Ecosystems services are provisions that humans derive from nature. Ecologists trying to value ecosystems have proposed five categories of these services: preserving, supporting, provisioning, regulating and cultural. While this ecosystem services framework attributes 'material' value to nature, sacred natural sites are areas of 'non-material' spiritual significance to people. Can we reconcile the material and non-material values? Ancient classical traditions recognise five elements of nature: earth, water, air, fire and ether. This commentary demonstrates that the perceived properties of these (...) elements correspond with the ecosystem services framework. Whilst the two can be reconciled, the 'elements of nature' framework is argued to be more suitable to make a case for conservation of sacred natural sites because it can be attractive to traditional societies whilst being acceptable to Western science. (shrink)

In the US Environmental Protection Agency, the World Wide Fund for Nature and many other environmental organisations, it is standard practice to evaluate particular woods, wetlands and other such places on the basis of the ‘ecosystem services’ they are thought to provide. I argue that this practice cannot account for one important way in which places are of value to human beings. When they play integral roles in our lives, particular places have a kind of value which cannot be adequately (...) conceived in terms of service provision. Since it is in this respect limited, the ecosystem services framework can, I suggest, be criticised on grounds of justice. (shrink)

Some ecologists, philosophers, and policy analysts believe that ecosystem health can be defined in a rigorous way and employed as a management goal in environmental policy. The idea of ecosystem health may have something to recommend it as part of a rhetorical strategy, but I am dubious about its utility as a technical term in environmental policy. I develop several objections to this latest version of scientism in environmental policy, and conclude that our environmental problems fundamentally involve problems in our (...) institutions of governance, our systems of value, and our ways of knowing. These are the problems that most need to be addressed. (shrink)

Conflicts between science and religion revolve about fundamental assumptions more often than they do facts or theories. The key postulates that have guided science since the Enlightenment appear to be wholly inadequate to describe properly the development of ecosystems. An emended set of tenets adequate to the ecological narrative also significantly ameliorates the adversarial nature of the dialogue between scientists and theists.

Building upon a non-standard understanding of evolutionary process focusing on variation and persistence, I will argue that communities and ecosystems can evolve by natural selection as emergent individuals. Evolutionary biology has relied ever increasingly on the modeling of population dynamics. Most have taken for granted that we all agree on what is a population. Recent work has reexamined this perceived consensus. I will argue that there are good reasons to restrict the term “population” to collections of monophyletically related replicators (...) and interactors, which explains why many existing models in population biology exclude by definition many genuine evolving biological individuals such as communities and ecosystems. By studying a case of community evolution, we will see that it is variation that is important to evolutionary processes, not populations. Variation within a population is only one of many types of variation that can lead to evolution by natural selection. The upshot of focusing on variation is that cases of community and ecosystem adaptive change become tractable in evolutionary terms. I will show that complex emergent individuals such as communities and ecosystems cannot be fully accommodated by conventional population/reproduction models but can be accommodated by variation/persistence models. (shrink)

On most understandings of what an ecosystem is, it is a kind of thing that can be literally, not just metaphorically, healthy or unhealthy. Health is best understood as a kind of well-being; a thing’s health is a matter of retaining those structures and functions that are good for it. While it is true both that what’s good for an ecosystem depends on how we define the system and that how we define the system depends on our interests, these facts (...) do not force us to the conclusion that an ecosystem has no good of its own. Ecosystems and persons can have goods of their own in spite of the fact that the schemes we use to categorize them are matters that we decide upon. (shrink)

In this article, I will discuss possible differences between ecosystems and organisms on the basis of their intrinsic complexity. As the concept of complexity still remains highly debated, I propose here a practical and original way to measure the complexity of an ecosystem or an organism. For this purpose, I suggest using the concept of logical depth (LD) in a specific manner, in order to take into account the difficulty as well as the time needed to generate the studied (...) object. I illustrate this method with fully controlled Daisyworld simulations (i.e., simulations based on the Gaia hypothesis) that have often been proposed to mimic living systems. The method consists of the following sequential stages: (1) identification of the shortest program able to numerically model the studied system (also called the Kolmogorov–Solomonoff complexity); (2) running the program, once if there are no stochastic components in the system, several times if stochastic components are there; and (3) computing the time needed to generate the system with LD complexity. This measure is supposed to estimate the system complexity. It appears in this study that LD estimations fit well with the intuition we have of complex systems, with higher complexities being found for more realistic Daisyworlds. With such a method of capturing the time needed to build a system, we expect to detect in future studies any quantified differences between complex ecosystems and organisms. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Scope of Ecology General Description of Ecosystems History of the Term “Ecosystem” Ecosystems as Symbiotic Units Ecosystems as Dissipative Structures Ecosystems and Evolutionary Biology Skeptical Critiques of Ecosystem Theory Ecosystem Integrity and Health Sustainability from an Ecosystems Point of View Acknowledgments References Further Reading.

