Me enfoco aquí en los principales contraargumentos que han sido erigidos en contra de una tesis que postulé en mi artículo “Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and the Transhumanims” (2009a), según la cual se pueden encontrar similitudes significativas en un nivel fundamental entre el concepto de posthumano, tal como es sostenido por algunos transhumanistas, y el concepto de Nietzsche de sobrehumano. Los artículos con los contraargumentos fueron publicados en el reciente apartado de la Journal of Evolution and Technology “Nietzsche and European Posthumanisms” (...) (junio-julio 2010). Como varios comentadores se han referido a problemas idénticos, he decidido que no sería apropiado responder a cada artículo individualmente, sino enfocarme en los argumentos centrales y lidiar con los contraargumentos mencionados en las diferentes réplicas. Me ocupo de cada tópico en una sección separada. Las secciones se titulan como sigue: 1. Tecnología y evolución; 2. Superando el nihilismo; 3. Política y liberalismo; 4. ¿Utilitarismo o ética virtuosa?; 5. La vida buena; 6. Creatividad y voluntad de poder; 7. Inmortalidad y longevidad; 8. Logocentrismo; 9. El tercer Reich. Cuando me ocupo con cada tópico, no sólo estoy respondiendo a los contraargumentos; también erijo interrogantes concernientes al transhumanismo y postulo mis propios puntos de vista en relación con algunas de las interrogantes con las que estoy lidiando. (shrink)

In 2019, a new national Ethics Review Authority (Etikprövningsmyndigheten, EPM) was created in Sweden. In 2020, Sweden’s Ethical Review of Research Involving Humans Act was revised, tightening this legislation, and increasing penalties for its infraction. This article draws on empirical material generated by artistic research conducted with a norm-critical contemporary music ensemble. Two of the musicians who collaborated with this research identify as disabled. Consequently, in accordance with EPM, my artistic research was subject to mandatory ethics review. Reflecting critically on (...) my own experience of seeking ethical approval for this artistic research project, I show how EPM’s process of ethics review enacts scientific boundary work in Sweden that privileges the interests of academic disciplines that are already well-established. As a corrective to EPM’s scientific boundary work I propose the application of an ethics of care that recognises the complex relationalities that exist between research institutions, researchers and research participants. (shrink)

La importancia de Montserrat como santuario se puede medir no sólo por la extensión de su culto, sino también como centro irradiador de modelos narrativos. La leyenda de Garí fue elaborada en el medievo por los benedictinos y proviene de dos fuentes conocidas: el eremita tentado y la historia del hombre salvaje. En ella se aúnan legados de origen oriental y europeo. El hallazgo de la imagen se suma más tarde a esta narración, lo que pone de manifiesto cómo se (...) van hilvanando las leyendas, su proceso de elaboración: 1º una leyenda de fundación del monasterio santuario como la de Garí. En 2º lugar una leyenda de origen de culto a una imagen. La leyenda mariana de Montserrat forma parte de la cultura devocional dedicada a ciertos santos y a san Miguel, así como también al culto a las imágenes. (shrink)

Reasoning, defined as the production and evaluation of reasons, is a central process in science. The dominant view of reasoning, both in the psychology of reasoning and in the psychology of science, is of a mechanism with an asocial function: bettering the beliefs of the lone reasoner. Many observations, however, are difficult to reconcile with this view of reasoning; in particular, reasoning systematically searches for reasons that support the reasoner’s initial beliefs, and it only evaluates these reasons cursorily. By contrast, (...) reasoners are well able to evaluate others’ reasons: accepting strong arguments and rejecting weak ones. The argumentative theory of reasoning accounts for these traits of reasoning by postulating that the evolved function of reasoning is to argue: to find arguments to convince others and to change one’s mind when confronted with good arguments. Scientific reasoning, however, is often described as being at odds with such an argumentative mechanisms: scientists are supposed to reason objectively on their own, and to be pigheaded when their theories are challenged, even by good arguments. In this article, we review evidence showing that scientists, when reasoning, are subject to the same biases as are lay people while being able to change their mind when confronted with good arguments. We conclude that the argumentative theory of reasoning explains well key features of scientists’ reasoning and that differences in the way scientists and laypeople reason result from the institutional framework of science. (shrink)

