Open peer commentary on the article “Homeostats for the 21st Century? Simulating Ashby Simulating the Brain” by Stefano Franchi. Upshot: Using the example of chemical oil droplets, the paper discusses the idea of a homeostat in terms of a default mode network.

This paper considers undecidability in the imitation game, the so-called Turing Test. In the Turing Test, a human, a machine, and an interrogator are the players of the game. In our model of the Turing Test, the machine and the interrogator are formalized as Turing machines, allowing us to derive several impossibility results concerning the capabilities of the interrogator. The key issue is that the validity of the Turing test is not attributed to the capability of human or machine, but (...) rather to the capability of the interrogator. In particular, it is shown that no Turing machine can be a perfect interrogator. We also discuss meta-imitation game and imitation game with analog interfaces where both the imitator and the interrogator are mimicked by continuous dynamical systems. (shrink)

Upshot: In the model simulation and the human experiment, we observed that attention shifted from a tool to a task. This was accompanied by bodily extension. However, our experiments lack a sense of bodily incorporation (the sense of ownership. Based on the valuable commentaries, we would like to discuss the necessary conditions for possible bodily incorporation in terms of redundant degrees of freedom, synchronous visual tactile stimulation, and 1/f noise.

Context: Our body schema is not restricted to biological body boundaries (such as the skin), as can be seen in the use of a cane by a person who is visually impaired or the “rubber hands” experiment. The tool becomes a part of the body schema when the focus of our attention is shifted from the tool to the task to be performed. Problem: A body schema is formed through interactions among brain, body, tool, and environment. Nevertheless, the dynamic mechanisms (...) underlying changes in the body schema are still not fully understood. Method: To study the changing conditions of the body schema (e.g., a shift of attention), a simulation model of object discrimination was extended to differentiate between two kinds of sensitivities – sensitivity to an object being directly manipulated and sensitivity to another object being manipulated by the first. The proposed model consisted of windmills with different numbers of vanes. A model agent was required to determine the number of vanes on a windmill by touching the vanes blindly with an arm controlled by a neural network. Placing a second windmill beside the first and gearing the two windmills to move associatively resulted in the agent using the first windmill as a tool with which to discern the number of vanes on the second windmill. In other words, an agent’s body schema can shift from its arm tip to the boundary between the first and second windmills. We then introduced an experiment with a real windmill model to test the hypothesis demonstrated by the theoretical model. Results: We demonstrated that even simple computational agents can have two different sensitivities to the windmills. One agent becomes sensitive to the first windmill and insensitive to the second one. Another agent becomes insensitive to the first windmill and sensitive to the second one by using the first one as a tool. Therefore, we concluded that the boundary of the body schema was extended to the first windmill in the case of the latter agent because paying attention to the task to be performed instead of the tool itself is essential for the tool to be considered as part of the body schema. Analysis of the experiments using a computational model and human experimentation revealed that a shift from an irregular to a regular movement of a windmill is an indication of extension of the body schema. Constructivist content: Our insights are beneficial for enactive cognitive science. This is because an extended body schema questions the Cartesian separation between subject and object, and the self and the environment. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Investigating Extended Embodiment Using a Computational Model and Human Experimentation” by Yuki Sato, Hiroyuki Iizuka & Takashi Ikegami. Upshot: Sato and colleagues make use of an innovative method that combines robotics modeling and psychological experimentation to investigate how tool use affects our living and lived embodiment. I situate their approach in a general shift from robotics to human-computer interface studies in enactive cognitive science, and speculate about the necessary conditions for the bodily incorporation (...) of tools. (shrink)

For a large natural class of forcing notions, we prove general equivalence theorems between forcing absoluteness statements, regularity properties, and transcendence properties over and the core model . We use our results to answer open questions from set theory of the reals.

In important ways, Clark's (HPM) approach parallels the research agenda we have been pursuing. Nevertheless, we remain unconvinced that the HPM offers the best clue yet to the shape of a unified science of mind and action. The apparent convergence of research interests is offset by a profound divergence of theoretical starting points and ideal goals.

