In this opening essay, Ginger Danto remembers her father's early life and time travelling in France and Italy, as well as his art‐making—in particular his woodcuts.

Powracając do estetyki kantowskiej autorka przygląda się wypowiedziom Kanta i stara się prześledzić możliwe pożytki płynące z wprowadzonego przez niego pojęcia „idei estetycznych”. Zasugerowane zostały także możliwe związki pomiędzy tą [źródłową] ideą a koncepcjami estetyki Rogera Scrutona raz Robina G. Collingwooda i odpowiednio ich pomysłami dotyczącymi doświadczenia wyobrażeniowego (Collingwood) oraz rozumienia i poznania za pomocą wyobraźni (Scruton).

ABSTRACTThis essay offers a reconfiguration of the possibility‐space of positions regarding the metaphysics and epistemology associated with historical knowledge. A tradition within analytic philosophy from Danto to Dummett attempts to answer questions about the reality of the past on the basis of two shared assumptions. The first takes individual statements as the relevant unit of semantic and philosophical analysis. The second presumes that variants of realism and antirealism about the past exhaust the metaphysical options . This essay argues that both (...) of these assumptions should be rejected. It develops as an alternative an irrealist account of history, a view based in part on work by Leon Goldstein and Ian Hacking. On an irrealist view, historical claims ought to be treated as subject to the same conditions and caveats that apply to any theory of empirical or scientific knowledge. Irrealism argues for pasts as made and not found. The argument emphasizes the priority of classification over perception in the order of understanding and so verification. Because nothing a priori anchors practices of classification, no sense can be attached to claims that some single structure must or does determine what events take place in human history. Irrealism denies to realism the very intelligibility of any imagined view from nowhere, that is, a determinately configured past subsisting sub specie aeternitatis. A plurality of pasts exists because constituting a past always depends to some degree on socially mediated negotiations of a fit between descriptions and experience. (shrink)

Although Murphey finds the question "is history scientific?" to be fruitless if not pointless, he does find it of great importance to ask just what it is that historians are doing and how they might do it better. "If truth is to be the daughter of time, it is the historian who must make the delivery, and the quality of his midwifery could stand improvement". At the root of all Murphey’s speculation is the question "just what is ‘historical knowledge'?" It (...) has always been claimed that "history is a discipline which seeks to establish true statements about events which have occurred and objects which have existed in the past". Yet what can this really mean, asks Murphey? Clearly Murphey wants no part of any "empathetic" gestures on the part of historians who claim that they can imaginatively transmigrate back in time. The past as past is not given, or as James Collins, citing Robert Ardley, pointed out recently, "history is what you cannot touch." Just what can we say that "knowing the past" really means, if in fact it means anything? Murphey takes quite serious the implications of Bertrand Russell’s remark that "there is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that ‘remembered’ a wholly unreal past." Murphey argues quite effectively that such an hypothesis involves a complete and inescapable skepticism, more complete than even Danto realized. But Murphey counters this hypothesis by saying that "we should reject Russell’s proposal, not because it is refuted by empirical evidence, but because it is more complex than the alternative". I am not altogether certain that Murphey clearly shows the relatively greater complexity of Russell’s hypothesis, nor that, in the long run, he can work himself free of it. (shrink)

The very idea of narrative explanation invites two objections: a methodological objection, stating that narrative structure is too far from the form of a scientific explanation to count as an explanation, and a metaphysical objection, stating that narrative structure situates historical practice too close to the writing of fiction. Both of these objections, however, are illfounded. The methodological objection and the dispute regarding the status of historical explanation can be disposed of by revealing their motivating presupposition: the plausibility of an (...) exclusivist explication of explanation which appeals either to the unity-of-method thesis or some implicit notion of analytic equivalence, both problematic philosophical doctrines. The metaphysical objection fails with the rejection of the idea, in Mink's phrase, of an "untold story." The argument against history as an "untold story" develops from Danto's image of an Ideal Chronicler recording ideal events. A consequence of rejecting this view is that it no longer makes sense to speak of historical narratives as true or false. However, this failure engenders no special problem for assessing the objectivity or explanatory utility of narratives qua explanations. (shrink)