How is the role of context in moral philosophy to be understood? Why is the consideration of context important here? This paper is a small contribution to answering these questions. The kind of context that is in focus does not help us answer moral questions but is essential for understanding what kind of moral question arises – indeed, if any question arises at all. For whom does the question arise? What form does the question have for him or her? What (...) relation does the person for whom it arises have to the events in the example as described by the philosopher? In considering such issues, the importance of thinking from an existentially and morally engaged perspective becomes evident. (shrink)

The persistence of multiple educational pathways into the nursing profession continues to occupy scholars internationally. In the Netherlands, various groups within the Dutch healthcare sector have tried to differentiate nursing practice on the basis of educational backgrounds for over 50 years. Proponents argue that such reforms are needed to retain bachelor‐trained nurses, improve quality of care and strengthen nurses' position in the sector. Opponents have actively resisted reforms because they would mainly benefit bachelor‐trained nurses and neglect practical experience and technical (...) skills. This historical case study aims to provide insight in this apparent stalemate. Our analysis of this debate is informed by literature on institutional work and current debates within the historiography of nursing. This study contributes to a better understanding of this contemporary debate by examining a broader timeframe than is usually studied, and by highlighting nurses' roles in complex processes of change. We argue that, rather than being stuck in their professional development, different groups of nurses have forged their own path forward in their professional development, albeit via different strategies. (shrink)

Many fields of study have shown that group discussion generally improves reasoning performance for a wide range of tasks. This article shows that most of the population, including specialists, does not expect group discussion to be as beneficial as it is. Six studies asked participants to solve a standard reasoning problem—the Wason selection task—and to estimate the performance of individuals working alone and in groups. We tested samples of U.S., Indian, and Japanese participants, European managers, and psychologists of reasoning. Every (...) sample underestimated the improvement yielded by group discussion. They did so even after they had been explained the correct answer, or after they had had to solve the problem in groups. These mistaken intuitions could prevent individuals from making the best of institutions that rely on group discussion, from collaborative learning and work teams to deliberative assemblies. (shrink)

Seit dem 2. Nachchristlichen Jahrhundert werden die Schriften von Aristoteles kommentiert. DIese Ausgabe enthalt griechische Kommentare zu seinem Werk vom 3. Bis 8. JAhrhundert n. CHr., u. A. Von Alexander von Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. PHiloponus, Simplicius in griechischer Sprache.

Are we gullible? Can we be easily influenced by what others tell us, even if they do not deserve our trust? Many strands of research, from social psychology to cultural evolution suggest that humans are by nature conformist and eager to follow prestigious leaders. By contrast, an evolutionary perspective suggests that humans should be vigilant towards communicated information, so as not to be misled too often. Work in experimental psychology shows that humans are equipped with sophisticated mechanisms that allow them (...) to carefully evaluate communicated information. These open vigilance mechanisms lead us to reject messages that clash with our prior beliefs, unless the source of the message has earned our trust, or provides good arguments, in which case we can adaptively change our minds. These mechanisms make us largely immune to mass persuasion, explaining why propaganda, political campaigns, advertising, and other attempts at persuading large groups nearly always fall in deaf ears. However, some false beliefs manage to spread through communication. I argue that most popular false beliefs are held reflectively, which means that they have little effect on our thoughts and behaviors, and that many false beliefs can be socially beneficial. Accepting such beliefs thus reflects a much weaker failure in our evaluation of communicated information than might at first appear. (shrink)

