Speed, flexibility, negotiated control of outcomes, savings and absence of future enmity. Why lose all this in litigation when a new user‐friendly alternative is on the increase? The author is Chief Executive of the Centre for Dispute Resolution, 7 St. Katharine's Way, London E1 9LB, and Special Professor in ADR in the University of Birmingham, England.

Despite the importance of the Judgement of Paris in the story of the Trojan War, theIliadhas only one explicit reference to it. This occurs, rather out of the blue, in the final book of the poem in a dispute among the gods about the treatment of Hector's body (24.25–30). Achilles keeps dragging the body around behind his chariot, but Apollo protects it with his golden aegis (24.18–21). Apollo then speaks among the gods and attacks the conduct of Achilles (24.33–54), claiming (...) at the end that he offends the dumb earth (24.54). Other gods too have their concerns about what is going on, and they keep trying to get Hermes to snatch the body away (24.23–4). The three most powerful divine enemies of Troy, however, Hera, Poseidon and Athena, will have none of this. They remain as hostile to Troy and Priam and his people as they ever were, and it is in this context that the Judgement of Paris is mentioned:ἔνθ' ἄλλοις μὲν πᾶσιν ἑήνδανɛν, οὐδέ πoθ' Ἥρῃοὐδὲ Ποσɛιδάων' οὐδὲ γλαυκώπιδι κούρῃ,ἀλλ' ἔχον ὥς σϕιν πρῶτον ἀπήχθɛτο Ἴλιος ἱρὴκαὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς Ἀλɛξάνδρου ἕνɛκ' ἄτης,ὃς νɛίκɛσσɛ θɛάς, ὅτɛ οἱ μέσσαυλον ἵκοντο,τὴν δ' ᾔνησ' ἥ οἱ πόρɛ μαχλοσύνην ἀλɛγɛινήν.(24.25–30)And this was pleasing to all the others, but never to Heranor to Poseidon, nor to the flashing-eyed maiden,but they remained hostile to sacred Ilios as in the beginning,and to Priam and to his people, because of Alexander's folly,he who insulted the goddesses when they came to his inner courtyardand praised her who provided his grievous lust. (shrink)

This article is concerned with reminiscences of Homer in Thucydides' History. The principal aim is to raise questions as to what extent Thucydides' account of the Sicilian venture is a conscious response to some Homeric journey narratives. Such questions are worth asking because Thucydides refers to the Cyclopes and Laestrygonians at the beginning of his story . It will be argued that this reference is intended not solely for the sake of mythical history, but to broaden the context in which (...) Athenian actions can be seen. As well as this direct mythical allusion there are other Homeric reminiscences, including topographical features, that help to convey the notion that the expedition to Sicily is a kind of heroic quest into the unknown that goes disastrously wrong. It is a venture of epic proportions with heroic aspirations, but one whose consequences have a grim and immediate reality. In the light of these Homeric associations, it is argued that the expedition to Sicily is to be seen both in its recent historical context and in its mythological context. The Athenians not only fail to learn the lessons of their most glorious military moments, but they also make the mistake of treading on the same disastrous path as Homer's Odysseus. (shrink)

Speed, flexibility, negotiated control of outcomes, savings and absence of future enmity. Why lose all this in litigation when a new user‐friendly alternative is on the increase? The author is Chief Executive of the Centre for Dispute Resolution , 7 St. Katharine's Way, London E1 9LB, and Special Professor in ADR in the University of Birmingham, England.

The Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius deals with a band of heroes one generation before the great warriors at Troy, and the narrative does not really concern itself directly with the later generation. Some of the familiar heroes of Homer may never seem very far from Apollonius' narrative, but they tend not to appear in the poem themselves. One who does is Achilles, twice in fact: once in the first book and once in the last. Both of these passages deal with (...) his early life: the first when he is in the care of Chiron and his wife , the second when he is in the family home with Peleus and Thetis . In the former the gods of heaven and nymphs of Pelion are described as watching the departure of the Argo from Thessaly bound for Colchis. Chiron then comes down from Pelion and waves the heroes goodbye. His wife meanwhile holds Achilles on her arm and shows the child to his father Peleus as he departs with the Argonauts. The later passage describes the failed attempt of Thetis to make her son immortal. In this account Thetis addresses Peleus for the first time since their separation , and then vanishes into the depths of ocean. Their separation occurred some time earlier when she disappeared in anger after her failure to make the young Achilles immortal. She tried to do this by placing him in the fire during the night, and anointing him with ambrosia during the day :The attempt fails when Peleus happens to see his son's immersion in the flames, and gives out a terrible cry, whereupon Thetis throws the boy down, goes away herself, and does not return. (shrink)

