This paper is structured in three sections. The first discusses the institutional framework pertaining to bioethics in Serbia. The functioning of this framework is critically assessed and a number of recommendations for its improvement presented. It is also emphasized that philosophers are underrepresented in public debate on bioethics in Serbia. Second, this underrepresentation will be related to two issues that figure prominently in Serbian society but are not accompanied by corresponding bioethical discourses: the first is abortion and the second is (...) the largely unrestricted use of neuropharmacology since the 1990s, both for therapeutic and for cosmetic/recreational purposes. Finally, the perspective of bioethics in Serbia is addressed. It is asserted that this perspective can be based on the enhancement of public philosophical debate on bioethical issues, especially those with notable features in Serbian society . Such enhancement would also strengthen the corresponding institutional and legal frameworks. (shrink)
The relation between violence and the institution was truly thematized for the first time in the writings of Hume, and in an entirely different way in Saint-Just's texts on the Republic and the institution. Gilles Deleuze's early works represent an original attempt at reconstruction of a possible dialogue between these two dissimilar authors. Regardless of the possibility of reconstruction of Deleuze's own theory of the institution , and analysis of the various combinations of the terms institution and revolution, the intention (...) is above all to examine the link between violence and the institution. Deleuze's attempt to make a preliminary systematic examination of the figure of the institution came about as a result of the conjoining of several fragments of his famous predecessors. (shrink)
Violence and Messianism looks at how some of the figures of the so-called Renaissance of "Jewish" philosophy between the two world wars - Franz Rosenzweig, Walter Benjamin and Martin Buber - grappled with problems of violence, revolution and war. At once inheriting and breaking with the great historical figures of political philosophy such as Kant and Hegel, they also exerted considerable influence on the next generation of European philosophers, like Lévinas, Derrida and others. This book aims to think through the (...) great conflicts in the past century in the context of the theory of catastrophe and the beginning of new messianic time. Firstly, it is a book about means and ends - that is, about whether good ends can be achieved through bad means. Second, it is a book about time: peace time, war time, time it takes to transfer from war to peace, etc. Is a period of peace simply a time that excludes all violence? How long does it take to establish peace? Building on this, it then discusses whether there is anything that can be called messianic acting. Can we - are we capable of, or allowed to - act violently in order to hasten the arrival of the Messiah and peace? And would we then be in messianic time? Finally, how does this notion of messianism - a name for a sudden and unpredictable event - fit in, for example, with our contemporary understanding of terrorist violence? The book attempts to understand such pressing questions by reconstructing the notions of violence and messianism as they were elaborated by 20th century Jewish political thought. Providing an important contribution to the discussion on terrorism and the relationship between religion and violence, this book will appeal to theorists of terrorism and ethics of war, as well as students and scholars of Philosophy, Jewish studies and religion studies. (shrink)
It is my intention to attempt to define pacifism, in its engagement and concept, as a necessary requisite of war and military action, following a phrase used over a hundred years ago by Franz Rosenzweig when speaking of pacifism as “necessary equipment of war.” I will try to defend the importance of pacifism as an integral part of war (as such, pacifism as a requisite of war ought to shorten the period of war and mitigate destruction) and oppose this concept (...) of pacifism to Jan Narveson’s old attempt at constructing pacifism as a position and then designating it as “untenable and unreasonable,” and then further oppose this to his later attempt to find in pacifism the cause of further (and more) violence for ever more vicious wars. (shrink)
