This is the introduction to the symposium on Maxime Lepoutre, Democratic Speech in Divided Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). The symposium contains articles by Paul Billingham, Rachel Fraser, and Michael Hannon, and a response by the author.

In an ideal democracy, people from all walks of life would come together to talk meaningfully and respectfully about politics. But we do not live in an ideal democracy. In contemporary democracies, which are marked by deep social divisions, different groups for the most part avoid talking to each other. And when they do talk to each other, their speech often seems to be little more than a vehicle for rage, hatred, and deception. -/- Democratic Speech in Divided Times argues (...) that we should nevertheless not give up on the ideal of democratic public speech. Drawing on the resources of political theory, epistemology, and philosophy of language, this book develops a sustained account of the norms that should govern public discourse in deeply divided circumstances. Should we try to find common ground when we talk to our political opponents, even though they seem unreasonable? Should we refrain from expressing anger, if we want to get things done? How can we use our speech to fight hate speech and disinformation? And is it even possible to speak to 'the other side,' in settings where different groups dislike one another, live apart from one another, and don't know much about one another? By tackling these questions, Lepoutre demonstrates that, when governed by the right set of norms, public speech can be a powerful force for good even amidst profound social divisions. (shrink)

An influential critique of anger holds that anger comes at an important epistemic cost. In particular, feeling angry typically makes risk less visible to us. This is anger’s ‘red mist.’ These epistemic costs, critics suggest, arguably outweigh the epistemic benefits commonly ascribed to anger. This essay argues that the epistemic critique of anger is importantly misleading. This is not because it underestimates anger’s epistemic benefits, but rather because it overlooks the fact that anger’s red mist performs a crucial moral function. (...) By concealing risk, the red mist helps protect the dignity and self-respect of those who live under severe and unchosen risk. This function is vitally important in non-ideal circumstances, where many are unjustly subjected to dignity-impairing risk. And it is irreplaceable, in that it cannot readily be performed by other political emotions, such as hope. Beyond providing a novel defence of anger, this argument has a broader upshot. Anger’s red mist reveals that ignorance is not always problematic in politics. Accordingly, it should not be treated—as has standardly been the case—as an unmitigated political evil. In the first instance, our efforts are better spent ascertaining when ignorance is a problem, and when, instead, it performs a felicitous function. (shrink)

Faced with hate speech, oppressed groups can use their own speech to respond to their verbal oppressors. This “counterspeech,” however, sometimes itself takes on a hateful form. This paper explores the moral standing of such “hateful counterspeech.” Is there a fundamental moral asymmetry between hateful counterspeech, and the hateful utterances of dominant or oppressive groups? Or are claims that such an asymmetry exists indefensible? I argue for an intermediate position. There _is_ a key moral asymmetry between these two forms of (...) speech. But, this asymmetry notwithstanding, hateful counterspeech is capable of enacting serious harms—and so, contrary to what many legal theorists have argued, it is in principle an appropriate object of legal regulation. I begin by considering the central argument for thinking that hateful counterspeech is not seriously troubling. This argument holds that oppressed groups lack authority—and, by extension, “speaker power.” Yet this argument, I suggest, sits in tension with the fact that low-status members of dominant groups can, through their utterances, seriously harm members of oppressed groups. Philosophers of language have developed sophisticated arguments to explain this last phenomenon: they have argued that speaker power is relativised to particular jurisdictions; that it can be acquired dynamically in local settings; and that it is socially dispersed. I argue that, in light of these arguments, it appears that hateful counterspeech, too, can generate serious harms. Nevertheless, I show that this conclusion is compatible with recognising a crucial moral asymmetry between hateful counterspeech and the hate speech of oppressors. (shrink)

