The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to explain the distinction between Kant’s notions of the sublime and ugliness, and to answer an important question that has been left unnoticed in contemporary studies, namely why it is the case that even though both sublime and ugliness are contrapurposive for the power of judgment, occasioning the feeling of displeasure, yet that after all we should feel pleasure in the former, while not in the latter. Second, to apply my interpretation of (...) the sublime and ugliness to contemporary art, and to resolve certain issues that have been raised in accounting for the possibility of artistic sublimity. I argue that an experience of a genuine artistic sublimity is an uncommon occurrence. I propose that the value of contemporary art can be best explained by referring to Kant’s notion of ugliness and his theory of aesthetic ideas. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to argue that Kant’s aesthetic ideas can help us to overcome cognitive limitations that we often experience in our attempts to articulate the meaning of abstract concepts. I claim that aesthetic ideas, as expressed in works of art, have a cognitive dimension in that they reveal the introspective, emotional, and affective aspects that appear to be central to the content of abstract phenomena.

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant introduces the notion of the reflective judgment and the a priori principle of purposiveness or systematicity of nature. He claims that the ability to judge objects by means of this principle underlies empirical concept acquisition and it is therefore necessary for cognition in general. In addition, he suggests that there is a connection between this principle and judgments of taste. Kant’s account of this connection has been criticized by several commentators for (...) the reason that it leads to the ‘everythingisbeautiful’ problem. In this paper I argue, contrary to these objections, that both finding an object beautiful and acquiring the concept represent the satisfaction of the same principle of nature’s purposiveness, which refers to the same cognitive need we have, that is, to systematize experience. I avoid the ‘everything is beautiful’ problem by arguing that aesthetic reflection refers to the synthesis of object’s individual and distinctive properties, while logical reflection refers to the synthesis of object’s general properties that it shares with other objects of its kind. Because aesthetic purposiveness is different from logical purposiveness, this allows for the possibility that we can have an object of cognition, without finding this object beautiful. (shrink)

At the end of section §6 in the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant defines taste as the “faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest”. On the face of it, Kant’s definition of taste includes both; positive and negative judgments of taste. Moreover, Kant’s term ‘dissatisfaction’ implies not only that negative judgments of taste are those of the non-beautiful, but also that of the ugly, depending on the presence of an (...) actual displeasure. (shrink)

In § 49 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant puts forward a view that the feeling of pleasure in the experience of the beautiful can be stimulated not merely by perceptual properties, but by ideas and thoughts as well. The aim of this paper is to argue that aesthetic ideas fill in the emptiness that abstract and emotion concepts on their own would have without empirical intuitions. That is, aesthetic ideas make these concepts more accessible to us, (...) by creating image schemas that allow us to think about these abstract concepts in a way linked to sensory experience, thereby imbuing them with a more substantive meaning and understanding. (shrink)

Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote: “In the tranquil landscape, and especially in the distant line of the horizon, man beholds somewhat as beautiful as his own nature” (2003. 39). Th e poet captures nicely an idea, dominant in the contemporary environmental aesthetics, namely, that aesthetic appreciation of nature is intimately connected with the moral nature within us. Many of us have experienced when in contact with nature that its beauty moves us in a way that goes deeper than its initial (...) appeal; it elicits in us a feeling of comfort, hope, a sense of well-being and belonging to the world. My aim in this paper is to propose an explanation of the connection between our aesthetic experience of natural beauty and our moral ideas. I approach this problem in light of Kant’s aesthetic theory put forward in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. (shrink)

In Kant’s aesthetic theory, the association of ugliness with aesthetic ideas is not immediately apparent. Even more, it has been argued by most of Kant’s commentators that ugliness cannot express aesthetic ideas. In short, they claim that accordance with taste (i.e. free harmony between imagination and understanding) is a necessary condition for an aesthetic idea to be expressed in a way that makes sense to others. But if production of aesthetic ideas must be restrained by taste in order to have (...) meaning and if ugliness consists in a disharmony between imagination and understanding (i.e. discordance with taste), then it follows that ugliness must essentially be nonsensical. My aim in this paper is to propose a different interpretation of the relation between Kant’s notions of aesthetic ideas and taste such that it can accommodate an ugly aesthetic idea into the overall aesthetic picture. I will argue that even though ugliness does not conform to taste it is nevertheless related to taste and thus it remains consistent with Kant’s view that taste is required for the communication of aesthetic ideas. (shrink)