The Principles of Logic by Herbert Austin Aikins, first published in 1902, is a rare manuscript, the original residing in one of the great libraries of the world. This book is a reproduction of that original, which has been scanned and cleaned by state-of-the-art publishing tools for better readability and enhanced appreciation. Restoration Editors' mission is to bring long out of print manuscripts back to life. Some smudges, annotations or unclear text may still exist, due to permanent damage to (...) the original work. We believe the literary significance of the text justifies offering this reproduction, allowing a new generation to appreciate it. (shrink)

On January 1, 2020, I (the first author), started my term as the new Editor in Chief of Metaphor and Symbol. I wanted to inaugurate that moment with a short editorial piece in the journal seeking t...

In connection with the special theory of relativity, Einstein made use of a now familiar thought experiment1 involving two lightning flashes, a railway train, and an embankment. Whether he used it merely to help explain the theory to others or whether it played a role in the theory's very generation as well is perhaps a matter of conjecture. However, physicist Richard Feynman, for one, believes that Einstein first conceived his theories in the visualizations of thought experiments and developed their mathematical (...) formulations afterwards. According to a recent magazine essay, ‘Einstein came to an understanding about relativity by imagining people going up in elevators and beaming light back and forth between rocket ships. (shrink)

The title is his own. Herbert Feigl, the provocateur and the soul (if we may put it so) of modesty, wrote to me some years ago, "I'm more of a catalyst than producer of new and original ideas all my life... ", but then he com pleted the self-appraisal: "... with just a few exceptions perhaps". We need not argue for the creative nature of catalysis, but will simply remark that there are 'new and original ideas' in the twenty-four (...) papers selected for this volume, in the extraordinary aperrus of the 25-year-old Feigl in his Vienna dissertation of 1927 on Zufall und Gesetz, in the creative critique and articulation in his classical monograph of 1958 on The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'; and the reader will want to turn to some of the seventy other titles in our Feigl bibliography appended. Professor Feigl has been a model philosophical worker: above all else, honest, self-aware, open-minded and open-hearted; keenly, devotedly, and even arduously the student of the sciences, he has been a logician and an empiricist. Early on, he brought the Vienna Circle to America, and much later he helped to bring it back to Central Europe. The story of the logical empiricist movement, and of Herbert Feigl's part in it, has often been told, importantly by Feigl himself in four papers we have included here. (shrink)

This article attempts at a close appraisal of legal research, dating back to the pre-war times. It begins by discussing the burst of research in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s as well as the dash of such research prior to 1920. Following this, it considers the funding dilemmas that confronted the undertaking of this research, why the research was found almost exclusively in the United States, and the methodologies employed for this research. It discusses a variety of (...) themes found in the early empirical legal research with a particular focus on projects and findings that presage debates and concerns in contemporary empirical legal research. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of why empirical work seemed to fade out in the late 1930s and what lead to its revival in the 1950s. (shrink)

And yet, as one advances further in the present edition, one realizes that in several respects its format fits Condillac's thought surprisingly well, particularly his rigorous, intransigent rationalism and his strong sense of the structure of thought. Condillac's starting point is in Locke's empiricism and in a determined anti-metaphysical and anti-systematic conviction; he set out to go beyond even Locke's tabula rasa sensationalism. Not only should the entire content of our mind be traced back to sense impressions which had been (...) received from objects outside of us or by inner impressions, but even the faculties and acts of the mind which transform these data into ideas should be explained as the effect of characteristics that are inherent in sensations. This was the thesis and the intent. But as Condillac's philosophy developed, the constructive, Cartesian forces of his mind, his almost passionate demand for precision, mathematical cogency and radical analysis became more and more prevalent. Already the subtitle of the 1746 edition of the Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines announces the Cartesian heritage or parentage; the subtitle reads: "ouvrage où l'on réduit à un seul principe tout ce qui concerne l'entendement.". (shrink)

Far from being part only of Early Modern learning, Polyhistory as a way of gathering and shaping knowledge can be traced through the Middle Ages back to Grammar and Rhetoric of Roman Antiquity. Practical use and wise limitation have always been the regulations to polyhistorical libido sciendi. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Polyhistory assumed the very high standard of Universitatis rerum historia , before it was losing its value by the rise of the new Cartesian paradigm of subject-centered epistemology. (...) It is indispensable to survey the whole of its tradition, however incompletely and tentatively, in order to come to due distance to a term with polemical connotations dating from early Enlightenment when Polyhistory lost its credit. (shrink)