Danto and White, alone among philosophers who emphasize the narrative structure of historical writing, attempt to reconcile historical narrative with the regularity theory of explanation. Their efforts fail because neither realizes that the concept of intentional action lies at the root of historical understanding. Danto's insistence that historical events can under some description be subsumed under universal causal laws forces him to disallow and thus to sacrifice the integrity of explanations that are intelligible to the historical agents themselves. White does (...) not see that "action" not "thought" or "underlying condition," may be "the decisive cause" of an event. Though the attempt to square historical narrative with the regularity theory is not doomed from the start, it has no chance of success until the concept of action, now being intensively analyzed by philosophers, is better understood. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Roger A. Shiner GETTING TO KNOW YOU IN pursuits OF happiness, Stanley Cavell attempts to establish the existence of a previously unrecognized genre of film — "comedies of remarriage " — which both includes and is defined by such movies as Adam's Rib, Bringing Up Baby, and TL· Philadelphia Story. l By "marriage" and "remarriage " is meant a certain kind of enduring emotional intimacy with which we as (...) adult men and women will be involved, an intimacy which is an integral part of the human form of life and whose relationship to an institutionally supported legal status in our culture is not one of identity. The same is true for the concept of "divorce" in this context. Using some of Cavell's interpretive ideas as a starting point, I shall seek to present the genre of remarriage as a figure for the profoundest relationships of epistemology and metaphysics — the relationship of the knower to the world which is known and the relationship of the individual to die other individuals widi whom society is shared. Specifically, divorce and remarriage as part of human life are to be seen as figures for separation and kinship, avoidance and acknowledgement in the philosophical sense of those terms.2 My discussion proceeds on several levels. There is film criticism, which attempts to find significance in certain movies. There is an examination of values, which presents a certain view ofmarriage as a human relationship. There is some metaphysics, which addresses certain traditional philosophical problems in a nontraditional way. And finally there is metaphilosophy, which attempts to present a different way ofhow to ask, and how to acknowledge as being answered, the great questions of philosophy. Only the latter two projects could be described as "philosophical" in a conventional sense. Yet, as Arthur Danto has rightly remarked,3 Cavell in Pursuits ofHappiness seems to be trying to suggest that to blur deliberately the distinction between criticism and philosophy is to show something 80 Roger A. Shiner81 important about philosophy (and thus criticism as well). If this essay in some small way is thought to show something similar, I shall be pleased. Cavell begins his chapter on It Happened One Night with some ruminations on Locke, Hume, Kant, and the idea of the limitations of human reason. Kant undertakes to show, Cavell claims (PH, pp. 75-76), that our position as human knowers is both better and worse than the Empiricists suggest. It is worse, because even if we pressed human knowledge to its Kantian limits, we would know more but not enough to fulfill the philosopher 's dream. It is better, because the very facts that are limitations of human knowledge are also the necessary conditions ofknowledge as such and to know those conditions clearly is enormously to increase human knowledge. The link between the limitations ofhuman knowledge and the comedies of remarriage is forged by the thought (CR, p. 74) that the capacity to relate oneself to the world by knowledge and the capacity to relate oneselfto others by marriage are both constitutive ofhuman society. Human community is based in part on the fact that there are limitations as to what each of us as individual knowers can know. We need each other's knowledge. If one of us were per impossibile to transcend the limitations of human knowledge, he would know, as it were, what God knows and thus have the power that God has. But the existence of these limitations reveals something deep about human knowledge, something which traditional theory of knowledge rejects, namely that it is human. Human knowledge is limited, but it is genuine. It rests on no surer a foundation than human community, but human beings are a community. We need each other, but we are there for each other. Community, and therefore knowledge, does not need to be achieved: it exists.4 Similarly, the conventions in society limiting the capacity to relate oneselfto others by marriage (one at a time, and only under protest not one forever) reveal something deep about the nature of marriage. The mutuality of the intimacy ofmarriage is possible only in conjunction with the exclusiveness of marriage. Only by turning away from all others can the taking into... (shrink)

THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE A SYSTEMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE UNDERSTANDING PRESUPPOSED BY PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE. BEGINNING WITH THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE UNDERSTANDING UNDERLYING KNOWLEDGE IS LINGUISTIC IN NATURE, A HYPOTHESIS I CALL "LT," I STATE AND CRITICIZE DANTO'S VERSION OF LT, WHICH ANALYZES THIS UNDERSTANDING AS THE UNDERSTANDING OF SENTENCES. I SHOW THAT HIS (INTELLECTUALIZED) VIEW OF WHAT IT IS TO UNDERSTAND LANGUAGE IS INCORRECT. BY DISTINGUISHING A COMPETENCE FROM A PERFORMANCE SENSE OF "UNDERSTANDS "S"," AND BY NOTING THAT LANGUAGE (...) FORMS A SYSTEM, I SHOW THAT WE MUST REPLACE SENTENCE UNDERSTANDING WITH KNOWLEDGE OF RULES OF LANGUAGE. (shrink)

In Time, Narrative, and History, David Carr argues against the narrativist claim that our lived experience does not possess the formal attributes of a story; this conclusion can be reinforced from a semiotic perspective. Our experience is mediated through temporal signs that are used again in the construction of stories. Since signs are social entities from the start, this approach avoids a problem of individualism specific to phenomenology, one which Carr takes care to resolve. A semiotic framework is also explicit (...) about a theme Carr handles implicitly: the status of representation. Representation is internal to signification, mediating our experience not just retrospectively but prospectively in the planning and execution of action. A model is presented in which the temporal organization of experience and action is formally coordinated with the temporal organization of narrative. The model is then applied to a historical event: John Batman's attempt in 1835 to purchase land from some Aboriginal tribes around what is now Melbourne. The meaning of this event is not located only in historical writing about it but in the semiotic constitution of the event itself. Changes of meaning emerge from relations between events as new events--in this case the Australian High Court's Mabo decision--align with old ones. Finally, a number of contrasts are indicated between this model and proposals made by Arthur C. Danto, Hayden White, F. R. Ankersmit, Fernand Braudel, and Paul Ricoeur. (shrink)

According to philosophers and art critics like Arthur Danto, modern art has reached a point of culmination. Being obliged to redefine itself otherwise than through the concept of representation, modern art has turned to a kind of self-interrogation and undertaken a program of revelation of its real essence. Modernist art became a kind of philosophical questioning, the answer to which brought it to fulfillment by the late 1960’s with Warhol’s duplicates. Since then, there could be nothing new in the history (...) of art; post-modern art in this sense seems to have come to an end and, liberated from the burden of its history, to have entered into an era of omnipossibility. From this point on it is absolutely free to follow as many directions as it likes at once. But is post-modern art really post-historical? Has art come to an end in this postmodern era? And how this concept of omnipossibility is to be understood? These questions rise as an agon between modernism and post-modernism, between objectivity and relativity, or between a claim of universal validity and cultural contingency. (shrink)

In this last work of his life, Natanson uses Arthur C. Danto’s essay, “.

In response to Michael Wreen, 'Once is Not Enough?' (British Journal of Aesthetics 1990), this article argues that the short story by Jorge Luis Borges, 'Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote' supports Arthur Danto's account of the individuation of art works, according to which two verbally identical compositions can be two distinct works. Wreen argues that the Menard story is a case of copying. But the story is one of intentional coincidence of texts, not copying. Hence Wreen lacks a convincing (...) case for denying that the the text of Borges' Menard constitutes a work distinct from Cervantes' Don Quixote. (shrink)

O presente estudo tem por objetivo identificar a presença de Gottlob Frege na filosofia da arte de Arthur C. Danto. Partimos do pressuposto de que algumas das principais soluções teóricas encontradas por Danto têm por base e inspiração a semântica fregeana. Para isso, analisamos o corpus em filosofia da arte de Danto, e mapeamos as passagens mais características do fenômeno observado, correlacionando com alguns trechos da obra de Frege.

Resenha do livro de Giovanna Borradori. A filosofia americana: conversações com Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre e Kuhn . Traduçáo de Álvaro Lorencini. Sáo Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2003, 223 páginas.

