In diesem Text wird die Bedeutung von Husserls phänomenologischen Forschungen zur Institution und zur Institutionalisierung . Es wird angenommen, dass die Bedeutung dieser nicht ausreichend bekannten Strategien nur in den unveröffentlichten Handschriften gefunden werden kann, dass die unterschiedlichen Generationen der Konsultanten von Husserls Archiven eine identische Überzeugung von der Bedeutung der Husserlschen Entdeckungen bezeugt, dass Merleau- Pontys Übersetzung von Stiftung als "institution" dominiert und dass eben diese Übersetzung bewirkt hat, dass Husserl zu einer französischen Angelegenheit wurde. Die Idee des Artikels (...) ist, dass diese Theater der Lektüre, der Übersetzung und des Einflusses Husserls die kontinentale Philosophie begründet. Das bedeutet, dass Husserls Strategie der Stiftung/Urstiftung am Ursprung dieses Syntagmas liegen kann, da das Denken einer Institution der Philosophie als Denken Europas strukturiert ist, als Denken von Menschheit und als Denken der Begegnung mit dem Anderen. (shrink)

Der Text erforscht den Ursprung und die Geschichte der "Fundamentierung" des Kriegs und seiner "Übertragung" in Frieden auf dem Weg der Gewalt. In einer Analyse des bekannten Syntagmas "Gleiches mit Gleichem vergelten" in einigen Schlüsseltexten, die versuchen, den Frieden zu "institutionalisieren" , sucht der Autor nach einer anderen Relation zur Gewalt. Die Interpretation von Jehuda Halevis Gedicht Feindesliebe in der Übersetzung von Franz Rosenzweig ist der wichtigste Orientierungspunkt auf dem Weg zu einem neuen und anderen Frieden.

Paraphrased within the title of this text is a note Hannah Arendt made in August 1952. After reading Carl Schmitt’s Nomos der Erde, Arendt tries to confront Schmitt’s idea of a just war. In the text I attempt to reconstruct Arendt’s readings of differing political philosophy texts within the context of her thinking concerning the relationship between violence and power, force and law. Arendt’s refusal to accept the existence of violence which can "conquer" freedom and "create" right and democracy, brings (...) contradiction to the great tradition of the followers of Marx, to whom Arendt undoubtedly belongs: how is and is revolutionary violence even possible and does violence as resistance to injustice bring justice? (shrink)

The relation between violence and the institution was truly thematized for the first time in the writings of Hume, and in an entirely different way in Saint-Just's texts on the Republic and the institution. Gilles Deleuze's early works represent an original attempt at reconstruction of a possible dialogue between these two dissimilar authors. Regardless of the possibility of reconstruction of Deleuze's own theory of the institution , and analysis of the various combinations of the terms institution and revolution, the intention (...) is above all to examine the link between violence and the institution. Deleuze's attempt to make a preliminary systematic examination of the figure of the institution came about as a result of the conjoining of several fragments of his famous predecessors. (shrink)

It is my intention to attempt to define pacifism, in its engagement and concept, as a necessary requisite of war and military action, following a phrase used over a hundred years ago by Franz Rosenzweig when speaking of pacifism as “necessary equipment of war.” I will try to defend the importance of pacifism as an integral part of war (as such, pacifism as a requisite of war ought to shorten the period of war and mitigate destruction) and oppose this concept (...) of pacifism to Jan Narveson’s old attempt at constructing pacifism as a position and then designating it as “untenable and unreasonable,” and then further oppose this to his later attempt to find in pacifism the cause of further (and more) violence for ever more vicious wars. (shrink)

This paper is structured in three sections. The first discusses the institutional framework pertaining to bioethics in Serbia. The functioning of this framework is critically assessed and a number of recommendations for its improvement presented. It is also emphasized that philosophers are underrepresented in public debate on bioethics in Serbia. Second, this underrepresentation will be related to two issues that figure prominently in Serbian society but are not accompanied by corresponding bioethical discourses: the first is abortion and the second is (...) the largely unrestricted use of neuropharmacology since the 1990s, both for therapeutic and for cosmetic/recreational purposes. Finally, the perspective of bioethics in Serbia is addressed. It is asserted that this perspective can be based on the enhancement of public philosophical debate on bioethical issues, especially those with notable features in Serbian society . Such enhancement would also strengthen the corresponding institutional and legal frameworks. (shrink)