As recent studies in economic and financial sociology have underscored, calculation is central to economic practices. While some sociological accounts locate the performance of calculation within individual ability, networks of human agents or their cultural embeddedness, studies operating on the background of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge conceive of calculation as situated in the practice of the participants engaged, the technological tools used and their requirements. The article explores this point further, using a distinction which can be traced back to (...) Heidegger’s notion of Gestell (enframing): the ‘calculation of something’ and the ‘calculation with something’ are analysed taking the practices of risk management departments of big international banks as an example. It is argued that, through the use of calculation tools, the corporate clients are constituted anew and that written documents which are the outcome of this process constitute a social prosthesis for remote communication taking place between subsidiaries and the headquarters of international banks. (shrink)

Considering that getting along in civil society is based on the expectation that people will do what they say they will do, i.e., essentially live up to their explicit or implicit promises, it is amazing that so little scientific attention has been given to the act of promising. A great deal of research has been done on the moral development of children, for example, but not on the child’s ability to make and keep a promise, one of the highest moral (...) achievements. What makes it possible developmentally, cognitively, and emotionally to make a promise in the first place? And on the other hand, what compels one to keep a promise when there seems to be no personal advantage in doing so, and even when harm can be predicted? How do we know when a promise is offered seriously to be taken at face value, and how do we understand that another is only a polite gesture, not to be taken seriously? In _Promises, Oaths, and Vows: On the Psychology of Promising_, Herbert Schlesinger addresses these questions, drawing on the literature of moral development in children; the psychotherapy of a patient who regularly broke promises that were unnecessary in the first place; those who were regarded as "promising youngsters" who did not fulfill their "promise"; and those who feared making a promise, a commitment, or a threat out of fear that, once made, the utterance would take on a life of its own and could never be taken back. Furthermore, he illustrates his conclusions by examining the widespread use of promising in classical literature, such as Greek drama and the plays of Shakespeare, as well as the motivating and reifying power of the promise in Western religious traditions. With a style honed over the penning of two previous books, Schlesinger once again produces a work grounded in a firm analytic sensibility, but which also retains the wit and candor of the seasoned analyst. His seminal investigation of this all but neglected topic in the clinical literature is as timely as it is scholarly, and – with the title firmly in mind – _Promises, Oaths, and Vows_ is assured to be a worthy addition to any clinician’s library and a provoking investigation into Nietzsche’s notion of man as "the animal who makes promises.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:102 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and removal of the social self, through the devaluation of values and de-culturation, to the objectivizatlonof the ego, the state of oneness and unity with all. The remaining sections of the book give an analysis of Rumi, the universal man of the Eas~, and an analysis of Goethe, the universal man of the West. The Rumi chapter contains impressive translations of RumPs poems and the (...) Goethe study offers a very pertinent critique of K. R. Eissler's psychoanalytic interpretation of the great man. Added is a case history of a young man who lived in two cultures, and after many errors and meanderings obtained full integration. The final section offers an application of the transcultural state to health, social change and leadership. A most rewarding and challenging work, marred only by an incredible number of typographical errors and a sometimes uneven English due to misunderstandings of the Dutch printers. Hg~RY WALTESBRANN Washington, D. C. Natural Law and Modern Society. Essays by John Cogley, Robert M. Hutchins, John Courtney Murray, SJ., Scott Buchanan, Philip Selznick, Harvey Wheeler, and Robert Gordis. (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1966. Pp. 285. Meridian Books. $1.75.) This group of essays has been discussed from time to time at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, California. The essays provide an excellent survey of the various contexts in which the idea of natural law is functioning today: in jurisprudence, political theory, sciences, religions, and philosophies of culture. Though the emphasis is on "modem society," there is a large amount of history in this collection, going back to the ancients, and one of the most valuable features of the analysis is the evidence here offered that "natural law" has meant and still means many different things, and that this flexibility of meaning gives the idea an enduring vitality and relevance. This is the particular theme of Scott Buchanan's "Natural Law and Teleology", which chapter reviews almost the whole history of philosophy to show how the content of natural law has varied for teleological reasons. Since it is impossible to review this whole story, it seems simplest and least distorting to quote a series of passages from the essays so that the reader can estimate the range of subject-matter and the kind of observations in the volume : The natural lawyer who lacks a sense of history, a factual sense, is as seriously deficient as the one who has been victimmed by the historical setting of his own time. Social scientists are concerned with digging up and evaluating exactly the kind of factual material the conscientious natural lawyer needs (Cogley, pp. 24, 26). We are free, with the deference that is due previous laborers in the vineyard, to work out the ~pplication of the principles of natural law to the conditions of our own time. The ends of uman life are heldto be unchanging; the search for the best way of achieving them is continuous and adapted to changing conditions and new knowledge. The search for a revival of natural law--not necessarily, or even principally pitched in Thomistic terms but projected more generally on a ~us gent~um, pluralistic basis--may well be the dominant theme of American legal philosophy over the second half of the century (Hutchins, pp. 34, 37, 46). Plato saw an epitome of the legal and political crisis of the city-state in the trial and death of Socrates.... The sophists are operators in opinion and power.... Plato sets out to find the truth in science and the good of the state.... There is no doctrinal answer to the quest.... The Dialogues practice what they preach, a relentless dialectical exposure of ideas masquerading in dogmas and opinions.... The endless mutual persuasions in any community could result in good laws if the formal processes of government provided insights for the citizens and magistrates alike.... Neither Plato nor Aristotle commonly uses the phrase 'natural law'.... For the Stoics what Plato had described as the "community of ideas," which was only the notion of the interpenetration of BOOK REVIEWS 103 mutual implication of ideas, became the Logos, the perhaps infinite total of... (shrink)

