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  1. Towards a Theory of Proprioception as a Bodily Basis for Consciousness in Music.Alicia Peñalba Acitores - 2011 - In David Clarke & Eric F. Clarke (eds.), Music and Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological, and Cultural Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
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  2. Margins of Me: A Personal Story (Chapter 1 of The Peripheral Mind).István Aranyosi - forthcoming - In The Peripheral Mind. Philosophy of Mind and the Peripheral Nervous System. Oxford University Press.
    The author presents an autobiographical story of serious peripheral motor nerve damage resulting from chemotoxicity induced as a side effect of Hodgkin’s Lymphoma treatment. The first-person, phenomenological account of the condition naturally leads to philosophical questions about consciousness, felt presence of oneself all over and within one’s body, and the felt constitutiveness of peripheral processes to one’s mental life. The first-person data only fit well with a philosophical approach to the mind that takes peripheral, bodily events and states at their (...)
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  3. Is Bodily Awareness a Form of Perception?Ignacio Ávila - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):337-354.
    In this paper I address the question of whether bodily awareness is a form of perceptual awareness or not. I discuss José Luis Bermúdez’s and Shaun Gallagher’s proposals about this issue and find them unsatisfactory. Then I suggest an alternative view and offer some reasons for it.
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  4. Evans on Bodily Awareness and Perceptual Self‐Location.Ignacio Ávila - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):269-287.
    In Chapter 7 of The Varieties of Reference Evans implicitly outlines a view to the effect that bodily awareness plays no role in perceptual self-location or in the specification of our perceptual perspective of the world. In this paper I discuss this story and offer an alternative proposal. Then I explore some consequences of this account for our understanding of the elusiveness of the self in perceptual experience.
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  5. Eye Contact Elicits Bodily Self-Awareness in Human Adults.Matias Baltazar, Nesrine Hazem, Emma Vilarem, Virginie Beaucousin, Jean-Luc Picq & Laurence Conty - 2014 - Cognition 133 (1):120-127.
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  6. Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity Identity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation.Tim Bayne & Neil Levy - 2005 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):75–86.
    In 1997, a Scottish surgeon by the name of Robert Smith was approached by a man with an unusual request: he wanted his apparently healthy lower left leg amputated. Although details about the case are sketchy, the would-be amputee appears to have desired the amputation on the grounds that his left foot wasn’t part of him – it felt alien. After consultation with psychiatrists, Smith performed the amputation. Two and a half years later, the patient reported that his life had (...)
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  7. Bodily Protentionality.Elizabeth A. Behnke - 2009 - Husserl Studies 25 (3):185-217.
    This investigation explores the methodological implications of choosing an unusual example for phenomenological description (here, a bodily awareness practice allowing spontaneous bodily shifts to occur at the leading edge of the living present); for example, the matters themselves are not pregiven, but must first be brought into view. Only after preliminary clarifications not only of the practice concerned, but also of the very notions of the “body” and of “protentionality” is it possible to provide both static and genetic descriptions of (...)
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  8. Disorders of Body Image.Giovanni Berlucchi & Salvatore M. Aglioti - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
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  9. The Phenomenology of Bodily Awareness. Berm - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  10. Bodily Self-Awareness and the Will: Reply to Power. Berm - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (1):139-142.
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  11. Bodily Ownership, Bodily Awareness and Knowledge Without Observation.José Luis Bermúdez - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):37-45.
    In a recent paper, Fredérique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership . She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of myness and takes issue with my defense in Bermúdez of a deflationary approach to bodily ownership. That paper proposed an argument deriving from Elizabeth Anscombe’s various discussions of what she terms knowledge without observation . De Vignemont is not convinced and appeals to the Rubber Hand Illusion (...)
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  12. The Phenomenology of Bodily Awareness.José Luis Bermúdez - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie Lynn Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  13. The Body and the Self.Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.) - 1995 - MIT Press.
  14. Making Sense of the Cotard Syndrome: Insights From the Study of Depersonalisation.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (3):356-391.
    Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (...)
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  15. Senses of Touch: Human Dignity and Deformity From Michelangelo to Calvin.Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle - 1998 - Brill.
    From posture to piety, from manicure to magic, the book discovers touch in a critical period of its historical development, in anatomy and society.
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  16. Bodily Awareness and the Self.Bill Brewer - 1995 - In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge: Mass: Mit Press. pp. 291-€“303.
    In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...)
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  17. From Phantom Limb to Phantom Body: Varieties of Extracorporeal Awareness.Peter Brugger - 2006 - In Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press. pp. 171-209.
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  18. Is the Body Schema Sufficient for the Sense of Embodiment? An Alternative to de Vignmont's Model.Glenn Carruthers - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.
    De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont (...)
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  19. Types of Body Representation and the Sense of Embodiment.Glenn Carruthers - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1316.
    The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body (...)
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  20. Reply to Tsakiris and Fotopoulou "Is My Body the Sum of Online and Offline Body Representations".Glenn Carruthers - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1323.
