Ssu-ma Ch'ien's hih chi is one of the most influential of Chinese histories, but its organization reflects a historiography quite different from that of traditional Western history. Ssu-ma divided his account of the past into five overlapping sections: basic annals , chronological tables, treatises, hereditary houses , and biographies. One result of this fragmented arrangement is that stories may be told more than once, from different perspectives, and these accounts may not be entirely consistent. From a Western perspective this would (...) seem to indicate a certain disregard for the truth, but in many hih chi passages Ssu-ma Ch'ien demonstrates a passionate concern for accuracy.In this article I examine in detail one typical set of multiple narrations--the five versions of Wei Pao's defection in c. 205 B.C.--and argue that in some ways Ssu-ma's conflicting accounts reflect the past more accurately than the unified narrative we expect from Western histories. Although Ssu-ma's methods might seem amenable to the constructivist theories of Louis Mink and Hayden White, in the end this type of analysis is inadequate to explain a work which is rooted in a non-Western tradition of historiography. Ssu-ma Ch'ien's own conception of history recognized the limitations of historians and evidence, held out the possibility of multiple interpretations, and focused on moral insight. It is a mix unfamiliar to Westerners, but it does provide a coherent picture of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's historical methodology, and it may serve as an interesting example for modern historians who seek to escape traditional modes of historical writing. (shrink)

Disc 1. Life's great questions: Asian perspectives ; The Vedas and Upanishads: the beginning -- Disc 2. Mahavira and Jainism: extreme nonviolence ; The Buddha: the middle way -- Disc 3. The Bhagavad Gita: the way of action ; Confucius: in praise of sage-kings -- Disc 4. Laozi and Daoism: the way of nature ; The Hundred Schools of preimperial China -- Disc 5. Mencius and Xunzi: Confucius's successors ; Sunzi and Han Feizi: strategy and legalism -- Disc 6. Zarathustra (...) and Mani: dualistic religion ; Kautilya and Ashoka: Buddhism and empire -- Disc 7. Ishvarakrishna and Patanjali: Yoga ; Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu: Buddhist theories -- Disc 8. Sima Qian and Ban Zhao: history and women ; Dong Zhongshu and Ge Hong: eclecticism -- Disc 9. Xuanzang and Chinese Buddhism ; Prince Shotoku, Lady Murasaki, Sei Shonagon -- Disc 10. Saicho to Nichiren: Japanese Buddhism ; Shankara, Ramanuja, Madhva: Hindu Vedanta -- Disc 11. Al-Biruni: Islam in India ; Nanak and Sirhindi: Sikhism and Sufism -- Disc 12. Han Yu to Zhu Xi: Neo-Confucianism ; Wang Yangming: The study of heart-mind -- Disc 13. Dogen and Hakuin: Zen Buddhism ; Zeami and Sen no Rikyu: Japanese aesthetics -- Disc 14. Wonhyo to King Sejong: Korean philosophy ; Padmasambhava to Tsongkhapa: Tibetan ideas -- Disc 15. Science and technology in premodern Asia ; Muhammad Iqbal and Rabindranath Tagore -- Disc 16. Mohandas Gandhi: Satyagraha, or soul-force ; Fukuzawa Yukichi and Han Yongun -- Disc 17. Kang Youwei and Hu Shi ; Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong -- Disc 18. Modern legacies ; East and West. (shrink)

During the 1930s and 1940s, American physical organic chemists employed electronic theories of reaction mechanisms to construct models offering explanations of organic reactions. But two molecular rearrangements presented enormous challenges to model construction. The Claisen and Cope rearrangements were predominantly inaccessible to experimental investigation and they confounded explanation in theoretical terms. Drawing on the idea that models can be autonomous agents in the production of scientific knowledge, I argue that one group of models in particular were functionally autonomous from the (...) Hughes–Ingold theory. Cope and Hardy’s models of the Claisen and Cope rearrangements were resources for the exploration of the Hughes–Ingold theory that otherwise lacked explanatory power. By generating ‘how-possibly’ explanations, these models explained how these rearrangements could happen rather than why they did happen. Furthermore, although these models were apparently closely connected to theory in terms of their construction, I argue that partial autonomy issued in extra-logical factors concerning the attitudes of American chemists to the Hughes–Ingold theory. And in the absence of a complete theoretical hegemony, a degree of consensus was reached concerning modelling the Claisen rearrangement mechanism.Keywords: Models; Explanation; Physical organic chemistry; Rearrangements. (shrink)

