L’Ancien et le Nouveau Testament associent constamment création et salut, deux notions que notre culture tend à séparer et que la théologie contemporaine voudrait réconcilier. Mais nos représentations du monde nous invitent à laisser aux sciences de l’univers le soin de parler de ses origines et il nous est devenu très difficile aujourd’hui de parler de l’acte créateur dans le registre de la « toute-puissance », concept ressenti comme contraire à l’autonomie humaine , à la révélation de la Croix , (...) à la bonté de Dieu . Comment donc penser Dieu en tant que créateur ?L’événement de la mort et de la résurrection de Jésus révèle Dieu, en tant que partie prenante de cet événement, comme celui qui, depuis la fondation du monde, appelle un être du monde à devenir homme à sa ressemblance par la conquête de la liberté pour revêtir l’immortalité dans le Christ. Dieu crée l’être humain en s’effaçant devant lui pour le laisser advenir à sa liberté. Il est montré du même coup, non pas que le monde a commencé à exister dans le temps, mais que Dieu est de toute éternité, selon son être trinitaire, en relation d’amour avec le monde, appelé à être récapitulé dans le Premier-né de la création. Par ce lien, tissé dans l’histoire, le monde est établi partenaire de notre destinée, et l’homme, solidaire et responsable du destin du monde.The Old and New Testament constantly join creation and salvation, two notions that our culture tends to separate and that contemporaneous theology would like to reconcile. But our representations of the world invite us to leave to the sciences of the universe the care to speak of its origins and it has become very difficult for us today to speak of the creative act in the register of the “almighty”, a concept felt as contrary to human autonomy , to the revelation of the Cross , or to the goodness of God . How, then, can we think God as the creator ?The event of the death and resurrection of Jesus reveals God, as an actor in the event, as He who, since the foundation of the world, calls a being of the world to become man in His likeness, by the conquest of freedom in order to put on immortality in Christ. God creates the human being by yielding preference to him and letting him arrive at his freedom. It is shown at the same time, not that the world began to exist in time, but that God is from all eternity, according to His Trinitarian being, in a relation of love with the world, called to be recapitulated in the First-born of creation. By this bond, woven in history, the world is established as a partner of our destiny, and man, as responsible for the destiny of the world. (shrink)

A partir d'une problématique qui fait droit à la distinction entre historique et historicité, l'article de J. Moingt pose la question : en quoi la théologie s'intéresse-t-elle au Jésus de l'histoire ? à quoi il répond d'emblée : le théologien, en tant que discours sur Dieu et ouverture à la révélation et au salut pris globalement, s'intéresse de façon inéluctable au Jésus de l'histoire en tant que l'identité du Dieu des chrétiens est déterminée par son rapport d'identification à un (...) personnage historique, Jésus de Nazareth. Proposant d'abord un parcours du symbole de foi pour vérifier cet intérêt de la foi pour l'histoire, il propose une approche théologique du Jésus de l'histoire par le retour à la question de Dieu aujourd'hui, rejoignant la question fondamentale qui est la question du sens.Starting from a problematical issue that admits the distinction between historical and historicity, the article of J. Moingt asks the question : in what way is theology interested in the Jesus of history ? to which he answers immediately : the theologian - as regards the discourse on God and openness to revelation and salvation taken globally - is interested ineluctably in the Jesus of history as the identity of the God of Christians and is determined by its relationship of identification to a historical personage, Jesus of Nazareth. Proposing, first of all, a run through the symbol of faith to verify the interest of the faith for history, he proposes a theological approach to the Jesus of history by returning to the question of God today, rejoining the fundamental question, which is the question of meaning. (shrink)

