The moral principle of fairness or fair play is widely believed to be a solid ground for political obligation, i.e., a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law qua law. In this article, I advance a new and, more importantly, principled objection to fairness theories of political obligation by revealing and defending a justificatory gap between the principle of fairness and political obligation: the duty of fairness on its own is incapable of preempting the citizen‟s liberty to reciprocate (...) fairly in ways other than obeying the law. This justificatory gap is unaffected by the ongoing debate between the voluntarist and the nonvoluntarist accounts of fairness, and it cannot be bridged by the two arguments that are perhaps implicit in Klosko‟s account, namely the presumptive benefits argument and the democratic procedure argument. (shrink)

The moral principle of fairness or fair play is widely believed to be a solid ground for political obligation, i.e., a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law qua law. In this article, I advance a new and, more importantly, principled objection to fairness theories of political obligation by revealing and defending a justificatory gap between the principle of fairness and political obligation: the duty of fairness on its own is incapable of preempting the citizen’s liberty to reciprocate (...) fairly in ways other than obeying the law. This justificatory gap is unaffected by the ongoing debate between the voluntarist and the nonvoluntarist accounts of fairness, and it cannot be bridged by the two arguments that are perhaps implicit in Klosko’s account, namely the presumptive benefits argument and the democratic procedure argument. (shrink)

In the recent debate on political legitimacy, we have seen the emergence of a revisionist camp, advocating the idea of ‘legitimacy without political obligation,’ as opposed to the traditional view that political obligation is necessary for state legitimacy. The revisionist idea of legitimacy is appealing because if it stands, the widespread skepticism about the existence of political obligation will not lead us to conclude that the state is illegitimate. Unfortunately, existing conceptions of ‘legitimacy without political obligation’ are subject to serious (...) objections. In this article, I propose a new conception of ‘legitimacy without political obligation,’ and defend it against various objections that the revisionist idea of legitimacy is either conceptually or morally mistaken. This new conception of legitimacy promises to advance the debates between anarchists and statists by making the task of philosophical anarchists significantly more difficult. (shrink)

In the recent debate on political legitimacy, we have seen the emergence of a revisionist camp, advocating the idea of ‘legitimacy without political obligation,’ as opposed to the traditional view that political obligation is necessary for state legitimacy. The revisionist idea of legitimacy is appealing because if it stands, the widespread skepticism about the existence of political obligation will not lead us to conclude that the state is illegitimate. Unfortunately, existing conceptions of ‘legitimacy without political obligation’ are subject to serious (...) objections. In this article, I propose a new conception of ‘legitimacy without political obligation,’ and defend it against various objections that the revisionist idea of legitimacy is either conceptually or morally mistaken. This new conception of legitimacy promises to advance the debates between anarchists and statists by making the task of philosophical anarchists significantly more difficult. (shrink)

In recent years, knowledge hiding has gained much popularity in the knowledge management literature. Apart from that, antecedents and consequences of knowledge hiding are being scrutinized at present. There have been many studies on the triggering forces of knowledge hiding; however, the uncivil behaviors at the workplace have led the organizations and employees in trouble due to its possible associating factors, which is well explained by social influence theory. One such factor that this study has identified is knowledge hiding behavior (...) at the workplace. This is a quantitative cross-sectional study based on a survey. The population taken in this study is the middle and low-level managerial staff of the software houses located in China. The respondents were selected based on convenient random sampling, and a sample size of 287 is used in this study. The data collected were employed with the partial least square structural equation modeling using Smart-PLS 3. The findings of this study show that apart from evasive hiding, playing dumb and rationalized hiding plays a significant role in predicting workplace incivility. In addition, psychological contract breach has been taken as the mediating variable. The violation of psychological contracts among employees can indulge them in negative feelings that may convert to workplace incivility at any available opportunity of revenge which is well explained by social influence theory. Workplace incivility cannot be completely eradicated from the organizations; however, it can be controlled by making relevant policies. The civility among the employees can be attained by due managerial interventions and training of the employees considering the protection of victims and due punishment to the perpetrator. (shrink)

This paper contends that the requirement of content independence poses a pressing challenge to natural-duty theories of political obligation, for it is unclear why subjects of a state should not discharge the background natural duty in proper ways other than obeying the law. To demonstrate the force of this challenge, I examine and refute three argumentative strategies to achieve content independence represented in recent notable natural-duty theories: by appealing to the epistemic advantages of the state in discharging a natural duty, (...) by claiming that one’s denial of state authority necessarily poses an unjust threat to other people, and by invoking the consideration of fairness to preempt one’s discretion in discharging a natural duty. My criticisms, I believe, provide sufficient reasons for natural-duty theorists to take the requirement of content independence much more seriously. (shrink)

中国儒学缄默维度是在语言关闭的缄默中，转向静的深度体证，具有渊与根两个特征，集约表达为“藏心于渊，美厥灵根”，诗意表达为“氤氲一气似初春”。本书从孔子观周见金人“三缄其口”开始，以方以智证成太极丸春结 束，选取颜回、言偃、扬雄、周敦颐、朱熹、杨简、文天祥、王阳明及其后学胡直与万廷言、刘宗周、王夫之等重要儒者，溯源至孟子、《易传》、庄子、屈原四个先秦流派的展开与互动，围绕罕言与雅言、深静与真动、冲然与 恬愉、主静与持敬、艺术大美与道德至善等重点问题，挖掘中国儒学缄默维度的深蕴及特质，并展望其在现代语境的展开，重写中国儒学史。.