When people speak today of »postanalytic philosophy«, it seems as if the linguistic turn that analytical philosophy since Russell and Wittgenstein completed, has been taken back and reputiated, and in fact the return to a »pure«, i.e. prelogical and pre-linguistic consciousness of facts has gained new attractiveness. On the other hand, we must insist that for philosophy language is not only the primary issue, but also the medium that cannot go behind. This can be shown by criticism of the traditional (...) instrumental understanding of language, that goes back to Herder and Humboldt. The analytical project of philosophy retains its currency as a program for the criticism of language, even after its impressive self-criticism, as an indispensable aspect of philosophical enlightenment. (shrink)

Dialogue has its origins in joint activities, which it serves to coordinate. Joint activities, in turn, usually emerge in hierarchically nested projects and subprojects. We propose that participants use dialogue to coordinate two kinds of transitions in these joint projects: vertical transitions, or entering and exiting joint projects; and horizontal transitions, or continuing within joint projects. The participants help signal these transitions with project markers, words such as uh-huh, m-hm, yeah, okay, or all right. These words have been studied mainly (...) as signals of listener feedback (back-channel signals) or turn-taking devices (acknowledgment tokens). We present evidence from several types of well-defined tasks that they are also part of a system of contrasts specialized for navigating joint projects. Uh-huh, m-hm and yeah are used for horizontal transitions, and okay and all right for vertical transitions. (shrink)

Looking back onto 50 years of teaching and research, Herbert Schnädelbach describes factors that shaped the development of philosophy during these years, leading foremost to a scientification of philosophy and to a specialization of philosophers. Simultaneously, he makes the diagnosis of a transformation from a personalized interpretation and explanation discipline to a cooperative effort, distinguished more by an increased interest in systemic questions and cooperation than by irreconcilable frontline positioning. The influence of the university reforms of the 1960s and (...) of the years from 2000 onwards, how he relates to Kant, Hegel, and Adorno and to the role of the Critical Theory are also subject matters of the interview, as are questions regarding the tasks of philosophy in modern society. (shrink)

Derogatory terms can be powerful mechanisms of subordination, while re-appropriating these terms can be a strategy to fight back against social injustice. I argue that projects seeking to reclaim slurs have a performative structure that raises particular hazards. Whereas more familiar forms of protest may fail to bring about their intended result, attempts to re-appropriate slurs can fail to be understood as transgressive acts at all. When attempts at reclamation fail, their force is distorted; context and convention lead the hearer (...) to give uptake to the speech act as a traditional deployment of the slur. The force of this traditional use is to validate and re-entrench the very norms the act was intended to subvert. This is the precarious structure of reclamation projects: when successful, reclamation is the subversion of powerful mechanisms of oppression, but when unsuccessful, the act has the ironic force of constituting mechanisms of oppression. (shrink)

Herbert, Dilinie Christmas is a special time in the Christian calendar. The Christmas story begins with a heavily pregnant Mary riding on the back of a donkey alongside her husband into the city of Bethlehem. Their search for board to see them till the morning is futile. A somewhat kind Inn keeper shows them to his stable, where the animals are accommodated.. That night Mary gives birth to baby Jesus and she lays the newborn down in a manger. The (...) Inn is symbolic of prosperity for those fortunate to share in its comforts. To have to reside instead in the stable reflects that there is not space in the Inn and some people, for not immediately apparent reasons, live on the outside. (shrink)

Herbert, Michael Indigenous health is everybody's responsibility. This is true from the national policy level, to state governments and clinics on the ground. Whichever way a particular health issue is approached, and new perspectives are certainly needed, the bottom line is that the determinants of health always reflect back to the living conditions, education, past injustices, and socioeconomic circumstances of the Aboriginal population.

The general practice of tracing the concept of human rights back to its presumed philosophical origins in the concepts of natural law and/or natural right, and invoking those concepts to give the idea of human rights its moral direction and philosophical substance, is dramatically mistaken. Interpreting human rights as the philosophical progeny of these earlier traditions allows the uglier aspects of natural rights and natural law, which the concept of human rights was intended to remedy, to serve as the defining (...) characteristics of human rights. (shrink)

The general practice of tracing the concept of human rights back to its presumed philosophical origins in the concepts of natural law and/or natural right, and invoking those concepts to give the idea of human rights its moral direction and philosophical substance, is dramatically mistaken. Interpreting human rights as the philosophical progeny of these earlier traditions allows the uglier aspects of natural rights and natural law, which the concept of human rights was intended to remedy, to serve as the defining (...) characteristics of human rights. (shrink)

Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CAUSALITY AND GENERALITY IN THE TREATISE AND THE TRACTATUS In the Tractatus Wittgenstein cryptically rejects the existence of a causal connection (or relation or nexus) : 5.135There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to the existence of another, entirely different situation. 5.136There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference. 5.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future from (...) those of the present. Belief stition. Belief in the causal nexus is super1 And he later proceeds to add: 6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity. What he is claiming can be understood in terms of the "Logical Atomism* of the Tractatus. Atomic sentences, composed of a monadic predicate or a relational predicate and a suitable number of subject terms, represent situations or possible facts. The existence of a represented situation is the ground of truth for (or condition for the truth of or explanation of the truth of) the representing atomic sentence. We can consider 2 such atomic situations or atomic facts to be composed of a monadic property or relational property and an appropriate number of particulars. (This is a matter of some debate among interpreters of the Tractatus, but that issue does not really affect the question at issue in this paper. So, I will simply treat the view in the Tractatus along the lines of Russell's more explicit version of logical atomism in his lectures of 1918.) The world, according to Wittgenstein, is made up of such facts. This is the point of: 1.11The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 1.12The facts in logical space are the world. 1.13The world divides into facts. Consider, then, the claim that a's being F is the cause of its being G. This suggests that we construe causality in terms of a relation between the situations represented by 'Fa' and 'Ga'. With 1C representing a relation or nexus of causality, we could express that situation by: (1)C(Fa, Ga). The existence of the situation represented by (1) would then ground or explain the truth of (1). But that would mean that we recognize a relation of causality and causal relations between facts or situations. I cannot here argue, but will simply assert, that Wittgenstein's logical atomism in the Tractatus is incompatible with the recognition of relations between facts. However, one point that will be relevant to the concerns of this paper is easy to see. Logical atomism involves the claim — 1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same. This is not compatible with the recognition of the relation C and a fact grounding the truth of (1), for then Fo and Ga would not be items that were "independent" in the sense of 1.21. Hence, one who holds Wittgenstein's views about the independence of atomic facts cannot recognize causal relations between such facts. Thus, no fact is represented by (1) and C cannot relate atomic facts. The same results would hold if one suggested, in place of (1), that there was a fact corresponding to (2)(X)(Fx * Gx), where we read the arrow as the "causal" arrow — anything's being F causes it to be G. For, if there were a fact corresponding to (2), it would guarantee the link between the purported atomic facts Fa and Ga, since (3)Fa + Ga would be a logical consequence of (2), and we are back to a case like (1), with the arrow replacing 'C. (2) would also be problematic in that it would be some sort of "general" fact, which Wittgenstein also rejects. Thus, as Wittgenstein sees it there is no basis in the world for the explanation of causal statements. If the sentence (4)' (x) (Fx O Gx) ' is a statement of causal law is true, it is so simply because the list of atomic facts will contain the atomic sentence 'Ga' if it contains 'Fa'. That is, (4) is true, not because of any special fact corresponding to (5)(X... (shrink)