The surprising thing about “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus. Ein handshriftliher Fund,” one of Rosenzweig’s best supported and most carefully detailed texts, is that he almost completely ignores one of the most stunning and mysterious fragments of this brief, two-page manuscript that he discovers in 1914 at the Prussian State Library in Berlin. Not only that: while discussing and justifying in detail every part of this manuscript, attempting to prove that just because it is in Hegel’s handwriting, does not (...) necessarily mean that Hegel is its author, Rosenzweig completely sidelines the famous, completely anarchistic, and radical fragment about the state. My question then is, why does Rosenzweig leave out any argument about Schelling’s understanding of the state? Or more precisely, how have Schelling’s positions on the state been incorporated and transformed in Rosenzweig’s texts? How does Rosenzweig use these fragments? Why does he nowhere thematize Schelling’s thoughts on the state, or what in eine revolutionäre Staatslehre Rosenzweig calls Schelling’s revolutionary teachings on the matter? (shrink)

The main cause of Schmitt’s and Kojève’s friendship, and consequently, their correspondence, lies in their common affinity for philosophy of Hegel. When they began corresponding in 1955, Schmitt was something of an academic pariah; in 1933, the legal scholar had joined the Nazi Party, publicly declared his anti-Semitism, was later interrogated at Nuremberg, and retired from his post at the University of Berlin in 1946. After his famous lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology ended in 1939, Kojève joined the Resistance. At the (...) end of the World II War, he wound up in the French ministry of economic affairs, where he worked until his death in 1968. This text is written on the margins of two letters, one written on 14.XII.1955. by Schmitt and the other, Kojève’s answer, dated on 4.I.1956. The subject of those two letters is the interpretation of the enemy in philosophy of Hegel. (shrink)

This paper is a reconstruction of Levinas’ reading of Hegel and his understanding of violence. Combining Franz Rosenzweig’s reflections which concern the sick philosopher and Hegel’s state, as well as Derrida’s interpretation of the different attributes of violence, our aim is also to give full evidence of Derrida’s critical reading of Levinas. The first part illustrates the various classifications of the figures of violence from the different periods of Hegel’s life and the traces that these figures have left in Levinas’ (...) texts beginning with ‘Liberté et commandement’ in 1953. In the second part we discuss Hegel’s well-known analogy from his Rechtsphilosophie on sovereignty and the organism—that is to say the parallel reading of some paragraphs of Naturphilosophie too—and the relation between totality and violence, in Levinas’ ‘ontology as allergy’ and in Derrida’s autoimmunology. (shrink)

Im Text dieses Projekt wird das Wort "Geheimnis" ausschließlich in Zusammenhang mit dem Staat und der "Ragion di Stato" /Staatsräson/ gedacht. Die unterschiedlichen Formen und Transformationen des Geheimnisses und des Verbergens bilden eine der grundlegenden Quellen und Bedingungen für die Souveränität. Die berühmte Fiktion von der Schwierigkeit, das "mystery in the soul of state", die Shakespeare, Bacon, Thomasius, Kant und Heidegger verwenden, zu erklären, könnte der Beginn eines anderen Verständnisses der Souveränität und der Figur des Souveräns sein. Ist der Souverän (...) ein Teil einer Einheit, der mystifizieren und ein Geheimnis produzieren kann? Was bedeutet "geheim" oder für den Staat bzw. für die geheime Souveränität eines Staates zu dienen? Was ist das Staatsgeheimnis? Und ist es das Geheimnis der Verteidigung einer Einheit, die ihren Souverän etabliert und den "Terror der Souveränität" erklärt? (shrink)

