U ovom clanku autor nastoji da analizira odnos morala i prava u okviru savremene pravne teorije. Odnos prava i morala moze se posmatrati na tri razlicita nacina: teza o identitetu - pravo i moral su osnovi identicni sistemi normi pri cemu su pozitivne pravne norme podredjene osnovnim moralnim principima (prirodna pravna teorija), teza o odvajanju - pravo i moral su konacno razliciti sistemi normi (pravni pozitivizam), teza o polaritetu - pravo i moral su dva razlicita normativna sistema, ali se oni (...) medjusobno radikalno ne iskljucuju, vec izmedju njih postoji znacajan nivo dodirivanja i nadopunjavanja. Ova teza na najbolji nacin je predstavljena u pravnim teorijama H.L.A Harta i Ronalda Dworkina. Na logickom nivou, teza o polaritetu na specifican nacin sintetise i prevladava jednostranosti teze o identitetu i teze o odvajanju. U isti mah na socioistorijskom nivou, ova teza proizvod je specificnog istorijsko-socijalnog razvitka angloamerickih pravnih i politickih institucija. U tekstu se ukazuje i na relevanciju ove teorijske kontraverze pri suocavanju sa prosloscu posttotalitarnih politickih poredaka i drustava. (shrink)

In the recent literature on contextualism and relativism, one often finds disputes as to which kind of consideration would be relevant for positing a feature of a context as a parameter in the ‘‘circumstance of evaluation’: via the presence of an operator in the language which shifts that feature (Stanley) or by being a feature of a context with respect to which the truth of ‘‘propositions’’ expressed in the context is relative (McFarlane). This kind of dispute arises from two different (...) independent roles that elements in ‘‘circumstances of evaluation’’ are sometimes assumed to have. I distinguish indices from points of evaluation, and motivate its significance in the debate. (shrink)

According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith , “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive (...) similarities and differences being relevant in the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s. (shrink)

Response to Max Kölbel: "A Criterion for Objectivity", Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2.

On the life and works of Maṇḍanamiśra, philosopher of Saṅkarācārya tradition.

Islamic philosophy; philosophy, Ancient.

Root text and autocommentary on the principles of Buddhist logic.