Paraphrased within the title of this text is a note Hannah Arendt made in August 1952. After reading Carl Schmitt?s Nomos der Erde, Arendt tries to confront Schmitt?s idea of a just war. In the text I attempt to reconstruct Arendt?s readings of differing political philosophy texts within the context of her thinking concerning the relationship between violence and power, force and law. Arendt?s refusal to accept the existence of violence which can "conquer" freedom and "create" right and democracy, brings (...) contradiction to the great tradition of the followers of Marx, to whom Arendt undoubtedly belongs: how is and is revolutionary violence even possible and does violence as resistance to injustice bring justice?. Naslov ovoga teksta je parafraza jedne beleske Hannah Arendt koja je napisana avgusta 1952. godine. Posle citanja Schmittove knjige Nomos der Erde, Arendt pokusava da se suprotstavi njegovom razumevanju pravednog rata. U tekstu rekonstruisem njena razlicita citanja mnostva tekstova politicke filozofije, u kontekstu Arendtovog razlikovanja izmedju nasilja i vlasti, snage i zakona. Arendtovo odbijanje da prihvati postojanje nasilja koje moze "osvojiti" slobodu i "stvoriti" pravo i demokratiju, suprotstavlja je velikoj tradiciji sledbenika Marxa, kojoj ona nesumnjivo pripada: da li je i na koji nacin moguce revolucionarno nasilje i da li nasilje kao otpor nepravdi donosi pravdu?. (shrink)
The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual understanding of knowledge and his placement of social epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of “new” knowledge. (...) In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy. (shrink)
In his poems, Paul Celan does not use words such as territory, border, border crossing, and only very rarely the word space. I would like to reconstruct the traces of?Heimat? in Celan, and perhaps try to describe what Heimat might have meant for the young Paul Antschel. That is to say, I would like to understand whether?Heimat? is synonymous with what Celan speaks about, many years after his name change, in the address given on the occasion of the Georg-Buechner-Preis:?Ich suche (...) auch, denn ich bin ja wieder da, wo ich begonnen habe, den Ort meiner eigenen Herkunft.? In the poems written at the time when Antschel is learning Hebrew as well as reading Martin Buber for the first time, I look for some basic figures Celan ties to his life in Bukovina at the time, in the environment of Czernowitzer Judentums. Aside from the works by Israel Chalfen, Else Keren and Elke Guenzel, I would like to make use of a book published some ten years ago, a detailed listing of Celan?s Paris library. I would like to consult this archive in the coming period, since Celan punctuated the margins of many of those books with evocations of his early creative period. (shrink)
My intention in this text is to present the most significant contribution of some French philosophers and anthropologists to the notion of reconstruction and advancement of institutions. The paradox of change, reform or transformation of the institution – is an entirely new institution possible? How do institutions die? – lies in the difficulty or even impossibility to change something that manifests what we are as a group. If institutions really present or represent the relations among all of us, how can (...) they be changed in the first place? Whence the capacity for change? What allows for the idea of the “new”? (shrink)
The surprising thing about “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus. Ein handshriftliher Fund,” one of Rosenzweig’s best supported and most carefully detailed texts, is that he almost completely ignores one of the most stunning and mysterious fragments of this brief, two-page manuscript that he discovers in 1914 at the Prussian State Library in Berlin. Not only that: while discussing and justifying in detail every part of this manuscript, attempting to prove that just because it is in Hegel’s handwriting, does not (...) necessarily mean that Hegel is its author, Rosenzweig completely sidelines the famous, completely anarchistic, and radical fragment about the state. My question then is, why does Rosenzweig leave out any argument about Schelling’s understanding of the state? Or more precisely, how have Schelling’s positions on the state been incorporated and transformed in Rosenzweig’s texts? How does Rosenzweig use these fragments? Why does he nowhere thematize Schelling’s thoughts on the state, or what in eine revolutionäre Staatslehre Rosenzweig calls Schelling’s revolutionary teachings on the matter? (shrink)
