Contribución exegética acerca de la teoría spinoziana de los afectos (=ética) y la libertad (=eleuteriología), la cual remarca el carácter constructivo de la ética spinoziana y algunas dificultades inherentes a la correlativa teoría metafísica de la libertad.

Christ as symbol in Kant¿s religion -- Hegel's conception of God -- The reality of religion in Hegel's idealist metaphysics -- Hegel's version of the ontological argument for the existence of God -- The trinity and the I -- The death of God and recognition of the self -- Beyond subjectivism -- The relevance of Hegel's philosophy of religion today.

Leading scholars discuss whether some of the main tenets or theses that are currently or traditionally ascribed to Wittgenstein are still both theoretically and exegetically viable, by focusing on three well-established Wittgensteinian themes: mind, meaning, and metaphilosophy.

La recepción durante el siglo XX se preguntó si la filosofía nietzscheana era a-, im- o anti-política, es decir, si podía ser asimilada por la democracia, o si era antimoderna, elitista y reaccionaria. El italiano Roberto Esposito ha propuesto leerla como formando e informando el paradigma de la biopolítica. Se discuten cuatro lecturas de esa biopolítica: como formadora del paradigma de la inmunidad, como tanatopolítica, como liberal y neoliberal, y como biopolítica afirmativa. Twentieth-century readers wondered if Nietzschean philosophy was apolitical, (...) impolitic, or anti-political; that is, if it could be assimilated by democracy or if it was antimodern, elitist, and reactionary. The Italian philosopher Robert Esposito has proposed reading Nietzsche's philosophy as forming and informing the biopolitical paradigm. Four readings of these biopolitics are discussed: as part of the paradigm of immunity, as thanatopolitics, as liberal and neoliberal, and as affirmative biopolitics. (shrink)

It may seem strange to connect the ontological argument for God‟s existence with René Girard‟s thought. My first aim is to clarify this connection.In order to do so, we must first suggest three distinct hermeneutical approaches to Girard. Ifwe take an internal, literal approach, we find that Girard writes nothing about theontological proof. Nevertheless, he does cite Anselm. If we take an internal, nonliteral approach to Girard, we can try to deduce what he might have thought about the ontological proof (...) on the basis of his mimetic theory, thereby extending his thought while remaining within his theory. If we take a critical approach, we can interpret Girard from an external perspective and critically analyze analogies between the ontological proof and his mimetic theory on the assumption that there is no a priori reason why there cannot be a relationship between an argument and a thinker, even without that thinker‟s awareness and in spite of his intentions. (shrink)

There are at least three different genealogical accounts of morality: the ontogenetic, the sociohistorical, and the evolutionary. One can thus construct, in principle, three distinct genealogical debunking arguments of morality, i.e., arguments that appeal to empirical data, or to an empirical hypothesis, about the origin of morality to undermine either its ontological foundation or the epistemic credentials of our moral beliefs. The genealogical account that has been, particularly since the early 2000s, the topic of a burgeoning line of inquiry in (...) the metaethical literature is the one that explains the origin of moral thinking by appealing to Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection. For this reason, when it comes to genealogical debunking arguments, it is various types of evolutionary debunking argument (EDA) that are the focus of the current debate between moral skeptics and moral realists. Evolutionary moral debunkers maintain that the capacity to make moral judgments is an evolved trait—a view accepted by most of their detractors. They maintain, in addition, that such a capacity is an adaptation—i.e., a trait selected for because it enhances reproduction and survival—and not merely either a by-product of an adaptation or an evolutionary accident—a view accepted by fewer of their detractors. Roughly put, the thrust of EDAs is that biological evolution is aimed, not at moral belief-forming processes that are reliable, but at moral belief-forming processes that are adaptive. In other words, the evolutionary function of those processes is not that of tracking the moral truth: their general success at matching or accurately representing allegedly objective or attitude-independent moral facts, properties, or truths explains neither their emergence nor their persistence. Humans are therefore disposed to make moral judgments regardless of the evidence to which they are exposed, regardless of whether there are or are not objective moral facts, properties, or truths. In the contemporary scene, the most important and influential EDAs are those advanced by Richard Joyce and Sharon Street. Although Joyce’s EDA is more elaborate than Street’s inasmuch as it is based on a detailed evolutionary account of morality, it is Street’s EDA that has received the most attention among those seeking to defend moral realism against EDAs. If an EDA can establish at most an epistemological conclusion, then it could be argued that Joyce’s argument (at least the version defended in his later works) is superior to Street’s given that the conclusion of the former is epistemological whereas that of the latter is ontological. Indeed, while Joyce’s EDA is taken to support epistemological moral skepticism, according to which our moral beliefs are epistemically unjustified, Street’s is taken to support moral anti-realism (moral constructivism in particular), according to which attitude-independent moral facts do not exist. (shrink)