Arthur Danto claims that knowing that S is not a property of some individual knower M but a relation between M and some object O in the world, where O is what makes S true. For if knowledge were a property of M it would be possible to determine whether M knew simply by examining M, which is typically not the case (i.e. unless S happens to be about M). I argue that Danto errs in: (1) claiming that we can (...) determine whether or not some assertion S is true only by observing the truth conditions for S; (2) claiming that we cannot determine whether s is true by examining M; and (3) claiming that since the statement that M knows that S ‘says something about both M and the world’ it must assert a relation between M and the world. (shrink)

The article comparatively analyzes A.C. Danto’s and P. Ricœur’s theories of historical narration. Ricœur’s synthetic assimilation of Danto’s views is interpreted as a characteristic phenomenon of the dialogue between hermeneutics and analytical philosophy, and in a broader perspective – of contemporary European continental and Anglo-American philosophical traditions. The version of the analytical philosophy of history developed by Danto is interpreted as being formed in the course of overcoming epistemological program of logical positivism under the impact of a platform of linguistic (...) philosophy, pragmatism and neo-pragmatism as well as F. Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the ideas of existentialism. The articles examines fundamental conclusions of Danto’s “descriptive metaphysics” of history, which influence his understanding of a number of epistemological factors and ontological assumptions specific for the theory of historical narration. At the late stage of the evolution of his philosophy of history, Danto spoke of a radical challenge to his views on the part of T. Kuhn’s theory, but he did not give to it a constructive answer. Despite the significant philosophical differences, a number of Danto’s historical narration theory’s theses became acceptable for Ricœur, especially in the light of the American colleague final confession that knowledge of the past is dependent on the kind of existential presence in history specific for a human being. Taking M. Heidegger’s and H.G. Gadamer’s ideas as a basis of his approach to narration problem, Ricœur considered also important the “linguistic turn” initiated by L. Wittgenstein. Offering a positive evaluation of Danto’s analysis of history language, Ricœur simultaneously rightly criticized him for his neglect of the formal instruments of organizing of narrative – plot, intrigue, and composition that should affect the knowledge resources and testify on the unity of narration features in history and fiction as well. (shrink)

Arthur Danto is one of the best Anglophone philosophers of art of the second half of the 20th century. His unique methodology of indiscernibility and provocative claim about the end of art have bee...

Resumen: Una de las problemáticas más recurrente y también más importante para el mundo del arte del siglo XX, tanto el filosófico como el de los artistas, fue la salida de la belleza como el único relato legitimador de un objeto del que se pretendía el estatus de arte. En tal sentido, la reflexión que Arthur Coleman Danto, filósofo del arte norteamericano, ha hecho carrera como una de las posturas teóricas para enfrentarse al arte después de la belleza y, además, (...) para sustentar la necesidad de una definición del mismo a pesar de la entropía propia del siglo XX, que implicó el advenimiento del arte como producción humana determinada tanto por la belleza como por la fealdad, el asco, la industria y un largo etcétera.: One of the problems not only more recurrent but also more important to the world of art of the 20th century, both the philosophical and the artists, was the departure of beauty as the only legitimizing account of an object which is intended to the status of art. In this sense, the reflection that Arthur Coleman Danto, philosopher of American art, it has made a career as one of the theoretical positions to confront the art after the beauty and, in addition, to support the need for a definition of the same despite the entropy of the 20th century, which meant the advent of art as a human production already determined not only for beauty but for the ugliness, the repugnance, the industry and a long etcetera. (shrink)

Danto inicia su filosofía de la historia del arte con un núcleo problemático que inaugura el modernismo: una obra de arte llega a ser indiscernible de una mera cosa, en la medida en que es el resultado lógico de la narrativa de un cierto periodo. Hablar sobre el fin del arte es hablar de las razones que sustentan esa narración y de la posibilidad de su culminación. Se propone una crítica, a partir de la relación entre esencialismo, historicismo y pluralismo, (...) para examinar su controversial tesis sobre la clausura histórica del arte por agotamiento de su impulso cognitivo. Danto begins his philosophy of the history of art with the problematic issue that characterizes modernism: a work of art becomes indiscernible from a mere thing insofar as it is the logical result of the narrative of a certain period. To speak of the end of art is to speak of the reasons that support such narrative and the possibility of its culmination. The article proposes a critique on the basis of the relation among essentialism, historicism, and pluralism, in order to examine Danto's controversial thesis regarding the historical end of art due to the exhaustion of its cognitive impulse. (shrink)

