This study analyses the attitudes of university students towards unethical behaviour in the individual and organisational environments, and relates these attitudes to tolerance of corruption in their future professional lives. The results show a positive relationship between attitudes towards unethical behaviour in both environments, as well as tolerance towards acts of corruption, based on a virtual perception survey. Despite the general rejection attitude by students of such behaviour and acts, the rejection diminishes as their degree programme progresses. This study contributes (...) to our understanding of the tolerance of university students towards corruption, and to revealing how this attitude could explain tolerance towards this phenomenon in their future professional lives. (shrink)

Analiso e critico neste artigo a solução apresentada por Robert Brandom para o problema por ele formulado acerca do critério de distintividade das percepções presentes nas meras enteléquias. Brandom considera ser problemática a vinculação entre distinção e consciência feita por vários intérpretes de Leibniz com o propósito de dar conta dos diferentes graus de distinção das percepções, pois tal vinculação somente pode ser válida para almas e espíritos, não se aplicando às enteléquias, as quais não são dotadas de nenhum tipo (...) de senciência ou de reflexão. Em função disso, Brandom propõe uma interpretação que não apresentaria essa difculdade. Segundo essa proposta, uma percepção será tão mais distinta quanto maior for seu domínio expressivo, isto é, seu grau de distinção será determinado pela quantidade de inferências que se deixam realizar a partir dela. Torna-se possível, assim, de acordo com ele, a comparação de diferentes percepções e a ordenação delas em uma série que vai das menos distintas às mais distintas tomando como base seus respectivos domínios expressivos. Mostro neste artigo que tanto esse – a meu ver, aparente – problema levantado por Brandom quanto a solução por ele proposta decorrem de uma compreensão parcial e equivocada da teoria leibniziana das mônadas, de tal forma que estaríamos aqui diante de uma solução equivocada para um problema inexistente. (shrink)

The main objective of this research is to identify the current panorama of scientific production associated with governance in university institutions. A bibliometric analysis was developed in Scopus using R Core Team 2022-Bibliometrix and Vosviewer software. The results highlight the countries with the highest productivity in the topic of study, with the most representative authors favoring the understanding of governance. The main thematic clusters stand out. It recognizes the role of university governance and its migration to direct spaces and the (...) transition from a face-to-face model. (shrink)

O principal objetivo deste artigo é mostrar, contra as interpretações da filosofia de Leibniz que tendem a reduzir sua noção de substância a uma concepção derivada unicamente de considerações de natureza lógica, que o conceito leibniziano de substância possui raízes lógicas, físicas e teológicas que são mutuamente independentes.

We investigate the possibility of inducing the cosmological constant from extra dimensions by embedding our four-dimensional Riemannian space-time into a five-dimensional Weyl integrable space. Following the approach of the space-time-matter theory we show that when we go down from five to four dimensions, the Weyl field may contribute both to the induced energy-tensor as well as to the cosmological constant Λ, or more generally, it may generate a time-dependent cosmological parameter Λ(t). As an application, we construct a simple cosmological model (...) in which Λ(t) has some interesting properties. (shrink)

A significant impediment to the study of perceptual consciousness is our dependence on simplistic ideas about what experience is like. This is a point that has been made by Wittgenstein, and by philosophers working in the Phenomenological Tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, it is an observation that has been brought to the fore in recent discussions of consciousness among philosophers and cognitive scientists who have come to feel the need for a more rigorous phenomenology of experience. The central (...) thought of this paper is that art can make a needed contribution to the study of perceptual consciousness. The work of some artists can teach us about perceptual consciousness by furnishing us with the opportunity to have a special kind of reflective experience. In this way, art can be a tool for phenomenological investigation. The paper has three parts. First, I present what I call the problem of the transparency of experience. This is a problem for philosophy, for art, and for cognitive science. Second, I present an alternative conception of experience as a mode of interactive engagement with the environment. Finally, against the background of this conception, I discuss, briefly, the work of the sculptors Richard Serra and Tony Smith. (shrink)

Star ting from the as ser tion about the no - tion of Com ple xity as not being pre sent in Phi lo - sophy re cog ni zed as such, alt hough pre sent in all thin kers that have de ve lo ped a com plex vi sion of the world, a cha rac te ri za tion is put for ward about why clas si cal Scien ce ha..

Ce texte, auquel nous souscrivons entièrement, a déjà paru sur Médiapart le 7 juin 2014. Ils n'ont pas su voir le lent dépérissement du peuple de gauche, éduqué sous la Troisième République par les idées issues de la Révolution française, assumées et développées par le socialisme, réassumées après 1933 par les communistes, propagées par les instituteurs de campagne, les enseignants secondaires, les écoles de formation du PS et du PC. Ils n'ont pas perçu le vide que laissait la mort du (...) radical socialisme, la (...) - Débats. (shrink)