In so-called full second-order logic, the second-order variables range over all subsets and relations of the domain in question. In so-called Henkin second-order logic, every model is endowed with a set of subsets and relations which will serve as the range of the second-order variables. In our Boolean-valued second-order logic, the second-order variables range over all Boolean-valued subsets and relations on the domain. We show that under large cardinal assumptions Boolean-valued second-order logic is more robust than full second-order logic. Its (...) validity is absolute under forcing, and its Hanf and Löwenheim numbers are smaller than those of full second-order logic. (shrink)

We explore the understanding of conscious states in terms of spatio-temporal dynamics through modelling a mobile agent. Conscious states are associated with an agent's spontaneous and deterministic fluctuation between attachment to and detachment from the surroundings. It is because of this fluctuating nature, we argue, that an agent can perceive structure in the world. Perception requires a conscious state in physical devices. This is a central concern of this paper, and we examine it by simulating a mobile agent equipped with (...) an interconnected Fitz-Hugh-Nagumo (FHN) neuron network with delayed signal transmissions. The agent can move around a space by sensing the environment pattern through the input neurons and computing the motor outputs via the FHN network. The agent shows a variety of motion styles and a spontaneous selection of motion styles responding to the surroundings. Such a phenomenon is named embodied chaotic itinerancy (ECI), as an extension of chaotic itinerant dynamics, which is known to be a typical dynamic with a high degree of freedom. We take this selective mode of response to be significant, particularly those interacting with spatial pattern, as an inevitable property of conscious states. (shrink)

Synthetic approaches to social interaction support the development of a second-person neuroscience. Agent-based models and psychological experiments can be related in a mutually informing manner. Models have the advantage of making the nonlinear brainenvironmentbrain system as a whole accessible to analysis by dynamical systems theory. We highlight some general principles of how social interaction can partially constitute an individual's behavior.

We study various classes of maximality principles, \\), introduced by Hamkins :527–550, 2003), where \ defines a class of forcing posets and \ is an infinite cardinal. We explore the consistency strength and the relationship of \\) with various forcing axioms when \. In particular, we give a characterization of bounded forcing axioms for a class of forcings \ in terms of maximality principles MP\\) for \ formulas. A significant part of the paper is devoted to studying the principle MP\\) (...) where \ and \ defines the class of stationary set preserving forcings. We show that MP\\) has high consistency strength; on the other hand, if \ defines the class of proper forcings or semi-proper forcings, then by Hamkins, MP\\) is consistent relative to \. (shrink)

Simple chemical agents with lifelike properties can be termed a protocell, meaning the earliest form of a natural living cell. These agents are not necessarily alive but are examples of living technology, namely technology that possesses lifelike qualities. Given that the protocell can respond to environmental cues with directional and controlled movement it can be thought of as being able to make decisions whilst navigating through a complex environment. In this way a mobile protocell agent can be considered to exhibit (...) a form of computation. The development of smart protocell agents can be used as experimental model systems for the investigation of abstracted living processes that can subsequently be physically and chemically manipulated to produce architectural design outcomes. (shrink)

Memory dynamics need both stable and unstable properties simultaneously. Hence memory dynamics cannot be simulated by chaotic itinerant dynamics alone, with no real world correspondence. Memory dynamics are constrained by both semantics and causalities in the embodied cognition.

We show under that every set of reals is I‐regular for any σ‐ideal I on the Baire space such that is proper. This answers the question of Khomskii [7, Question 2.6.5]. We also show that the same conclusion holds under if we additionally assume that the set of Borel codes for I‐positive sets is. If we do not assume, the notion of properness becomes obscure as pointed out by Asperó and Karagila [1]. Using the notion of strong properness similar to (...) the one introduced by Bagaria and Bosch [2], we show under without using that every set of reals is I‐regular for any σ‐ideal I on the Baire space such that is strongly proper assuming every set of reals is ∞‐Borel and there is no ω1‐sequence of distinct reals. In particular, the same conclusion holds in a Solovay model. (shrink)

The dynamical category uses the sensory-motor coordination to do categorization. If categories are inevitably grounded in sensory-motor coordination, sharing categories may also share the same sensory-motor coordination. Concerning this aspect, we discuss the color category as a dynamical categorization. Additional to the converging effect of a category by communication, we discuss the diverging effect of communication that creates new categories.