Our topic is the understanding of the nature of negative numbers - the entities to which expressions such as?-1? refer. Following Frege, we view positive whole numbers as providing the answer to the question?how many?? In this light, how are we to view negative numbers? Both positive and negative numbers can be ordered through the relation of larger or smaller. It is then true of all negative numbers that they are entities which are smaller than zero. For many, this has (...) been understood as an ontological paradox: how can something be?less than nothing?? Some propose to avoid the paradox by treating negative numbers as mere fa?ons de parler. In this paper, we propose a more realist account, taking as our starting point the thesis that there is at least one familiar type of object, the magnitude of which can be expressed with negative numbers, namely, debt. How can the sense of an expression be ontologically paradoxical, yet the expression itself still plausibly refer to a social object such as a debt? Or, put differently, how is it possible to be, at the same time, a realist in financial theory and a nominalist in mathematical theory? The paper first shows that the paradox arises when the two distinct ways in which negative numbers are connected to real objects are run together. The first of the two refers to debt only, whereas the second could refer to debt, as well as to physical objects. Finally, we claim that a debt is at once a specifically social object and part of reality as described by physics. nema. (shrink)
I will attempt to explain the connection between violence and my own or Levinas's or the State's violence as a response to the initial violence and finally the violence which remains in the mouth, throat, aftertaste [gout] or in disgust [degout]. 'Cet arri?re-go?t de violence' or 'un quelconque arri?re-go?t de degout' [a sort of aftertaste of disgust]. Pokusacu da objasnim vezu izmedju nasilja, potom mog ili Levinasovog ili drzavnog nasilja kao odgovora na ovo prvo nasilje i na kraju, nasilja koje (...) preostaje u ustima, u grlu, u ukusu [gout] ili u gadjenju [degout]. 'Cet arri?re-go?t de violence' ili 'un quelconque arri?re-go?t de degout' [neki zaostali ukus gadjenja; a sort of aftertaste of disgust]. (shrink)
This critique is focused on a small theory regarding the constituting of a group through the simultaneous exclusion of some other group. Is it possible, then, to produce social and non-social acts at the same time? Or is it possible to construct a group which acts?genocidally?, meaning that it destroys another group or?the groupness? of a group, and at the same time affirm its own unity and its ontological stability? Finally, does this thematization of the group through inter-group antagonism have (...) anything to do with Lemkin?s word?genocide?? (shrink)
Notre intérêt se centrera sur quelques textes que Franz Rosenzweig, soldat autrichien combattant dans la défense anti-aérienne, a écrit au cours des dernières années de la Première Guerre mondiale sur le front des Balkans. Nous nous proposons deux tâches : examiner dans le contexte des différents penseurs de la politique de ce siècle la tentative rosenzweigienne de comprendre la guerre, les découpages territoriaux dans la guerre, l’appropriation de la terre, sa compréhension de la frontière, de l’espace, du peuple, de la (...) géopolitique, du rapport entre la mer et la terre, du monde et de l’État mondial. La seconde direction consiste à tenter de déterminer le statut de ces textes politiques de Rosenzweig à l’égard de la totalité de son œuvre, de même que l’influence implicite et explicite de sa judéité sur sa compréhension de la guerre et du monde. (shrink)