There is considerable discussion about the nature of the health metaphor as applied to ecosystems. One does not need to accept the analogy of ecosystem as 'organism' to reap insight into the diagnosis of ecosystem ills by applications of approaches pioneered in the health sciences. Ecosystem health can be assessed by the presence or absence of signs ecosystem distress, by direct measures of ecosystem resilience or counteractive capacity, and by evaluation of risks or threats from human activity and natural (...) forces which may decrease the supply of ecological services. The focus of this essay is on what is and what is not implied by the ecosystem health metaphor. It also elaborates a research agenda for this emerging transdiciplinary science. One can argue that beyond the metaphor is the potential for systematic diagnosis of ecosystem ills, development of indicators of ecosystem health, development of early warning indicators of ecosystem dysfunction, development of diagnostic protocols and preventive strategies for maintaining ecological services. (shrink)

The notion of a spontaneous order has a long history in the philosophy of economics, where it has been used to advance a view of markets as complex networks of information that no single mind can apprehend. Traditionally, the impossibility of grasping all of the information present in the spontaneous order of the market has been invoked as grounds for not subjecting markets to central planning. A less noted feature of the spontaneous order concept is that when it is applied (...) to ecosystems it yields a reasonably strong environmental ethic. Thinking of ecosystems as spontaneous orders generates a presumption against interfering with their natural functioning in a manner that results in anthropogenic species loss. Such a presumption will permit some interventions in nature while precluding others. Environmental ethics could potentially make valuable use of the spontaneous order idea, without necessarily endorsing its traditional application to markets. (shrink)

This paper argues that philosophers should pay more attention to the idea of ecosystem engineering and to the scientific literature surrounding it. Ecosystem engineering is a broad but clearly delimited concept that is less subject to many of the “it encompasses too much” criticisms that philosophers have directed at niche construction . The limitations placed on the idea of ecosystem engineering point the way to a narrower idea of niche construction. Moreover, experimental studies in the ecosystem engineering literature provide detailed (...) accounts of particular empirical situations in which we cannot neglect the O term in dE /dt = g (O, E), which helps us get beyond verbal arguments and simple models purporting to show that niche construction must not be ignored as a factor in evolution. Finally, this literature demonstrates that while ecosystem engineering studies may not require us to embrace a new evolutionary process, as niche construction advocates have claimed, they do teach us that the myriad abiotic factors concealed by the abstract term ‘environment’ are often controlled in large part by organisms. (shrink)

I propose an ecologically attuned criterion for genuine virtue, namely, the criterion of ecosustainable virtue: a genuine virtue includes the goal of ensuring ecosystem sustainability. I show how this criterion emerges from environmental practice and how it can be supported by syllogistic reasoning.

Some ecologists and philosophers have tried to develop a concept of ecosystem health that would support a more 'objective' means of evaluating an ecosystem. I argue (following Dale Jamieson) that the concept of health is itself too subjective to justify such an attempt, and then suggest that part of the problem is that the goal of achieving greater objectivity is itself unclear. I analyse and evaluate three different ways of drawing the distinction between subjective and objective evaluations as a first (...) step towards clarifying that goal. (shrink)

Jonathan Newman, Gary Varner, and Stefan Linquist’s Defending Biodiversity: Environmental Science and Ethics is a critical examination of a panoply of arguments for conserving biodiversity. Their discussion is extremely impressive though I think one can push back on some of their criticisms. In this essay, I consider their criticisms of the argument for conserving biodiversity based on ecosystem services; specifically, ecosystem functioning. In the end, I try to clarify and defend this argument against their criticisms.