Se propone un examen crítico de la última obra de J.-L. Marion titulada, dedicada a la unión de alma y cuerpo, y cuya tesis principal es: los problemas que esta unión suscita confunden dos términos, cuerpo y mi cuerpo. Esta confusión lleva a que se apliquen al primero categorías propias del segundo. Se examinan las "paradojas ónticas" que mi cuerpo (la carne) inaugura (a); se despeja la tesis de dos interpretaciones de las meditaciones primera y sexta (b); se discute la (...) "excepción a la metafísica" instaurada por el conocimiento de mi cuerpo (c); se arriesga, siguiendo una indicación del autor, la apertura a una dimensión ética que exige examinar ya no la unión de cuerpo y alma, sino la unión por el amor a un semejante y a la comunidad de semejantes (d). The article carries out a critical examination of J.-L. Marion's latest work, "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", whose main thesis is that the problems posed by the union of body and soul confuse two terms: body and my body. This confusion leads to the application to the former of categories inherent to the latter. The paper examines the "ontic paradoxes" that my body (the flesh) gives rise to (a); it clarifies the thesis of two interpretations of the First and Sixth Meditations (b); it discusses the "exception to metaphysics" established by the knowledge of my body (c); and, following an indication by the author, it proposes an opening to the ethical dimension, which demands an examination of the union, through love, with a fellow human being and with the community of human beings, rather than of the union of body and soul (d). Neste artigo, propõe-se um exame crítico da última obra de J.-L. Marion, intitulada "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", dedicada à união de alma e corpo, e cuja tese principal é: os problemas que essa união suscita confundem dois termos, corpo e meu corpo. Essa confusão leva a que se apliquem ao primeiro categorias próprias do segundo. Examinam-se os "paradoxos ônticos" que meu corpo (a carne) inaugura; a tese de duas interpretações das medita ccedil;ões primeira e sexta é esclarecida; arrisca-se, seguindo uma indicação do autor, a abertura a uma dimensão ética que exige examinar já não a união de corpo e alma, mas sim a união pelo amor a um semelhante e à comunidade de semelhantes. (shrink)

There are many differences between the theories of Bentham and StuartMili specially in the ways in which both characterize the concept of pleasure.The concept, in turn, obviously has great influence on the utilitarian calculus. I am concemed in this paper with the issue of which of the two versions is most compatible with the liberal doctrine. In the procesa of establishing the compatibility of both versions with the liberal doctrine serious difficulties cannot be avoided, but this difficulties can be resolved (...) easily in Bentham's theory. This conclusion has been disputed from many quarters. Ronald Dworkin has raised objections to Bentham's theory from the point of view of liberalism while Jonathan Riley has attempted at building a liberal utilitarianism based-precisely- on Mill's theory. I set out to demostrate that Dworkin's objection may be overcome and I introduce, with purpose in mind, the concept of voluntarily accepted extemal reasons. 1 also believe that Riley's intent is doomed to fail, because it introduces elements of perfectionism and patemalism into the theory. (shrink)

O presente artigo visa analisar a proposta construtivista rawlsiana na qual se pode visualizar a influencia da teoria da escolha racional da filosofia prática kantiana. Rawls, apesar de declarar-se herdeiro de Kant, assume sua própria concepção construtivista, a saber, um construtivismo político, enquanto que o filósofo alemão, segundo ele, apresenta um construtivismo moral fundamentado no idealismo transcendental. A posição original, por sua vez, situa as partes de maneira equitativa considerando-as iguais e livres. Assim, a construção dos princípios da justiça nesta (...) posição é autônoma, ou seja, a escolha é realizada sem influências heterônomas, tais como classe social, talentos pessoais, etc. A proposta da justiça como equidade é a construção de princípios básicos endossados publicamente os quais regem de maneira justa a estrutura básica da sociedade democrática. (shrink)

Este articulo investiga el cada vez más frecuente fenómeno de las intervenciones internacionales noviolentas para la transformación de conflictos y, en concreto, analiza los efectos que pueden tener dichas intervenciones sobre la protección y el empoderamiento de los activistas de derechos humanos que viven en situaciones de riesgo por su trabajo en entornos conflictivos altamente violentos. Para ello se situará el contexto en el que han surgido y se han desarrollado estas iniciativas, analizándose los principales elementos que las caracterizan, y (...) se estudiará el caso de la protección que proporciona Peace Brigades International a los defensores de derechos humanos, lo que permitirá extraer conclusiones relativas a las posibilidades que ofrecen las intervenciones internacionales noviolentas a la comunidad internacional en los campos de la prevención de la violencia, la gestión de conflictos y de construcción de la paz. (shrink)