Related categories
Siblings:
24 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.
    The first part of this paper presents an argument showing that the currently most highly acclaimed interventionist theory of causation, i.e. the one advanced by Woodward, excludes supervening macro properties from having a causal influence on effects of their micro supervenience bases. Moreover, this interventionist exclusion argument is demonstrated to rest on weaker premises than classical exclusion arguments. The second part then discusses a weakening of interventionism that Woodward suggests. This weakened version of interventionism turns out either to be inapplicable (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Michael Baumgartner (2008). Regularity Theories Reassessed. Philosophia 36 (3):327-354.
    For a long time, regularity accounts of causation have virtually vanished from the scene. Problems encountered within other theoretical frameworks have recently induced authors working on causation, laws of nature, or methodologies of causal reasoning – as e.g. May (Kausales Schliessen. Eine Untersuchung über kausale Erklärungen und Theorienbildung. Ph.D. thesis, Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, 1999), Ragin (Fuzzy-set social science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), Graßhoff and May (Causal regularities. In W. Spohn, M. Ledwig, & M. Esfeld (Eds.), Current issues in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Helen Beebee (2006). Does Anything Hold the Universe Together? Synthese 149 (3):509-533.
    According to ‘regularity theories’ of causation, the obtaining of causal relations depends on no more than the obtaining of certain kinds of regularity. Regularity theorists are thus anti-realists about necessary connections in nature. Regularity theories of one form or another have constituted the dominant view in analytic Philosophy for a long time, but have recently come in for some robust criticism, notably from Galen Strawson. Strawson’s criticisms are natural criticisms to make, but have not so far provoked much response from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. David Braddon-Mitchell (1993). The Microstructural Causation Hypothesis. Erkenntnis 39 (2):257 - 283.
    I argue against a priori objections to the view that causation may be reducible to some micro-structural process in principle discoverable by physics. I distinguish explanation from causation, and argue that the main objections to such a reduction stem from conflating these two notions. Explanation is the collection of pragmatically relevant, possibly counterfactual information about causation; and causation is to be identified in a necessary a posteriori way with whatever physical processes underwrite our explanatory claims.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. John Carroll, Chapter 13 Anti-Reductionism.
    showing what makes causal facts both true and accessible enough for us to have the knowledge of them that we ordinarily take ourselves to have. Some current approaches to analyzing causation were once resisted. First, analyses that use the counterfactual conditional were viewed with suspicion because philosophers also sought (and still do seek) similar understanding of counterfactual facts. Since the same can be said for the other nomic concepts--causation, lawhood, explanation, chance, dispositions, and their conceptual kin--philosophy demonstrated a preference for (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Luke Glynn (2013). Causal Foundationalism, Physical Causation, and Difference-Making. Synthese 190 (6):1017-1037.
    An influential tradition in the philosophy of causation has it that all token causal facts are, or are reducible to, facts about difference-making. Challenges to this tradition have typically focused on pre-emption cases, in which a cause apparently fails to make a difference to its effect. However, a novel challenge to the difference-making approach has recently been issued by Alyssa Ney. Ney defends causal foundationalism, which she characterizes as the thesis that facts about difference-making depend upon facts about physical causation. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Christian Jakob (2006). Hitchcock's (2001) Treatment of Singular and General Causation. Minds and Machines 16 (3):277-287.
    Hitchcock (2001a) argues that the distinction between singular and general causation conflates the two distinctions ‘actual causation vs. causal tendencies’ and ‘wide vs. narrow causation’. Based on a recent regularity account of causation I will show that Hitchcock’s introduction of the two distinctions is an unnecessary multiplication of causal concepts.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Henry W. Johnstone Jr (1956). Hume's Arguments Concerning Causal Necessity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (3):331-340.
    An analysis of effectiveness of some of hume's arguments in a framework developed by the author. The author states his position that arguments attacking positions attempt to show that, Given the assumptions of a position, Certain consequences are incompatible with it--A valid species of "argumentum ad hominem". Although this species does not work for constructive philosophical "proofs," it will work inversely in arguments (defending such proofs) which cite possible objections. These charge "petitio": the objection assumes what the position denies or (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Douglas Kutach (2013). Causation and Its Basis in Fundamental Physics. Oxford University Press.
    I provide a comprehensive metaphysics of causation based on the idea that fundamentally things are governed by the laws of physics, and that derivatively difference-making can be assessed in terms of what fundamental laws of physics imply for hypothesized events. Highlights include a general philosophical methodology, the fundamental/derivative distinction, and my mature account of causal asymmetry.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Kris McDaniel (2002). Phil Dowe, Physical Causation. Erkenntnis 56 (2):258-263.
  11. Peter Menzies (1999). Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Conceptions of Causation. In H. Sankey (ed.), Laws and Causation: Australasian Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Kluwer. 313-329.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Peter Menzies (1988). Against Causal Reductionism. Mind 97 (388):551-574.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Eugene Mills (2003). An Epistemic Reductio of Causal Reductionism. Topoi 22 (2):151-161.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Alyssa Ney (2009). Physical Causation and Difference-Making. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):737-764.