The early abolition of serfdom in England, the early growth of relatively free institutions, and the greater recognition of popular claims after the decay of feudalism had divorced the masses from the soil, were traits of English life which may be looked back upon with pride. When it was decided that any slave who set foot in England became free; when the importation of slaves into the Colonies was stopped; when twenty millions were paid for the emancipation of slaves in (...) the West Indies; and when, however unadvisedly, a fleet was maintained to stop the slave trade; our countrymen did things worthy to be admired. And when England gave a home to political refugees and took up the causes of small states struggling for freedom, it again exhibited noble traits which excite affection. But there are traits, unhappily of late more frequently displayed, which do the reverse. Contemplation of the acts by which England has acquired over eighty possessions – settlements, colonies, protectorates, &c. – does not arouse feelings of satisfaction. The transitions from missionaries to resident agents, then to officials having armed forces, then to punishments of those who resist their rule, ending in so called “pacification” – these processes of annexation, now gradual and now sudden, as that of the new Indian province and that of Barotziland, which was declared a British colony with no more regard for the wills of the inhabiting people than for those of the inhabiting beasts – do not excite sympathy with their perpetrators. Love of country is not fostered in me on remembering that when, after our Prime Minister had declared that we were bound in honour to the Khedive to reconquer the Soudan, we, after the re conquest, forthwith began to administer it in the name of the Queen and the Khedive – practically annexing it; nor when, after promising through the mouths of two Colonial Ministers not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, we proceeded to insist on certain electoral arrangements, and made resistance the excuse for a desolating war.. (shrink)