Biologists employ a suggestive metaphor to describe the complexities of molecular interactions within cells and embryos: cytological components are said to be part of “ecosystems” that integrate them in a complex network of relations with many other entities. The aim of this essay is to scrutinize the molecular ecosystem, a metaphor that, despite its longstanding history, has seldom be articulated in detail. I begin by analyzing some relevant analogies between the cellular environment and the biosphere. Next, I discuss the (...) applicability of the molecular ecosystem concept in actual scientific practice. (shrink)

Advances in technology, research development, and teaching practices have brought improvements in the training, levels of autonomy, and quality of life of people who need support and resources appropriate to their circumstances of disability. This article focuses on empirically analyzing the usefulness of treatments that have been supported by technology to answer the question “How do technological ecosystems being used help people with special educational needs?” The multiple case study methodology was used to address six categories of analysis: project (...) data, objectives, processes, outputs and outcomes, technologies, and impact. The processes, open in communication, were characterized as transversal, ethical, and sustainable. The results yielded various technological ecosystems that support people with disabilities, deliver the help they need to improve their health, and provide enjoyable user experiences. At the same time, they promote the training and improvement of teaching methodologies and involve families in order to improve their knowledge, attitudes, and care of children, young people, and adults with functional diversity. (shrink)

This study attempts to fill in two research gaps in the extant literature concerning the ecosystem for social innovation in the context of emerging market economies such as India. The study first attempts to assess the potential of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in not-for-profit entities such as technology business incubators (TBIs) to stimulate social innovations in the prevalent ecosystems in emerging markets. Further, using a random-effects Tobit model, the study examines the characteristics of firms that spend higher percentages of (...) CSR expenditure on not-for-profit TBIs/societies/trusts in India. The study provides policy suggestions to create an entrepreneurial ecosystem for promoting social innovation in emerging markets such as India. (shrink)

Ecosystems of Jubilee, by José Humphreys and Adam Gustine, is a practical look at the economic ethics and practices found in the Scripture. Focusing on the biblical practices of gleaning, Sabbath, and Jubilee, this book aims to help Christians embrace a serious commitment to economic development as a way of seeking justice in their neighborhoods.

The paper focuses on the semiotic principles of the organisation of ecosystems, attempting to find concepts that point to relations and not to elements. (1) Consortium (the term introduced by Johannes Reinke around 1873) can be defined as a group of organisms connected via (sign) relations, or groups of interspecific semiosic links in biocoenosis. The consortial relations include trophic and topic relations, both implying a recognition (identification) of the object by an organism involved (these, i.e., are sign relations). These (...) relations are ecologically inheritable. (2) Umwelt (the term introduced by Jakob von Uexküll around 1909) can be defined as a set of relations an organism has in an ecosystem (as in a semiosphere). The formation of an umwelt is dependent on the modelling system of the organism. (3) Biophony (the term introduced by Bernie Krause around 2000) denotes the coordination of inter- and intra-species relations in a soundscape of a biological community. This can be seen as a special case of Komposition as defined by Jakob and Thure von Uexküll. (4) Ecological code (as introduced, e.g. by Alexander Levich around 1977) can be defined as the set of (sign) relations (regular irreducible correspondences) characteristic to an entire ecosystem. We also mention the concepts of ecomones and coactones (introduced by Marcel Florkin in 1965) as the substances which are responsible for mediation of ecological inter-individual relations. All the relations as sign-relations evidently imply both a static or structuralist description (in terms of codes), and a processual description (in terms of semiosis carried on by interpretation). We conclude that all the above mentioned concepts can be viewed as conceptually connected and are suitable for semiotic description of biological communities. (shrink)

A recent idea of “ecosystem health” was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s to draws attention to the fact that ecosystems can become ill because of a reduction of properties such as primary productivity, functions and diversity of interactions among system components. Starting from the 1990s, this idea has been deeply criticized by authors who argued that, insofar as ecosystems show many differences with respect to organismic features, these two kinds of systems cannot share a typical organismic property (...) such as health. In recent years, an organisational approach in philosophy of biology and ecology argued that both organisms and ecosystems may share a fundamental characteristic despite their differences, namely, organisational closure. Based on this kind of closure, scholars have also discussed health and malfunctional states in organisms. In this paper, we examine the possibility of expanding such an organisational approach to health and malfunctions to the ecological domain. Firstly, we will see that a malfunction is related to a lower effectiveness in the functional behaviour of some biotic components with respect to other systemic components. We will then show how some introduced species do not satisfactorily interact in an organisational closure with other ecosystem components, thus posing a threat to the self-maintenance of the ecosystem in which they are found. Accordingly, we will argue that an ecosystem can be said to be healthy when it is a vital environment organisationally grounded on its intrinsic capacity to ensure, under favourable conditions, appropriate functional behaviours for ecosystem components and ecosystem self-maintenance. (shrink)