The notions of perceptual normativity and optimality have generated much discussion in the last decade or so in the literature on Merleau-Ponty. Husserl’s position on the topic has been far less extensively investigated. Surprisingly, however, Husserl wrote a great deal about the question of perceptual optimality. Not only are there a considerable number of important passages scattered throughout the manuscripts, the archive also contains a few important full texts on precisely this issue. Given the role of fulfillment for Husserl’s concept (...) of intentionality, this should not really come as a surprise, since the teleological nature of the fulfillment structure terminates in an experience of the optimum. Hence, however marginal this topic might seem at first glance, reflecting on it rapidly leads us to the heart of Husserl’s project and sheds further light on his conception of intentional experience. (shrink)

Jeremy Waldron, among others, has forcefully argued that public hate speech assaults the dignity of its targets. Without denying this claim, I contend that it fails to establish that bans, rather than counterspeech, are the appropriate response. By articulating a more refined understanding of counterspeech, I suggest that counterspeech constitutes a better way of blocking hate speech’s dignitarian harm. In turn, I address two objections: according to the first, which draws on contemporary philosophy of language, counterspeech does not block enough (...) hate speech; according to the second, counterspeech blocks too much speech. Although these objections should qualify our optimism regarding counterspeech, I demonstrate that each can be turned, with even greater force, against hate speech bans. (shrink)

Maxime Chastaing s'étonne de l'embarras manifesté par les philosophes pour s'assurer de l'existence des autres : ne va-t-il pas de soi que nous coexistons depuis toujours avec nos semblables et que nous ne doutons pas de leur présence tant que nous ne spéculons pas? Il s'agit dès lors de dénoncer avec énergie le faux problème philosophique de la connaissance d'autrui, tout en s'employant à rendre compte, grâce à la psychologie, des conditions de notre communauté d'existence. Cette perspective proprement psycho-philosophique (...) est déployée dès 1934, dans un travail inédit à ce jour, La compréhension d'autrui. Essai de psychologie descriptive. Proche à cette époque de Gabriel Marcel et d'Emmanuel Mounier, après avoir été l'élève de Jean-Paul Sartre au lycée du Havre, Chastaing est un des premiers en France à discuter les thèses de la phénoménologie allemande, d'Edmund Husserl à Max Scheler. Il anticipe ce faisant sur la phénoménologie d'autrui que Sartre développera, non sans résoudre par avance des difficultés que ce dernier mettra du temps à apercevoir. (shrink)

Public opinion research has shown that voters accept many falsehoods about politics. This observation is widely considered troubling for democracy—and especially participatory ideals of democracy. I argue that this influential narrative is nevertheless flawed, because it misunderstands the nature of political understanding. Drawing on philosophical examinations of scientific modelling, I demonstrate that accepting falsehoods within one’s model of political reality is compatible with—and indeed can positively enhance—one’s understanding of that reality. Thus, the observation that voters accept many political falsehoods does (...) not necessarily establish that they lack political understanding. I then address three worries: that voters cannot generally engage in such political modelling; that political modelling obscures facts that are crucial to political understanding; and that successful political modelling would require knowing that one’s model contains falsehoods. My responses reveal how, going forward, we should measure political ignorance; and they highlight the standing importance of participatory democracy. (shrink)

How promising is Bitcoin as a currency? This paper discusses four claims on the advantages of Bitcoin: a more stable currency than state-backed ones; a secure and efficient payment system; a credible alternative to the central management of money; and a better protection of transaction privacy. We discuss these arguments by relating them to their philosophical roots in libertarian and neoliberal theories, and assess whether Bitcoin can effectively meet these expectations. We conclude that despite its advocates’ enthusiasm, there are good (...) reasons to doubt that Bitcoin can fulfill its promises and act as a functioning currency, rather than as a mere speculative asset. (shrink)

This article defends the democratic ideal of inclusive public discourse, as articulated in Democratic Speech in Divided Times, against the critiques offered by Billingham, Fraser, and Hannon. Specifically, it considers and responds to three core challenges. The first challenge argues, notably, that the “shared reasons” constraint should either apply everywhere or not at all, and that, if this constraint is to apply in divided circumstances, its justificatory constituency must be idealized. The second challenge contends that the resistance of hate speech (...) and misinformation to counterspeech cannot adequately be explained by considerations of salience, and therefore cannot adequately by countered (as I suggest) by “positive” forms of counterspeech. Finally, the last challenge objects that the ideal of inclusive public discourse I defend remains, as pessimists allege, excessively idealistic. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 52, Issue 2, Page 106-146, Spring 2024.

