8 found
Order:
  1.  85
    What Moore's Paradox is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.
    On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore’s paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  2. Moorean Absurdity : An Epistemological Analysis.Claudio de Almeida - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  3.  85
    Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons.Claudio de Almeida - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):301 - 319.
    It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  46
    Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder.Claudio de Almeida & J. R. Fett - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):152-169.
    For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  27
    Racionalidade epistêmica e o Paradoxo de Moore.Cláudio de Almeida - 2009 - Veritas: Revista de Filosofía y Teología 54 (2):48-73.
    G. E. Moore identified a peculiar form of epistemic irrationality. Wittgenstein called it “Moore’s Paradox”. Neither of them knew exactly what he was talking about. And yet, the vast literature on the problem leaves no room for doubt: the paradox is deep; its resolution, elusive. But, up until now, we haven’t been in a position to appreciate its importance for contemporary epistemology. This paper puts forward an epistemological solution to the paradox. It also seeks to show that the paradox yields (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  22
    Editorial Preface.Claudio de Almeida - 2005 - Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):141-141.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Russell on Meaning and Denotation: The Argument of 'on Denoting'.Claudio de Almeida - 1992 - Dissertation, Mcmaster University (Canada)
    The aim of the thesis is twofold. Firstly, it is argued that Frege's theory of meaning and denotation is the first successful non-psychologistic response to what has been called 'the puzzle of identity' and that, where Frege's theory differs most significantly from the theory of meaning and denotation developed by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics and in his unpublished manuscripts on logic of 1903-1905, Russell was right. Secondly, it is shown that Russell was again right when he claimed that (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. What Moore's Paradox Is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.
    On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography