En Faulkner llama la atención la repetición de personajes, la recurrencia a escenarios parecidos, la persistencia en memorias colectivas y la profundidad en conflictos cotidianos. Faulkner no se sale del sur, del ambiente de los vencidos, de sus imágenes más cercanas.

Pensamientos desde Berlín, pensamientos sobre Berlín; lo que el autor ve, siente, percibe y lo que capta en relación con todo su amplio bagaje de lecturas. Ver, entender, leer, del ojo a la pluma, del recuerdo a la pluma, magia o realidad de un encuentro.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume and Pascal: Pyrrhonism vs. Nature José R. Maia Neto The view that Pyrrhonism is not practically viable was, according to Richard H. Popkin, held during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuriesbydifferent philosophers suchas Mersenne,Arnauld, Pascal, Ramsay, and others.1 Among the anti-sceptics, this position was usually taken as an argument against Pyrrhonism. Popkin points out that Hume's main contribution to the "Pyrrhonian controversy" is to show that (i) "the Pyrrhonian (...) doctrine was the logical outcome of philosophical analysis,"2 (ii) that the infeasibility of Pyrrhonism does not weaken its epistemological force but only its psychological plausibility, and (Ui) that this implausibility obtains because nature (the common affairs ofeveryday life and the feeUngs, impressions, and ideas thereby generated) impels the philosopher to believe.3 Popkin alsomakes an allusion to the similaritybetweenHume and Pascal on this issue.4 In this paper I compare the dilemma posed by Pascal as apropaedeutic tofaith withthe "dangerous dilemma" alluded to, but avoided, by Hume in the conclusion of book 1 of the Treatise. The dilemma follows from (i) above. At a certain point in his epistemological enquiry the philosopher is forced tomake a hard choice between the quite disadvantageous alternatives: either to continue his philosophizing, which, leading to Pyrrhonism, may bring despair and cause the annihilation ofhis life, or to abandon philosophy, makinghim aprey ofthe "errors, absurdities, andobscurities"ofanon-critical life.5 In what follows I compare Hume's solution to this dilemma with Pascal's.? In the following passage Hume shows the toughness of the dilemma and offers a first answer to it: What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? If we... condemn all refin'd reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, I know not what ought to be done Volume XVII Number 1 41 JOSE R.???? NETO in the present case. I can only observe what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression behind it. (T 268) Note that in this first answer Hume manages to avoid the normative response that the dilemma demands. He provides, instead, a descriptive account which is a kind of solution because it purports to show that human psychology makes it unlikely that someone could reach the point at which he or she would have to choose between the two parties. The dilemma does not arise because nature stops the self-subversion ofreason. Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herselfsuffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent ofmind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. (T 269) Hume means by nature in this passage both human nature and the social and natural environments which, in so far as they demand specific reactions, generate appropriate beliefs. Those beliefs imposed by nature are necessaryforour survival. So, the mere interaction ofthe philosopher with the world outside his closet suffices to dispel his sceptical crisis. According to Hume, this determination of nature is absolute and necessary. "I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live... I may, nay I must yield to the current ofnature" (T 269). This view is reaffirmed in the Enquiry. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a PYRRHONIAN may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point ofaction and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches.6 So, it would appear that the dilemma is just a fleeting impression in the imagination of the philosopher during a momentary sceptical crisis. Nature provides that such a crisis is not prolonged... (shrink)

O primeiro capítulo versa a respeito do objetivo do que há de ser tratado. O segundo mostra de que modo o Império Romano permaneceu sem alteração durante trezentos e cinqüenta e quatro anos e cinco meses, governado por trinta e três imperadores. O terceiro aborda porque os Orientais, a saber, os Persas, os Árabes, os Caldeus e outras nações limítrofes se subtraíram do domínio do Império Romano. O quarto capítulo discorre sobre quais foram os principais povos que se rebelaram por (...) causa das mencionadas circunstâncias. O quinto trata do princípio e da àisposição relativa à transferência do Império dos Gregos para os Francos. O sexto aborda de que modo Pepino, no tempo de Zacarias, papa romano, foi elevado de mordomo a rei dos Francos. O sétimo capítulo discorre de que maneira Pepino, rei dos Francos, por solicitação da Igreja Romana, veio à Itália lutar contra Astolfo, rei dos Lombardos, o venceu e restituiu à Igreja Romana seus bens temporais. O oitavo trata do modo como, no tempo do papa Adriano, Carlos Magno foi estabelecido patrício da cidade, e como lhe foi concedido o controle sobre a Sé Apostólica. O nono mostra de que maneira foi efetuada a translação do Império Romano dos Gregos para os Francos. O décimo considera como o Império foi transferido dos Francos ou Gauleses para os Germânicos. O décimo primeiro discorre acerca do modo como foram estabelecidos os eleitores do Império Germânico. O décimo segundo capítulo recapitula o que foi anteriormente abordado. (shrink)