Im Text dieses Projekt wird das Wort "Geheimnis" ausschließlich in Zusammenhang mit dem Staat und der "Ragion di Stato" /Staatsräson/ gedacht. Die unterschiedlichen Formen und Transformationen des Geheimnisses und des Verbergens bilden eine der grundlegenden Quellen und Bedingungen für die Souveränität. Die berühmte Fiktion von der Schwierigkeit, das "mystery in the soul of state", die Shakespeare, Bacon, Thomasius, Kant und Heidegger verwenden, zu erklären, könnte der Beginn eines anderen Verständnisses der Souveränität und der Figur des Souveräns sein. Ist der Souverän (...) ein Teil einer Einheit, der mystifizieren und ein Geheimnis produzieren kann? Was bedeutet "geheim" oder für den Staat bzw. für die geheime Souveränität eines Staates zu dienen? Was ist das Staatsgeheimnis? Und ist es das Geheimnis der Verteidigung einer Einheit, die ihren Souverän etabliert und den "Terror der Souveränität" erklärt? (shrink)
Znano je, da so negativne velikosti svojo legitimnost od svojega nastanka dalje dobile skozi to, da so bile interpretirane kot dolg. S pretvorbo matematike v prirodoslovje pa je ta interpretacija postala nezadostna. Kantov spis iz leta 1763 o negativnih velikosti predstavlja poskus, da se po vzoru na Eulerjev argument o neizogibnosti iz dela Réflexions sur l'espace et le temps pokaže realnost negativnih velikosti izhajajoč iz tretjega Newtonovega zakona akcije in reakcije. Kantov pojem realne zoperstavljenosti skuša dotedanjo interpretacijo – dolg, spraviti (...) z novo – silo. V tekstu nas zanima težava, ki pri tem nastopi: potlačitev paradoksa negativnih velikosti, ki ga je lahko interpretativno zadovoljil le dolg. Drugače rečeno, paradoksna lastnost negativnih velikosti, ki jo je lahko za realno naredil dolg kot družbeni objekt, postane glavna prepreka za njihovo fizikalno intepretacijo. (shrink)
If we attempt to find signs of messianism within the rebellion as such, if, for example Korah, "contrary to" but always "together with" Benjamin, is the "first left oppositionist in the history of radical politics," then the final and divine violence carried out by God would, in fact, be Benjamin's pure revolutionary violence perpetrated precisely against this first revolutionary. The circulation of the alternative title of this text ("Benjamin's 'Divine Violence' and the case of Korah") within the subtitle ("The Rebellion (...) against Moses as the First Scene of Messianism [Numbers, 16]"), and conversely, is an accurate description of the "misunderstanding" in connection to the understanding of revolution in Benjamin, because the one who carries out revolutionary violence is not found where we, all this time, had expected him to be. Is it precisely this betrayed expectation that constantly brings us back to Benjamin's "Critique of Violence"? But what exactly do we expect? Do we expect a final violence of catastrophic proportions negating every future violence and time of expectation? Do we expect the subject of this positive violence – the noble [edle] subject of the revolution? (shrink)
The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual understanding of knowledge and his placement of social epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of “new” knowledge. (...) In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy. (shrink)
Der Text erforscht den Ursprung und die Geschichte der "Fundamentierung" des Kriegs und seiner "?bertragung" in Frieden auf dem Weg der Gewalt. In einer Analyse des bekannten Syntagmas "Gleiches mit Gleichem vergelten" in einigen Schl?sseltexten, die versuchen, den Frieden zu "institutionalisieren", sucht der Autor nach einer anderen Relation zur Gewalt. Die Interpretation von Jehuda Halevis Gedicht Feindesliebe in der?bersetzung von Franz Rosenzweig ist der wichtigste Orientierungspunkt auf dem Weg zu einem neuen und anderen Frieden.. Tekst istrazuje poreklo i istorije "utemeljenja" (...) i "prevodjenja" rata u mir putem nasilja. Analizom poznate sintagme "vratiti milo za drago" unutar nekoliko kljucnih tekstova koji pokusavaju da "institucionalizuju" mir, autor pokusava da pronadje mogucnost jednog drugacijeg odnosa prema nasilju. Interpretacija pesme Jehude Halevija "Ljubav prema neprijatelju" u prevodu Franza Rosenzweiga treba da bude osnovni orijentir na putu ka novom i drugacijem miru. (shrink)
