Издание представляет результаты исследования малоизученной темы социально-экономических доктрин консерватизма. Оно отражает их развитие от времени выражения их в виде утопий, погруженных в более общие социально-философские и политические учения.

A proof of Fermat’s last theorem is demonstrated. It is very brief, simple, elementary, and absolutely arithmetical. The necessary premises for the proof are only: the three definitive properties of the relation of equality (identity, symmetry, and transitivity), modus tollens, axiom of induction, the proof of Fermat’s last theorem in the case of n = 3 as well as the premises necessary for the formulation of the theorem itself. It involves a modification of Fermat’s approach of infinite descent. The infinite (...) descent is linked to induction starting from n = 3 by modus tollens. An inductive series of modus tollens is constructed. The proof of the series by induction is equivalent to Fermat’s last theorem. As far as Fermat had been proved the theorem for n = 4, one can suggest that the proof for n ≥ 4 was accessible to him. An idea for an elementary arithmetical proof of Fermat’s last theorem (FLT) by induction is suggested. It would be accessible to Fermat unlike Wiles’s proof (1995). (shrink)

Тhе question which animates Heidegger's paper (''Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik:) is: "How are God coming in phi1osophy?"; and it is only а sharpening of "th.e question of the onto-theologic character of philosophy". Hegel and Heidegger are bothunited and opposed as identity and difference. Both being and existing descend from difference. Equilibrium (Aпstrag) arranges the unit of being and existing.

"Да резюмираме: отказът от всяка форма на либерализъм и разделяне на властите, госnодството на една nартия и монополната власт, отказът от всякакъв идеологически · неутралитет и култивиране на единодушие, nреобладаване на бюрокрацията, олицетворяваща nроизвола и тайната, nрезрението към nравото и nак nоявата на политически nрестъnления и наказания за умисъл или "азиатското nрезрение към човешкия живот" - всичко това nоказва, че комунистическият режим е бил не само е наследник на Маркс, но в не по-малка стеnен - наследник на царското самодържавие. Това (...) чудовищно сдвояване на царското самодържавие с ленинския марксизъм е nричината за бъдещия сталинизъм" (Кокен 1996: 350). (shrink)

In a previous paper, an elementary and thoroughly arithmetical proof of Fermat’s last theorem by induction has been demonstrated if the case for “n = 3” is granted as proved only arithmetically (which is a fact a long time ago), furthermore in a way accessible to Fermat himself though without being absolutely and precisely correct. The present paper elucidates the contemporary mathematical background, from which an inductive proof of FLT can be inferred since its proof for the case for “n (...) = 3” has been known for a long time. It needs “Hilbert mathematics”, which is inherently complete unlike the usual “Gödel mathematics”, and based on “Hilbert arithmetic” to generalize Peano arithmetic in a way to unify it with the qubit Hilbert space of quantum information. An “epoché to infinity” (similar to Husserl’s “epoché to reality”) is necessary to map Hilbert arithmetic into Peano arithmetic in order to be relevant to Fermat’s age. Furthermore, the two linked semigroups originating from addition and multiplication and from the Peano axioms in the final analysis can be postulated algebraically as independent of each other in a “Hamilton” modification of arithmetic supposedly equivalent to Peano arithmetic. The inductive proof of FLT can be deduced absolutely precisely in that Hamilton arithmetic and the pransfered as a corollary in the standard Peano arithmetic furthermore in a way accessible in Fermat’s epoch and thus, to himself in principle. A future, second part of the paper is outlined, getting directed to an eventual proof of the case “n=3” based on the qubit Hilbert space and the Kochen-Specker theorem inferable from it. (shrink)