L'eschatologie a marqué la théologie chrétienne du XXe siècle. Initiateur en ce domaine, R. Bultmann entreprend une herméneutique « existentiale » et « démythologisante » de la prédication apocalyptique de Jésus, mise en lumière par J. Weiss et A. Schweitzer : en Jésus Dieu prononce la parole définitive qui m'appelle aujourd'hui à la décision de foi et à l'existence authentique. La théologie apprend ainsi à parler de Dieu avec sens en parlant de l'homme. Avec J. Moltmann, le futur est désenclavé (...) du présent où le laissait Bultmann, et l'eschatologie se fait résolument christologique en même temps qu'historique ; mais le passage de la Théologie de l’espérance au Dieu crucifié pose le problème redoutable du lien entre l’horizon de l’espérance et l'histoire abandonnée à la souffrance. Pour J. Moingt, la résurrection, fondement de la christologie, permet de relire la vie de Jésus comme l’histoire de Dieu menant avec les hommes depuis la création le combat eschatologique de la vie contre la mort.La pensée eschatologique s’élabore aussi dans la ligne des théologiens de l'histoire. O. Cullmann fait du Christ le centre de l’histoire du salut, entre un « déjà là » et un « pas encore ». Avec plus d’ambition mais aussi d’ambiguïté, W. Pannenberg situe la résurrection de Jésus, en tant qu’événement historique, au regard de l'histoire universelle dont elle anticipe la fin. La pensée eschatologique ne laisse pas de travailler également d’autres théologies, davantage marquées par les problématiques traditionnelles.Twentieth century Christian theology has been marked by eschatology. R. Bultmann, initiator in this field, underlook an “existential” and “demythologising” hermeneutic of the apocalyptic preaching of Jesus, which had been brought. to light by J. Weiss and A. Schweitzer : in Jesus God pronounces the definitive word that calls me to a decision of faith and authentic existence today. Theology thus learns to speak of God with meaning by speaking of man. With J. Moltmann, the future is freed from present, where Bultmann had left it, and eschatology became resolutely Christological at the same time as historical. But the passage from the Theology of Hope to the Crucified God poses the difficult problem of the connection between the horizon of hope and history left to suffering. For J. Moingt, the resurrection, foundation of Christology, permits a rereading of the life of Jesus as the history of God, who, from the time of creation, leads humanity in the eschatological combat of life against death.Eschatological thought also develops in the direction of theologies of history. O. Cullmann makes Christ the center of the history of salvation, between an “already here” and a “not yet”. With greater ambition but also ambiguity, W Pannenberg places the resurrection of Jesus as a historical event, in comparison with universal history, of which it anticipates the end. Eschatological thought does not fail to also influence others theologies, more marked by traditional problematics. (shrink)

Jean-Pol Gallez | : L’humanisme chrétien bénéficie d’une longue tradition de pensée incarnée par de nombreuses figures. Au xxe siècle, il a fait l’objet de travaux essentiellement historiques. Mais cette tradition n’a pas vraiment été visitée par la théologie fondamentale. L’humanisme chrétien se trouve donc en manque de conceptualisation théologique. À travers l’importance accordée au concept d’« humanisme évangélique » dans Dieu qui vient à l’homme, J. Moingt ouvre incontestablement une voie théologique en cette direction et établit, à notre (...) sens, un lien tangible et précieux entre l’histoire de la révélation trinitaire et l’humanisme chrétien. Sans oublier le cas de l’humanisme séculier, le présent article entend éclaircir ce rapport dans la théologie de l’auteur et situer quelques enjeux qu’il soulève à l’horizon du monde sécularisé. | : Christian humanism has a long tradition embodied by many figures. In the twentieth century it has been approached mainly through a historical perspective. But this tradition has not really been studied by fundamental theology. Christian humanism is therefore in lack of theological conceptualization. Due to the importance granted by J. Moingt to the concept of “evangelical humanism” in Dieu qui vient à l’homme, we think that the author is paving the way to a theological approach of Christian humanism and establishes a tangible and valuable link between the history of the Trinitarian revelation and Christian humanism. Taking into account the case of secular humanism the present article seeks to clarify this ratio inside the author’s theology and to raise some of the issues it implies on the horizon of the secularized world. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is the (...) plan. After some ground clearing in §1, §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—moderate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the inverse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity. With reference to recent work on moral understanding by Hills, §5 proposes a solution to the problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have been led to draw the wrong conclusion. (shrink)

Protagoras, of all the ancient philosophers, has perhaps attracted the most interest in modern times. His saying ‘Man is the measure of all things’ caused Schiller to adopt him as the patron of the Oxford pragmatists, and has generally earned him the title of the first humanist. Yet the exact delineation of his philosophcal position remains a baffling task. Neumann, writing on Die Problematik des ‘Homo-mensura’ Satzes in 1938,2 concludes that no certainty whatever can be reached on the meaning of (...) the dictum, since ‘man’, ‘measure’, and ‘things’ are all ambiguous, nor can we tell which of the three is the predicate. The time is past when it was believed that a man's philosophy could be understood apart from the events of his life and the circumstances of his age: yet in the case of Protagoras the historical method of approach has hardly been attempted, although the impact of environment was perhaps more decisive in the formation of philosophical concepts in the Greek world than anywhere else. The reality about which the Greek philosopher spoke had three aspects: it was either the one universe of physics, or the political unity, or God. For example, the book of Heracleitus Περ φσεως was divided into three chapters or logoi, About the Whole, a political, and a theological. Neither physics nor theology supplies from its own subject-matter the form in which this reality was described. (shrink)