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) to aid legal decision making has become prominent. This paper investigates the use of AI in a critical issue in employment law, the determination of a worker’s status—employee vs. independent contractor—in two common law countries (the U.S. and Canada). This legal question has been a contentious labor issue insofar as independent contractors are not eligible for the same benefits as employees. It has become an important societal issue due to the ubiquity of the gig (...) economy and the recent disruptions in employment arrangements. To address this problem, we collected, annotated, and structured the data for all Canadian and Californian court cases related to this legal question between 2002 and 2021, resulting in 538 Canadian cases and 217 U.S. cases. In contrast to legal literature focusing on complex and correlated characteristics of the employment relationship, our statistical analyses of the data show very strong correlations between the worker’s status and a small subset of quantifiable characteristics of the employment relationship. In fact, despite the variety of situations in the case law, we show that simple, off-the-shelf AI models classify the cases with an out-of-sample accuracy of more than 90%. Interestingly, the analysis of misclassified cases reveals consistent misclassification patterns by most algorithms. Legal analyses of these cases led us to identify how equity is ensured by judges in ambiguous situations. Finally, our findings have practical implications for access to legal advice and justice. We deployed our AI model via the open-access platform, https://MyOpenCourt.org/, to help users answer employment legal questions. This platform has already assisted many Canadian users, and we hope it will help democratize access to legal advice to large crowds. (shrink)

On trouvera dans cet ouvrage les principaux jalons du parcours philosophique étonnant de Maxime Chastaing (1913-1997) qui culmine dans une psycholinguistique, et même une psychophonétique, une étude des interactions sociales, enfin une théorisation du pacte romanesque liant l'écrivain à ses lecteurs.

According to the influential “expressive” argument for hate speech laws, legal restrictions on hate speech are justified, in significant part, because they powerfully express opposition to hate speech. Yet the expressive argument faces a challenge: why couldn't we communicate opposition to hate speech via counterspeech, rather than bans? I argue that the expressive argument cannot address this challenge satisfactorily. Specifically, I examine three considerations that purport to explain bans’ expressive distinctiveness: considerations of strength; considerations of directness; and considerations of complicity. (...) These considerations either fail to establish that bans are expressively superior to counterspeech, or presuppose that bans successfully deter hate speech. This result severely undercuts the expressive argument's appeal. First, contrary to what its proponents suggest, this argument fails to circumvent the protracted empirical controversies surrounding bans’ effectiveness as deterrents. Second, the expressive argument appears redundant, because bans are expressively distinctive only insofar as hate speech is already suppressed. (shrink)

Most twentieth‐century European philosophers have attempted to think anew the Kantian question about the necessary conditions of experience. A rapid survey of last century's European philosophy would easily show that in spite of the various criticisms formulated against the very project of transcendental foundationalism, the vast majority of the philosophers in the so‐called Continental tradition have not abandoned the project of formulating transcendental arguments altogether. These transcendental inquiries into the conditions of possibility of all these phenomena are certainly more immediately (...) visible in the early works, especially those on Husserl, but a patient reading would show that they are still very much present in the later writings as well. The overcoming of classical transcendentalism at work in deconstruction is indeed the outcome of an ultra‐transcendental strategy. In Of Grammatology, Derrida exposes this ultra‐transcendental logic for the first time when he famously claims that a “pathway” through the transcendental is necessary. (shrink)