At first sight the title “Regimentation” seems to imply nothing more than a description in detail of the changes set forth above; but while in part it brings into view one side of these changes, and suggests their common tendency, it serves a further end. I use it here to express certain wider changes which are their concomitants. For as indicated some pages back, and as shown at length in The Principles of Sociology , in a chapter on  “The (...) Militant Type,” that graduated subordination which we see in an army, characterizes a militant society at large more and more as militancy increases. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:128 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Nietzsches Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. 30 vols. in 8 sections. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter Co.) In Print: Section IV. Vol. 1. Richard Wagner in Bayreuth. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1875-1876 (1967), 366 pp. DM. 38 Vol. 2. Menschliches, Alzumenschliches I. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1876-1877. (1967), 586 pp. DM. 56 Vol. 3. Menschliches, Alzumenschliches H. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1878-1879. (1967), 615 (...) pp. DM. 48 Vol. 4. Nachbericht zur vierten Abteilung, by M. Montinari (1969), 615 pp. DM. 58 Section V. Vol. I. Morgenr6te. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1880-1881 (1971), 772 pp. DM. 86 Section VI. Vol. 1. Also sprach Zarathustra 1883-1885 (1968), 412 pp. DM. 41 Vol. 2. lenseits yon Gut und Bi~se. Zur Genealogie der Moral 1886-1887 (1968), 430 pp. DM. 43 Vol. 3. Der Fall Wagner. G6tzen-Diimmerung. Der Antichrist. Ecce Homo. Dionysos-Dithyramben. Nietzsche contra Wagner. 1888-1889 (1969), 449 pp. DM. 45 Section VIII. Vol. 2. Nachgelassene Fragmente Herbst 1887 bis Miirz 1888 (1970), 478 pp. DM. 58 Now in press: VIII, 3. Nachgelassene Fragmente Friihjahr 1888 bis An[ang Januar 1889 (1972), ca. 400 pp. Scheduled /or 1972: III, 1. Geburt der Trag6die. Unzeitgemiil3e Betrachtungen. III, 2. Baseler Nachgelassene Schri#en und Fragmente 1870-1874 V, 2. Die/r6hliche Wissenschafl. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1881-1882 VII, 2. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884 In 1959 two Italian scholars, Giorgio Colli (Piza) and Mazzino Montinari (Florence ), decided to make a new Italian translation of Nietz.sche's works. But the confusion surrounding the publication.of the posthumous fragments, particularly in the wake of the Schlechta-Edition controversy, caused the two men to question existing German editions. Montinari's visit to the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar in 1961 confirmed their growing conviction that the only way to eliminate the inaccuracies and BOOK REVIEWS 129 omissions with respect to the late fragments was to work from the original manuscripts. Since they had to go to Weimar anyway, they reasoned, why not take the bull by the horns and attempt a truly critical German edition of all of Niet.z.sche's writings as well? Now that nine of the planned thirty volumes of the German edition have been published, in particular IV, 4 (commentary to Section IV) and VIII, 2 (posthumous fragments of 1887-1888), it appears that the editors have an excellent chance of achieving not only a critical, but a definitive edition of Nietzsche's works. 1 Volumes IV, 4 and VIII, 2 are of special importance to our evaluation as, more than the other volumes published thus far, they reveal the critical and innovative features of the edition. It will pay to examine them in some detail. The first thing we encounter in volume IV, 4 is a statement of editorial principles. We learn that with regard to works which Nietzsche himself had published, both first editions and later editions approved by Nietzsche were consulted--a double-check was needed since Nietzsche with his bad eyesight was a poor proofreader. In the case of obvious printing errors that were retained through all the printed editions, final manuscripts were also referred to; usually several, as the scribes occasionally misunderstood Nietzsche when he dictated to them. The procedure is careful but it is also selective. What is to assure us that the editors made the right selection? This problem is dealt with in the 380 pages which collate all the variants found in the principal manuscripts and editions. Whenever possible, the reason for having variants is given. The explanation of the critical apparatus is a model of painstaking thoroughness. So far authenticity and objectivity have been achieved to a high degree. However, a principal difficulty in editing Nietzsche's works is chronology, determining the order in which the fragments and manuscripts were written. How did the editors proceed here? There is a section eighteen pages long on manuscript chronology and genesis in which the editors detail their reasoning and conclusions. To back this up there are two additional sections: (1) a page-by-page inventory of every manuscript used, summarizing the content of each page and listing such facts as the designation number, the presumed scribe, the kind... (shrink)

The essay probes the limits of social ontology as a grounding project for interpretation and explanation in the social sciences. The argument proceeds by challenging the exemplary and influential ontology of John Searle by means of Jim Bohman’s hermeneutic approach. While both share the interest in establishing the validity basis of social-scientific claims, Bohman reconstructs in this regard the situated standpoint of the hermeneutic interpreter, in contrast to Searle’s building block approach to social reality. A careful analysis of Bohman’s argumentation (...) reveals the need for differentiating a variety of interpretive stances, which leads back to important revisions of the intentionality-based social ontology of Searle. The discussion results in the need to ground methodological pluralism in a universal hermeneutics of interpretive capabilities to safeguard the social sciences against relativistic as well as metaphysical challenges. (shrink)

_The Legacy of Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader_ is a collection of brand new papers by seventeen Marcuse scholars, which provides a comprehensive reassessment of the relevance of Marcuse's critical theory at the beginning of the 21st century. Although best known for his reputation in critical theory, Herbert Marcuse's work has had impact on areas as diverse as politics, technology, aesthetics, psychoanalysis and ecology. This collection addresses the contemporary relevance of Marcuse's work in this broad variety of fields (...) and from an international perspective. In Part One, veteran scholars of Marcuse and the Frankfurt school examine the legacy of various specific areas of Marcuse's thought, including the quest for radical subjectivity, the maternal ethic and the negative dialectics of imagination. Part Two focuses on a very new trend in Marcuse scholarship: the link between Marcuse's ideas and environmental thought. The third part of this collection is dedicated to the work of younger Marcuse scholars, with the aim of documenting Marcuse's reception among the next generation of critical theorists. The final section of the book contains recollections on Marcuse's person rather than his critical theory, including an informative look back over his life by his son, Peter. (shrink)