In Book 6.88–94 of the Aeneid reference is made by the Cumaean Sibyl to the fact that there will be terrible wars on the Trojans' arrival at Lavinium. The details given by the Sibyl evoke the war at Troy; there will be a Simois, a Xanthus, and a Greek camp. Moreover, there will be another Achilles in Latium and the war will again be fought over a woman. Aeneas, when he hears this, has just arrived in Italy after the war (...) at Troy and a gruelling seven-year journey. The prophecy is therefore the last thing that he wants to hear, but he responds very stoically and then proceeds to ask the Sibyl's permission to enter the Underworld . Aeneas' filial pietas is therefore stressed by his determination to meet with his father's shade in the face of forthcoming adversity. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;The main part of the thesis concerns how things, in the sense of individuals, might have been. The topic is what limits there are on the counterfactual possibilities for individuals: in other words, what essential properties, if any, they have. ;In Chapters 3-6 three answers to this question that have been given in recent philosophical literature are examined. They are: that each thing has a unique individual essence ; (...) that there are features of the origin of an individual without which it could not possibly have existed ; and, finally, that there are sortal concepts that represent essential properties of the things that fall under them . ;All of these answers, and many of the arguments that have been given for them, are criticised. Sometimes the criticism takes the form of pointing to unpalatable consequences that result from the acceptance of the doctrine in question. Sometimes the criticism consists in pointing to difficulties or inadequacies in the arguments that have been presented in its favour. ;A preliminary chapter prepares the ground by setting out the conceptual framework, and the chief formal characteristics, of the essentialism discussed in the later chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the nature of necessary a posteriori truth, touching on questions in the philosophy of language and mind concerning the notion of de re thought. ;It is argued that essentialism about natural kinds raises problems of its own: some of these are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. Here the main topic is the connection between semantic theory and natural kind essentialism. Concluding that the essentialism should be regarded as in an important sense independent of semantic theory, the chapters add to, and also criticise, the work of other writers who have reached the same verdict. Scepticism is also expressed about the independent plausibility of natural kind essentialism. ;Recent interest in essentialism owes its genesis chiefly to the work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam: these figures stand in the background throughout the discussion. Among the other writers whose work is discussed are Baruch Brody, Gareth Evans, Graeme Forbes, Colin McGinn, J. L. Mackie, D. H. Mellor, Nathan Salmon, and David Wiggins. (shrink)

A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins' argument.

There is what might be called a ‘majority position’ in the history of Western philosophy according to which causes are sufficient for or ‘necessitate’ their effects. However, there is also a singificant ‘minority position’ according to which causes are necessary relative to their effects. The second/third century A.D. Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias is an ancient representative of the minority position. He attributes his own view — with some justification, I shall suggest – to Aristotle. This paper has two, somewhat loosely (...) connected purposes. The first is to explore the origin of the conception of ‘causes’ as necessary conditions in Aristotle, particularly in On Generation and Corruption 2.11 and Posterior Analytics 2.12, and the development and use of the conception in Alexander's De fato. The second purpose of the paper is to explore and criticize a sophisticated contemporary version of the conception of causes as ‘necessary in the circumstances,’ that of J.L. Mackie. (shrink)

There is what might be called a ‘majority position’ in the history of Western philosophy according to which causes are sufficient for or ‘necessitate’ their effects. However, there is also a singificant ‘minority position’ according to which causes are necessary relative to their effects. The second/third century A.D. Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias is an ancient representative of the minority position. He attributes his own view — with some justification, I shall suggest – to Aristotle. This paper has two, somewhat loosely (...) connected purposes. The first is to explore the origin of the conception of ‘causes’ as necessary conditions in Aristotle, particularly in On Generation and Corruption 2.11 and Posterior Analytics 2.12, and the development and use of the conception in Alexander's De fato. The second purpose of the paper is to explore and criticize a sophisticated contemporary version of the conception of causes as ‘necessary in the circumstances,’ that of J.L. Mackie. (shrink)