The main cause of Schmitt?s and Koj?ve?s friendship, and consequently, their correspondence, lies in their common affinity for philosophy of Hegel. When they began corresponding in 1955, Schmitt was something of an academic pariah; in 1933, the legal scholar had joined the Nazi Party, publicly declared his anti-Semitism, was later interrogated at Nuremberg, and retired from his post at the University of Berlin in 1946. After his famous lectures on Hegel?s Phenomenology ended in 1939, Koj?ve joined the Resistance. At the (...) end of the World II War, he wound up in the French ministry of economic affairs, where he worked until his death in 1968. This text is written on the margins of two letters, one written on 14.XII.1955. by Schmitt and the other, Koj?ve?s answer, dated on 4.I.1956. The subject of those two letters is the interpretation of the enemy in philosophy of Hegel.. Ljubav prema Hegelovoj filozofiji nalazi se u osnovi prijateljstva i prepiske Koj?va i Schmitta. Kada su 1955. poceli svoju prepisku, Schmitt je bio u potpunoj nemilosti. Ispitivan u Nirnbergu, 1946 godine bio je udaljen sa Univerziteta u Berlinu. Posle cuvenih predavanja o Hegelu koja su se okoncala 1939. godine, Koj?ve se prikljucio Otporu. Od 1946 godine radio je u francuskom Ministarstvu za privredu. Ovaj tekst je inspirisan Schmittovim pismom od 14. XII 1955. i odgovorom Koj?va u vezi sa Hegelovim razumevanjem pojma?neprijatelj?. (shrink)
This paper is a reconstruction of Levinas’ reading of Hegel and his understanding of violence. Combining Franz Rosenzweig’s reflections which concem the sick philosopher and Hegel’s State, as well as Derrida’s interpretation of the different attributes of violence, our aim is also to give full evidence of Derrida’s critical reading of Levinas. The first part illustrates the various classifications of the figures of violence from the different periods of Hegel’s life and the traces that these figures have left in Levinas’ (...) texts beginning with „Liberté et commandement” in 1953. In the second part we discuss Hegel’s well-known analogy from his Rechtsphilosophie on sovereignty and the organism - that is to say the parallel reading of some paragraphs of Naturphilosophie too - and the relation between totality and violence, in Levinas’ “ontology as allergy” and in Derrida’s autoimmunology. (shrink)
Was ist vom Begriff der "Souver?nit?t" geblieben, mit anderen Worten: ist es nach der Schaffung einer Vielzahl kleiner souver?ner Staaten in Osteuropa noch m?glich,?ber die Figur des Souver?ns zu sprechen? Was ist ein Staat sofern er kein Souver?n ist bzw. sofern er nur teilweise ein Souver?n ist? Wieviel Souver?nit?t bedarf es damit ein Staat wirklich souver?n ist? Verhandelt der Internationale Gerichtshof f?r Kriegsverbrechen, die innerhalb des ehemaligen Jugoslawien begangen wurden, de facto die Folgen jener Verbrechen, die die Grundlage der Souver?nit?t (...) und der Unabh?ngigkeit aller dieser neuen kleinen Staaten liegen, w?hrend er de iure auf einer rein pers?nlichen Verantwortlichkeit insistiert? Die Ausf?hrungen versuchen, eine der grundlegenden Aporien der internationalen Rechts zu problematisieren, die - von Kant bis heute - die Unverletzlichkeit der Souver?nit?t eines Staates und, im selben Moment, das Recht auf humanit?re Intervention und auf pr?ventive Gewalt betrifft. Sta je preostalo od pojma "suverenosti", drugim recima, da li je moguce i dalje govoriti o figuri "suverena" posle stvaranja mnostva malih "suverenih" "drzava" istocne Evrope? Sta je to drzava ukoliko nije suverena, ukoliko je samo delimicno suverena? Kolika je to nuzna kolicina suverenosti, da bi jedna drzava zaista bila suverena? Da li Medjunarodni sud za ratne zlocine, za zlocine pocinjene na teritorijama bivse Jugoslavije, de jure insistirajuci samo na pojedinacnoj odgovornosti, de facto prihvata posledice istih tih zlocina koji se nalaze u osnovama suverenosti i nezavisnosti svih tih novih malih drzava? Nase izlaganje pokusava da problematizuje jednu od osnovnih aporija medjunarodnog prava koja se tice nepovredivosti suverenosti jedne drzave i, u isti mah, prava na humanitarnu intervenciju i preventivno nasilje od Kanta do danas. (shrink)