This present book explores recent advances in modeling discourse processes, in particular, new approaches aimed at understanding pathological language behavior specific to schizophrenia. The contributors examine the modeling paradigm of formal semantics, which falls within the scope of both linguistics and logic while providing overlapping links with other fields such as philosophy of language and cognitive psychology. This book is based on results presented during the series of workshops on Coherence and Discourse organized by SLAM, a project developed to systemize (...) the study of pathological language processing by taking an overarching interdisciplinary approach combining psychology, linguistics, computer science and philosophy. The principle focus is on conversations produced by people with psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and autism. The contributions come from young and experienced researchers, and invited speakers. The book appeals to likeminded students and researchers. (shrink)

Maxime Vachon | : L’objectif de cet article est de montrer l’unité du chapitre 14 du Peri Hermeneias, chapitre dans lequel Aristote retourne au fondement de l’échange dialectique, à savoir la doxa. Je montre ainsi que ce chapitre expose progressivement les trois conditions sémantiques que des points de vue doivent respecter pour être contraires : le sujet doit être le même, l’objet doit aussi être le même, mais le mode de prédication doit être contradictoire. | : The aim of (...) this paper is to show the unity of chapter 14 of the Peri Hermeneias, in which chapter Aristotle goes back to the basis of dialectical exchange, that is doxa. Thus I show that this chapter presents in successive order the three semantical conditions that points of view must respect in order to be contrary : the subject has to be the same, the object has also to be the same, but the mode of predication must be contradictory. (shrink)

In philosophical debates about immigration, one of the most prominent arguments asserts that a state’s citizenry has a right to unilaterally control its territorial borders by virtue of its right to self-determination. This is the self-determination argument. The present article demonstrates that this argument is internally undermined by the Coercion Principle, according to which all persons subjected to coercive political power are entitled to an equal say in exercising that power. First, whichever way the self-determination argument identifies the relevant self-determining (...) self, it is bound to rely on the Coercion Principle. Specifying the self politically involves appealing to the Coercion Principle, as it is a core principle of democratic theory. Alternatively, specifying a pre-political self fails to circumvent this problem, as a similar issue arises further down the argumentative line, when inferring the right to unilaterally control borders from the right to self-determination. Finally, since border controls coerce would-be immigrants, this reliance on the Coercion Principle renders the self-determination argument self-defeating. (shrink)

Maxime F. Giguère Cet article propose une nouvelle stratégie pour écarter la conclusion sceptique, mise de l’avant par Thomas Szasz, selon laquelle la psychiatrie est illégitime. La conclusion sceptique repose sur une démarcation radicale entre troubles mentaux et somatiques. Afin de minimiser cette démarcation, Jerome Wakefield emploie une analyse conceptuelle stipulant que les troubles mentaux et somatiques sont tous les deux des dysfonctions préjudiciables. De récentes critiques ont toutefois montré que son analyse bute sur la difficulté pratique de distinguer (...) les fonctions normales des dysfonctions. En raison de ce problème, l’analyse de Wakefield ne permet pas d’écarter la conclusion sceptique. Une nouvelle stratégie ne nécessitant pas de résoudre le problème reconnu par ces critiques s’annonce alors préférable pour écarter la conclusion sceptique. (shrink)

« Falsifier la monnaie », réévaluer les valeurs : telle est la mission que l’oracle de Delphes aurait confiée à Diogène. Rapportée aux personnages du théâtre tragique, à Socrate ou encore à Antisthène, la subversion cynique permet de construire un concept de marginalité pour l’Antiquité grecque.

Les questions de la pauvreté volontaire, de la mendicité, ou encore de la falsification de la monnaie ayant déjà donné lieu à plusieurs études directes, nous nous proposons de les aborder par le biais, jusqu’à présent négligé, des gestes effectués par les Cyniques à l’égard des biens matériels : prendre et jeter. S’élabore, ainsi, une gestualité économique du Cynisme, qui exprime à la fois une critique éthique de l’économie et un mode de vie philosophique incarné. Classification JEL : B11.