Notre intérêt se centrera sur quelques textes que Franz Rosenzweig, soldat autrichien combattant dans la défense anti-aérienne, a écrit au cours des dernières années de la Première Guerre mondiale sur le front des Balkans. Nous nous proposons deux tâches : examiner dans le contexte des différents penseurs de la politique de ce siècle la tentative rosenzweigienne de comprendre la guerre, les découpages territoriaux dans la guerre, l’appropriation de la terre, sa compréhension de la frontière, de l’espace, du peuple, de la (...) géopolitique, du rapport entre la mer et la terre, du monde et de l’État mondial. La seconde direction consiste à tenter de déterminer le statut de ces textes politiques de Rosenzweig à l’égard de la totalité de son œuvre, de même que l’influence implicite et explicite de sa judéité sur sa compréhension de la guerre et du monde. (shrink)

If we attempt to find signs of messianism within the rebellion as such, if, for example Korah, "contrary to" but always "together with" Benjamin, is the "first left oppositionist in the history of radical politics," then the final and divine violence carried out by God would, in fact, be Benjamin's pure revolutionary violence perpetrated precisely against this first revolutionary. The circulation of the alternative title of this text ("Benjamin's 'Divine Violence' and the case of Korah") within the subtitle ("The Rebellion (...) against Moses as the First Scene of Messianism [Numbers, 16]"), and conversely, is an accurate description of the "misunderstanding" in connection to the understanding of revolution in Benjamin, because the one who carries out revolutionary violence is not found where we, all this time, had expected him to be. Is it precisely this betrayed expectation that constantly brings us back to Benjamin's "Critique of Violence"? But what exactly do we expect? Do we expect a final violence of catastrophic proportions negating every future violence and time of expectation? Do we expect the subject of this positive violence – the noble [edle] subject of the revolution? (shrink)

I will attempt to explain the connection between violence and my own or Levinas's or the State's violence as a response to the initial violence and finally the violence which remains in the mouth, throat, aftertaste [gout] or in disgust [degout]. 'Cet arrière-goût de violence' or 'un quelconque arrière-goût de degout' [a sort of aftertaste of disgust].

We should investigate whether the phrase l’institution révolutionnaire best describes Deleuze’s imaginary theory of the institution, as well as his engagement with the theory more generally. The preliminary difficulty, which immediately questions and devalues our commentary, is Deleuze’s own refusal to thematize the institution and his own effort, and thus actually answer his own questions from the 1950s: what is it that explains the institution? And what should perfect institutions be like, that is, ones opposed to all agreement, and which (...) suppose a minimum of laws? Deleuze’s carelessness and effectively his abandonment of his own early attempt at thinking the institution, could possibly mark his intuition and recognition that the thematization of the institution is, as of yet, an impossible task. (shrink)

Was ist vom Begriff der "Souveränität" geblieben, mit anderen Worten: ist es nach der Schaffung einer Vielzahl kleiner souveräner Staaten in Osteuropa noch möglich, über die Figur des Souveräns zu sprechen? Was ist ein Staat sofern er kein Souverän ist bzw. sofern er nur teilweise ein Souverän ist? Wieviel Souveränität bedarf es damit ein Staat wirklich souverän ist? Verhandelt der Internationale Gerichtshof für Kriegsverbrechen, die innerhalb des ehemaligen Jugoslawien begangen wurden, de facto die Folgen jener Verbrechen, die die Grundlage der (...) Souveränität und der Unabhängigkeit aller dieser neuen kleinen Staaten liegen, während er de iure auf einer rein persönlichen Verantwortlichkeit insistiert? Die Ausführungen versuchen, eine der grundlegenden Aporien der internationalen Rechts zu problematisieren, die - von Kant bis heute - die Unverletzlichkeit der Souveränität eines Staates und, im selben Moment, das Recht auf humanitäre Intervention und auf präventive Gewalt betrifft. (shrink)

