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  1. Varol Akman, The Mark of the Mental.
    and it's just comfortable in here. But what is a belief anyway? How does it acquire the content it has (e.g., that it's chilly in here)? These questions cannot really be answered without clarifying the concept of "a mechanism with a mind". What conditions must be satisfied by a mechanism (say, a computer or a robot) before we can attribute a mind to it? Obviously, the essence of this problem concerns the relation between mental and physical properties. After all, a (...)
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  2. Inácio de Araújo Almeida (2013). Verdade, Relativismo E Consciência Em Joseph Ratzinger. Lumen Veritatis 6 (24):77-88.
    Since Joseph Ratzinger ascended the pontifical throne, the issue of relativism has been the subject of ongoing study, as well as heated debate. Moreover, it has frequently been asked how this theme arose in his thought, along with how the most salient characteristics of relativism should be gauged. Therefore, this paper seeks to provide some explanations on the concept of truth and relativism of this author, focusing on two main ideas. The first is an analysis of how the problem of (...)
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  3. G. E. M. Anscombe (1981). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. University of Minnesota Press.
    The intentionality of sensation -- The first person -- Substance -- The subjectivity of sensation -- Events in the mind -- Comments on Professor R.L. Gregory's paper on perception -- On sensations of position -- Intention -- Pretending -- On the grammar of "Enjoy" -- The reality of the past -- Memory, "experience," and causation -- Causality and determination -- Times, beginnings, and causes -- Soft determinism -- Causality and extensionality -- Before and after -- Subjunctive conditionals -- "Under a (...)
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  4. Richard E. Aquila (1979). Mental Particulars, Mental Events, and the Bundle Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (March):109-120.
    I argue, First, That the bundle theory is compatible with certain views of mental states as alterations in an underlying substance. Then I distinguish between momentary and enduring experiencers and argue that the bundle theory does not imply the possibility of experiences apart from experiencers, But at most apart from enduring experiencers. Finally, I reject strawson's claim that the bundle theory implies that some particular person's experience might instead have belonged to some other person. Regarding experiences as events rather than (...)
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  5. Dan Arnold (2008). Dharmakīrti's Dualism: Critical Reflections on a Buddhist Proof of Rebirth. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1079-1096.
    Dharmakīrti, elaborating one of the Buddhist tradition's most complete defenses of rebirth, advanced some of this tradition's most explicitly formulated arguments for mind-body dualism. At the same time, Dharmakīrti himself may turn out to be vulnerable to some of the same kinds of arguments pressed against physicalists. It is revealing, then, that in arguing against physicalism himself, Dharmakīrti does not have available to him what some would judge to be more promising arguments for dualism (arguments, in particular, following Kant's 2nd (...)
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  6. Wolfgang Baer (2006). Amazing Light --Visions for Discovery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 1-2):177-183.
    An International Symposium In Honor of the 90th Birthday Year of Charles Townes October 6-8, 2005, UC Berkeley.
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  7. Emilia Barile (2007). La Materia Della Mente: Lavori in Corso. Aracne.
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  8. Ralph Barton Perry (1909). The Mind Within and the Mind Without. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (7):169-175.
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  9. J. V. Bateman (1940). Professor Alexander's Proofs of the Spatio-Temporal Nature of Mind. Philosophical Review 49 (May):309-324.
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  10. John Beloff (1962/1965). The Existence Of Mind. McGibbon & Kee.
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  11. Jiri Benovsky (forthcoming). Dual-Aspect Monism. Philosophical Investigations.
    In this article, I am interested in dual-aspect monism as a solution to the mind-body problem. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under-represented in the contemporary debate, and I would like to help it make its way. Dual-aspect monism is a parsimonious, elegant, and simple view. It avoids problems with 'mental causation'. It naturally explains how and why mental states are correlated (and interact) with physical states while avoiding any mysteries concerning the nature of this (cor)relation. It (...)
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  12. Arthur F. Bentley (1941). Some Logical Considerations Concerning Professor Lewis's Mind. Journal of Philosophy 38 (November):634-635.
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  13. Gustav Bergmann (1942). An Empiricist Schema of the Psychophysical Problem. Philosophy of Science 9 (January):72-91.
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  14. Reinaldo J. Bernal, Pierre Jacob, Maximilian Kistler, David Papineau, Jérôme Dokic, Jaime Ramos & Juan D. Morales (2013). Précis de "E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory Of Phenomenal Consciousness". Ideas Y Valores 62 (152):267-297.
    El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
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  15. Graham H. Bird (1971). Minds and States of Mind. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (July):244-246.
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  16. Brand Blanshard (1941). The Nature of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 38 (April):207-215.
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  17. Jonathan Bricklin (2010). Consciousness Already There Waiting to Be Uncovered: William Jamess Mystical Suggestion as Corroborated by Himself and His Contemporaries. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (11-12):11-12.
    'Is consciousness already there waiting to be uncovered and is it a veridical revelation of reality?' William James asked in one of his last published essays, 'A Suggestion About Mysticism'. The answer, he said, would not be known 'by this generation or the next'. By separating what James wanted to believe about commonsense reality, from what his 'dispassionate' insights and researches led him to believe, I show how James himself, in collaboration with a few friends, laid the groundwork for adopting (...)
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  18. Jason W. Brown (2002). The Self-Embodying Mind: Process, Brain Dynamics and the Conscious Present. Midpoint Trade Books Inc.
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  19. K. Campbell (1983). Abstract Particulars and the Philosophy of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (June):129-41.