The issue of public health ethics has received much attention in recent years and is seen as a new field, distinct from medical ethics. Faculty from the University of Virginia, Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, Georgetown University, the University of Minnesota, and others received a grant from the Greenwall Foundation to examine this new field of public health ethics and identify the unique principles that distinguish it from the study of medical ethics. In the course of that study, (...) which included exploring the field with public health practitioners, a number of distinguishing ethical principles emerged. The moral principles appropriate for public health officials included producing benefits; avoiding, preventing and removing harms; producing a maximum balance of benefits over harms; and distributing benefits and burdens fairly. (shrink)

Bergson's legacy to literature was nothing short of transformative. His theories of duration, memory, intuition, the élan vital, and comedy inspired a wide range of vital literary innovations. Techniques essential to modern literature—stream of consciousness, imagistic precision, time-shift, plotlessness, multiple perspective—can be traced to Bergson, and Bergsonian tendencies—his focus on subjective consciousness, interest in novelty, and critique of materialism—yet determine literature written today. But what made Bergson such a powerful influence on such a diverse array of writers was his theory (...) of the artist: throughout his work, Bergson honors aesthetic insight and grants the artist authority over discoveries central to his philosophy. Writers were indeed inspired by Bergson's theories of duration, memory, and intuition, but they were truly galvanized to pursue Bersgonian ends by the power promised in his account of the artist's relationship to reality. Any account of Bergson's literary influence should recognize this distinction. Moreover, we should recognize that this will to power made a significant difference to the way writers interpreted Bergson's theories—especially the theory of time. Bergson's account of duration was transformative not just because it inspired writers to try for new approaches to the representation of time but because it encouraged them to think that they, like Bergson himself, could be time's prophets. (shrink)

Predatory grooming is a form of abuse most familiar from high-profile cases of sexual misconduct, for example, the Nassar case at Michigan State. Predatory groomers target individuals in a systematic effort to lead them into relationships in which they are vulnerable to exploitation. This is an example of a broader form of epistemic misconduct that Leydon-Hardy describes as epistemic infringement, where this involves the contravention of social and epistemic norms in a way that undermines our epistemic agency. In this (...) chapter, Leydon-Hardy looks at the distinctive epistemic harm caused by epistemic infringement. She argues that this harm cannot be understood simply as the victim’s having a false belief, or even as her being alienated from her belief-forming mechanisms. A deeper understanding of the harm caused by infringement shows that it stems from damage to one’s epistemic agency, and indeed, to one’s personhood. (shrink)

From text to action -- Park fiction, ala plastica, and dialogue -- The risk of diversity -- Programmatic multiplicity -- Art theory and the post-structuralist canon -- Lessons in futility -- Enclosure acts -- The twelfth seat and the mirrored ceiling -- The atelier as workshop -- Labor, praxis, and representation -- The divided and incomplete subject of yesterday -- Memories of development -- The limits of ethical capitalism -- The art of the locality -- Blindness and insight -- The (...) invention of the public -- The boulevards of the inner city -- Park fiction : desire, resistance, and complicity -- A culture of needles : project row houses in Houston. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: On Definition Theories of Gaming A Definition of Videogames.

During the battle of Iwo Jima in June 1944, Private First Class Jackylin Harold Lucas and three other U.S. Marines came under attack while making their way along a ravine. Upon seeing two grenades thrown near the soldiers, Lucas dove onto one grenade and pulled the other under his body, saving his companions from serious injury or death. Lucas survived, but his injuries were so grave that his companions left him for dead. Lucas’s act was one of spectacular and nearly (...) suicidal altruism. What does such an act show us about our nature and the human capacity for good and evil? Perhaps it offers a window onto our true nature—a nature ultimately good, though susceptible to corrupting influences. Or perhaps it seems extraordinary precisely because we are greedy and violent by nature but can, in rare instances, rise above those instincts. Questions about what human nature is and how we can learn about it are difficult to answer. They are difficult not just because humans are complex creatures whose behavior is deeply embedded in the cultural environment that they are a part of, but also because it is not obvious what a concept of human nature is supposed to do or what it is for. The concept of human nature is often used as a normative concept, one that can serve as a guide to action, showing us how we ought to behave. Less commonplace is an approach that seeks a descriptive account of human nature, one that characterizes what humans do and are disposed to do. I argue in this essay that the normative and descriptive approaches are at odds and that we should not expect a single concept of human nature to play both roles. Furthermore, there are deep problems with normative accounts. They often ignore or contradict the contemporary scientific worldview, and they often merely reflect biases about how we ought to be and what we ought to do. Human nature in this sense becomes politicized and serves in arguments about the moral status of issues like homosexuality, abortion, or biomedical enhancement. Because of the problems inherent in normative notions of human nature, I offer a descriptive alternative. My alternative attempts to align the scientific study of the human with human nature. (shrink)