U ovom radu pokušavam da rekonstruišem Levinasovo čitanje Hegela i njegovo razumevanje nasilja , služeći se tekstovima Franza Rosenzweiga o Hegelovoj državi i Derridinom interpretacijom različitih atributa nasilja kod Emmanuel Levinasa. Interesovaće me klasifikacija nekih figura nasilja iz različitih perioda Hegelovog života i njihovi tragovi u Levinasovim tekstovima počevši od teksta 'Liberté et commandement' iz 1953. godine. Analiza slavne Hegelove analogije iz njegove Rechtsphilosophie o suverenosti i organizmu, odnosno čitanje nekih paragrafa njegove Naturphilosophie, treba da objasne vezu između totaliteta i (...) nasilja, kao i Levinasovu 'ontologiju kao alergologiju' odnosno Derridinu autoimunologiju. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 149031: Regionalni i evropski aspekti integrativnih procesa u Srbiji: civilizacijske pretpostavke, stvarnost i izgledi za budućnost. (shrink)

Avant de qualifier la théorie du 'radical' de Rosenzweig de messianisme, il me semble important de localiser le 'registre du sacrifice' dans ce système de connaissance. Du reste, c'est la première innovation de Rosenzweig par rapport ŕ la tradition. Rosenzweig n'a ni essayé ni eu le temps de thématiser en détail la figure du 'sacrifice' ou du korban comme le nom le plus générique d'une telle activité. Tout ce que nous possédons se résume ŕ quelques fragments répartis sur plusieurs années (...) de correspondance avec ses amis, auxquels Rosenzweig enseigne la pensée du sacrifice et ses limites, et ŕ quelques-unes de ses notes sur la difficulté de traduire et d'effacer le mot allemand Opfer. Cependant, depuis le tout début, lorsqu'il 'traduit' et 'pense' le sacrifice comme 'don' ou 'offrande', son effort est tout ŕ fait transparent: Rosenzweig ne fait qu'interroger le rapprochement de Dieu ou d'Autrui. (shrink)

We should investigate whether the phrase l’institution révolutionnaire best describes Deleuze’s imaginary theory of the institution, as well as his engagement with the theory more generally. The preliminary difficulty, which immediately questions and devalues our commentary, is Deleuze’s own refusal to thematize the institution and his own effort, and thus actually answer his own questions from the 1950s: what is it that explains the institution? And what should perfect institutions be like, that is, ones opposed to all agreement, and which (...) suppose a minimum of laws? Deleuze’s carelessness and effectively his abandonment of his own early attempt at thinking the institution, could possibly mark his intuition and recognition that the thematization of the institution is, as of yet, an impossible task. (shrink)

»Protiinstitucija« je »francoska stvar« in je del tistega, kar bi sam poimenoval francoski institucionalizem. Moj namen je tematizirati ta contre ali »proti«, to upiranje instituciji, a hkrati želim rekonstruirati nekaj več kot zgolj upiranje samo. Prvič, contre vedno implicira penser autrement, ki je na neki način povezno z utopijo. Drugič, zdi se mi, da je Saint Simon naš večni sodobnik in da je njegovo razglabljanje o Evropi še vedno aktualno – tako kot včasih je tudi danes Evropa autre chose in (...) contre-institution. Tretjič, sledeč Humu in nato Deleuzu, bi lahko zatrdil, da gre pri contre-institution ali upiranju instituciji v resnici za poskus zmanjšanja neizbrisne sledi nasilja znotraj institucij. (shrink)

Znano je, da so negativne velikosti svojo legitimnost od svojega nastanka dalje dobile skozi to, da so bile interpretirane kot dolg. S pretvorbo matematike v prirodoslovje pa je ta interpretacija postala nezadostna. Kantov spis iz leta 1763 o negativnih velikosti predstavlja poskus, da se po vzoru na Eulerjev argument o neizogibnosti iz dela Réflexions sur l'espace et le temps pokaže realnost negativnih velikosti izhajajoč iz tretjega Newtonovega zakona akcije in reakcije. Kantov pojem realne zoperstavljenosti skuša dotedanjo interpretacijo – dolg, spraviti (...) z novo – silo. V tekstu nas zanima težava, ki pri tem nastopi: potlačitev paradoksa negativnih velikosti, ki ga je lahko interpretativno zadovoljil le dolg. Drugače rečeno, paradoksna lastnost negativnih velikosti, ki jo je lahko za realno naredil dolg kot družbeni objekt, postane glavna prepreka za njihovo fizikalno intepretacijo. (shrink)