冷戦終焉の直後から大震災の直前まで、世紀をまたぎ『現代思想』に毎月書き続けられた編集後記。世界の哲学・思想の最先端から政治・社会・文化の現状に鋭く斬りこみ、ネオリベラリズムにいち早く警鐘を鳴らし、「他 者」「マイノリティ」の声に耳を澄ませながら新しい理論、運動、文化を次々に導入した旺盛にしてスリリングな活動の軌跡。.

We show that ${{\bf \Sigma}^1_3}$ -absoluteness for Sacks forcing is equivalent to the non-existence of a ${{\bf \Delta}^1_2}$ Bernstein set. We also show that Sacks forcing is the weakest forcing notion among all of the preorders that add a new real with respect to ${{\bf \Sigma}^1_3}$ forcing absoluteness.

The theory of infinite games with slightly imperfect information has been developed for games with finitely and countably many moves. In this paper, we shift the discussion to games with uncountably many possible moves, introducing the axiom of real Blackwell determinacy \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf{Bl-AD}_\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document} (as an analogue of the axiom of real determinacy \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf{AD}_\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document}). We prove that the consistency strength of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} (...) \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf{Bl-AD}_\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document} is strictly greater than that of AD. (shrink)

A new design principle is discussed for making a sufficiently complex cell for the creation of the first wet artificial life in the laboratory. The current approach is to attempt a minimal cell, which consists of a liposome that contains a minimal metabolic cycle for self-maintenance and self-replication. Given the lack of success with the minimal cell to date, the authors suggest it is possible to take an alternative approach to building the first wet artificial life form that they have (...) called the first cell. In this article, the concept of the first cell versus the minimal cell is discussed. The new design principle is supported by the following observations that are examined and developed from an Origins of Life perspective: That human development shows a U-shaped curve where the skills and developmental patterns of human infants are proficient at the first phase then decline and subsequently recover to a qualitatively better level. A review of spatial temporal dynamics using cellular automata studies shows that complexity generated at both the initial states and the time evolution dynamics can synthesize rich evolutionary processes. A chemical experiment exhibiting self-organizing dynamics results in the emergence of a self-propelling oil droplet that demonstrates the self-sustaining properties of a non-equilibrium state. Finally, the important design question Is life a contingent or deterministic phenomenon? is examined which asks whether a life form is a dynamic product of its surroundings or whether it is the inevitable outcome of prior events, and is discussed making reference to the characteristics of an art installation The Way Things Go. This contemporary masterpiece, which exhibits a long-lasting chain of unrelated causal events, serves as a theoretical model for discussion of evolutionary processes, suggesting that when it comes to designing wet artificial life forms in the laboratory, both contingent and deterministic processes should be taken into account. (shrink)

The Cartesian thinking self may seem indisputably real. But if it is real, then so thinking, which would undercut mental fictionalism. Thus, in defense of mental fictionalism, this paper argues for fictionalism about the thinking self. In short form, the argument is: (1) If I exist outside of fiction, then I am identical to (some part of/) this biomass [= my body]. (2) If I die at t, I cease to exist at t. (3) If I die at t, no (...) part of this biomass ceases to exist at t. (4) Therefore, no part of this biomass is identical to me. [From (2), (3)] (5) Therefore, I do not exist outside of fiction. [From (4), (1)] One reply to the argument is that the self is an aggregate of electricity in the brain which disperses upon death. The rejoinder is that this, at best, describes the thoughts realized in the brain, and not the subject who thinks the thoughts. A second objection stresses the undeniable sense that the thinking self has a location. In reply, the extended thought-experiment from Dennett’s “Where Am I?” is used to show that the sense of self-location may well be illusory. (shrink)