To speak of human rights in the twenty-first century is to speak of proportionality. Proportionality has been received into the constitutional doctrine of courts in continental Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Israel, South Africa, and the United States, as well as the jurisprudence of treaty-based legal systems such as the European Convention on Human Rights. Proportionality provides a common analytical framework for resolving the great moral and political questions confronting political communities. But behind the singular appeal to proportionality (...) lurks a range of different understandings. This volume brings together many of the world's leading constitutional theorists - proponents and critics of proportionality - to debate the merits of proportionality, the nature of rights, the practice of judicial review, and moral and legal reasoning. Their essays provide important new perspectives on this leading doctrine in human rights law. (shrink)

In _Beyond the Sovereign Self_ Grant H. Kester continues the critique of aesthetic autonomy begun in _The Sovereign Self_, showing how socially engaged art provides an alternative aesthetic with greater possibilities for critical practice. Instead of grounding art in its distance from the social, Kester shows how socially engaged art, developed in conjunction with forms of social or political resistance, encourages the creative capacity required for collective political transformation. Among others, Kester analyzes the work of conceptual artist Adrian Piper, (...) experimental practices associated with the escrache tradition in Argentina, and indigenous Canadian artists such as Nadia Myer and Michèle Taïna Audette, showing how socially engaged art catalyzes forms of resistance that operate beyond the institutional art world. From the Americas and Europe to Iran and South Africa, Kester presents a historical genealogy of recent engaged art practices rooted in a deep history of cultural production, beginning with nineteenth-century political struggles and continuing into contemporary anticolonial resistance and other social movements. (shrink)

Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we _think with words_, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous nature of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have traditionally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could not be but (...) linguistic. When any problem divides a community of otherwise intelligent rational thinkers, one suspects some deep conceptual confusion is at play. Indeed, we believe that the conceptual categories used to frame these and related questions are so hopelessly muddled that one could honestly answer “both simultaneously”, or “neither”, depending one what is meant by the alternatives. But let’s get our priorities straight. This paper first and foremost aims at defending what we believe to be a step in that direction of the proper view of thinking, a view we call the spatial-motor view. In order to do so, however, we have found it essential to start by address the conceptual confusion just alluded to. Accordingly, the paper proceeds in two steps. First a conceptual step, in which we reconsider some of the traditional categories brought into play when thinking about thinking. Then an empirical step, in which we offer empirical evidence for one of the views conceptually isolated during the first part of the work. Future version of this collaborative work will include a speculative step in which we spin out an evolutionary and developmental scenario whose function it is justify the spatial-motor view by showing how it fits into current evolutionary and developmental theories. (shrink)

Aristotle maintains that every man has, or should have, a single end, a target at which he aims. The doctrine is stated in E.N. I 2. ‘If, then, there is some end of the things we do which we desire for its own sake, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else, clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall (...) we not, like archers who have a mark to aim t, be more likely to hit upon what is right?’. Aristotle does not here prove, nor need we understand him as claiming to prove, that there is only one end which is desired for itself. He points out correctly that, if there are objects which are desired but not desired for themselves, there must be some object which is desired for itself. The passage further suggests that, if there were one such object and one only, this fact would be important and helpful for the conduct of life. (shrink)

Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we think with words, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous na- ture of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have tradition- ally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could not (...) be but linguistic. When any problem divides a community of otherwise intelligent rational thinkers, one suspects some deep conceptual confusion is at play. Indeed, we believe that the conceptual cate- gories used to frame these and related questions are so hopelessly muddled that one could honestly answer “both simultaneously”, or “neither”, depending one what is meant by the alternatives. But let’s get our priorities straight. This paper first and foremost aims at defending what we believe to be a step in that direc- tion of the proper view of thinking, a view we call the spatial-motor view. In order to do so, however, we have found it essential to start by addressing the conceptual confusion just alluded to. Accordingly, the paper proceeds in two steps. First a conceptual step, in which we reconsider some of the traditional categories brought into play when thinking about thinking. Then an empirical step, in which we offer empirical evidence for one of the views conceptually isolated during the first part of the work. Future version of this collaborative work will include a speculative step in which we spin out an evolutionary and developmental scenario whose function it is justify the spatial-motor view by showing how it fits into current evolutionary and developmental theories. (shrink)