Peng and Nisbett put forward an influential theory of the influence of culture on the resolution of contradiction. They suggested that Easterners deal with contradiction in a dialectical manner, trying to reconcile opposite points of view and seeking a middle-way. Westerners, by contrast, would follow the law of excluded middle, judging one side of the contradiction to be right and the other to be wrong. However, their work has already been questioned, both in terms of replicability and external validity. Here (...) we test alternative interpretations of two of Peng and Nisbett’s experiments and conduct a new test of their theory in a third experiment. Overall, the Eastern and Western participants behaved similarly, failing to exhibit the cross-cultural differences observed by Peng and Nisbett. Several interpretations of these failed replications and this failed new test are suggested. Together with previous failed replications, the present results raise questions about the breadth of Peng and Nisbett’s interpretation of cross-cultural differences in dealing with contradiction. (shrink)

En philosophie du droit, on a coutume d’opposer juspositivisme et jusnaturalisme et de placer Jeremy Bentham dans la première catégorie. Plusieurs auteurs tiennent même Bentham pour le père du juspositivisme. Je prétends pour ma part que cette façon de classer Bentham est inadéquate et nécessite une importante mise au point. S’il est vrai que Bentham était un adversaire des doctrines du droit naturel, il ne s’ensuit pas pour autant qu’il appartient au positivisme juridique; et les raisons qui pourraient justifier le (...) classement de Bentham parmi les juspositivistes militent aussi pour son association au jusnaturalisme. Que faut-il entendre exactement par « positivisme juridique », et en quel sens Bentham y adhère-t-il? C’est à cette double question que le présent article est consacré. (shrink)

Coherence plays an important role in psychology. In this article, I suggest that coherence takes two main forms in humans’ cognitive system. The first belong to ‘system 1’. It relies on the degree of coherence between different representations to regulate them, without coherence being represented. By contrast other mechanisms, belonging to system 2, allow humans to represent the degree of coherence between different representations and to draw inferences from it. It is suggested that the mechanisms of explicit coherence evaluation have (...) social functions. They are used as means of epistemic vigilance—to evaluate what other people tell us. They can also be turned inwards to examine the coherence of our own beliefs. Their function is then to minimize the chances that we are perceived as being incoherent. Evidence from different domains of psychology is briefly reviewed in support of these hypotheses. (shrink)

Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence (...) in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found. (shrink)

In “Mercier and Sperber’s Argumentative Theory of Reasoning: From Psychology of Reasoning to Argumentation Studies” (2012) Santibáñez Yañez offers constructive comments and criticisms of the argumentative theory of reasoning. The purpose of this reply is twofold. First, it seeks to clarify two points broached by Yanez: (1) the relation between reasoning (in this specific theory) and dual process accounts in general and (2) the benefits that can be derived from reasoning and argumentation (again, in this specific theory). Second, it suggests (...) one domain—the categorization of arguments—in which argumentation studies and the argumentative theory of reasoning could usefully complement each other to yield a better understanding of the processes of argumentation. (shrink)

The Condorcet Jury Theorem, along with empirical results, establishes the accuracy of majority voting in a broad range of conditions. Here we investigate whether naïve participants (in the U.S. and...

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. (shrink)

This book sets out to deepen our moral understanding by thinking about forgiveness: what does it mean for our understanding of morality that there is such a thing as forgiveness? Forgiveness is a challenge to moral philosophy, for forgiveness challenges us: it calls me to understand my relations to others, and thereby myself, in a new way. Without arguing for or against forgiveness, the present study tries to describe these challenges. These challenges concern both forgiving and asking for forgiveness. The (...) latter is especially important in this context: what does the need to be forgiven mean? In the light of such questions, central issues in the philosophy of forgiveness are critically discussed, about the reasons and conditions for forgiveness, but mostly the focus is on new questions, about the relation of forgiveness to plurality, virtue, death, the processes of moral change and development, and the possibility of feeling at home in the world. (shrink)

We elaborate on the approach to syllogistic reasoning based on “case identification” (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995; Stenning & Yule, 1997). It is shown that this can be viewed as the formalisation of a method of proof that dates back to Aristotle, namely proof by exposition ( ecthesis ), and that there are traces of this method in the strategies described by a number of psychologists, from St rring (1908) to the present day. We hypothesised that by rendering individual cases explicit (...) in the premises, the chance that reasoners would engage in a proof by exposition would be enhanced, and thus performance improved. To do so, we used syllogisms with singular premises (e.g., this X is Y ). This resulted in a uniform increase in performance as compared to performance on the associated standard syllogisms. These results cannot be explained by the main theories of syllogistic reasoning in their current state. (shrink)

We give a version of L´os’ ultraproduct result for forcing in Kripke structures in a first-order language with equality and discuss ultrafilters in a topology naturally associated to a partial order. The presentation also includes background material so as to make the exposition accessible to those whose main interest is Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence and/or Philosophy.