Discusses managing the environment from philosophical, scientific, and political perspectives.

As the increasing loss of ecosystem services severely affects life perspectives of today's poor and future populations, governing access to, and use of, ecosystem services in an intragenerational and intergenerational just way is an urgent issue. The author argues that theories of distributive justice should consider the distribution of access rights to ecosystem services. Three specific demands that a theory of distributive justice should fulfill to adequately cope with the distribution of access rights to ecosystem services, and show that Rawls??A (...) Theory of Justice? can be consistently extended to meet the identified demands. (shrink)

The world contains many different types of ecosystems. This is something of a commonplace in biology and conservation science. But there has been little attention to the question of whether such ecosystem types enjoy a degree of objectivity—whether they might be natural kinds. I argue that traditional accounts of natural kinds that emphasize nomic or causal–mechanistic dimensions of “kindhood” are ill-equipped to accommodate presumptive ecosystemic kinds. In particular, unlike many other kinds, ecosystemic kinds are “anchored” to the contingent character (...) of species and higher taxa and their abiotic environments. Drawing on Slater (Br J Philos Sci 66(2):375–411, 2015a), I show how we can nevertheless make room for such contingent anchoring in an account of natural kinds of ecosystems kinds. (shrink)

Among the instrumental value defenses for biodiversity conservation is the argument that biodiversity is necessary to support ecosystem functioning. Lower levels of biodiversity yield lower levels of ecosystem functioning and hence the inference that we should conserve biodiversity. In our book Defending Biodiversity: Environmental Science and Ethics, we point out three problems with this inference. (1) The empirical support for such an inference derives from experiments conducted on a very small set of ecosystem types (mainly grasslands and fresh water aquatic) (...) and ecosystem functions (mainly nutrient uptake, biomass production, and decomposition rates). These experiments suffer from a number of largely unavoidable logistical constraints making the generality of their results questionable. (2) Even if the experimental results were unequivocal, their lack of external validity would still raise significant questions about how (if at all) these results apply to real world conservation problems. And (3) even if the experimental results were unequivocal and completely applicable to conservation problems, relying on such defenses implies other rational policy commitments that are at odds with other positions that environmentalists commonly take. Odenbaugh and I disagree largely about what inferences follow from these points rather than about the points themselves. I think that what follows is that if environmentalists want to use instrumental value defenses, then we need to accept that not all biodiversity is useful to us, and parts that are useful are not necessarily more useful than alternatives that might threaten biodiversity. I also think that the unpalatable implied commitments need to be taken seriously. This may mean that we environmentalists have to accept that biodiversity should not always be conserved, and that parts of the environmentalist agenda are little more than strong personal preferences that others need not respect. If environmentalists are willing to accept these conclusions, then there are no problems with relying on these instrumental value defenses, but I suspect that environmentalists are likely to be unhappy with such conclusions. (shrink)

Our main hypothesis is that an extended moral agent cannot fulfill their expectation of “extendedness” without a dynamical and evolutionary ecosystem where the agent develops and behave properly. It is important to establish a bridge between extended moral agents and ecosystems for two reasons: first, because there is not an enough direct theoretical reflection about this link. The scholars focus has been independently in improving the “extended agent theory”, the concepts of “ecosystem” or “ecosystem of innovation”. Second, if we (...) want to understand the wide scope of the decentered ethics in design of mobile robots and AI these two theoretical frames cannot be seen separately but in join interdependency. (shrink)