The achievements of the textile industry in Roman Britain are often underestimated as a result of the meagreness of our available evidence. The Edict on maximum prices issued by Diocletian in A.D. 301 shows that British capes commanded high prices on the markets of the Empire, and that in the late third century A.D. British rugs were the best in the world. In view of the competition from the traditional centres of rug manufacture in the East, this is an astonishing (...) achievement. (shrink)

The received translation and interpretation of many of the technical terms current in the textile industry of the Roman Empire are inaccurate, because lexicographers have either fought shy of being precise, or have thought that they recognized in the ancient world technical processes which originated at a much later date. The evidence is often equivocal or insufficient, but may still yield details that have been overlooked. The textile expression scutulatus, to take an example, deserves more attention than Blümner has devoted (...) to it. When it refers to the appearance of a garment, Lewis and Short, s.v. scutulatus, translate ‘diamond or lozenge-shaped, checkered’. It seems worth while to attempt a more precise translation, and, if possible, to estimate the significance in context of the goods so designated. (shrink)

If the world itself is metaphysically indeterminate in a specified respect, what follows? In this paper, we develop a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy answering this question.

The year 2010 marks the one-hundredth anniversary of the Recherches de Science Religieuse and provides an opportunity for the journal to explore its past, present, and prospects for the twenty-first century. In order to celebrate the event, this special commemorative issue calls upon authors from many different fields. "Commemoration" involves not only examining the past, however rich it may be, but also taking up the challenge of analyzing the present and reflecting upon the future. In the first section, diverse approaches (...) -- theological, sociological or historical -- are applied to an in-depth diagnosis of the present. The second part is dedicated to memory: the founding years during the modernist crisis and the major stages in the development of the journal under various directors until today, among them, Henri de Lubac and Joseph Moingt. Finally, this special issue is rounded off by a series of broad perspectives tracing out paths for the future of the disciplines at the heart of theology and religious science today, thus remaining faithful to the journal's original mission of "research in movement". (shrink)

In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in such (...) a way that it will fit in the modern biology and psychology, which are becoming increasingly physicalistic. (shrink)

Living out of silence, out of a fully functioning, lovingly attentive mind, and not just out of thought, out of a partially functioning mind, is requisite for depth or profundity in living or relating. A fully attentive, truly silent or meditative mind sees that there is real dualism of time and the timeless and that time and the timeless each has its own unique value. The timeless, or real silence, that which alone can make for depth in one's living and (...) relating, can be there only when, in one's awareness, time and all that is related to time, have come to an end. An examination of a wide variety of statements made by writers, both past and present, shows that these understandings are seldom there in contemporary writings, just as they were not there in writings that have come down to us from the past. 'Living beyond the One and the Many' invites readers to consider the possibility that what is presented in it can bring deep meaning to one's way of living in the world"--Publisher's description, back cover. (shrink)

Telling a patient that the outcome of his illness is not good, or even hopeless, requires sensitivity and the ability to communicate with him in the setting of a hospital which is an unnatural environment divorced from family and friends. It is a task which must be taught and learned by doctors and nurses.

Husserlian phenomenology, as the study of conscious experience, has often been accused of solipsism. Husserl’s method, it is argued, does not have the resources to provide an account of consciousness of other minds. This chapter will address this issue by providing a brief overview of the multiple angles from which Husserl approached the theme of intersubjectivity, with specific focus on the details of his account of the concrete interpersonal encounter – “empathy.” Husserl understood empathy as a direct, quasi-perceptual form of (...) intentionality through which the sense of the Other is constituted. Furthermore, his account of empathy is holistically integrated with his overall theory of intersubjectivity, including his discussions of the objectivity of nature, and the social, historical, and communal aspects of subjectivity. Husserl’s theory of empathy continues to cast a long shadow, influencing both the analytic and continental approaches to the problem of other minds, as well as contemporary account of social cognition in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

An Essay on Human Action seeks to provide a comprehensive, detailed, enlightening, and (in its detail) original account of human action. This account presupposes a theory of events as abstract, proposition-like entities, a theory which is given in the first chapter of the book. The core-issues of action-theory are then treated: what acting in general is (a version of the traditional volitional theory is proposed and defended); how actions are to be individuated; how long actions last; what acting intentionally is; (...) what doing one thing by doing another is; what basic action is; and what omitting to do something is. Attention is also given to the concepts of causation, intention, volition, deciding, choosing, and trying. Finally, a libertarian account of free action is tentatively proposed and defended. (shrink)

The existential analysis -- The death of dasein -- The timeliness of dasein -- The derivation of time -- The time of being.