Santo Antônio de Lisboa, na qualidade de pregador, deixou um legado de sermões, nos quais encontra-se toda uma visão de vida cristã. A obra não pode ser qualificada como pertencente a um filósofo, tal como se deu este nome a outros seus contemporâneos, mas possui denso conteúdo teórico, como, por exemplo, no que se refere à dimensão ética do conceito de justiça.

In this article, we scrutinize views that justify exclusionary policies regarding transgender athletes based primarily on physiological criteria. We introduce and examine some elements that deserve...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Academic Skepticism in Early Modern PhilosophyJosé R. Maia NetoAncient skepticism was more influential in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it had ever been before. Thanks to the groundwork of Charles B. Schmitt and Richard H. Popkin on the influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy and to the extensive research that followed their lead, skepticism is now recognized as having played a major role in the rise (...) of modern thought. 1There were two ancient skeptical schools, Academic skepticism and Pyrrhon-ism. Were both equally influential? Until the sixteenth century, Pyrrhonism was scarcely known. Only a few copies of Sextus’s books (the only surviving primary source of ancient Pyrrhonism) have been discovered in medieval libraries. By contrast the main source of Academic skepticism, Cicero’s Aca-demica, was occasionally referred to by medieval authors and was the object of some commentaries and criticism in the Renaissance. 2 Academic skepticism was preserved from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance not only through Cicero’s Academica, but also through Lactantius’s Divinae Institutiones and [End Page 199] Augustine’s Contra Academicos. 3 This situation changed when Sextus’s works were translated to latin and published in 1562 and 1569. Sextus presents a much more complete and detailed account and defense of ancient skepticism than that of Cicero’s Academica. Sextus presents Pyrrhonism as a coherent form of skepticism and Academic skepticism as a kind of negative dogmatism. 4 It was thus natural that the ancient skepticism that fascinated some (and troubled so many) early modern thinkers was mostly Pyrrhonian. Because of the publication of Sextus’s works, according to Schmitt, the increasing influence of Cicero’s Academica in the Renaissance was halted. Sextus’s Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos took the place of Cicero’s Academica and drastically increased the influence of ancient skepticism. 5 The skeptical crisis at the dawn of modern philosophy is called “pyrrhonienne” not “academicienne.”While the appearance of Sextus’s works in Latin turned him and Pyrrhonism into the main source and influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy, further research on the history of skepticism in the period has shown that the role of Cicero’s Academica and of Academic skepticism in general continued to be considerable. First, Cicero’s works were important items in the university curricula. Although Cicero’s works of rhetoric and morals were those more read, the students could certainly learn about Academic skepticism through at least some of them. Second, many editions of De Natura Deorum, a work of Cicero’s in which Academic skepticism is quite central, were published during the seventeenth century. Third, features of Academic skepticism, exhibited above all in Cicero’s Academica, are basic to the skepticism revived in the late Renaissance by Montaigne and Charron; were related to the new science in the first half of the seventeenth century by Gassendi; were used in the anti-Cartesian reaction of the late seventeenth century by Rapin, Huet, Bayle, and above all Foucher; and were radicalized in the eighteenth century by Hume. Despite the Academic features of Montaigne’s, Charron’s, and Gassendi’s skepticisms, it does seem that from the publication of Sextus’s works to the mid-seventeenth century, Academic skepticism was secondary to Pyrrhonism. But the appearance of Descartes and the development of Cartesianism in the second half of the seventeenth century set conditions for a complete revamping of Academic skepticism, bringing about what Schmitt thought was precluded by the appearance of Sextus in the modern scene, namely, a “full flowering of the Academica as a work to inspire new directions of philosophical thought.” 6 [End Page 200]Montaigne’s Apologie pour Raimond Sebond is rightly considered the first major result of the revival of ancient Pyrrhonism in modern thought. 7 Montaigne never cites the name of Sextus nor acknowledges his source and, by contrast, fills his Apology with passages from Cicero on the Academic skeptics. It is clear, however, that Montaigne follows closely Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the central part of the Apology where he gives a detailed and sympathetic exposition of ancient skepticism.After dwelling on the evils and problems arising from knowledge and science, Montaigne... (shrink)