The effects of climate change and increasing environmental pollution have clearly shown the vulnerability of individuals, local communities, and the natural environment, even in the Western context. However, despite such unquestionable data, International Law is still struggling to find adequate, unambiguous, effective solutions to the issue. Even the ‘human right to a healthy environment’, recognised by the UN General Assembly in 2022, is permeated by an anthropocentric idea of the world, which prevents it from fully dealing with ecosystem issues so (...) as to protect any living and non-living being. The paper starts by exploring the historical relevance of the concept of limit and the lack of boundaries in contemporary society, aiming to show that new semantics are needed, in order to overcome contemporary extractivism. An analysis of international legislation and jurisprudence will investigate the role that the concept of ecosystem vulnerability might play in the implementation of both human rights and the rights of nature. (shrink)

This paper is a preliminary treatment of the categories of agency and dependence in the context of ecosystem services discourse. These categories are discussed in terms of critical categorial ontology in order to articulate adequately the nature of humankind’s dependence upon the nonhuman natural world, inadequately captured by ecosystem services discourse. Following Val Plumwood, this essay takes ecosystems services discourse as an example of one type of failure to discern various forms of agency as well as dependence, and it (...) goes on to define diffuse dependence as the relation that corresponds to the form of agency expressed through ecosystem services. (shrink)

A survey of professional foresters in the northeastern United States was conducted to determine whether professional forest resource managers viewed forest ecosystem management and other "new" forestry language as representing practical constructs, and whether there is a difference between USDA Forest Service foresters and private-sector foresters in the degree to which they have applied "new" forestry. Results suggested that the forest management behaviors of most foresters in the region may be influenced more by traditional forestry concepts and language than by (...) "new" forestry. (shrink)

We critique the metaphysical ecology developed by J. Baird Callicott in “The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology” in light of what we take to be the most viable attempt to provide an inclusive theoretical framework for the wide variety of extant ecosystem analyses—namely, hierarchy theory. We argue that Callicott’s metaphysical ecology is not consonant with hierarchy theory and is, therefore, an unsatisfactory foundation for the development of an environmental ethic.

Arts and Humanities in Higher Education, Ahead of Print. Preparing students to navigate a life in music involves understanding how they develop awareness of their personal and professional identities, build networks, and reflect on practice in order to sustain and develop work which is meaningful. In a complex, uncertain and rapidly changing world, particularly following the Covid-19 pandemic, we explore the ways in which HEIs might support music students as they prepare for their futures. We argue that employability ecosystems (...) may provide a useful frame for considering the ways in which students’ work transitions can be supported. We consider three vignettes of practice relating to the role of eportfolios and mentoring in scaffolding student reflections on how the intersections of passion, partnership and identity inform personal definitions of success. We suggest that there is a need to disrupt dominant working practices within the music industry and its institutions towards a more ethical, sustainable and culturally enriching employability ecosystem. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the study of the history of the "innovation ecosystem" concept formation and provides a simplified schematic representation of the system as five interacting modules. Innovations are assumed by national governments and companies as a source of long-term sustainability. In the past decade, there has been an increased interest in identifying approaches that would accelerate the development and deployment of innovations. The attention of the academic and business communities representatives to the innovation ecosystems underlines the (...) fact that it is ecosystems and IT platforms that implement them that are the most promising candidates for the role of an organizational structure for the accumulation and scaling of new knowledge in the era of the industrial revolution. (shrink)

Based on extensive fieldwork, this book demonstrates how gender is an organizing principle of entrepreneurial ecosystems and makes a difference in how ecosystem resources are assembled and how they can be accessed. By bringing visibility to how ecosystem actors are heterogeneous across identities, interactions and experiences, the book highlights the role and complexity of individual, organizational, and institutional factors working in concert to create and maintain gendered inequities. Entrepreneurial Ecosystems provides research-driven insights around effective organizational practices and policies (...) aimed at remedying gendered and intersectional inequalities associated with entrepreneurship activities and economic growth. Proposing a typology of four ecosystem identities, it highlights how some might be more amenable and organized towards gender inclusion and change, while others may be much more difficult to change, reorganize and restructure. It offers scholars, students, practitioners and policymakers insights about gender in relation to analyzing entrepreneurial ecosystems and for fostering inclusive economic development policies. (shrink)

We critique the metaphysical ecology developed by J. Baird Callicott in “The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology” in light of what we take to be the most viable attempt to provide an inclusive theoretical framework for the wide variety of extant ecosystem analyses—namely, hierarchy theory. We argue that Callicott’s metaphysical ecology is not consonant with hierarchy theory and is, therefore, an unsatisfactory foundation for the development of an environmental ethic.