En el escrito Vorläufige Thesen zur Refomation der Philosophie, Ludwig Feuerbach atribuye a Spinoza la autoría de la filosofía especulativa. A la zaga queda Schelling, considerado por Feuerbach únicamente como el restaurador de la misma. En la secuencia establecida por éste, Hegel sería, por su parte, solo un elemento más en la constitución de la filosofía especulativa, aunque tiene el mérito de completar tal sistema de pensamiento. En el presente artículo pretendo determinar en qué medida el autor de esta filosofía (...) se halla presente en el que la consuma. Esbozaré la forma y grado de esa presencia poniendo el foco en un aspecto nuclear, que, al mismo tiempo, servirá de guía del trabajo aquí propuesto: la negación. (shrink)

E. L. Grant Watson, an English field naturalist, zoologist, and one of England's best-loved nature writers, spent a lifetime trying to bring nature and consciousness into a unified, holistic vision that would establish meaning in the world without losing wonder. The questions raised by facts of nature inexplicable in terms of conventional theories, together with insights gained from a reading of Jung--as well as by a study of early Christian gnostic literature and the anthroposophy of Rudolf Steiner--brought him to (...) an imaginative perception of living things based on the conviction of the presence in all things of a spiritual reality. "Love is of man, but wisdom is of nature, and there are times when it almost seems that the author's secret--as perhaps it will one day be the secret of a reformed scientific method--is to stand aside and let the wisdom of nature herself speak through him. "-Owen Barfield. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Plato's conception of expertise as a part of the Platonic theory of a good, successful life (eudaimonia). In various Platonic dialogues, Socrates argues that the good life requires a certain kind of knowledge that guides all our good, beneficial actions: the “knowledge of the good and bad”, which is to be acquired by “questioning ourselves and examining our and others’ beliefs”. This knowledge encompasses the particular knowledge of how to recognize experts in a given technical (...) domain. The central element in Socrates’ account of an expert is what I call the truth-and-caring criterion: an expert has to make seeking the truth and avoiding (avoidable) error her supreme epistemic goal and she has to make caring for common goods the supreme goal of practising her expertise. (shrink)

Human nature is frequently evoked to characterize our species and describe how it differs from others. But how should we understand this concept? What is the nature of a species? Some take our nature to be an essence and argue that because humans lack an essence, they also lack a nature. Others argue for non-essentialist ways of understanding human nature, which usually aim to provide criteria for sorting human traits into one of two bins, the one belonging to our nature (...) and the other outside our nature. This Element argues that both the essentialist and trait bin approaches are misguided. Instead, the author develops a trait cluster account of human nature, which holds that human nature is based on the distribution of our traits over our (actual and possible) life histories. One benefit of this account is that it aligns human nature with the human sciences, rendering the central concern of the human sciences to be the study of human nature. (shrink)

Millions of scientific articles are published each year, making it difficult to stay abreast of advances within even the smallest subdisciplines. Traditional approaches to the study of science, such as the history and philosophy of science, involve closely reading a relatively small set of journal articles. And yet many questions benefit from casting a wider net: Is most scientific change gradual or revolutionary? What are the key sources of scientific novelty? Over the past several decades, a massive effort to digitize (...) the academic literature and equip computers with algorithms that can distantly read and analyze a digital database has taken us one step closer to answering these questions. The Dynamics of Science brings together a diverse array of contributors to examine the largely unexplored computational frontiers of history and philosophy of science. Together, they reveal how tools and data from automated textual analysis, or machine "reading," combined with methods and models from game theory and cultural evolutionary theory, can begin to answer fundamental questions about the nature and history of science. (shrink)

The developmental properties of organisms play important roles in the generation of variation necessary for evolutionary change. But how can individual development steer the course of evolution? To answer this question, we introduce developmental channeling as a disposition of individual organisms that shapes their possible developmental trajectories and evolutionary dappling as an evolutionary outcome in which the space of possible organismic forms is dappled—it is only partially filled. We then trace out the implications of the channeling-dappling framework for contemporary debates (...) in the philosophy of evolution, including evolvability, reciprocal causation, and the extended evolutionary synthesis. (shrink)