Em boa parte do Artigo 68 do Livro Primeiro de seu Estado e Pranto da Igreja, Álvaro Pais, O. Min. (c. 1270-1349) refuta 5 proposições com implicações políticas atribuídas a Marsílio de Pádua (1280-1342). Neste artigo, analisamos a refutação dessas proposições feitas pelo Menorita galego, comparando-as, de um lado, com os textos, efetivamente escritos pelo Médico paduano, que se encontram em sua obra Defensor da Paz (1324) e, de outro, cotejando-o com uma Epistula ad quosdam cardinales, de autoria do mencionado (...) Frade, escrita pelo menos dois anos antes. Desse estudo resultaram as seguintes conclusões: 1 – Frei Álvaro, sem fazer nenhuma alusão, apoiou-se basicamente na mencionada Epistula. 2 – Sob o aspecto doutrinal, essencialmente, não há diferença entre ambos os textos alvarinos. 3 – Nos dois textos, o Franciscano galego não compulsou o Defensor da Paz, tendo utilizado as teses que os censores dessa obra imputaram ao seu autor; em 1327, quando o Papa João XXII condenou-a como herética. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Álvaro Pais. Marsílio de Pádua. Plenitude do poder. Filosofia política. ABSTRACT In a large part of the Article 68 of the Book one of his Status et Planctus Ecclesiae, Alvarus Pelagius O. Min. (c. 1270-1349) refutes five propositions, having political implications, attributed to Marsilius Patavinus (1280-1342). In this study, we analyze the refutation of these propositions made by Alvarus, comparing, on the one hand, with the texts, really, written by Marsilius, which are in his book entitled Defensor pacis (1324), and on the other hand, quoting Alvarus’ text with the Epistula ad quosdam cardinales, also written by the mentioned Franciscan friar two years before. From this study, resulted the following conclusions: 1 – Without to do any mention in the Article 68, the principal Alvarus’ source was the referred Epistula. 2 – Considering the two texts written by Fr. Alvarus, according the doctrinal aspect, they are essentially equal. 3 – In both texts we could see that Alvarus not had in his hands the Defensor Pacis, having used the thesis which the censors of this book imputed to Marsilius in 1327, when this book was condemned as heretic by the Pope John XXII. KEY WORDS – Alvarus Pelagius. Marsilius of Padua. Plentitude of power. Political philosophy. (shrink)

Marsílio de Pádua, embora não tenha escrito sobre Teoria da História, contudo oferece pistas para analisar-se como a ciência histórica estava formulada no século XN. Pela leitura de seus textos, vê-se como formulou a teoria a partir de fatos candentes de seu tempo.

Neste artigo, inicialmente, discorremos sobre o contexto histórico que suscitou a 1ª fase do conflito em torno às relações de poder, entre Bonifácio VIII e Felipe IV de França, e as fundamentações teóricas em que o Papa e o Rei se apoiavam. A seguir, analisamos um dos opúsculos anónimos, escrito em defesa da política do Rei contra parte da clerezia franca, que não queria ser taxada em seus bens, e contra a bula papal Clericis laicos. Por último, apresentamos a tradução (...) do opúsculo Antequam essent clerici. We begin by discussing the historical context of the first phase of the power struggle between Boniface VIII and Philip IV of France, and the theoretical foundations upon which the Pope and the King supported their positions. We then consider one of the anonymous opuscula written in defense of the King's policy against the French clergy faction , and in opposition to the papal bull Clericis laicos. Finally, we present a translation of this opusculum. (shrink)

The existence of a Richter–Peleg multi-utility representation of a preorder by means of upper semicontinuous or continuous functions is discussed in connection with the existence of a Richter–Peleg utility representation. We give several applications that include the analysis of countable Richter–Peleg multi-utility representations.

Retention of postgraduate students is a complex problem at higher education institutions. To address this concern, various forms of academic support are offered by higher education institutions to nurture and develop the pipeline of postgraduate students. The support provided to postgraduate students tends to emphasize academic support at times at the expense of psychosocial or non-academic support. Non-cognitive skills were underscored as integral to determining academic and employment outcomes and thus, may need to be investigated more. This manuscript reports on (...) an attempt to filter and consolidate the literature reporting on interventions for postgraduate students that include the development of non-cognitive skills. A systematic review was conducted, because it enabled rigorous and replicable process of consolidating literature. Covidence software was used as a digital platform for the systematic review. The review was conducted at four levels as per the PRISMA guideline namely, identification, screening, eligibility and final summation. The filtration process attempted to answer the following research questions: How are non-cognitive factors or skills defined? Which non-cognitive skills were included in support for postgraduate students in the higher education setting?, and How have non-cognitive skills been included in support interventions provided to retain postgraduate students? Descriptive and theory explicative metasynthesis was used for the summation and data extraction. The primary finding was that the term non-cognitive was not used explicitly in the included studies to describe skills or factors supporting student retention. The discourse centered around support and social support as non-academic factors and skills. This suggested that non-cognitive skills were constructed as co-curricular and not integrated into the postgraduate academic project or core learning outcomes. The findings highlighted the distinction between non-cognitive skills and factors and illustrated how skills and factors operate at different levels with different spheres of influence. The formats of support provide an intersectional space where skills and factors are combined. (shrink)