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  20. Gregg Caruso (2002). Review of David Cockburn’s An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW] Metapsychology.
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  21. Chhanda Chakraborti (2005). Mental Properties and Levels of Properties. Metaphysica 6 (2):7-24.
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  22. Hugh Chandler, -≫Tredicims' Minds.
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  23. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Indeterminate 'Minds'.
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  24. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Tredecims.
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  25. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Minds.
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  26. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫13 'Minds'.
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  27. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Many Minds.
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  28. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Borderline 'Minds'.
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  29. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Counting Minds.
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  30. Hugh S. Chandler, ≫no Mind?
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  31. Hugh S. Chandler, How Many Minds?
    In Analysis, Vol. 45, June 1984, George Rea published a paper attacking my claim that there could be ‘indeterminate minds'. This paper is a reply to his attack. I claim, again, that such ‘minds’ are possible – entities such that it is indeterminate whether or not these entities are people with minds. -/- .
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  32. Hugh S. Chandler, One Mind?
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  33. Hugh S. Chandler, How Many Minds?
    In Analysis, Vol. 45, June 1984, George Rea published a paper attacking my claim that there could be ‘indeterminate people'. This paper is a reply to his attack. I claim, again, that such ‘people’ are possible – entities such that it is indeterminate whether or not these entities are people. -/- .
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  34. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Singular Minds.
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  35. Sara Rachel Chant (2006). The Special Composition Question in Action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):422–441.
    Just as we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of objects composes a single object, we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of actions composes a single action. In the material objects literature, this question is known as the "special composition question," and I take it that there is a similar question to be asked of collections of actions. I will call that question the "special composition question in action," and argue that the correct (...)
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  36. Stephen R. L. Clark (2010). How to Become Unconscious. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):21-44.
    Consistent materialists are almost bound to suggest that , if it exists at all, is no more than epiphenomenal. A correct understanding of the real requires that everything we do and say is no more than a product of whatever processes are best described by physics, without any privileged place, person, time or scale of action. Consciousness is a myth, or at least a figment. Plotinus was no materialist: for him, it is Soul and Intellect that are more real than (...)
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  37. Stephen R. L. Clark (1990). A Parliament of Souls. Oxford University Press.
    This second volume in the Limits and Renewals trilogy is an attempt to restate a traditional philosophy of mind, drawing on philosophical and poetical resources that are often neglected in modern and postmodern thought, and emphasizing the moral and political implications of differing philosophies of mind and value. Clark argues that without the traditional concept of the soul, we have little reason to believe that rational thought and individual autonomy are either possible or desirable. The particular topics covered include the (...)
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  38. Stephen R. L. Clark (1990). Reason as Daimōn. In Christopher Gill (ed.), The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Oxford University Press
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  39. S. Marc Cohen (1969). The Concept of Pleasure. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 78:386-390.
    Review of The Concept of Pleasure, by David L. Perry (Mouton:1967).
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  40. Arthur W. Collins (1994). Precis of the Nature of Mental Things. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):901-903.
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  41. Arthur W. Collins (1994). Reply to Commentators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):929-945.
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  42. D. E. Cooper (1970). Materialism and Perception. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (October):334-346.
  43. Richard Corry (2015). ESP, Causation, and the Possibility of Precognition. In Edwin May & Sonali Marwaha (eds.), Extrasensory Perception: Support, Skepticism, and Science. Praeger 107--127.
    In this chapter, I aim to clarify the concept of ESP so that we can ask whether it is even logically possible for anything to satisfy this concept. If ESP is not logically possible, then it would be pointless to conduct experiments trying to discover whether it exists. If, on the other hand, it is logically possible, then its existence or otherwise is an empirical question, a question that can be decided only by looking at the empirical evidence for and (...)
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  44. John G. Cox (1982). Mental Events Must Have Spatial Location. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (July):270-274.
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  45. Tim Crane (1998). How to Define Your (Mental) Terms. Inquiry 41 (3):341-354.
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  46. Tamás Demeter (2010). In Defence of Empty Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):195-197.
    This piece defends the distinction I have drawn in my "Two Kinds of Mental Realism" against criticism put forward in János Tőzsér's "Mental Realism Reloaded".
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  47. Tamás Demeter (2009). Two Kinds of Mental Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):59-71.
    I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component (...)
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  48. Randall R. Dipert, Two Unjustly Neglected Aspects of C.S. Peirce's Philosophy of Mind.
    Few philosophers today know much about Charles Peirce’s metaphysics, although a great many know something about his epistemology, philosophy of science, and logic. Indeed, few Peirce experts have written much on his metaphysics or made it the focus of their research. To an extent, this is understandable. Peirce’s writings were left in a disastrously disorganized state (mostly unpublished), and the crucial papers on metaphysics from his later years have not yet been republished in the first-rate chronological edition, the incomplete Writings (...)
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  49. Daniel Dohrn, Can't One Truly Judge That One is Judging?
    Matthew Soteriou provides an analysis of authoritatively knowing one’s own mental acts which depends on a surprising assumption: One cannot truly judge that one is judging. After briefly criticizing his account of one’s awareness that one is judging, I critically scrutinize two of his arguments against the possibility of truly judging that one is judging. Firstly, assuming such a possibility leads to a regress. Secondly, the second-order judgement inevitably replaces the first-order judgement such as to make the former wrong.
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  50. Durant Drake (1926). What is a Mind? Ontological Pluralism Versus Ontological Monism. Mind 35 (138):230-236.
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