The automatic tendency to anthropomorphize our interaction partners and make use of experience acquired in earlier interaction scenarios leads to the suggestion that social interaction with humanoid robots is more pleasant and intuitive than that with industrial robots. An objective method applied to evaluate the quality of human–robot interaction is based on the phenomenon of motor interference (MI). It claims that a face-to-face observation of a different (incongruent) movement of another individual leads to a higher variance in one’s own movement (...) trajectory. In social interaction, MI is a consequence of the tendency to imitate the movement of other individuals and goes along with mutual rapport, sense of togetherness, and sympathy. Although MI occurs while observing a human agent, it disappears in case of an industrial robot moving with piecewise constant velocity. Using a robot with human-like appearance, a recent study revealed that its movements led to MI, only if they were based on human prerecording (biological velocity), but not on constant (artificial) velocity profile. However, it remained unclear, which aspects of the human prerecorded movement triggered MI: biological velocity profile or variability in movement trajectory. To investigate this issue, we applied a quasi-biological minimum-jerk velocity profile (excluding variability in the movement trajectory as an influencing factor of MI) to motion of a humanoid robot, which was observed by subjects performing congruent or incongruent arm movements. The increase in variability in subjects’ movements occurred both for the observation of a human agent and for the robot performing incongruent movements, suggesting that an artificial human-like movement velocity profile is sufficient to facilitate the perception of humanoid robots as interaction partners. (shrink)

Einleitung.--Die begriffliche Erkenntniss der Körperwelt.--Natur und Geist.--Natur und Geschichte.--Die historische Begriffsbildung.--Naturphilosophie und Geschichts-Philosophie.

The idea of levels of organization plays a central role in the philosophy of the life sciences. In this article, I first examine the explanatory goals that have motivated accounts of levels of organization. I then show that the most state-of-the-art and scientifically plausible account of levels of organization, the account of levels of mechanism proposed by Bechtel and Craver, is fundamentally problematic. Finally, I argue that the explanatory goals can be reached by adopting a deflationary approach, where levels of (...) organization give way to more well-defined and fundamental notions, such as scale and composition. (shrink)

The book addresses the constitution of the high culture of modernity as an uneasy unity of the sciences, including philosophy, and the arts. Their internal dynamism and strain is established through, on the one hand, the relationship of the author - work - recipient, and, on the other, the respective roles of experts and the market.

Robustness is often presented as a guideline for distinguishing the true or real from mere appearances or artifacts. Most of recent discussions of robustness have focused on the kind of derivational robustness analysis introduced by Levins, while the related but distinct idea of robustness as multiple accessibility, defended by Wimsatt, has received less attention. In this paper, I argue that the latter kind of robustness, when properly understood, can provide justification for ontological commitments. The idea is that we are justified (...) in believing that things studied by science are real insofar as we have robust evidence for them. I develop and analyze this idea in detail, and based on concrete examples show that it plays an important role in science. Finally, I demonstrate how robustness can be used to clarify the debate on scientific realism and to formulate new arguments. (shrink)

This chapter reviews empirical research on the rules governing assertion and retraction, with a focus on the normative role of truth. It examines whether truth is required for an assertion to be considered permissible, and whether there is an expectation that speakers retract statements that turn out to be false. Contrary to factive norms (such as the influential “knowledge norm”), empirical data suggests that there is no expectation that speakers only make true assertions. Additionally, contrary to truth-relativist accounts, there is (...) no requirement for speakers to retract statements that are false at the context of assessment. We conclude by suggesting that truth still plays a crucial role in the evaluation of assertions: as a standard for evaluating their success, rather than permissibility. (shrink)

I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that (...) apparent cases of downward causation can be analyzed away. (shrink)