    I thank Tsakiris and Fotopoulou for their insightful commentary on my target article. In particular I welcome the opportunity to revisit how the online /offline representation of the body distinction is drawn. Tsakiris and Fotopoulou raise three major points of concern with my model. First they argue that the sense of embodiment is not sufficient for self recognition. Second they show that the relationship between online and offline representations of the body cannot be the simple ‘serial construction’ relationship I advocate (...)
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  21. Bodily Awareness and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Cheryl K. Chen - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):21-38.
    Abstract: Some first person statements, such as ‘I am in pain’, are thought to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM): I cannot be wrong that I am in pain because—while I know that someone is in pain—I have mistaken that person for myself. While IEM is typically associated with the self-ascription of psychological properties, some philosophers attempt to draw anti-Cartesian conclusions from the claim that certain physical self-ascriptions are also IEM. In this paper, I will examine whether some physical (...)
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  22. Ownership and the Body.Jennifer Church - 1997 - In Diana T. Meyers (ed.), Feminists Rethink the Self. Westview Press.
  23. "Self-Consciousness and the Body": Commentary.Jonathan Cole - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):50-52.
    Traditionally, what we are conscious of in self-consciousness is something non-corporeal. But anti-Cartesian philosophers argue that the self is as much corporeal as it is mental. Because we have the sense of proprioception, a kind of body awareness, we are immediately aware of ourselves as bodies in physical space. In this debate the case histories of patients who have lost their sense of proprioception are clearly relevant. These patients do retain an awareness of themselves as corporeal beings, although they hardly (...)
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  24. Unity and Disunity in Bodily Awareness: Phenomenology and Neuroscience.Jonathan Cole, Natalie Depraz & Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness Workshop.
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  25. Sensations and Bodily Position: A Conclusive Argument?David A. Conway - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (September):353-354.
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  26. A Multimodal Conception of Bodily Awareness.Frédérique De Vignemont - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):00-00.
    One way to characterize the special relation that one has to one's own body is to say that only one's body appears to one from the inside. Although widely accepted, the nature of this specific experiential mode of presentation of the body is rarely spelled out. Most definitions amount to little more than lists of the various body senses (including senses of posture, movement, heat, pressure, and balance). It is true that body senses provide a kind of informational access to (...)
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  27. Habeas Corpus: poczucie własności swojego ciała.Frederique de Vignemont - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T).
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
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  28. A Self for the Body.Frédérique de Vignemont - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.
    Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (e.g., somatoparaphrenia), (...)
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  29. Body Schema and Body Image - Pros and Cons.Frédérique De Vignemont - unknown
    There seems to be no dimension of bodily awareness that cannot be disrupted. To account for such variety, there is a growing consensus that there are at least two distinct types of body representation that can be impaired, the body schema and the body image. However, the definition of these notions is often unclear. The notion of body image has attracted most controversy because of its lack of unifying positive definition. The notion of body schema, onto which there seems to (...)
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  30. Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One's Own Body.Frederique de Vignemont - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
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  31. Das Gefühl des Lebendigseins Als Einfache Form Phänomenalen Bewusstseins. Ein Aristotelischer Theorieansatz.Eva-Maria Engelen - 2012 - In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter.
    This paper works out which conceptual and theoretical preconditions have to be met, among others, in order for a living creature to be able to have a feeling of being alive beyond the mere capacity for sensation. For the emergence of such a feeling, which can be equated with a rudimentary phenomenal consciousness (1.), it is not enough for the organism to be alive (2. a.). Rather it has to be able to conceive its body as a unit and to (...)
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  32. The Bodily Social Self: A Link Between Phenomenal and Narrative Selfhood.Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):125-144.
    The Phenomenal Self (PS) is widely considered to be dependent on body representations, whereas the Narrative Self (NS) is generally thought to rely on abstract cognitive representations. The concept of the Bodily Social Self (BSS) might play an important role in explaining how the high level cognitive self-representations enabling the NS might emerge from the bodily basis of the PS. First, the phenomenal self (PS) and narrative self (NS), are briefly examined. Next, the BSS is defined and its potential for (...)
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  33. Body Image/Body Without Image.M. Featherstone - 2006 - Theory, Culture and Society 23 (2-3):233-236.
  34. Me and My Shadows: On the Accumulation of Body-Images in Western Society Part One-The Image and the Image of the Body in Pre-Modern Society.Harvie Ferguson - 1997 - Body and Society 3 (3):1-31.
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  35. Out on a Limb: Variations on the Theme: Stability of Body Image and the Golden Section.Roland Fischer - 1969 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 12 (2):259-273.