The paper is a continuation of another paper published as Part I. Now, the case of “n=3” is inferred as a corollary from the Kochen and Specker theorem (1967): the eventual solutions of Fermat’s equation for “n=3” would correspond to an admissible disjunctive division of qubit into two absolutely independent parts therefore versus the contextuality of any qubit, implied by the Kochen – Specker theorem. Incommensurability (implied by the absence of hidden variables) is considered as dual to quantum contextuality. The (...) relevant mathematical structure is Hilbert arithmetic in a wide sense, in the framework of which Hilbert arithmetic in a narrow sense and the qubit Hilbert space are dual to each other. A few cases involving set theory are possible: (1) only within the case “n=3” and implicitly, within any next level of “n” in Fermat’s equation; (2) the identification of the case “n=3” and the general case utilizing the axiom of choice rather than the axiom of induction. If the former is the case, the application of set theory and arithmetic can remain disjunctively divided: set theory, “locally”, within any level; and arithmetic, “globally”, to all levels. If the latter is the case, the proof is thoroughly within set theory. Thus, the relevance of Yablo’s paradox to the statement of Fermat’s last theorem is avoided in both cases. The idea of “arithmetic mechanics” is sketched: it might deduce the basic physical dimensions of mechanics (mass, time, distance) from the axioms of arithmetic after a relevant generalization, Furthermore, a future Part III of the paper is suggested: FLT by mediation of Hilbert arithmetic in a wide sense can be considered as another expression of Gleason’s theorem in quantum mechanics: the exclusions about (n = 1, 2) in both theorems as well as the validity for all the rest values of “n” can be unified after the theory of quantum information. The availability (respectively, non-availability) of solutions of Fermat’s equation can be proved as equivalent to the non-availability (respectively, availability) of a single probabilistic measure as to Gleason’s theorem. (shrink)

В книге представлены статьи современных российских философов, писателей, литературоведов о творчестве и миросозерцании русского философа и писателя Василия Васильевича Розанова (1856-1919). Труды розановедов собраны за последние 25 лет.

Цель данного издания - познакомить широкий круг читателей с основными вехами жизни ученого, организатора, ее научными трудами, литературой о ней.

Here we suggest a formal using of N.A. Vasil’ev’s logical ideas in categorical logic: the idea of “accidental” assertion is formalized with topoi and the idea of the notion of nonclassical negation, that is not based on incompatibility, is formalized in special cases of monoidal categories. For these cases, the variant of the law of “excluded n-th” suggested by Vasil’ev instead of the tertium non datur is obtained in some special cases of these categories. The paraconsistent law suggested by Vasil’ev (...) is also demonstrated with linear and tensor logics but in a form weaker than he supposed. As we have, in fact, many truth-values in linear logic and topos logic, the admissibility of the traditional notion of inference in the categorical interpretation of linear and intuitionistic proof theory is discussed. (shrink)

The solution of the problem of the future random events truth is considered in Vasil’ev’s logic. N. A. Vasil’ev graded the logic according to two levels—the level of facts, i.e. time fixed events, and the level of notions or rules, governing these facts. The mathematical construction previously suggested for imaginary Vasil’ev’s logic, extends to the early variant of his logic—a logic of notions. In the paper, we investigate the meaning of problematic and uncertain assertions introduced by Vasil’ev. As a result, (...) we developed a model of Vasil’ev’s logic of facts that resolves also the truth problem of future random events. The imaginary logic has also been extended to the level of notions, and the law of the excluded eighth is gotten in it. The correspondence between Vasil’ev’s terms “some” and “all” and modern quantifiers is discussed. (shrink)

BOOK REVIEWS: Valentin A. Bazhanov, “N.A. Vasil’ev and his Imaginary Logic”, Kanon+, Reabilitatsiia, Moscow, 2009, 240 pp., ISBN 9785883731968.

[1]Aldanov, M. A. [i dr.] Religīoznyi︠a︡ i obshchestvennyi︠a︡ iskanīi︠a︡.--[2]Melgunov, S. P. N. V. Chaĭkovskīĭ v gody grazhdanskoĭ voĭny.

Volume 40, Issue 3, August 2019, Page 298-303.

The ethics of social consequences is a means of satisficing non-utilitarian consequentialism that can be used to approach disaster issues. The primary values in the ethics of social consequences are humanity, human dignity and moral rights, and these are developed and realized to achieve positive social consequences. The secondary values found in the ethics of social consequences include justice, responsibility, moral duty and tolerance. Their role and purpose is given by their ability to help achieve and realize moral good. Fair (...) treatment within moral issues stems from applying primary as well as secondary values. The nature of these values cannot be determined exclusively in ordinary circumstances. However, in extraordinary circumstances (disasters), not all the requirements relating to the value structure of the ethics of social consequences need be considered in its entirety. In extraordinary circumstances, values are prioritised and realized. Primary values are realized prior to secondary ones. When prioritizing primary values, the realization of positive social consequences, or at least minimizing the negative social consequences, takes priority over other primary values. In disaster bioethics especially, it is often necessary to find a way to minimize the negative social consequences; thus, actions where positive social consequences are prevalent are preferred. (shrink)