The text examines different assumptions of Hegel?s understanding of the corporation across various versions of his Lectures of the Philosophy of Right, given recent contemporary reflections on?the end of capitalism.? My intention is to take Hegel?s thematization of the poor and poverty, as well as the significance Hegel ascribes to common work and the constitution of a working group as the foundation of civil society, and formulate these as real conditions of a potential reconstruction of the corporative model and new (...) common action. nema. (shrink)
What interest me are the reasons why?human? or?human rights? could be important or possibly most important in constituting a group? in the subtitle). If I had to justify the existence of the latest debates on nature, justification and universality of human rights, on their distinction from other normative standards, on the philosophy and foundation of human rights, on?Human Rights without Foundations?, then I would immediately conclude that this?process of grandiose concretization? of a complete fabrication is far from over. Despite the (...) innumerable pacts and international conventions established after World War II, the slew of obligations to which states have agreed in the last few decades, the establishment of rights to secession or humanitarian intervention it is as if the constitution of classification of basic human rights and their universality is far from over. (shrink)
In diesem Text wird die Bedeutung von Husserls ph?nomenologischen Forschungen zur Institution und zur Institutionalisierung. Es wird angenommen, dass die Bedeutung dieser nicht ausreichend bekannten Strategien nur in den unver?ffentlichten Handschriften gefunden werden kann, dass die unterschiedlichen Generationen der Konsultanten von Husserls Archiven eine identische?berzeugung von der Bedeutung der Husserlschen Entdeckungen bezeugt, dass Merleau- Pontys?bersetzung von Stiftung als "institution" dominiert und dass eben diese?bersetzung bewirkt hat, dass Husserl zu einer franz?sischen Angelegenheit wurde. Die Idee des Artikels ist, dass diese Theater (...) der Lekt?re, der?bersetzung und des Einflusses Husserls die kontinentale Philosophie begr?ndet. Das bedeutet, dass Husserls Strategie der Stiftung/Urstiftung am Ursprung dieses Syntagmas liegen kann, da das Denken einer Institution der Philosophie als Denken Europas strukturiert ist, als Denken von Menschheit und als Denken der Begegnung mit dem Anderen. U ovom tekstu se razmatra znacaj Husserlovih fenomenoloskih istrazivanja o instituciji i institucionalizovanju. Pretpostavlja se da je vaznost ovih Husserlovih nedovoljno poznatih "strategija" mogla da bude pronadjena jedino u neobjavljenim manuskriptima, da su razlicite generacije konsultanata Husserlovih arhiva svedocila identicnu veru u znacaj Husserlovih otkrica, da Merleau-Pontyjeva verzija prevoda dominira i da upravo prevod reci Stiftung sa institution, cini da "Husserl" postane cisto "francuska stvar". Ideja je da ovaj teatar citanja, prevodjenja i uticaja Husserla utemeljuje "kontinentalnu filozofiju". To znaci da Husserlova strategija sa Stiftung/Urstiftung moze da bude u poreklu ove sintagme jer je misljenje institucije filozofije strukturirano kao misljenje Evrope, kao misljenje covecnosti /Menschheit/ i kao misljenje susreta sa drugim.. (shrink)
»Protiinstitucija« je »francoska stvar« in je del tistega, kar bi sam poimenoval francoski institucionalizem. Moj namen je tematizirati ta contre ali »proti«, to upiranje instituciji, a hkrati želim rekonstruirati nekaj več kot zgolj upiranje samo. Prvič, contre vedno implicira penser autrement, ki je na neki način povezno z utopijo. Drugič, zdi se mi, da je Saint Simon naš večni sodobnik in da je njegovo razglabljanje o Evropi še vedno aktualno – tako kot včasih je tudi danes Evropa autre chose in (...) contre-institution. Tretjič, sledeč Humu in nato Deleuzu, bi lahko zatrdil, da gre pri contre-institution ali upiranju instituciji v resnici za poskus zmanjšanja neizbrisne sledi nasilja znotraj institucij. (shrink)
My intention in this text is to present the most significant contribution of some French philosophers and anthropologists to the notion of reconstruction and advancement of institutions. The paradox of change, reform or transformation of the institution - is an entirely new institution possible? How do institutions die? - lies in the difficulty or even impossibility to change something that manifests what we are as a group. If institutions really present or represent the relations among all of us, how can (...) they be changed in the first place? Whence the capacity for change? What allows for the idea of the?new?? nema. (shrink)