Tianyi Zhang offers in this study an innovative philosophical reconstruction of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī's (d. 1191) Illuminationism. Commonly portrayed as either a theosophist or an Avicennian in disguise, Suhrawardīappears here as an original and hardheaded philosopher who adopts mysticism only as a tool of philosophical inquiry. Zhang makes use of Plato's cave allegory to explain Suhrawardī's Illuminationist project. Focusing on three areas-the theory of presential knowledge, the ontological discussion of mental considerations, and Light Metaphysics-Zhang convincingly reveals the (...) Nominalist and Existential nature of Illuminationism, and thereby proposes a new way of understanding how Suhrawardī's central philosophical ideas cohere. (shrink)

This book reinterprets classical Chinese philosophical tradition along the conceptual line of human dignity. Through extensive textual evidence, it illustrates that classical Confucianism, Mohism and Daoism contained rich notions of dignity, which laid the foundation for human rights and political liberty in China, even though, historically, liberal democracy failed to grow out of the authoritarian soil in China. The book critically examines the causes that might have prevented the classical schools from developing a liberal tradition, while affirming their positive contributions (...) to the human dignity concept. Analysing the inadequacies of the western concept of human dignity, the text covers relevant teachings of Kongzi, Mengzi, Xunzi, Mozi, Laozi and Zhuangzi (in comparison with Rousseau). While the Confucian notions of humanity (Ren), righteousness (Yi), and gentleman (Junzi) bear most directly on the conception of dignity, Mohism and Daoism provide salutary corrections to the ossification of the orthodox Confucian practice (Li). (shrink)

Truth pluralism is the view that there is more than one truth property. The strong version of it (i.e. strong pluralism) further contends that no truth property is shared by all true propositions. In this paper, I help strong pluralism solve two pressing problems concerning mixed discourse: the problem of mixed inferences (PI) and the problem of mixed compounds (PC). According to PI, strong pluralism is incompatible with the truth- preservation notion of validity; according to PC, strong pluralists cannot find (...) any appropriate truth property for mixed compound propositions, whose atomic constituents are from different domains of discourse (e.g., <sky is blue and chocolate is tasty>). I argue that the strong pluralist is motivated to take the truth predicate in truth-involving universal statements to be deflationary to avoid the two pressing problems. Such a move entails that the truth predicate in the platitude of validity (V) for any argument, it is valid if and only if necessarily its conclusion is true when its premises are all true does not denote any substantive truth property. Instead, it is merely an expressive device to help people generalize instances of (V) to (V). Analogous stories hold for the truth predicate in the platitudes of compound (e.g., conjunction). The upshot is that, the strong pluralist can solve PI and PC by further conceding that mixed compounds are true/false in a deflationary way. (shrink)

In a recent article, Arthur Applbaum contributes a new view—legitimacy as a moral power—to the debate over the concept of political legitimacy. Applbaum rejects competing views of legitimacy, in particular legitimacy as a claim-right to have the law obeyed, for mistakenly invoking substantive moral argument in the conceptual analysis, and concludes that “at the core of the concept—what legitimacy is” is only a Hohfeldian moral power. In this article, I contend that: (1) Applbaum’s view of legitimacy, when fully unfolded, refers (...) to more than a mere moral power and should therefore be rejected even by his own standards; (2) Applbaum’s rejection of competing views of legitimacy ultimately relies on a claim that he does not successfully defend, namely, the claim that moral duties are of absolute rather than prima facie force. (shrink)

In “Sidgwick on Bentham: the ‘Double Aspect’ of Utilitarianism”, Schofield argued that Bentham did not regard his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that natural benevolence is at his disposal to mitigate the problem of the “double aspect” of utilitarianism. This paper argues that Bentham regarded his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that, in a manner quite distinct from an internal, benevolence approach, he took advantage of self‐preference and thus adopted a self‐preference and artificial means‐based (...) approach, thereby still maintaining an internal approach supported by external, institutional contrivance. In so doing, he argued first that self‐preference could add to the greatest happiness; second, that benevolence would tend to facilitate the achievement of the greatest happiness, with the consequence that he endorsed the artificial cultivation of benevolence; and third, that the artificial means of the junction‐of‐interests‐prescribing principle should be adopted to bridge the gap between self‐preference and the greatest happiness. Sidgwick failed to appreciate the depth and sophistication of Bentham's logic. (shrink)