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  36. Two Takes on the De Se.Marina Folescu & James Higginbotham - 2012 - In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    In this article we consider, relying in part upon comparative semantic evidence from English and Romanian, two contrasting dimensions of the sense in which our thoughts, including the contents of imagination and memory, and extending to objects of fear, enjoyment, and other emotions directed toward worldly happenings, may be distinctively first-personal, or "de se," to use the terminology introduced in Lewis (1979), and exhibit the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (hereafter: IEM) in the sense of Shoemaker (1968) and (...)
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  37. Disorders of the Body Schema.J. A. M. Frederiks - 1969 - In P. Vinken & G. Bruyn (eds.), Handbook of Clinical Neurology. North Holland. pp. 4--207.
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  38. The Case for Proprioception.Ellen Fridland - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):521-540.
    In formulating a theory of perception that does justice to the embodied and enactive nature of perceptual experience, proprioception can play a valuable role. Since proprioception is necessarily embodied, and since proprioceptive experience is particularly integrated with one’s bodily actions, it seems clear that proprioception, in addition to, e.g., vision or audition, can provide us with valuable insights into the role of an agent’s corporal skills and capacities in constituting or structuring perceptual experience. However, if we are going to have (...)
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  39. The Feeling of Being Alive. Organic Foundations of Self-Awareness.Thomas Fuchs - 2012 - In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter. pp. 149-165.
  40. The Body in Social Context: Some Qualifications on the'Warmth and Intimacy'of Bodily Self-Consciousness.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):91-121.
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  41. Bodily Self-Awareness and Object Perception.Shaun Gallagher - 2003 - Theoria Et Historia Scientarum 7 (1):53--68.
    Gallagher, S. 2003. Bodily self-awareness and object perception. _Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary_ _Studies_, 7 (1) - in press.
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  42. Dimensions of Embodiment: Body Image and Body Schema in Medical Contexts.Shaun Gallagher - 2001 - In Kay Toombs (ed.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 147--175.
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  43. Body Schema and Intentionality.Shaun Gallagher - 1995 - In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press. pp. 225--244.
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  44. How the Body in Action Shapes the Self.Vittorio Gallese & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):117-143.
    In the present paper we address the issue of the role of the body in shaping our basic self-awareness. It is generally taken for granted that basic bodily self-awareness has primarily to do with proprioception. Here we challenge this assumption by arguing from both a phenomenological and a neurophysiological point of view that our body is primarily given to us as a manifold of action possibilities that cannot be reduced to any form of proprioceptive awareness. By discussing the notion of (...)
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  45. Proprioception as Basic Knowledge of the Body.Andy Hamilton - 2005 - In Rene van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser & Ron Rood (eds.), Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge. Ontos-Verlag.
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  46. Wittgenstein and Bodily Self-Knowledge.Edward Harcourt - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):299-333.
  47. Witnessing From Here: Self-Awareness From a Bodily Versus Embodied Perspective.Aaron Henry & Evan Thompson - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    This article argues against the no-self or nonegological account of bodily self-awareness. It proposes an account of consciousness that challenges Miri Albahari's forceful defence of a nonegological view of consciousness, particularly its sharp distinction between subject and self. It contends that the subject of experience is a bodily subject and not merely an embodied one and argues that in order to be a subject of experience even in the minimal sense of witnessing-from-a-perspective, one must be prereflectively aware of oneself as (...)
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  48. Corrigendum to “Illusory Own Body Perceptions: Case Reports and Relevance for Bodily Self-Consciousness” [Consciousness and Cognition 19 702–710]. [REVIEW]Lukas Heydrich, Sebastian Dieguez, Thomas Grunwald, Margitta Seeck & Olaf Blanke - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):487.
    In the abstract the word “self-location” is repeated twice. The second “self-location” was meant to be “self-identification”. The correct sentence reads below:This has recently been tested experimentally in healthy subjects showing that integration of multisensory bodily signals from the entire body with respect to the three aspects: self-location, first-person perspective, and self-identification, is crucial for bodily self-consciousness.
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  49. Illusory Own Body Perceptions: Case Reports and Relevance for Bodily Self-Consciousness☆.Lukas Heydrich, Sebastian Dieguez, Thomas Grunwald, Margitta Seeck & Olaf Blanke - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):702-710.
    Neurological disorders of body representation have for a long time suggested the importance of multisensory processing of bodily signals for self-consciousness. One such group of disorders – illusory own body perceptions affecting the entire body – has been proposed to be especially relevant in this respect, based on neurological data as well as philosophical considerations. This has recently been tested experimentally in healthy subjects showing that integration of multisensory bodily signals from the entire body with respect to the three aspects: (...)
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  50. Attention in Bodily Awareness.Gregor Hochstetter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (12):3819-3842.
    The aim of this paper is to develop and defend an Attentional View of bodily awareness, on which attention is necessary for bodily awareness. The original formulation of the Attentional View is due to Marcel Kinsbourne. First, I will show that the Attentional View of bodily awareness as formulated by Kinsbourne is superior to other accounts in the literature for characterizing the relationship between attention and bodily awareness. Kinsbourne’s account is the only account in the literature so far which can (...)
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