This article examines the conception of scepticism during the early modern period. It describes how the writings of Pierre Charron and Michel de Montaigne inspired authors to search for a balance between extreme scepticism and what was often described as the dogmatism of the Schools. It discusses the revival of scepticism in the Renaissance and early seventeenth-century philosophy and shows the impact of Cartesian doubt in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century scepticism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume and Pascal: Pyrrhonism vs. Nature José R. Maia Neto The view that Pyrrhonism is not practically viable was, according to Richard H. Popkin, held during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuriesbydifferent philosophers suchas Mersenne,Arnauld, Pascal, Ramsay, and others.1 Among the anti-sceptics, this position was usually taken as an argument against Pyrrhonism. Popkin points out that Hume's main contribution to the "Pyrrhonian controversy" is to show that (i) "the Pyrrhonian (...) doctrine was the logical outcome of philosophical analysis,"2 (ii) that the infeasibility of Pyrrhonism does not weaken its epistemological force but only its psychological plausibility, and (Ui) that this implausibility obtains because nature (the common affairs ofeveryday life and the feeUngs, impressions, and ideas thereby generated) impels the philosopher to believe.3 Popkin alsomakes an allusion to the similaritybetweenHume and Pascal on this issue.4 In this paper I compare the dilemma posed by Pascal as apropaedeutic tofaith withthe "dangerous dilemma" alluded to, but avoided, by Hume in the conclusion of book 1 of the Treatise. The dilemma follows from (i) above. At a certain point in his epistemological enquiry the philosopher is forced tomake a hard choice between the quite disadvantageous alternatives: either to continue his philosophizing, which, leading to Pyrrhonism, may bring despair and cause the annihilation ofhis life, or to abandon philosophy, makinghim aprey ofthe "errors, absurdities, andobscurities"ofanon-critical life.5 In what follows I compare Hume's solution to this dilemma with Pascal's.? In the following passage Hume shows the toughness of the dilemma and offers a first answer to it: What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? If we... condemn all refin'd reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, I know not what ought to be done Volume XVII Number 1 41 JOSE R.???? NETO in the present case. I can only observe what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression behind it. (T 268) Note that in this first answer Hume manages to avoid the normative response that the dilemma demands. He provides, instead, a descriptive account which is a kind of solution because it purports to show that human psychology makes it unlikely that someone could reach the point at which he or she would have to choose between the two parties. The dilemma does not arise because nature stops the self-subversion ofreason. Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herselfsuffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent ofmind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. (T 269) Hume means by nature in this passage both human nature and the social and natural environments which, in so far as they demand specific reactions, generate appropriate beliefs. Those beliefs imposed by nature are necessaryforour survival. So, the mere interaction ofthe philosopher with the world outside his closet suffices to dispel his sceptical crisis. According to Hume, this determination of nature is absolute and necessary. "I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live... I may, nay I must yield to the current ofnature" (T 269). This view is reaffirmed in the Enquiry. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a PYRRHONIAN may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point ofaction and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches.6 So, it would appear that the dilemma is just a fleeting impression in the imagination of the philosopher during a momentary sceptical crisis. Nature provides that such a crisis is not prolonged... (shrink)

Ranking finite subsets of a given set X of elements is the formal object of analysis in this article. This problem has found a wide range of economic interpretations in the literature. The focus of the article is on the family of rankings that are additively representable. Existing characterizations are too complex and hard to grasp in decisional contexts. Furthermore, Fishburn (1996), Journal of Mathematical Psychology 40, 64–77 showed that the number of sufficient and necessary conditions that are needed to (...) characterize such a family has no upper bound as the cardinality of X increases. In turn, this article proposes a way to overcome these difficulties and allows for the characterization of a meaningful (sub)family of additively representable rankings of sets by means of a few simple axioms. Pattanaik and Xu’s (1990), Recherches Economiques de Louvain 56, 383–390) characterization of the cardinality-based rule will be derived from our main result, and other new rules that stem from our general proposal are discussed and characterized in even simpler terms. In particular, we analyze restricted-cardinality based rules, where the set of “focal” elements is not given ex-ante; but brought out by the axioms. (shrink)