Written by four members of the Calvin College philosophy department, The Little Logic Book is a valuable resource for teachers and undergraduate students of philosophy. In addition to providing clear introductions to the modes of reasoning students encounter in their philosophy course readings, it includes a nuanced description of common informal fallacies, a narrative overview of various philosophical accounts of scientific inference, and a concluding chapter on the ethics of argumentation. The book features engaging dialogues on social, philosophical and religious (...) issues based on the styles of argument taken up in the chapters. In additions to core concepts, distinctions, explanations, rules of inference, methods of assessment, and examples, The Little Logic Book provides philosophical commentary that will stimulate discussion of the assumptions and implications of various kinds of human reasoning. (shrink)

This paper raises four queries about Simester’s defective engagement with reason account of culpability found in his Fundamentals of Criminal Law: (1) the characterisation of the account in terms of moral ‘vices’; (2) the basis for identifying a vice as a ‘moral’ vice; (3) what is involved in an agent manifesting ‘insufficient care and concern’ for the interests of others; and (4) whether the account is an account of culpability generally, or is instead an account of criminal culpability, i.e., the (...) type of culpability necessary for criminal conviction. (shrink)

When do companies deserve moral credit for doing what is right? This question concerns the positive side of corporate moral responsibility, the negative side of which is the more commonly discussed issue of when companies are blameworthy for doing what is wrong. I offer a broadly functionalist account of how companies can act from morally creditworthy motives, which defuses the following Strawsonian challenge to the claim that they can: morally creditworthy motivation involves being guided by attitudes of “goodwill” for others, (...) and these attitudes involve affect and/or phenomenal consciousness, which corporate agents cannot maintain. In response, I show that what matters about being guided by attitudes of goodwill is being directly concerned for others in one’s practical deliberation. Companies can achieve this direct concern through their decision-making procedures without affect or phenomenal consciousness. I also explore how a company’s moral creditworthiness, or lack thereof, should shape stakeholders’ relationship with it. (shrink)

This article argues the following points. The Hobbesian hypothesis, which we define as the claim that all people are better off under state authority than they would be outside of it, is an empirical claim about all stateless societies. It is an essential premise in most contractarian justifications of government sovereignty. Many small-scale societies are stateless. Anthropological evidence from them provides sufficient reason to doubt the truth of the hypothesis, if not to reject it entirely. Therefore, contractarian theory has not (...) done what it claims to do: it has not justified state sovereignty to each person subject to it by demonstrating that they benefit from that authority. To be justified in contractarian terms, states have to do something to improve the living standards of disadvantaged people under their rule. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'middle ground (MG)'. Like almost all fallacies, MG is prevalent because it closely resembles a non‐fallacious way of reasoning. In many disputes, especially when there is a spectrum of opinions, the truth often lies somewhere in between the most extreme views on either side. The fallacy is committed by people who don't listen to the reasons that have been offered by each side to defend their theories – they (...) simply assume that the truth is in the middle. The fallacy is the result of intellectual laziness. Fortunately, this is an easy fallacy to avoid. Simply keep in mind the fact that merely because someone asserts a theory, especially an extreme theory, this does not by itself provide evidence for any conclusion at all. (shrink)

Revision of the author's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1970. Bibliography: p. 155-158.

In this theological essay, Grant Kaplan revisits the key figures and debates that shape how faith and reason relate. Divided into three parts, Kaplan invites readers into a conversation that has helped to shape Christianity and modern civilization. Readers will encounter the words and arguments of some of Christianity's greatest thinkers, some well-known (Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Newman) and others nearly forgotten. Readings of these fifty figures bring them to life in an accessible manner for a range of audiences: theologians (...) and philosophers, instructors, graduate students, seminarians, lay study groups, and undergraduate theology majors. Rather than simply summarizing their thought, Kaplan traces their arguments through key texts. (shrink)

Moral education is an important topic—both for moral philosophy and for the philosophy of education. Of the many questions that ought to be asked about moral education, certainly the following would be included in any reasonable list: What constitutes a moral education? How does one properly give someone a moral education? and Why provide persons with moral education? I have little to say about question. My main interest in this paper is in the third question, but I shall approach it (...) by first concentrating on question. What does a person have if he possesses a moral education? What is lacking and what is defective in an individual who does not have one? (shrink)

In the context of a dialogue between Kant and Hegel, this paper aims at presenting some aspects of the reception that Hegel made in the Logic of Being on the so-called notion of Inbegriff aller Realität. It is a notion that Hegel retrieves and examines dialectically and speculatively, not just in a way of an exposition. The paper seeks to identify and explain the main connections of the moments in which Hegel, in the field of the development of a pure (...) logic, first turns the reality into negation and then into contradiction. (shrink)