Torino, 2 ottobre 2007 1. La prima volta in cui ho sentito parlare di Arthur C. Danto è stato, come sovente mi è capitato, dal mio maestro Gianni Vattimo. Me ne parlava come di uno studioso di Nietzsche, riferendosi al suo Nietzsche come filosofo, di cui mi raccomandava la lettura per la mia tesi. correva dunque l’anno 1976. Poi, anni dopo, nel 1984, avevo appena incominciato a insegnare a Trieste, me ne riparlò il mio collega Pier Aldo Rovatti, che aveva (...) tradotto qualche tempo prima la sua... (shrink)

Torino, 2 ottobre 2007 1. La prima volta in cui ho sentito parlare di Arthur C. Danto è stato, come sovente mi è capitato, dal mio maestro Gianni Vattimo. Me ne parlava come di uno studioso di Nietzsche, riferendosi al suo Nietzsche come filosofo, di cui mi raccomandava la lettura per la mia tesi. correva dunque l’anno 1976. Poi, anni dopo, nel 1984, avevo appena incominciato a insegnare a Trieste, me ne riparlò il mio collega Pier Aldo Rovatti, che aveva (...) tradotto qualche tempo prima la sua... (shrink)

"This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy as a whole. Written by today's leading philosophers, each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of the key figures, terms, topics, and problems of the field. Taken together, the volumes provide the ideal basis for course use, representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike"--.

A number of objections to the style matrix that Arthur Danto introduced in “The Artworld” seem to have quelled most discussion of it. So telling have these arguments been that Danto himself later recanted the idea entirely. This situation is somewhat unfortunate. It may be that Danto's own interpretation of the style matrix is not tenable, but I believe we can articulate an alternative reading of it that escapes the aforementioned objections. While the interpretation I suggest cannot provide all that (...) Danto initially imagined for his style matrix, it does maintain much that was theoretically beneficial in it. (shrink)

RESUMO O artigo, em um primeiro momento, reconstrói a separação realizada por Arthur Danto entre Estética e Filosofia da Arte. Essa separação se encontra no fundamento da ontologia dantiana e distancia sua tentativa de definir arte dos argumentos da tradição estética sobre a beleza e o gosto. A partir dessa reconstrução, dou um segundo passo e analiso como Arthur Danto discute com a experiência estética, do modo como é compreendida, principalmente, após Kant, e quais são as suas críticas e propostas (...) para repensar a relação entre público e arte. ABSTRACT The article, at first, retraces the detachment made by Arthur Danto between Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art. This detachment lies on the foundation of Danto’s ontology and differentiates its attempt to define art from the traditional aesthetics arguments on beauty and taste. From this reconstruction, I take a second step where I analyze how Arthur Danto discusses with aesthetic experience, the way it is understood, especially, after Kant, and what are his criticisms and proposals to rethink the relation between public and art. (shrink)

Danto was not a fan of Dewey, the pragmatist who dominated Columbia's philosophy department for much of the twentieth century. A broad context for what might at first seem their total clash of philosophical temperaments is Danto's embrace of analytic philosophy in a period when classical pragmatism was evolving into the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty. A more specific context is Danto's preference for Cartesian‐inflected forms of atomistic explanation and representationalism, in contrast to Dewey's anti‐dualist and anti‐representationalist holism. In addition, Dewey's (...) vision of art as embodied in human experiences across the modern institutional spectrum contrasts starkly with Danto's more “compartmental” account of the Artworld. Yet despite these differences, both philosophers were also (in Dewey's case since the turn of the twentieth century, in Danto's case in late career) deeply, if differently, indebted to Hegel, who provided a fertile framework for understanding how human beings can at one and the same time be social, self‐interpreting spiritual beings and also natural beings. This fact provides a basis for thinking that while Danto never renounced his lifelong aversion to pragmatism, a subtler strand of Dewey's pervasive influence is present in his later writings. (shrink)