In this text, I analyze the most important topics of one of the most complex portions of Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption. The chapter “The Fire or the Eternal Life” deals with the community and communal life of the eternal people, and it reconstructs the basic elements and conditions of communal living. A presentation of all key protocols of life and work of a group of people ought to show the plurality of heterogeneous practices that have helped maintain a people scattered (...) and always on the verge of extinction. (shrink)
This paper is a reconstruction of Levinas’ reading of Hegel and his understanding of violence. Combining Franz Rosenzweig’s reflections which concern the sick philosopher and Hegel’s state, as well as Derrida’s interpretation of the different attributes of violence, our aim is also to give full evidence of Derrida’s critical reading of Levinas. The first part illustrates the various classifications of the figures of violence from the different periods of Hegel’s life and the traces that these figures have left in Levinas’ (...) texts beginning with ‘Liberté et commandement’ in 1953. In the second part we discuss Hegel’s well-known analogy from his Rechtsphilosophie on sovereignty and the organism—that is to say the parallel reading of some paragraphs of Naturphilosophie too—and the relation between totality and violence, in Levinas’ ‘ontology as allergy’ and in Derrida’s autoimmunology. (shrink)
U ovom radu pokusavam da rekonstruisem Levinasovo citanje Hegela i njegovo razumevanje nasilja, sluzeci se tekstovima Franza Rosenzweiga o Hegelovoj drzavi i Derridinom interpretacijom razlicitih atributa nasilja kod Emmanuel Levinasa. Interesovace me klasifikacija nekih figura nasilja iz razlicitih perioda Hegelovog zivota i njihovi tragovi u Levinasovim tekstovima pocevsi od teksta 'Libert? et commandement' iz 1953. godine. Analiza slavne Hegelove analogije iz njegove Rechtsphilosophie o suverenosti i organizmu, odnosno citanje nekih paragrafa njegove Naturphilosophie, treba da objasne vezu izmedju totaliteta i nasilja, (...) kao i Levinasovu 'ontologiju kao alergologiju' odnosno Derridinu autoimunologiju. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 149031: Regionalni i evropski aspekti integrativnih procesa u Srbiji: civilizacijske pretpostavke, stvarnost i izgledi za buducnost. (shrink)
Avant de qualifier la th?orie du 'radical' de Rosenzweig de messianisme, il me semble important de localiser le 'registre du sacrifice' dans ce syst?me de connaissance. Du reste, c'est la premi?re innovation de Rosenzweig par rapport? la tradition. Rosenzweig n'a ni essay? ni eu le temps de th?matiser en d?tail la figure du 'sacrifice' ou du korban comme le nom le plus g?n?rique d'une telle activit?. Tout ce que nous poss?dons se r?sume? quelques fragments r?partis sur plusieurs ann?es de correspondance (...) avec ses amis, auxquels Rosenzweig enseigne la pens?e du sacrifice et ses limites, et? quelques-unes de ses notes sur la difficult? de traduire et d'effacer le mot allemand Opfer. Cependant, depuis le tout d?but, lorsqu'il 'traduit' et 'pense' le sacrifice comme 'don' ou 'offrande', son effort est tout? fait transparent: Rosenzweig ne fait qu'interroger le rapprochement de Dieu ou d'Autrui. Pre nego se 'teorija o radikalnom' Franza Rosencvajga prepozna kao mesijanizam i mozda kao jedna komplikovana i sistematska zurba ka novom vremenu, cini mi se da je vazno da lociramo 'registar zrtvovanja' u ovom sistemu spoznaje. Uostalom, to je prva Rozencvajgova novina u odnosu na tradiciju. Rozencvajg nije ni pokusao niti je imao vremena da detaljno tematizuje figuru 'zrtvovanja' ili korban kao najopstije ime za ovu delatnost. Sve sto imamo jeste nekoliko fragmenata iz razlicitih godina u pismima prijateljima koje Rozencvajg poducava o granicama i smislu zrtvovanja, i nekoliko njegovih zabelezaka o teskoci prevodjenja i brisanja nemacke reci Opfer. Ipak, od samog pocetka, i kada on 'prevodi' i 'misli' zrtvovanje kao 'poklon' ili 'prinos', njegov napor je sasvim transparentan. Sve sto Rozencvajg ispituje jeste priblizavanje Bogu ili drugom. (shrink)