It is necessary to specify in which sense the concept "Silence" is to be used in Celan's poetry. If on one hand it can be said that his Lyric is an answer to Adorno's impossibility of poetry after Auschwitz, and that it arose in the frame of the annihilation of war and Nazism that also devastated language , on the other hand, it is in a dialectical way that this allusion to Silence, neither positively nor factically determinable, could be explored, (...) according to the opposing tension lines that go across Celan's Lyric.Es necesario precisar en qué sentido se habla de silencio en la obra de Celan. Si por un lado puede decirse que su lírica es una réplica a la imposibilidad de la poesía después de Auschwitz y que se alza en el marco de la aniquilación de la guerra y el nazismo que arrasó también al lenguaje , es de modo dialéctico como esta alusión al silencio, nunca positiva y fácticamente determinable, puede ser explorada, según las líneas de tensión contrapuestas que atraviesan la lírica de Celan. (shrink)

ResumenBasado en elementos de la filosofía clásica, el common sense británico y la Escuela de Frankfurt, el autor postula un sentido común guiado críticamente, que serviría para evaluar las tendencias históricas y los modelos de modernización en el Tercer Mundo. Evitando extremos, este teorema rechazaría tanto las pretensiones de verdad de muchos enfoques racionalistas como el relativismo epistemológico y ético. La existencia de leyes y etapas obligatorias de la historia es uno de esos extremos; otro es la opción teórica que (...) afirma que los modelos culturales son incomparables e inconmensurables entre sí. La existencia de un solo paradigma normativo-positivo de desarrollo es insostenible, pero igualmente la posición que decreta la diversidad e incomparabilidad totales de los regímenes civilizatorios. Es conveniente adoptar una línea intermedia entre universalismo y particularismo y alcanzar una síntesis fructífera de ambos.Palabras claveEscuela de Frankfurt, Habermas, Kant, particularismo, sentido común, universalismoAbstractBased on elements of classical philosophy, the British common sense and the Frankfurt School, the author proposes a critically guided common sense, which could be used to evaluate historical tendencies and specially the modernization efforts in the Third World. Avoiding extremes, this theorem rejects the pretensions of truth of rationalist theories and also the epistemic and ethic relativism. The existence of obligatory laws and periods of historical development is one of these extremes; the other one is the position which states that cultural models are incomparable and immeasurable. It is reasonable, for instance, to take a middle way between universalism and particularism and also to reach a fruitful synthesis between both currents.KeywordsCommon sense, Frankfurt School, Habermas, Kant, particularism, universalism. (shrink)

The question of the function of reasoning is drawing increased attention. One suggestion is that the function of reasoning is argumentative: to find arguments to convince others and to evaluate others’ arguments. Darmstadter offers an alternative. According to this pragmatic theory the function of reasoning is to minimally adjust our beliefs so that they remain sound guides for action. This theory is similar to the classical view, which sees reasoning as a way of improving the reasoner's beliefs and decisions. The (...) pragmatic theory shares the classical view's flaws as a theory of the function of reasoning: it does not define reasoning strictly enough, it does not offer a convincing evolutionary rationale for reasoning's existence, it does not make predictions based on this rationale, and it does not properly test these predictions. Darmstadter also points out the importance of the phenomenon of deliberation failures. While I argue that documented deliberation failures are compatible with the argumentative theory of reasoning, Darmstadter's work usefully draws attention to the importance of studying reasoning outside the laboratory and in particular in argumentative situations. (shrink)

1. Derecho y cultura, derecho y otros órdenes deónticos, norma y orden jurídico.