In his paper, “A Causal Argument for Physicalism” (Zhong, 2023), Zhong presents a novel argument for non-reductive physicalism (which he calls “A2”), based on the causal argument for reductive physicalism (which he calls “A1”), and claims that A2 is better than A1 since the premises in A2 are more plausible than those in A1. In this paper, I will argue that A2 fails to be a sound argument for non-reductive physicalism, or even physicalism per se, because the premises in A2 (...) can be fulfilled by the kind of dualism which claims that the physical event (P), the mental event (M), and their effect (E) form a causal chain and that P and M are simultaneous causes. Also, I will argue that we do have ways to strengthen A2 to block the aforementioned problem. But the only plausible way to strengthen the argument is to appeal to the conservation of energy and momentum. And this favors A1 more than A2. So, I conclude that A2 is not better than A1, and a causal argument for physicalism still naturally favors reductive physicalism. (shrink)

C.S. Peirce offered an evaluation of Bentham's philosophy to the effect that on some points Bentham's performance was of great value, but essentially, he was ‘a shallow logician’ confined to analysis of ‘lower motive’. This paper argues that Bentham's logic is deeply metaphysically based, multi‐levelled, and comprehensive. There are at least three constituent parts in his utilitarian logic: the first is his ontology, with its distinction between real and fictitious entities, and with pain and pleasure constituting the core real entities; (...) the second is his reductionism in, and analytical view of, simple and complex pleasures and pains; the third is the distinction between private ethics and public ethics. Bentham's logic is staunchly based on empiricism and truth and he developed a pragmatic utilitarian solution to overcome the potential impasse of Hume's scepticism through a mechanism of reflection. Even the doctrines of belief and abduction embraced and developed by Peirce are contained in Bentham's utilitarian logic. Bentham would certainly take Peirce's philosophy as ipse dixitism. Peirce was not in fact a serious reader of Bentham and failed to employ the distinction between argument and argumentation in his study of Bentham's logic. (shrink)

With the development of teachers’ psychological cognition, the moral education curriculum develops as per the changes in times. Currently, a resurgence of interest on studying teachers’ perceptions of the moral education curriculum has observed. This is because moral education curriculum of each country plays a unique role in the overall design of the country’s education curriculum. However, studies on teachers’ perceptions of the moral education curriculum are scarce, and no framework has been developed to guide the teaching and learning of (...) teachers for the moral education curriculum for schools. The moral education curriculum serves as one of the main vehicles for value education, with teachers as direct executors. It can influence the overall development of the school system and long-term development of a country. Thus, in this paper, we reviewed current literature related to teachers’ perceptions of the moral education curriculum and developed future trends considering teachers’ perceptions of the moral education curriculum in improving existing moral education programs in a country. We identified a list of keywords related to moral education curriculum and teacher perceptions and relevant to the scope of this study. These keywords were used to search the articles from the Scopus and WoS studies. Overall, 32 papers meeting the search criteria were retrieved. Further, we conducted thematic studies, and four themes were successfully identified: the model of teacher perceptions of moral and national education, the dimensions of the teacher ethics model, teaching strategies, and the role of teachers. The results of this study suggested a new framework for research trends in teachers’ perception models, particularly toward the moral education curriculum. This study contributed to the knowledge regarding teaching and learning approaches of moral education considering teachers’ perceptions of the moral education curriculum. The findings of study would benefit future studies and would improve the implementation of a country’s moral education program. (shrink)

本书是一本解读鬼谷子哲学思想的文化随笔。它从总论到分篇阐述了《鬼谷子》所包涵的深邃文化精神和哲学价值并以现代实例相印证。.

本书收录了张家龙先生有关西方逻辑史论,数理逻辑史论以及中国逻辑史论的相关文章,是作者多年研究的精华集.他用现代逻辑的技术重新构建了亚里士多德的直言三段论和模态三段论系统,用现代逻辑观点对亚里士多德的模 态命题逻辑,关系理论和偏好理论作了解释,将欧洲中世纪逻辑的成果构建成类似模态逻辑S3的系统.全面系统地研究了从莱布尼茨到哥德尔的数理逻辑发展史.他在中国逻辑史研究方面,从数理逻辑观点构造了"周易"的形 式公理系统,用现代逻辑方法将'侔'式推理概括为两类共6种有效式.他研究了艾耶尔,布拉德雷和罗素的哲学思想,提出一些新见解.在逻辑哲学研究方面,他分析了国内外已有的悖论定义,提出了不同定义;提出了关于可 能世界的'模态结构论';对本质主义的观点作了新的辩护.

本书以人物、机构和刊物为抓手，对16-18世纪儒学西传欧洲进行了全面的梳理和总结，对中国古代文化经典外译的数量和时段做了初步的划分，也对我国中学西传研究滞后的原因做了分析。.