T × W logic is a combination of tense and modal logic for worlds or histories with the same time order. It is the basis for logics of causation, agency and conditionals, and therefore an important tool for philosophical logic. Semantically it has been defined, among others, by R. H. Thomason. Using an operator expressing truth in all worlds, first discussed by C. M. Di Maio and A. Zanardo, an axiomatization is given and its completeness proved via D. Gabbay’s irreflexivity (...) lemma. Given this lemma the proof is more or less straight forward. At the end an alternative axiomatization is sketched in which Di Maio’s and Zanardo’s operator is replaced by a version of “actually”. (shrink)

As cause we often specify an event the occurrence of which first guaranteed that of the effect. This notion is explicated in a framework of branching worlds in Sections I to V. VI and VII point out its close relations to the concept of an agent's bringing about an event. The topic of the last two sections is the distinction between causes and necessary circumstances. For this purpose conditionals are used, interpreted with respect to branching worlds without a similarity relation (...) between them. (shrink)

Global supervenience of beliefs about physical states of affairs on such states has strongly counter-intuitive consequences about what beliefs we can nomologically hold. This is an argument against a global supervenience of all mental properties on physical ones, and, since that is implied by strong supervenience, also against that as the preferred materialist thesis.

ZusammenfassungDie Arbeit diskutiert die These C. G. Hempels, dass allgemeine Gesetze in den Naturwissenschaften und in der Historie die selbe ‘theoretische Funktion’ innehaben. Zu diesem Zweck unterscheidet der Autor zwischen systembildenden und genetische Strukturen bildenden Wissenschaften, denen als Darstellungsformen die Theorienhierarchie und die Narration entsprechen. Diese beiden Grundformen der Organisation unseres Wissens über Tatsachen werden auf einen Unterschied in der Erklärungsweise zurückgeführt, der nicht logischer, sondern pragmatischer Natur ist. Es ist dies der Unterschied zwischen Subsumption und Zurechnung. Während bei der (...) systematischen Organisation des Wissens das zugrundeliegende Theoriengefüge die Bedingungen exakt festlegt, unter denen ein Faktum als erklärt anzusehen ist, fehlt eine solche erkenntnis‐leitende Funktion der Gesetze bei der genetischen Organisation.SummaryThis paper discusses C. G. Hempeľs contention according to which universal laws fulfil the same ‘theoretical function’ in Natural and Historical Science. To this end, the author differentiates between system‐building and genetically structured sciences. Their modes of presentation are respectively hierarchically ordered theory and narrative. These two basic ways of arranging our knowledge of facts are led back to a difference in explanation, of a pragmatic, not logical nature, that is, to the difference between Subsumption and Ascription. Whereas in the systematic organization of knowledge, the basic underlying theory sets the exact conditions, under which a fact can be described as explained, such an epistemological directive function of laws is not to be found in genetic organization. (shrink)

The Parmenides is, especially with respect to its second part, one of Plato's most difficult dialogues. The paper sketches an interpretation which is characterized by the following main points: The interpretation is neither rejectionistic nor compatibilistic, that is, according to it, neither should none of the statements of the 2nd part be taken seriously as an assertion meant to be true, nor are all statements of the 2nd part acceptable as true if correctly interpreted. In the 2nd part of the (...) Parmenides, Plato develops a logical theory - a theory of predication, participation and of the community of ideal forms in general - on mereological foundations; in doing this, he advances far beyond elementary mereological principles. This forces us to revise our views concerning the beginnings of logic. It is due to the incomparably high rank which Plato accorded to the active working-out of insights that Plato presents his results not in an expository manner, but as a web of contradictions. The readers are challenged to find the truth for themselves. (shrink)

To celebrate the 270th anniversary of the De Gruyter publishing house, the company is providing permanent open access to 270 selected treasures from the De Gruyter Book Archive. Titles will be made available to anyone, anywhere at any time that might be interested. The DGBA project seeks to digitize the entire backlist of titles published since 1749 to ensure that future generations have digital access to the high-quality primary sources that De Gruyter has published over the centuries.

In der Diskussion metaethischer Fragen spielt das Humesche Gesetz eine wichtige Rolle, nach dem normative Aussagen, d.h. Aussagen über Gebote oder Werte, sich nicht aus deskriptiven Aussagen ableiten lassen. In dieser Arbeit wird das Gesetz präzise formuliert und bewiesen, und es wird seine Relevanz für eine Kritik naturalistischer ethischer Theorien erörtert.

T × W logic is a combination of tense and modal logic for worlds or histories with the same time order. It is the basis for logics of causation, agency and conditionals, and therefore an important tool for philosophical logic. Semantically it has been defined, among others, by R. H. Thomason. Using an operator expressing truth in all worlds, first discussed by C. M. Di Maio and A. Zanardo, an axiomatization is given and its completeness proved via D. Gabbay’s irreflexivity (...) lemma. Given this lemma the proof is more or less straight forward. At the end an alternative axiomatization is sketched in which Di Maio’s and Zanardo’s operator is replaced by a version of “actually”. (shrink)

Dieses Buch ist aus diesen Vorlesungen entstanden und wendet sichprimär an Studenten. Sein Ziel ist es, ihnen das Werk Freges zu erschließen und sie zum Studium der Originaltexte anzuregen.

This book has arisen out of lectures I gave in recent years at the Uni versities of Munich and Regensburg, and it is intended to serve as a textbook for courses in the Philosophy of Language. In my lectures I was able to presuppose that the students had taken an introductory course in logic. Some knowledge of logic will also be helpful in studying this book - as it is almost everywhere else in philosophy -, especially in Section 3. 2, (...) but it is no prerequisite. I would like to give my sincere thanks to Prof. Terrell for his excellent translation of the book, which is based on the second, revised and en larged German edition. Regensburg, May 1975 FRANZ VON KUTSCHERA INTRODUCTION Language has become one of philosophy's most important and pressing themes during this century. This preoccupation with language has its ori gins in the most diverse areas of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Two criteria, one for distributive and one for commutative justice are formulated, the latter applying to cases of free cooperation. Both criteria follow Aristotle's idea of proportional equality which in the first case is equality in the fulfillment of legitimate claims, in the second case equality of the gains derived from cooperation. The theory of social welfare functions is employed in the definition of the two criteria, but such functions are applied only to morally or legally justified interests. A theory (...) of justice only has to say how to satisfy conflicting legitimate claims, it is argued, but not what interests are justified in some given context. (shrink)

Three main types of subjectivist ethics are distinguished and specified by the use of elementary game-theoretical notions. It will be argued that all these theories run into difficulties that cannot be overcome within the self-imposed limits of subjectivism.

Theorizing about something we tend to conceive of it as objective and admitting, in principle, of a clear-cut distinction between what it is in its own right and what we believe about it. Obviously this tendency gets us into trouble if we theorize about the mental, and it is the tenet of this paper that the temptation to objectify the mental is the main source of our notorious difficulties with it. Evidence is presented from a variety of fields, from set (...) theory, semantics and epistemology to doxastic logic. (shrink)