The aim of this paper is to develop and defend an Attentional View of bodily awareness, on which attention is necessary for bodily awareness. The original formulation of the Attentional View is due to Marcel Kinsbourne. First, I will show that the Attentional View of bodily awareness as formulated by Kinsbourne is superior to other accounts in the literature for characterizing the relationship between attention and bodily awareness. Kinsbourne’s account is the only account in the literature so far which can (...) accommodate key neurological diseases such as personal neglect. Second, when I consider Kinsbourne’s view in more detail, I will argue that Kinsbourne’s Attentional View faces problems because it is too reductive. Kinsbourne deviates from the standard taxonomy on which there is a body schema and a body image. Instead he reduces the body image to the neural representation of the body in the somatosensory cortex, the body schema and attentional shifts. I will present two challenges to Kinsbourne’s view which demonstrate that Kinsbourne’s reduction of the body image is unsuccessful. Finally, I will present a revised version of the Attentional View that is both empirically adequate and philosophically satisfactory. (shrink)

This commentary challenges Railton’s claim that the affective system is the key source of control of action. Whilst the affective system is important for understanding how acting for a reason is possible, we argue that there are many levels of control of action and adaptive behaviour and that the affective system is only one source of control. Such a model seems to be more in line with the emerging picture from affective and movement neuroscience.

Stage Theory is the view that ordinary objects are instantaneous things. Nevertheless, an object O can have counterparts, which are instantaneous objects appropriately related to O. O “persists” by way of its counterparts. In this paper, I argue that stage theory implies that persons cannot do temporally extended acts, since in order to do such an act, one must do each part of the act, and no instantaneous person can do each part of a temporally extended act. Thus, since it (...) is obvious that persons do temporally extended acts, we should reject stage theory. (shrink)

We argue that the trend toward providing users with feasible and actionable explanations of AI decisions—known as recourse explanations—comes with ethical downsides. Specifically, we argue that recourse explanations face several conceptual pitfalls and can lead to problematic explanation hacking, which undermines their ethical status. As an alternative, we advocate that explanations of AI decisions should aim at understanding.

It is a commonplace that things persist, though thinkers disagree over what persistence consist in. Views about time are closely related to views about persistence, though some have questioned the compatibility of certain combinations, such as Jonathan Tallant’s recent argument that presentism is incompatible with all views of persistence, including endurantism. We believe that such arguments can be avoided with neutral definitions of the terms. However, a nearly exhaustive investigation of contemporary literature revealed that, except for two that we could (...) find, all definitions of “persist,” “endure,” and derivatives are incompatible with presentism! And, the exceptions fail to capture endurantist intuitions about endurance. But we believe that present-friendly and intuitive definitions of these concepts can be given. In this paper we offer such definitions. We go on to apply our definitions to two sample cases, showing that if our neutral definitions are used, the arguments in the cases fail. (shrink)

Eric Olson and Ned Markosian have, independently, complained that the ways in which the problem of personal identity has been formulated rule out certain views of personal identity just by how the problem is formulated. As a result, both have proposed alternative formulations, each attempting theory neutrality. They have not succeeded, however, since both of their formulations, as well as the formulations that they have rejected, are biased against presentist solutions to the problem, and some are biased against four-dimensionalist solutions, (...) as well as stage theory solutions. In this paper, I show how previous formulations, including Olson’s and Markosian’s, are biased in the ways mentioned, and I propose a list of criteria that any formulation of the problem must meet in order to be theory neutral. Finally, I attempt a formulation that is neutral. (shrink)

In the metaphysics or persistence, some hold to “four dimensionalism,” the doctrine that temporally extended things have temporal parts. Two four dimensionalists accounts are perdurantism and stage theory. In this paper I assume that these exhaust the possible ways of being a four dimensionalist. I argue that a Christian should not be a four-dimensionalist because four-dimensionalism implies that persons cannot act. The resurrection of Jesus is an act. Thus, four-dimensionalism implies Jesus did not rise from the dead. But, Christianity stands (...) on the resurrection of Jesus. Therefore, a Christian should not be a four-dimensionalist. (shrink)