"Ces souvenirs ne sont pas venus selon un ordre chronologique comme le sont habituellement les Mémoires. Ils sont venus à ma rencontre selon l'inspiration, les circonstances. S'interpellant les uns les autres, certains en ont fait émerger d'autres de l'oubli. Ils témoignent que j'ai pu admirer inconditionnellement des hommes ou femmes qui furent à la fois mes héros et mes amis. Ils témoignent des dérives et des dégradations, mais aussi des grandeurs et des noblesses que les violents remous de l'Histoire ont (...) entraînées chez tant de proches. Ils témoignent des illuminations qui m'ont révélé mes vérités, de mes émotions, de mes ferveurs, de mes douleurs, de mes bonheurs. Ils témoignent que je suis devenu tout ce que j'ai rencontré. Ils témoignent que le fils unique, orphelin de mère que j'étais, a trouvé dans sa vie des frères et des soeurs. Ils témoignent de mes résistances : sous l'Occupation, puis au cours des guerres d'Algérie, de Yougoslavie, du Moyen-Orient, et contre la montée de deux barbaries, l'une venue du fond des âges, de la haine, du mépris, du fanatisme, l'autre froide, voire glacée, du calcul et du profit, toutes deux désormais sans freins. Ces souvenirs témoignent enfin d'une extrême diversité de curiosités et d'intérêts, mais aussi d'une obsession essentielle, celle qu'exprimait Kant et qui n'a cessé de m'animer : Que puis-je savoir? Que puis-je croire? Que puis-je espérer? Inséparable de la triple question : qu'est-ce que l'homme, la vie, l'univers? Cette interrogation, je me suis donné le droit de la poursuivre toute ma vie."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Correspondence: Alva Noë, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-2390, USA. _Email: [email protected]_ Evan Thompson, Philosophy Department, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. _Email: [email protected]_.

"Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...

Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. (...) Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? If active externalism is right, then the boundary cannot be drawn at the skull. The mind reaches – or at least can reach --- beyond the limits of the body out into the world. (shrink)

In The Entanglement, philosopher Alva Noë explores the inseparability of life, art, and philosophy, and argues that we have radically underestimated the significance of this long recognized but underappreciated reality, what he refers to as the "entanglement." The core of The Entanglement is the idea that human existence is inextricably aesthetic and philosophical. In the first half of the book, Noë offers a detailed examination of pictures and seeing, writing and speech, and choreography and dancing, which serve as case (...) studies and the base in which the phenomenon of entanglement is set. In later chapters, Noë deepens this analysis by exploring the nature of the aesthetic itself, and its place in our lives, examining what the entanglement can teach us about science, and, in particular, the project of applying science in the domain of the human. In these later chapters he covers a range of topics, including sex, gender, and the body, psychology and AI, the problem of style, and the nature of 'nature.' Drawing on his work in perception, consciousness, and the philosophy of art, Noë offers a new model for thinking about the nature of the human, the limits to what a natural science of the human can do on its own, and the irreplaceable importance of art and philosophy for the larger project of studying and understanding ourselves. (shrink)

Introduction: free presence -- Conscious reference -- Fragile styles -- Real presence -- Experience of the world in time -- Presence in pictures -- On over-intellectualizing the intellect -- Ideology and the third realm.

A noted philosopher and member of the Institute for Cognitive and Brain Science examines flaws in current understandings about consciousness while proposing a radical solution that argues that consciousness must not be limited to the confines of the brain.

This paper investigates the idea that perception can be, at once, a mode of direct awareness of the world and an encounter, in the first instance, with mere appearances. In developing this point, I introduce a sensorimotor account of perception according to which the senses are ways of exploring the environment mediated by different patterns of sensorimotor contingency (i.e. by the distinctive ways in which what the perceiver does affects how things appear).

Trois courts textes qui se présentent comme trois petits traités sur le bonheur, sur ces trois "complexités" énigmatiques qui enchantent et illuminent nos vies : l'amour, la poésie et la sagesse, et les liens qui les unissent. Issus de conférences prononcées en 1990 et 1995.

Many philosophers take mental causation to be required for free will. But it has also been argued that the most popular view of the nature of mental states, i.e. non-reductive physicalism, excludes the existence of mental causation, due to what is known as the ‘exclusion argument’. In this paper, I discuss the difference-making account of mental causation proposed by [List, C., and Menzies, P. 2017. “My Brain Made Me Do It: The Exclusion Argument Against Free Will, and What’s Wrong with (...) It.” In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, & H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation. Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press], who argue that their account not only solves the problem of causal exclusion but also saves free will. More precisely, they argue that it rebuts what they call ‘the Neurosceptical Argument’, the argument that if actions are caused by neural states and processes unavailable to us, there is no free will. I argue that their argument fails for two independent reasons. The first reason is that they fail to show that difference-makers are independent causes. The second reason is that physical realizers of mental states can be individuated in a way that makes both mental states and their realizers difference-makers. (shrink)

and apply it to various examples of neural plasticity in which input is rerouted intermodally or intramodally to nonstandard cortical targets. In some cases but not others, cortical activity ‘defers’ to the nonstandard sources of input. We ask why, consider some possible explanations, and propose a dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis. We believe that this distinction is important and worthy of further study, both philosophical and empirical, whether or not our hypothesis turns out to be correct. In particular, the question of how (...) the distinction should be explained is linked to explanatory gap issues for consciousness. Comparative and absolute explanatory gaps should be distinguished: why does neural activity in a particular area of cortex have this qualitative expression rather than that, and why does it have any qualitative expression at all? We use the dominance/deference distinction to address the comparative gaps, both intermodal and intramodal. We do so not by inward scrutiny but rather by expanding our gaze to include relations between brain, body and environment. (shrink)