The essay contrasts two recurring phenomena of European culture: renaissance and avant-garde. The author discusses the paradigmatic Renaissance of 15th and 16th centuries and the paradigmatic Avant-Garde of early 20th century from the point of view of a practicing artist, interested in philosophical, social, religious, and political involvements of artists and their creation. The author shows the artistic and social history of 20th century as a struggle between the Avant-Garde and the Renaissance ideals, which, as he points out, found a (...) fertile ground in in the 20 years that followed immediately the Second World War. (shrink)

Summary The author is of the opinion that as a result of Alexander the Great’s conquest of Syria, which had been a single administrative entity under the Achaemenids, it was divided into two satrapies – the northern and the southern one. He believes that Menon, son of Cerdimmas, was appointed as the first head of the northern satrapy, to be replaced by Arimmas, who, in his turn, was succeeded by Asclepiodorus, son of Eunicus. Besides, it seems that Andromachus became the (...) first head of the southern satrapy, and after he was killed, Menon, transferred from the north to the south, took his place. Already in Alexander’s lifetime, probably in 329/328, Syria was once again merged into one satrapy. It is unclear who was installed as satrap of the unified region. At any rate, it could not have been Menes, son of Dionysius: the hypothesis that in winter 331/330 he was made satrap of the new province including Syria and Cilicia does not stand scrutiny. In the author’s view, the main task Alexander assigned to Menes was to take control and then to keep open and organized the sea communications with the coast of Syria, Phoenicia and Cilicia, and in the matters concerning these activities Menes was fully independent of the local satraps. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 48, Issue 1, Page 40-78, Winter 2020.

According to an influential objection, which Martha Nussbaum has powerfully restated, expressing anger in democratic public discourse is counterproductive from the standpoint of justice. To resist this challenge, this article articulates a crucial yet underappreciated sense in which angry discourse is epistemically productive. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, which emphasize the distinctive phenomenology of emotion, I argue that conveying anger to one’s listeners is epistemically valuable in two respects: first, it can direct listeners’ attention to elusive (...) morally relevant features of the situation; second, it enables them to register injustices that their existing evaluative categories are not yet suited to capturing. Thus, when employed skillfully, angry speech promotes a greater understanding of existing injustices. This epistemic role is indispensable in highly divided societies, where the injustices endured by some groups are often invisible to, or misunderstood by, other... (shrink)

Ignorant speech, which spreads falsehoods about people and policies, is pervasive in public discourse. A popular response to this problem recommends countering ignorant speech with more speech, rather than legal regulations. However, Mary Kate McGowan has influentially argued that this ‘counterspeech’ response is flawed, as it overlooks the asymmetric pliability of conversational norms: the phenomenon whereby some conversational norms are easier to enact than subsequently to reverse. After demonstrating that this conversational ‘stickiness’ is an even broader concern for counterspeech than (...) McGowan suggests—it applies not just to oppressive or hateful speech, but also to ordinary policy-related misinformation—I argue that a more sophisticated account of counterspeech can nevertheless overcome it. First, the stickiness objection overlooks the distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ counterspeech. Instead of directly negating a distorted proposition, positive counterspeech affirms a correct proposition that is inconsistent with the falsehoods at hand. This, I contend, allows it to counter ignorant speech without triggering the properties that render it sticky. Second, the stickiness objection presupposes an unrefined conception of counterspeech’s temporality. Counterspeech should be understood as a diachronic process, which not only follows, but also pre-empts, ignorant utterances. Drawing on speech-act theories of silencing, I argue that pre-emptive counterspeech can condition the conversational context so as to prevent subsequent ignorant utterances from enacting sticky conversational norms. Thus, this theoretically-refined conception of counterspeech helps appreciate how verbal responses might overcome the stickiness of conversational norms; and, in doing so, it reveals that this stickiness need not provide reasons to prefer legal remedies to counterspeech. (shrink)