The relationship between psychological states and the brain remains an unresolved issue in philosophy of psychology. One appealing solution that has been influential both in science and in philosophy is Dennett’s concept of the intentional stance, according to which beliefs and desires are real and objective phenomena, but not necessarily states of the brain. A fundamental shortcoming of this approach is that it does not seem to leave any causal role for beliefs and desires in influencing behavior. In this paper, (...) I show that intentional states ascribed from the intentional stance should be seen as real causes, develop this to an independently plausible ontological position, and present a response to the latest interventionist causal exclusion worries. (shrink)

There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that scientific endeavors of understanding the human mind or the brain exhibit explanatory pluralism. Relatedly, several philosophers have in recent years defended an interventionist approach to causation that leads to a kind of causal pluralism. In this paper, I explore the consequences of these recent developments in philosophy of science for some of the central debates in philosophy of mind. First, I argue that if we adopt explanatory pluralism and the interventionist (...) approach to causation, our understanding of physicalism has to change, and this leads to what I call pluralistic physicalism. Secondly, I show that this pluralistic physicalism is not endangered by the causal exclusion argument. (shrink)

Argument and its performance as debate are ambient phenomena. It takes a world to have an argument, and as the world changes, so will the ways and means of argument. The current narratives circulating about post-truth, truthiness, alternative facts, and the like, while illuminating somewhat different registers, gloss this point. Collectively, they seem to assert that truth's sway in public discourse has lessened, threatening the possibility of robust civic discourse and politics. I am leery of such claims. They are in (...) general regressive, since they are nostalgic, working from a rear-view mirror mirage of stability and surety. Setting aside the panic such writers generate, and considering some deeper implications... (shrink)

Although scientific realism is the default position in the life sciences, philosophical accounts of realism are geared towards physics and run into trouble when applied to fields such as biology or neuroscience. In this paper, I formulate a new robustness-based version of entity realism, and show that it provides a plausible account of realism for the life sciences that is also continuous with scientific practice. It is based on the idea that if there are several independent ways of measuring, detecting (...) or deriving something, then we are justified in believing that it is real. I also consider several possible objections to robustness-based entity realism, discuss its relationship to ontic structural realism, and show how it has the potential to provide a novel response to the pessimistic induction argument. (shrink)

Is the assessment of a view of life only a matter of personal preference? I argue that there is more than personal preference. I defend the position that a view of life must be useful for the ascription of meaning and therefore needs to fulfil the requirements of the process of ascribing meaning. In this article I analyse this process and its requirements and deduce from them a set of criteria by which views of life can be assessed.

This article aims to classify those reducts of expansions of (Q, <) by unary predicates which eliminate quantifiers, and in particular to show that, up to interdefinability, there are only finitely many for a given language. Equivalently, we wish to classify the closed subgroups of Sym(Q) containing the group of all automorphisms of (Q, <) fixing setwise certain subsets. This goal is achieved for expansions by convex predicates, yielding expansions by constants as a special case, and for the expansion by (...) a dense, co-dense predicate. Partial results are obtained in the general setting of several dense predicates. (shrink)

Text: Reproduktion nach Scan der Ausgabe von 1934, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) in Tübingen. - Von dem kleinen Buch, das ich hier der Öffentlichkeit übergebe, bitte ich den Leser, nichts anderes zu erwarten, als das, was sein Titel ausdrücklich sagt. Es handelt sich in ihm nicht etwa um die Grundlinien eines Systems der Philosophie, sondern ausschließlich um dessen Probleme, und wenn diese sich auch nicht darlegen lassen, ohne die Richtung anzudeuten, in der das System bei der (...) Ausführung sich zu bewegen hätte, so sollen doch in dieser Schrift hauptsächlich Fragen gestellt, nicht Antworten gegeben werden. Oft brechen die Darlegungen dort ab, wo mancher Leser glauben kann, daß die größten Schwierigkeiten noch ungelöst sind. Ja mehr: nur die Grundprobleme der Philosophie werden erörtert, und das Eingehen auf Sonderfragen ist fast überall vermieden. Einzelheiten sind dann allein herangezogen worden, wenn es zur Verdeutlichung der Hauptbegriffe wünschenswert erschien. [Auszug aus dem Vorwort des Buches]. (shrink)