Appeals to science as a help in constructing policy on complex issues often assume that science has relatively clear-cut, univocal answers. That is not so today in the environmentally crucial fields of ecology and evolutionary biology. The social role of science has been as a source of information to be used in the prediction and domination of nature. Its perspectives are finely honed for such purposes. However, other more conscientious perspectives are now appearing within science, and we provide an example (...) here in rebuttal to the claim that there is no warrant from within ecology for ecosystem moral considerability. (shrink)

Appeals to science as a help in constructing policy on complex issues often assume that science has relatively clear-cut, univocal answers. That is not so today in the environmentally crucial fields of ecology and evolutionary biology. The social role of science has been as a source of information to be used in the prediction and domination of nature. Its perspectives are finely honed for such purposes. However, other more conscientious perspectives are now appearing within science, and we provide an example (...) here in rebuttal to the claim that there is no warrant from within ecology for ecosystem moral considerability. (shrink)

Everybody knows that humans are cultural animals. Although this fact is universally acknowledged, many opportunities to exploit it are overlooked. In this article, I propose shifting our attention from local examples of extended mind to the cultural-cognitive ecosystems within which human cognition is embedded. I conclude by offering a set of conjectures about the features of cultural-cognitive ecosystems.

This paper is about the practice of evaluating ecosystems on the basis of the cultural services they provide. My first aim is to assess the various objections that have been made to this practice. My second is to argue that when particular places are integral to people’s lives, their value cannot be adequately conceived in terms of the provision of cultural ecosystem services. It follows, I conclude, that the ecosystem services framework can provide only a very limited account of (...) the value of places. (shrink)

Arthur Tansley first defined the term ecosystem in his seminal work “Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts,” as an improved way of viewing the relationships between plants and their physical environments. However, his definition, while widely influential, privileges the living components over nonliving components of ecosystems, and has thus been unable to fully overcome the biocentrism of early plant ecologists. Moreover, the binary between life and nonlife is untenable, and serves only as a marker of the underlying biocentric values (...) of a researcher. Drawing from Donna Haraway’s argument for situated knowledges, one can critically examine the biocentrism implicit in much of ecology, and reconsider our definition of ecosystem in order to highlight our devaluation of the nonliving, and expand our normative universe. (shrink)

Attempts to come to grip with what appears to be the autonomy of nature have developed into several schools of thought. Among the most influential of these schools is the ecosystem integrity approach to environmental ethics, management and policy. The philosophical arm of the approach has been spearheaded by Laura Westra and her work in An Environmental Proposal for Ethics. The emphasis that this school places on pristine wilderness to model ecosystem integrity and the arguments Westra devises to justify the (...) application of what she calls the “principle of integrity,” although clear in its goal and object of inquiry, could very well retrench dualistic thinking of the sort that environmental thinkers have been trying to undermine. More importantly, I argue that Westra misses an important implication for the way in which ecosystem integrity could be used to help develop an ethic not so confined by problems of justification in attaching values to facts and descriptions to prescriptions. (shrink)

Attempts to come to grip with what appears to be the autonomy of nature have developed into several schools of thought. Among the most influential of these schools is the ecosystem integrity approach to environmental ethics, management and policy. The philosophical arm of the approach has been spearheaded by Laura Westra and her work in An Environmental Proposal for Ethics. The emphasis that this school places on pristine wilderness to model ecosystem integrity and the arguments Westra devises to justify the (...) application of what she calls the “principle of integrity,” although clear in its goal and object of inquiry, could very well retrench dualistic thinking of the sort that environmental thinkers have been trying to undermine. More importantly, I argue that Westra misses an important implication for the way in which ecosystem integrity could be used to help develop an ethic not so confined by problems of justification in attaching values to facts and descriptions to prescriptions. (shrink)

The notion of entorno is discussed and its mutual dependence upon the organism is emphasised. Both the etymology and meaning of ethos, oikos, entorno and ecotomo are discussed. The intimate relation between Ethology and Ecology is also shown. A reference background is given to explain how the commonly considered isolated components organism/society and entorno/nature articulate in the form of a relation. It is argued that the integrated concepts that originated the notion of ecosystem have been set aside. The term ecotomo (...) is proposed, which refers to any territorial unit that, considered at a local, regional or global level, emerges from the society-nature relationship. (shrink)