Invité à relire son itinéraire d’écriture, l’auteur de L’homme qui venait de Dieu et de Dieu qui vient à l’homme l’inscrit dans la perspective d’une nouvelle manière de faire de la théologie, marquée par la recherche d’une méthode d’interprétation théologique de l’Écriture destinée à combler la distance entre dogmatique et exégèse, et la recherche d’une énonciation de la foi au sein d’une culture où Dieu est absent. Son oeuvre, qui a pris la forme du grand récit de la révélation de (...) Dieu, est orientée vers la «fin» de la théologie comprise comme menace de son extinction, quête de sa finalité essentielle, et surtout visée du terme de l’histoire où «Dieu sera tout en tous». Libérée des ornières du religieux par la singularité de Jésus Christ, la théologie assume selon l’auteur la responsabilité d’un penser et d’un croire dignes de l’humain. (shrink)

Notre époque de culture sans Dieu, celle du « discours sur la mort de Dieu », provoque la théologie à se concentrer sur la Croix du Christ pour y reconnaître le lieu même de la révélation de Dieu et fonder du même coup le vrai sens de la « mort de Dieu ». Si l’athéisme est né de l’impuissance de la pensée moderne à concevoir la nécessité de Dieu , la théologie de la Croix en apporte la justification ; car (...) la connaissance naturelle de Dieu ne peut se réclamer d’aucune nécessité rationnelle, quand la révélation de Dieu sur la Croix — scandale pour la raison — échappe à toute évidence externe et fait savoir que l’existence de Dieu n’a pas de fondement dans ce monde.La gratuité est donc caractéristique de cette révélation, la marque de son humilité. L’événement de la Croix est l’avènement historique de la liberté de l’homme face à Dieu, liberté de croire et de ne pas croire, d’exister avec Dieu ou sans Dieu. Cette liberté est le don même de la foi et le salut offet à tous ceux qui vivent selon la gratuité de l’amour. En révélant que Dieu est amour, la Croix proclame que la gratuité est son être en soi et pour soi en même temps que son être « pour nous », à la fois existence trinitaire et relation à la créature.Our era of a culture without God, that of “discourse on the death of God”, provokes theology to concentrate on the Cross of Christ in order to recognize the center of God’s revelation and to establish, at the same time, the true sense of the “death of God”. If atheism is born of the weakness of modern thought to conceive the necessity of God , the theology of the Cross brings justification to it. For the natural knowledge of God can not claim for itself any rational necessity, when the revelation of God on the Cross — a scandal to reason — escapes all external evidence and shows that the existence of God has no foundation in this world.Gratuitousness, then, is characteristic of this revelation, the mark of its humility. The event of the Cross is the historical coming of mankind’s freedom before God, freedom to believe or not to believe, to exist with God or without God. This freedom is the very gift of faith and salvation offered to all those who live according to the gratuitousness of love. In revealing that God is love, the Cross proclaims that gratuitousness is his being in itself and for itself at the same time as his being “for us”. It is both Trinitarian existence and relation to the creature. (shrink)

L’article s’ouvre par une interrogation sur le fait paradoxal que la stabilité de l’Église puisse être menacée par sa sacramentalité, qu’une ordination reçue hors d’elle et malgré elle puisse servir à la démembrer et à la désunir sans qu’elle puisse s’y opposer sous peine de désavouer ses propres sacrements. Un regard à la fois méticuleux et concis est alors porté sur une tradition embrouillée, celle concernant la question de la validité des ordinations hérétiques et schismatiques, pour montrer qu’une longue tradition (...) autorise à raisonner dans un sens qui conclurait à l’invalidité des ordinations conférées en dehors de l’Église et pour plaider en faveur d’une prise en compte plus résolue, s’agissant de la validité des sacrements, du point de vue, non du ministre, mais des sujets au profit de qui ils sont administrés.The article begins by examining the paradoxical fact that the stability of the Church can be threatened by its sacramentality, that an ordination outside and in spite of the Church can work to divide and disunite the Church without it being able to oppose this effect unless it disavows its own sacraments. Then, a meticulous and concise examination is undertaken of a confusing tradition - that which deals with the question of the validity of heretical and schismatic ordinations - in order to show that a long tradition enables us to reason in a way that would define ordinations conferred outside the Church as invalid and would plead in favor of a more resolute consideration of the validity of sacraments, from the standpoint, not of the ministry, but of the subjects who are supposed to benefit from the sacraments. (shrink)