictly on the principle of non· contradiction (172-4). The concrete individual which serves as his starting point and remains his faithful companion throughout the book is a particular existing dog named " Fido," and the way to the existence of God begins with the simple question: " How ever can it be that Fido does exist? " Miller's first task is to establish that his question is not gratuitous by showing that Fido's existence is not a " brute fact" requiring no explanation. The argument given in chapters two and three shows that Fido's existence is very puzzling indeed, requiring conditions that are "apparently impossible to satisfy" (10). The argument begins with BOOK REVIEWS 365 the Fregean position that ontological categories are to he assigned in accordance with linguistic categories. (While Miller admits that this Fregean view is not the only legitimate one, he does not think that this limits the effectiveness of his argument [10, 87-88.]) Since the name "Fido" in the linguistic expression " Fido exists " is a complete expression, while the predicate " exists " is not (15, 23), Fido's existence is understood as " exemplifying two ontological categories, viz., a complete entity (Fido) and an incomplete entity (Fido's existence)" (Prop. 1.1, p. 10). It is then argued that "Fido's existing must he constructible conceptually from Fido and his existence" (Prop. 1.2, p. 10). This conceptual construction would he impossible, however, "if Fido were inconceivable except in terms of Fido's existing." The fact is, however, that Fido is inconceivable except in terms of Fido's existing : "Fido could neither he referred to nor conceived of before he existed" (Prop. 1.3, p. 11). Indeed, prior to its existing, "no concrete individual could be conceived of by anyone or in any way " (42). One is thus left with a dilemma that requires one conceptually to construct Fido's existing from Fido and Fido's existence, but prevents one from doing so since Fido is only conceivable in terms of Fido's existing. In chapter four and its appendix, Miller presents detailed arguments in response to C. J. F. Williams, B. Russell, W. V. Quine, and others to show that existence is a real property. He then goes on in chapter five to review the dilemma and to offer his solution. Fido's existing must he conceptually constructible from two ontological categories, "Fido" and "Fido's existence." But "Fido's existing" cannot he constructed from them since one of them, "Fido's existence," is not a complete entity and the other one... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MARITAIN AS AN INTERPRETER OF AQUINAS ON THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION }UDE P. DOUGHERTY The Catholic University ofAmerica Washington, D.C. I T HE MEDIEVAL problem of individuation is not the contemporary problem of "individuals" or "particulars" discussed by P. F. Strawson, J. W. Meiland, and others.1 In a certain sense the problem of individuation originates with Parmenides, but it is Plato's philosophy of science that bequeaths the problem to (...) Aristotle and to his medieval commentators. Its solution in Aquinas is not that of Aristotle, nor is it that of Scotus or Suarez. Aquinas will distinguish between the problem of individuation and what we may call the problem of "individuality" or the problem of "subsistence." The solution to both will draw upon many Aristotelian distinctions but will incorporate key elements of St. Thomas's own metaphysics, including the real distinction between essence and existence and his doctrine of participation. It is Maritain's appropriation of St. Thomas's metaphysics that enables him to produce a realistic philosophy of science, one that he offers as compatible with contemporary scientific enquiry. It also enables him to develop a theory of person and personality. But the story begins with Plato. Although Plato's theory of knowledge may appear fanciful to the modern reader, his analysis of scientific knowledge contains a basic set of observations whose truth remains uncontested even 1 Cf. P.F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen and Co., 1959); J.W. Meiland, Talking About Particulars (New York: Humanities Press, 1970); P. Butchvarov, Resemblance and Identity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966). 19 20 JUDE P. DOUGHERTY though his explanation be faulty. Plato saw clearly that science is of the universal. Things may be particular, but when we consider them as objects of enquiry, the intellect focuses upon the form taken as an exemplar. In Plato's explanation things belong to their various kinds by participating in incorporeal, eternal, and unchangeable archetypes. From a realist's vantage point the problem may be stated simply: Since things are singular, how is it that we intellectually apprehend them as universal? Aristotle's solution is well known and it is one adopted and amplified by St. Thomas. Universals are abstracted from singular things. No one would present Maritain as a medievalist, but, as an interpreter of Aquinas, he has wielded considerable influence in the United States and in Latin America. Many have come to St. Thomas under his tutelage. His knowledge of Aquinas is extensive and is drawn upon throughout his lifelong work, but perhaps nowhere more than in his philosophy of science and in his discussions of the person. The primary text for Thomas's doctrine of individuation is his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, where he discusses the division and methods of the sciences. Maritain's philosophy is indebted mainly to his reading of Thomistic texts, but he draws heavily, as well, on the works of his contemporaries, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and Louis Geiger, and on those of the classic commentators on Thomas, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, and John of St. Thomas. Though employing St. Thomas, Maritain is always a man of the twentieth century. In books such as the Degrees of Knowledge, Science and Wisdom, Existence and the Existent, and A Preface to Metaphysics, his foe is always some contemporary exponent of a nominalist position.2 "Nominalists,'' he will say, "have a taste for the real, but no sense of being."3 Timeless 2 Degrees ofKnowledge [Les Degres du Savoir(l 932)], trans. G.B. Phelan, 4th ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959); Science and Wisdom [Science et Sagesse (1935)], trans. B. Wall (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940); Existence and the Existent [Court Traite de L:Existence et de L:Existant (1947)], trans. L. Galantiere and G.B. Phelan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1948); A Preface to Metaphysics [Sept Le~ons sur L'Etre et les Premieres Principes de la Raison Speculative (1934)], trans. B. Wall (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939). 3 Degrees of Knowledge, 3. AN INTERPRETER OF AQUINAS 21 metaphysics, he will lament, no longer suits the modern intellect. "Three centuries of empirico-mathematics have so warped the intellect... (shrink)

The existence of exact upper bounds for increasing sequences of ordinal functions modulo an ideal is discussed. The main theorem gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an exact upper bound ƒ for a ¦A¦+ is regular: an eub ƒ with lim infI cf ƒ = μ exists if and only if for every regular κ ε the set of flat points in tf of cofinality κ is stationary. Two applications of the main Theorem to set theory (...) are presented. A theorem of Magidor's on covering between models of ZFC is proved using the main theorem : If V-W are transitive models of set theory with ω-covering and GCH holds in V, then κ-covering holds between V and W for all cardinals κ. A new proof of a Theorem by Cummings on collapsing successors of singulars is also given . The appendix to the paper contains a short proof of Shelah's trichotomy theorem, for the reader's convenience. (shrink)