Natural ecosystems perform fundamental life-support services upon which human civilization depends. However, many people believe that nature provides these services for free and therefore, they are of little or no value. One nearly forgotten ecosystem service is ecotherapy – the ability of interaction with nature to enhance healing and growth. While we do not pay for this service, we pay significantly for its loss resulting in slower recovery times, greater distress, reduced well-being and losses in those images of nature (...) that contribute to our basic happiness. Little is understood about the ecotherapy benefits of the natural environment and its ecosystem services. The complex and interactive relationship of ecosystems, their services and human well-being is poorly acknowledged in the broad social, philosophical and economic well-being literature. In this article, we examine the role of nature and its ecosystem services in ecotherapy and its associated enhancement of recovery from physical and mental illness. (shrink)

The essays by Allen et al and Peterson present a number of challenges to readers of this volume. For some, the theoretical framework for ecosystem management that is endorsed by the authors – a variant of what may be called the “ecosystem approach to ecosystem management ” – will be unfamiliar, and there.

Some writers have suggested that it would be desirable to assess the state of the Earth''senvironments by making use of a concept of ecosystem health. We subject this suggestion toscrutiny first by calling attention to obscurities inthe notion of an ecosystem and then by callingattention to obscurities in and objections to someviews about ecosystem health. Finally, we note, thateven if ecosystem health can be adequately clarified, there are reasons for saying that whetherwe are morally obligated to protect the health ofsome (...) ecosystem depends on other circumstances. In many possible circumstances we would not beobligated to protect the health of a particularecosystem. (shrink)

The claim that animals, as well as people, ‘have rights’ may often mean only that their interests ought to be given some moral weight: they should not be treated ‘cruelly’ or ‘inconsiderately’. The more demanding claim may also be made that animals should not be subjected to simple-mindedly utilitarian calculation: their choices, their liberty, should sometimes be respected even if this prevents the realization of some notionally ‘greater good’. Finally, talk of rights may have a clearly political context: if, and (...) only if, animals have rights, governments are entitled to legislate on how they should be treated. If they do not, then any laws on the subject are merely moralistic, and such as to be regretted by any sincere liberal. It is this last doctrine that I shall be investigating in this paper, with particular attention to the writings of Regan and McCloskey. Only in this context, so it seems to me, does much hang upon the question of whether animals ‘really’ have rights: for those outside the liberal, or libertarian, tradition it is enough to know that we ought not to disregard the suffering of our fellow-creatures, nor treat it merely ‘aggregatively’. (shrink)

Ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. Many of these services are provided outside the borders of the land where they are produced. This article investigates who is entitled to these non-excludable ecosystem services from a libertarian perspective. Taking a right-libertarian perspective, it is concluded that the beneficiaries generally hold the right to use non-excludable ecosystem services and the right to landowners not converting ecosystems. Landowners are only at liberty to convert ecosystems if they appropriated (...) their land before any beneficiary used the services and converted the ecosystems before or shortly after the beneficiaries started using the services. This means that the beneficiaries generally hold the right to compensation payments by the landowners in the event of service losses, instead of the landowners holding the right to payments for ecosystem services by the beneficiaries. Taking a left-libertarian perspective, it is concluded that landowners ought to pay for the non-excludable ecosystem services lost as a result of their activities as well as beneficiaries paying for the non-excludable ecosystem services they use. These payments are not made mutually, however, but to a central authority that distributes the returns to the community on an equal per capita basis. (shrink)

This article addresses the implications of rapid and uncertain ecological change, and global climate change in particular, for reserve oriented and restoration oriented ecosystem management. I argue for the following conclusions: (1) rapid and uncertain ecological change undermines traditional justifications for reserve oriented and restoration oriented ecosystem management strategies; (2) it requires rethinking ecosystem management goals, not just developing novel strategies (such as assisted colonization) to accomplish traditional goals; (3) species preservation ought to be deemphasized as an ecosystem management goal; (...) (4) reserve oriented ecosystem management remains well justified, but the goals for it must be revised. (shrink)