In this paper we study collective identity functions that deal with formation of clubs. Usually the choice offered to individuals is to cast a vote in favor of qualification or not, and the final outcome is qualification or non-qualification. In this context we show that independent collective identity functions are naturally characterized by voting rules, and in particular, consent rules can be represented by one single collection of weighted majorities. In addition, we consider the extended model where voters are allowed (...) to abstain and we distinguish between disqualification and a neutral outcome. We show that this environment allows agents to act in different capacities that cannot be distinguished in the original formulation of the problem. (shrink)

Marsilio de Pádua e Guilherme de Ockham viveram seus últimos anos na corte de Luís da Baviera. Ambos opuseram-se aos papas da época. Entretanto, a posição deles a respeito do primado do sumo pontífice não é idêntica. Enquanto Marsílio a nega quase totalmente, Ockham observa que se trata de um problema de cunho teológico e critica os argumentos de Marsílio.

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 1-8.

I present two criticisms: (1) Merge is a model of performance in speech perception experiments but not an ecologically valid model integrating both word recognition and speech perception, and (2) Merge's implementation of the variability of lexical effects must be made more precise or the model is indistinguishable from its alternatives.

In astronomy Abraham Zacut is best known for the Latin version of his tables, the Almanach Perpetuum, first published in 1496, based on the original Hebrew version that he composed in 1478. These tables for Salamanca, Spain, were analyzed by the authors of this paper in 2000. We now present Zacut’s tables preserved in Latin and Hebrew manuscripts that have not been studied previously, with a concordance of his tables in different sources. Based on a hitherto unnoticed text in a (...) Latin manuscript, we argue that Zacut is the author of the Tabule verificate which, in our publication of 2000, we took to be anonymous. We also discuss in detail Zacut’s tables for epoch 1513 for Jerusalem that are arranged for the Hebrew calendar, rather than the Julian calendar that he used elsewhere. We then consider a number of fragmentary texts that were found in the Cairo Geniza, now scattered in various European and American libraries. The new evidence is consistent with our earlier finding that Zacut depended both on the medieval Hebrew tradition in astronomy and on the Parisian Alfonsine Tables. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze the astronomical tables for 1340 by Immanuel ben Jacob Bonfils who flourished 1340–1365, based on four Hebrew manuscripts. We discuss the relation of these tables principally with those of al-Battānī, Abraham Bar Ḥiyya, and Levi ben Gerson, as well as with Bonfils’s better known tables, called Six Wings. An unusual feature of this set of tables is that there are two kinds of mean motion tables, one arranged for Julian years from 1340 to 1380, months, (...) days, hours, and minutes of an hour, and the other arranged in the Hebrew calendar for the times of conjunctions and oppositions of the Sun and the Moon only, with subtables for 19-year cycles, single years in a 19-year cycle, and months. The latter arrangement is found in Bonfils’s Six Wings for solar and lunar motions only, whereas in his Tables for 1340, this arrangement applies to all planets. Notably absent are tables for the trigonometric functions, etc., that are generally found in such sets of astronomical tables. (shrink)

This book is the first systematic account of Pierre Charron's influence among the major French philosophers in the period (1601-1662). It shows that Charron's Wisdom was one of the main sources of inspiration of Pierre Gassendi's first published book, the Exercitationes adversus aristoteleos. It sheds new light on La Mothe Le Vayer, who is usually viewed as a major free thinker. By showing that he was a follower of Charron, La Mothe emerges neither as a skeptical apologist nor as a (...) disguised libertine, as combatting superstition but not as irreligious. The book shows the close presence of Charron in the preambles of Descartes' philosophy and that the cogito is mainly based on the moral Academic self-assurance of Charron's wise man. This interpretation reverses the standard view of Descartes' relation to skepticism. Once this skepticism is recognized to be Charron's Academic one, it is seen not as the target but as the source of the cogito. Pascal is the last major philosopher for whom Charron's wisdom is crucially relevant. Montaigne and Descartes influenced, respectively, Pascal's view of the Pyrrhonian skeptic and of the skeptical main arguments. The book shows that Charron's Academic skeptical wise man is one of the main targets of his projected apology for Christianity, since he considered him as a threat and counter-example of the kind of Christian view of human beings he believed. By restoring the historical philosophical relevance of Charron in early modern philosophy and arguing for the relevance of Academic skepticism in the period, this book opens a new research program to early modern scholars and will be valuable for those interested in the history of philosophy, French literature and religion. (shrink)