Recent epistemology has been notable for an emphasis, or a variety of emphases, upon the social dimension of knowledge. This has provided a corrective to the heavily individualist account of knowledge previously holding sway. It acknowledges the ways in which an individual is deeply indebted to the testimony of others for his or her cognitive endowments, both with respect to capacities and information. But the dominance of the individualist model was connected with a concern for the value of cognitive autonomy. (...) It is unclear how due recognition of the social dimension can allow for this value. It is argued here that there are ways of construing intellectual autonomy that not only can make it consistent with these new emphases but also respect its status as an epistemic concept. The author’s approach is contrasted with Alvin Goldman’s recent development of an approach to social knowledge via the idea of maximising truths. This seems to leave insufficient scope for intellectual character and autonomy. So concepts of independence, mastery, intellectual self-creation and intellectual integrity are explored in order to develop a perspective on cognitive autonomy adequate to the insights of social epistemology.Author Keywords: Autonomy; Testimony; Ideals; Epistemology; Mackie; Goldman. (shrink)

Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings is a comprehensive anthology that draws together leading philosophers writing on the major themes in Metaphysics. Chapters appear under the headings: Universals Particulars Modality and Possible Worlds Causation Time Persistence Realism and Anti-Realism Each section is prefaced by an introductory essay by the editor which guides students gently into each topic. Articles by the following leading philosophers are included: Allaire, Anscombe, Armstrong, Black, Broad, Casullo, Dummett, Ewing, Heller, Hume, Kripke, Lewis, Mackie, McTaggart, Mellor, Merricks , Parfit, Plantinga, (...) Price, Prior, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Smart, Swinburne, Taylor , Van Cleve, van Inwagen, Williams Featuring a new section on causation, this new edition is highly accessible and provides a broad-ranging exploration of the subject. Ideal for any philosophy student, this reader will prove essential reading for any metaphysics course. The sections and selections of readings have been updated to complement Michael Loux's textbook Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction , third edition. (shrink)

J. L. Mackie distinguished himself in twentieth-century philosophy by presenting an important objection to the traditional free will explanation for why God would allow evil: If evil is due to the free choice of creatures, why wouldn’t an omnipotent God simply create free creatures who would choose better? Alvin Plantinga, in turn, distinguished himself with his critique of Mackie. Plantinga’s main point is that Mackie made a mistake in assuming that it is within the power of omnipotence fully to create (...) just any possible world. However, Mackie made a second questionable assumption which Plantinga does not critique, and which I aim to clarify in this article. Mackie assumes that a God, as construed by classical theistic belief, who could create either of two people—one of whom would freely choose right and the other of whom would freely choose wrong—must create the one who would freely choose right. This assumption motivates Plantinga’s own account of trans-world depravity, which suggests that every free creature God might have created would have sinned had God created them. I consider Plantinga’s suggestion highly improbable. More importantly, under Mackie’s assumption, if there is at least one possible creature who would choose rightly, then there is no possibility of God ever allowing any other creature to sin, which would seem to be incompatible with their having any free will. -/- This version of the paper does have the same pagination as the published version. Permission has been granted from the Editor of Philosophia Christi to upload this contribution according to Philosophy Documentation Center terms of use. Learn more about the Journal by going to wwwepsociety. org/philchristi. (shrink)

A distinction is drawn between the "outcome", Or result of a certain exercise of power, And the "act", Or the manner in which that result is accomplished. Omnipotence is then defined solely in terms of its possible outcomes, And the definition used to dispel certain "paradoxes" recently discussed in articles by j l mackie, P t geach and r g swinburne, Among others. Finally, It is argued that god's inability to do certain things, Such as telling a lie or breaking (...) a promise, Is not incompatible with his omnipotence. (shrink)

McCloskey presents a powerful case for the view, already well argued in briefer form by Mackie, Flew, McCloskey, and others, that the existence of evil—any and particularly actual evil-is, if not logically, morally incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, all-good creator. While he promises to "take up the challenge" of certain theists who claim no logical contradiction is implied in the position God and evil exist, aside from a few ad hominem arguments directed Plantinga’s way he seems finally (...) to concede their point. The early chapters are of a preliminary nature and aim at defining traditional and parallel forms of the problem of evil, describing the enormity of actual evil, and establishing, by way of assessing particular ethical and linguistic theories, the presuppositions required for the problem to appear as a real one. It is in the later chapters, however, that the author makes his case. Here he considers and rejects for numerous reasons the view that physical evil, pain and suffering, can be justified by the virtuous and other goods they make possible, and the view that they are justified theologically, as punishment for sin. The former view implies an ethic, unacceptable to McCloskey, in which evil befalling a person can be willed or approved as a means. The latter view fails in the case of undeserved suffering, e.g., animals and undeserving children. (shrink)