_The Legacy of Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader_ is a collection of brand new papers by seventeen Marcuse scholars, which provides a comprehensive reassessment of the relevance of Marcuse's critical theory at the beginning of the 21st century. Although best known for his reputation in critical theory, Herbert Marcuse's work has had impact on areas as diverse as politics, technology, aesthetics, psychoanalysis and ecology. This collection addresses the contemporary relevance of Marcuse's work in this broad variety of fields (...) and from an international perspective. In Part One, veteran scholars of Marcuse and the Frankfurt school examine the legacy of various specific areas of Marcuse's thought, including the quest for radical subjectivity, the maternal ethic and the negative dialectics of imagination. Part Two focuses on a very new trend in Marcuse scholarship: the link between Marcuse's ideas and environmental thought. The third part of this collection is dedicated to the work of younger Marcuse scholars, with the aim of documenting Marcuse's reception among the next generation of critical theorists. The final section of the book contains recollections on Marcuse's person rather than his critical theory, including an informative look back over his life by his son, Peter. (shrink)

_The Legacy of Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader_ is a collection of brand new papers by seventeen Marcuse scholars, which provides a comprehensive reassessment of the relevance of Marcuse's critical theory at the beginning of the 21st century. Although best known for his reputation in critical theory, Herbert Marcuse's work has had impact on areas as diverse as politics, technology, aesthetics, psychoanalysis and ecology. This collection addresses the contemporary relevance of Marcuse's work in this broad variety of fields (...) and from an international perspective. In Part One, veteran scholars of Marcuse and the Frankfurt school examine the legacy of various specific areas of Marcuse's thought, including the quest for radical subjectivity, the maternal ethic and the negative dialectics of imagination. Part Two focuses on a very new trend in Marcuse scholarship: the link between Marcuse's ideas and environmental thought. The third part of this collection is dedicated to the work of younger Marcuse scholars, with the aim of documenting Marcuse's reception among the next generation of critical theorists. The final section of the book contains recollections on Marcuse's person rather than his critical theory, including an informative look back over his life by his son, Peter. (shrink)

Being on a 40 city 24x7 book tour for War Against the Weak . I am writing this from an airplane, and I regret my brevity. Catching up on some email from a few weeks back I have now come across your remarks and those of your like minded friends defending Spencer.

Upon its publication in 1976, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis? Schooling in Capitalist America was the most sophisticated and nuanced Marxian social and political analysis of schooling in the United States. Thirty-five years after its publication, Schooling continues to have a strong impact on thinking about education. Despite its unquestionable influence, it has received strikingly little historical attention. This historical article revisits the scholarship of Bowles and Gintis and the milieu in which Schooling was conceived. Specifically, it contextualizes the (...) production and reception of Schooling to better understand the emergence of Marxist thought in the field of education in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. It also seeks to understand how the emergence of Marxist thought in the field was connected to the rise of an Academic Left?an intellectual shift in the academy toward Marxist social and political theory as a framework to theorize democratic socialist movement-building against capitalism and concomitant state sponsored oppression in the 1960s and 1970s. This history suggests that as we engage in historical and contemporary work on radical ideas in the field of education, we need to push ourselves continually to think about the intersection of education with other fields and disciplines. The article also pushes back against a widespread depiction of Schooling as crudely mechanistic. (shrink)

The traditional philosophical treatises on culture, who mostly started from neohumanistic inheritance, recently got a serious, though revolutionary partner for discussion in the person of Herbert Marcuse. The ideas, which this thinker launches on culture and society, are not loose propositions or emotionally determined interpretations, but form a structural theory, that earns further consideration. This article tries to give a survey of his opinions on this theme as well as a critical look at their suppositions and coherence. Eventually are (...) discussed Marcuse's concept of the prevailing culture as an affirmative culture, i.e. an attitude in which one accepts the existing social conditions and resigns to them. After that it discusses Marcuse's deepened interpretation of culture as a civilisation, in which the repression of the truely human needs and impulses is so to say institutionalised, and finally his matured judgement on the recovery of culture by means of the play-impulse and sufficient space for speculative and practical negation in a non-operational dimension. Retrospecting we stated that Marcuse is taking back now something of his original, marxistic aversion of the theoretical attitude, that is inaugured by the Greeks. One must also criticise his unilateral reviewing of the technical and social acquisitions of mankind. But his realising and objectifying of the old spiritual ideal of culture is no doubt a profit in relation to the neo-humanistic philosophy of culture. (shrink)

The struggle against liberalism in the totalitarian view of the state.--The concept of essence.--The affirmative character of culture.--Philosophy and critical theory.--On hedonism.--Industrialization and capitalism in the work of Max Weber.--Love mystified; a critique of Norman O. Brown and a reply to Herbert Marcuse by Norman O. Brown.--Aggressiveness in advanced industrial society.