In a context where individuals are increasingly more sensitive to corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and where mobilization of savings for the energy transition is essential, our article is the first to study the drivers of online green bank adoption. By analyzing 1075 questionnaires from a panel of French individuals in charge of financial decisions in their households, we show that altruism and green consumption values are significant drivers of individuals' green banking adoption and reveal that willingness to adopt a (...) green bank is mediated by the preference for green savings. These results extend the nascent literature dealing with the link between responsible consumption and saving behaviors. Briefly speaking, green banks (and associated savings products) have the potential to enable households to express their consumption values through their investments. That said, our results suggest that households' financial well-being and financial literacy can be barriers to the mobilization of green savings. Our results also demonstrate the significant influence of information system variables, such as personal innovativeness and trust, on willingness to adopt green banking. By shedding light on the drivers of individuals' green bank adoption, our results provide valuable insights for the banking industry. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà été publié dans Sur le journalisme, About Journalism, Sobre jornalismo [En ligne, online], Vol. 9, n°1 - 2020, 15 juin - June 15 - 15 de juno. A partir d'une étude sémiotique et communicationnelle de l'exposition de l'Agence France-Presse sur les réseaux socionumériques, nous nous demanderons de quelle manière la photographie agencière a été en partie bouleversée et transformée par ces moyens de communication. Face à un nouveau rythme de - Sciences de l'information et de la (...) communication – Nouvel article. (shrink)

The proliferation of conspiracy theories poses a significant threat to democratic decision-making. To counter this threat, many political theorists advocate countering conspiracy theories with ‘more speech’ (or ‘counterspeech’). Yet conspiracy theories are notoriously resistant to counterspeech. This article aims to conceptualise and defend a novel form of counterspeech – narrative counterspeech – that is singularly well-placed to overcome this resistance. My argument proceeds in three steps. First, I argue that conspiracy theories pose a special problem for counterspeech for three interconnected (...) reasons relating to salience, emotion and internal coherence. Drawing on recent work in social epistemology, philosophy of emotion and cognitive science, I then demonstrate that narrative forms of counterspeech constitute an apt response to this diagnosis. Finally, I forestall two objections: the first questions the likely effectiveness of narrative counterspeech; the second insists that, even if it were effective, it would remain unacceptably manipulative. Neither objection, I contend, is ultimately compelling. (shrink)

Summary The article deals with a complex of issues connected with the campaign waged by the Macedonian expeditionary corps in Asia Minor in 336–335 BC. The author clears up the aims set for the advance-guard, its command structure, strength and composition. He also describes the relevant military operations and reveals the reasons both for the Macedonians’ successes in 336 and their failures in 335. The idea is argued that despite the final failures, it is hardly possible to say that the (...) campaign the expeditionary corps conducted ended in its total defeat. Besides, it is noted that those military operations had major significance for Alexander’s campaign in Asia Minor in 334, because a number of preconditions for its full success had been created right in their course. (shrink)

This paper examines how officials of the Qin (221–207 BCE) and Former Han (202 BCE–9 CE) empires gathered information on their far-flung domains. These empires were able to maintain control over large areas of the East Asian subcontinent because they had an effective system for obtaining information on the things that mattered most to them: people, land, resources, and transport. We have various sources on these information collection systems from both excavated and received texts. These can be considered to include (...) not only maps, surveys, and population records, but also communication infrastructures such as roads, canals, and postal systems. The information-gathering systems of this period are important both because they worked relatively well and because they were recorded in the histories and became a model for later administrators. (shrink)

Counterspeech is communication that tries to counteract potential harm brought about by other speech. Theoretical interest in counterspeech partly derives from a libertarian ideal – as captured in the claim that the solution to bad speech is more speech – and partly from a recognition that well-meaning attempts to counteract harm through speech can easily misfire or backfire. Here we survey recent work on the question of what makes counterspeech effective at remedying or preventing harm, in those cases where it (...) is effective, as well as work investigating when and why there is a duty to engage in counterspeech. We suggest that the most fruitful area for philosophical inquiry on this topic, currently, relates to the questions about efficacy. Specifically, we argue that there is a need for better frameworks for conceptualizing the efficacy of counterspeech. Philosophers have collaborative work to do, alongside social scientists, in developing these frameworks. (shrink)