This article examines Leibniz's philosophy of causation with the aim of clarifying how causes are related to their effects. I argue that, much like J. L. Mackie's INUS conditions, Leibnizian causes are members of complex causal conditions. More precisely, Leibniz identifies causes with elements of complex causal conditions, where the complex condition as a whole is sufficient for the effect, and the cause is a necessary part of that condition. This conception of causation is able to incorporate Leibniz's many other (...) definitions of ‘cause’, thereby resolving what appear to be internal inconsistencies in his philosophy of science. Introduction The ingredients of causation Causes and conditions Causes as INUS conditions Conclusion. (shrink)

Morality, as commonly conceived, is a delusion; it is, however, indispensable for the flourishing both of society and of individuals. These are the main theses, one concerning the status, the other the content of morality,, of J. L. Mackie’s Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong. In part 1, with much fresh, useful, if subsidiary discussion of more standard meta-ethical fare—meanings of normative terms and analysis of moral argument—Mackie argues that the morality of the plain man is not, what it is commonly (...) taken to be, revelatory of a realm of objective values. Such values, he contends, making no secret of his empiricism, are ontologically too queer to exist, epistemologically too alien to be known. Nor are they needed to account for the specious objectivity of common sense morality, for there are "patterns of objectification" which, with less philosophical extravagance, can explain how an agent’s subjective attitudes become objectified. Although Mackie does think that one’s moral principles are prescriptive, universal, and, in some sense, chosen, his skepticism is not the fruit of linguistic analysis. On the contrary. "[O]rdinary moral judgments include a claim to objectivity.... Any analysis of the meanings of moral terms which omits this claim to objective, intrinsic, prescriptivity is to that extent incomplete; and this is true of any non-cognitive analysis, any naturalist one, and any combination of the two". (shrink)

Experience and reason, it has been claimed, provide the bases of religious belief. The first and fourth groups of selections in Mr. Yandell’s collection of readings probe this claim. In these sections, as in the two intervening ones primary sources are followed by critical analyses and appraisals. Thus, when religious experience is being considered selections from the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita, Buddhist scriptures, and the Old and New Testaments are followed by commentaries drawn from writers such as William James, Rudolf (...) Otto, and John Baillie. Generally, primary materials are selected from "traditional" thinkers, while analyses are drawn from more contemporary ones. For example, the problem of evil is set by Hume, Leibniz, and Kant, and discussed by J. L. Mackie, Alvin Plantinga, and Dewey Hoitenga. Those authors who are included are readable, and the readings mesh well. (shrink)

This is a welcome addition to the scant literature in English on the life of the great seventeenth-century German philosopher and polymath, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. No full-scale biography of Leibniz has appeared in English since John Milton Mackie devised a condensation of G. E. Guhrauer’s still standard work in 1845. Some material from unpublished papers was incorporated into J. T. Merz’s account. Since then virtually nothing has been attempted in this area of Leibniz scholarship, in spite of the fact that (...) much important work has been done, especially in German, culminating in the fine Leben und Werk von. G. W. Leibniz by Kurt Müller and Gisela Krönert. If for no other reason than the dearth of English treatments of the subject, Mr. Aiton’s biography would be a significant contribution. (shrink)

This is a welcome addition to the scant literature in English on the life of the great seventeenth-century German philosopher and polymath, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. No full-scale biography of Leibniz has appeared in English since John Milton Mackie devised a condensation of G. E. Guhrauer’s still standard work in 1845. Some material from unpublished papers was incorporated into J. T. Merz’s account. Since then virtually nothing has been attempted in this area of Leibniz scholarship, in spite of the fact that (...) much important work has been done, especially in German, culminating in the fine Leben und Werk von. G. W. Leibniz by Kurt Müller and Gisela Krönert. If for no other reason than the dearth of English treatments of the subject, Mr. Aiton’s biography would be a significant contribution. (shrink)