This volume consists of a collection of articles published by Spencer in leading Victorian periodicals, such as The Westminster Review, The Fortnightly Review and Mind. The wide range of subjects explored includes science, philosophy, aesthetics, ethics, psychology and politics.

The Study of Sociology, by English philosopher, biologist, anthropologist, and sociologist, Herbert Spencer, was originally published in 1873. Spencer was known for his contributions to evolutionary theory and for applying it outside of biology, to the fields of philosophy, psychology, and within sociology. In particular, this work is a survey of the foundations of sociology, by one of its founders. Within which he applies the idea of natural selection to the group survival and institutional structures.

Kann der christliche Glaube an Gott in einer der Freiheit verpflichteten Moderne bedeutsam sein? Wie kann man von Gott sprechen unter dem Anspruch der Autonomie der Vernunft? Die Studie gibt darauf eine Antwort mittels einer Analyse der genealogischen Rekonstruktionen von Moderne, wie sie die Philosophen Hermann Krings und Herbert Schnädelbach vorgelegt haben. Dabei zeigt sich, dass es innertheologische Momente waren, die am Ende des Spätmittelalters die Moderne freigesetzt haben. So lässt sich die Moderne als eine Epoche begreifen, in der (...) der Glaube nochmals radikalisiert hermeneutisch erschlossen werden kann." --provided by publisher, back cover. (shrink)

Herbert Clark argues that language use is more than the sum of a speaker speaking and a listener listening. It is the joint action that emerges when speakers and listeners, writers and readers perform their individual actions in coordination, as ensembles. In contrast to work within the cognitive sciences, which has seen language use as an individual process, and to work within the social sciences, which has seen it as a social process, the author argues strongly that language use (...) embodies both individual and social processes. (shrink)

In his inaugural lecture as director of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt, Horkheimer points out the need for a new understanding of history that avoids the contemporary versions of the Hegelian Verklärung. He synthesizes this challenge with an imperative: to do justice to past suffering. The result of this appeal can be found in the works of the members of the Frankfurt School in the form of multiple, even divergent, trains of thought that reach with (...) unlike intensities the current debates on memory and its link with history. This paper focuses on three of these trains, which can be traced back to different periods of the work of Herbert Marcuse. It intends to systematize and present what can be considered alternative—although not necessarily contradictory—approaches aroused from the same concern over the critical power of nonreconciliatory memory: first, a genealogy inquiry that deconstructs the reified character of the given; second, a recollection of past images of happiness; and finally, a memory of the limits of all attainable freedom. Exploring these three moments, their shortcomings and tensions, may shed light on the complexity and present importance of the challenge they intend to face. (shrink)

The original publication of this volume drew Herbert into the epistemological debate with John Stuart Mill. It was to be of relevance to future psychologists, including William James, a pioneer of experimental psychology.

Alfredo Traps in Durrenmatt’s tale discovers that he has brought off, all by himself, a murder involving considerable ingenuity. The mock prosecutor in the tale demands the death penalty “as reward for a crime that merits admiration, astonishment, and respect.” Traps is deeply moved; indeed, he is exhilarated, and the whole of his life becomes more heroic, and, ironically, more precious. His defense attorney proceeds to argue that Traps was not only innocent but incapable of guilt, “a victim of the (...) age.” This defense Traps disavows with indignation and anger. He makes claim to the murder as his and demands the prescribed punishment—death. (shrink)

Bourne, H. R. F. A sketch of his life--Thornton, W. T. His career in the India House.--Spencer, H. His moral character.--Trimen, H. His botanical studies.--Minto, W. His place as a critic.--Levy, J. H. His work in philosophy.--Hunter, W. A. His studies in morals and jurisprudence.--Cairnes, J. E. His work in political economy.--Fawcett, H. His influence at the universities.--Fawcett, M. G. His influence as a practical politician.--Harrison, F. His relation to positivism.--Hunter, W. A. His position as a philosopher.