This chapter presents the meeting points and conflicts between Arthur Danto’s philosophy of art and George Dickie’s avowedly succeeding theory. Its focus is on the internalist-externalist debate on the ontology of the artwork as created and perceived within the artworld. It shows that both Danto and Dickie developed anti-formalist theories, that contributed to the demise of aesthetic modernism. Inverting the formalist distinction between internal and external properties of the artwork, they classified the sensuous properties of the artwork as secondary in (...) its essence and identity. Accordingly, Danto and Dickie’s definitions of art emerged from the challenge “to be consistent with art appearing in every possible way.” Both negated the Neo-Wittgensteinians’s proposal to forgo the project of defining art and found the then-new pluralism to be revealing of the essence of art, directing philosophy to art’s nonexhibited infrastructure – beyond the reach of the eye. Across from this, the chapter presents their opposing ideas as revealed through different analyses of the concept of the “artworld”: as an intellectual sphere by Danto versus an institutional one by Dickie. Danto’s internalist/intentionalist ontology begins with the mental and stretches to its embodying material. Opposing it, Dickie’s externalist ontology points to social practices as constituting the artwork, which is attributed with the status of “arthood” by agents in its social sphere. Accordingly, I claim, Danto’s ontology is more versatile than Dickie’s. -/- . (shrink)

Arthur Danto's quarter century as art critic for The Nation was crucial, as photography had, by the 1980s and '90s, become very much in vogue in the New York artworld that was his beat. Readers familiar with the corpus of Danto's writing might infer from the discussion that his interest in photography is peripheral to his larger investigation into the ontology of artworks. Consideration of the distinction between stills and natural drawings, or of Kantian ethical concerns, appears foreign to his (...) well‐known consideration of Warhol's 1964 Brillo Box. Danto's consideration of photography reveals that art does essentially involve craft, but it is a craft involving sensitivity to, and dexterity in relation to, aspects of a realm of human interaction, rather than necessarily to materials. Further research may be directed toward refining this new craft and, especially, toward the development of pedagogical techniques suitable to it. (shrink)

Los planteamientos de A. C. Danto sobre el pluralismo en el arte y la crítica de arte contemporáneos toman como punto de referencia los años ochenta, un corto periodo en el que el pluralismo afloró como tema para la conciencia artística. Movimientos artísticos de los sesenta como el pop, el minimalismo, fluxus, habían derogado la estética como criterio para la definición del arte: obra de arte podía ser cualquier cosa. Esto ya no lo podía asimilar la crítica sino la filosofía (...) del arte, única capaz de un concepto del arte transhistórico y pluralista de por sí. Sin embargo, el pluralismo en el arte requiere también de la crítica. El artículo expone la diferencia entre filosofía del arte y crítica de arte, y para afrontar el reto del pluralismo, la diferencia entre crítica de arte libre y crítica dependiente del mundo del arte institucionalizado. Finalmente, el artículo aprovecha una alusión de Danto para asociar el espíritu del pluralismo en el arte y la política. (shrink)

This paper investigates Danto’s claims that the narrative of art is over. In this state, which Danto sees as ideal, art is free from any master narrative, and its direction cannot be predicted. The claim that art ought to remain in its current state—pluralistic, free and with no further historical development—is problematic. Danto is correct that late 20th c. art could not be explained through a single narrative, and the myriad forms art takes demonstrate its pluralism. But Danto’s claim that (...) freedom is the outcome of inexplicability, and progress is measured by amenability to narrative, does not follow. Based on Gombrich’s theory of pictorial representation, I provide an alternative explanation of Danto’s claim that art no longer manifests the narrative of the era of art, arguing that the shift in art’s preferred form of presentation, though no longer supporting narrative explanation, is developing as a language of disclosure. (shrink)

This essay takes Arthur Danto’s end-of-art thesis as a case in point of a substantive philosophy of history. Such philosophy explains the direction that art has taken and why that direction could not have been different. Danto never scrutinized the philosophy of history that his end-of-art thesis presumes. I aim to do that by drawing a distinction between what I refer to as the common view of history and the philosophical view of history, and by arguing that we need the (...) latter if we want to properly assess the plausibility of the end-of-art thesis. (shrink)