    This paper examines the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making. It is plausible to think that such theories are compatible with one another as they are aimed at different targets: the former, an empirical account of actual causal relations; the latter, an account that will capture the truth of most of our ordinary causal claims. The question then becomes: what is the relationship between physical causation and difference-making? Is one kind of causal fact more fundamental than (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Arthur Pap (1952). Philosophical Analysis, Translation Schemas, and the Regularity Theory of Causation. Journal of Philosophy 49 (21):657-666.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Stathis Psillos, The Next Best Thing: Causation and Regularity.
    In this paper I articulate RVC with an eye to two things: first, its conceptual development; second, its basic commitments and implications for what causation is. I have chosen to present RVC in a way that respects its historical origins and unravels the steps of its articulation in the face of objections and criticism. It is important for the explication and defence of RVC to see it as a view of causation that emerged in a certain intellectual milieu. RVC has (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Chris Ranalli (2013). Skepticism, Invulnerability, and Epistemological Dissatisfaction. In C. Illies & C. Schaefer (eds.), Metaphysics or Modernity? Bamberg University Press. 113-148.
    How should we understand the relationship between the contents of our color, causal, modal, and evaluative beliefs, on the one hand, and color, causal, modal, and evaluative properties, on the other? According to Barry Stroud (2011), because of the nature of the contents of those types of beliefs, we should also think that what he calls a “negative metaphysical verdict” on the latter is not one that we could consistently maintain. The metaphysical project aims to arrive at an improved conception (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Causation and Laws of Nature : Reductionism. In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub.. 82-107.
    Causation and the laws of nature are nothing over and above the pattern of events, just like a movie is nothing over and above the sequence of frames. Or so I will argue. The position I will argue for is broadly inspired by Hume and Lewis, and may be expressed in the slogan: what must be, must be grounded in what is.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Counterfactuals, Causal Independence and Conceptual Circularity. Analysis 64 (4):299–308.
    David Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals remains the standard view. Yet counter-examples have emerged, which suggest a need to invoke causal independence, and thus threaten conceptual circularity. I will review some of these counter-examples (§§1–2), illustrate how causal independence proves useful (§3), and suggest that any resulting circularity is unproblematic (§4).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Aaron Segal (forthcoming). Half-Hearted Humeanism. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
    Many contemporary philosophers endorse the Humean-Lewisian Denial of Absolutely Necessary Connections (‘DANC’). Among those philosophers, many deny all or part of the Humean-Lewisian package of views about causation and laws. I argue that they maintain an inconsistent set of views. DANC entails that (1) causal properties and relations are, with a few possible exceptions, always extrinsic to their bearers, (2) nomic properties and relations are, with a few possible exceptions, always extrinsic to their bearers, and (3) causal and nomic properties (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Wolfgang Spohn (2006). Causation: An Alternative. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):93-119.
    The paper builds on the basically Humean idea that A is a cause of B iff A and B both occur, A precedes B, and A raises the metaphysical or epistemic status of B given the obtaining circumstances. It argues that in pursuit of a theory of deterministic causation this ‘status raising’ is best explicated not in regularity or counterfactual terms, but in terms of ranking functions. On this basis, it constructs a rigorous theory of deterministic causation that successfully deals (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Galen Strawson (2013). 'On "Humean&Quot;'. In https://www.academia.edu/. 1–6.
    In metaphysics, the adjective ‘Humean’ is standardly used to describe positions that deny the existence of any necessary connection or causal influence in concrete reality. This usage has been significantly reinforced by David Lewis’s employment of ‘Humean’ in the phrase ‘Humean supervenience’. It is, however, most unclear that this usage is appropriate, and Lewis himself raised a doubt about it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Mariam Thalos (2002). The Reduction of Causal Processes. Synthese 131 (1):99 - 128.
    The principle that causes always render their effects more likely is fundamental to the enterprise of reducing facts of causation to facts about (objective) chances. This reductionist enterprise faces famous difficulties in accommodating common-sense intuitions about causal processes, if it insists on cashing out causal processes in terms of streams of events in which every event that belongs to the stream is a cause of the adjoining event downstream of it. I shall propose modifications to this way of cashing out (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Resemblance-Based Resources for Reductive Singularism. The Monist 92 (1):153-190.
    Hume argued that experience could not justify commonly held beliefs in singular causal effcacy, according to which individual or singular causes produce their effects or make their effects happen. Hume's discussion has been influential, as motivating the view that Causal reductionism (denying that causal efficacy is an irreducible feature of natural reality) requires Causal generalism (according to which causal relations are metaphysically constituted by patterns of events). Here I argue that causal reductionists---indeed, Hume himself---have previously unappreciated resources for making sense (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation