In the bioethical literature, discrimination in insurance on the basis of genetic risk factors detected by genetic testing has been defended and opposed on various ethical grounds. One important argument in favour of the practice is offered by those who believe that it is not possible to distinguish between genetic and non-genetic information, at least not for practical policy purposes such as insurance decision-making. According to the argument from indistinguishability, the use of genetic test information for insurance purposes should be (...) permitted, because genetic test information is no different from non-genetic medical information in any relevant respect, therefore it would be inconsistent to prohibit the former whilst permitting the latter. This paper discusses and defends this argument and suggests a new, more tenable foundation. (shrink)

In the bioethical literature, discrimination in insurance on the basis of genetic risk factors detected by genetic testing has been defended and opposed on various ethical grounds. One important argument in favour of the practice is offered by those who believe that it is not possible to distinguish between genetic and non-genetic information, at least not for practical policy purposes such as insurance decision-making. According to the argument from indistinguishability, the use of genetic test information for insurance purposes should be (...) permitted, because genetic test information is no different from non-genetic medical information in any relevant respect, therefore it would be inconsistent to prohibit the former whilst permitting the latter. This paper discusses and defends this argument and suggests a new, more tenable foundation. (shrink)

The article investigates the validity of two different versions of the slippery slope argument construed in relation to human gene therapy: the empirical and the conceptual argument. The empirical version holds that our accepting somatic cell therapy will eventually cause our accepting eugenic medical goals. The conceptual version holds that we are logically committed to accepting such goals once we have accepted somatic cell therapy. It is argued that neither the empirical nor the conceptual version of the argument can provide (...) a conclusive moral reason for banning somatic cell therapy. According to a third interpretation, referred to as the arbitrary result argument, the many apparent similarities between somatic cell therapy and eugenic-based human genetic engineering drive us to make principled choices concerning what differences and similarities between the two practices should be regarded as morally (ir)relevant. Decisions of this kind are likely to have unpredictable moral consequences. Thus formulated, the slippery slope argument has much plausibility. One objects to somatic cell therapy not so much because of what is at the bottom of the slope on which it lies, but because it is on a slope of which one does not know what is at the bottom. While the arbitrary result argument does not provide a conclusive reason for prohibiting human gene therapy, it reminds of a very important thing: when making bioethical decisions, we should be as specific and as consistent as possible about our basic moral and medical concepts. (shrink)

In an editorial to a recent issue of Neurology, Richard Dees expresses the same criticism in an even more rigorous epistemic tone: Veikko Launis, Ph.D., is Professor of Medical Ethics and Adjunct Professor of Ethics and Social Philosophy at the University of Turku, Finland.FootnotesThis article is part of the Neuroethics of Brainreading research project, directed by myself and funded by the Academy of Finland. I am grateful to Olli Koistinen, Pekka Louhiala, Helena Siipi, and an anonymous referee for helpful (...) comments, criticism, and suggestions. (shrink)

The aim of this review was to analyse the empirical studies that focus on ethics in nursing care for older people, scoping the need and areas for further study. A search of the MEDLINE and CINAHL databases (earliest to August 2009) was conducted using the the keywords: ethic* and nursing or care or caring and elderly or aged or older. After a four-stage process, 71 empirical articles were included in the review, with informants ranging from elderly people to relatives, caregivers, (...) managers and students in care settings. The review focusses on the concepts, contexts, methods and validity of these studies. Based on the analysis, the reviewed research seems to be fragmented and multifaceted, focussing on selected issues such as autonomy, self-determination and informed consent. No large research programs or research traditions were found so it was not possible to draw any conclusions about suitable methods, study designs or instruments of measurement for use in this research area. (shrink)

Most public discussion has focused on those effects of genetic research that are considered in some way unwanted or unpleasant. For example, there has been much debate concerning the risks and the ethical appropriateness of genetic screening, gene therapy, and agricultural applications based on genetic techniques. It often claimed that genetic research may cause new problems such as genetic discrimination, stigmatization, environmental risks, or mistreatment of animals. Genes and Morality: New Essays adopts a critical attitude toward genetic research, on both (...) a theoretical and a practical level. It presents some of the most important problems in the ethics of genetic engineering, including the questions of genetic health and disease, genetic testing, responsibility for health, patenting non-human and human life, and problems related to the disclosure of genetic information. The aim of the book is to focus on real ethical and conceptual issues. Consider, for instance, the concept of genetic disease. As one of the contributors, Ingmar Pörn, writes, fear of genetic disease, or anxiety, is not itself a disease any more than fear of becoming unemployed is a disease. Alleviating such emotions is not a medical task to be discharged by drug therapy. The book also examines the philosophical foundations of these issues by discussing the most influential bioethical theories of today, including utilitarianism and principlism. (shrink)

Ocherk 1. Voprosy ontologii -- Ocherk 2. Voprosy ėtiki i ėstetiki -- Ocherk 3. Voprosy gnoseologii i aksiologii.

Because the techno-economic paradigm of contemporary conceptualizations of innovation is often taken for granted in the literature, this chapter opens up this self-evident notion. First, the chapter consults the work of Joseph Schumpeter, who can be seen as the founding father of the current conceptualization of innovation as technological and commercial. Second, we open up the concept by reflecting on two aspects of Schumpeter’s conceptualization of innovation, namely its destructive and its constructive aspect, based on findings in the history of (...) innovation. Finally, we synthesize our findings and propose an ontic-ontological conceptualization of innovation as ontogenetic process and outcome with six dimensions—newness, political dimension, economic dimension, temporal dimension, human dimension and risk—that moves beyond its technological and commercial orientation. (shrink)

Research on brain or cognitive/affective processes, culture, social interaction, and structural analysis are overlapping but often independent ways humans have attempted to understand the origins of their evolution, historical, and contemporary development. Each level seeks to employ its own theoretical concepts and methods for depicting human nature and categorizing objects and events in the world, and often relies on different sources of evidence to support theoretical claims. Each level makes reference to different temporal bandwidths (milliseconds, seconds, minutes, hours, days, months, (...) years, decades, and centuries) and focuses on different spatio-temporal activities and controlled and non-controlled stimulus conditions. Biological mechanisms and environmental pressures for survival simultaneously created a gradual intersection and enhancement of cognitive/affective skills, cultural practices, and changes in collaborative social interaction and communicative skills. The evolution of a given level of analysis is assumed to have been incremental and overlapping. These innovative and independent ways humans have learned to characterize their brain or cognitive/affective and social/economic/political life often depend on unexamined, representational re-descriptions or cognitive/affective and socio-cultural devices and forms of communication that facilitate the depiction of practices and beliefs we attribute to respondents or subjects and research colleagues. (shrink)

Selected Logic Papers, long out of print and now reissued with eight additional essays, includes much of the author's important work on mathematical logic and ...

В книге очерки Владимира Брагинского в жанре ироничного эссе о любви.

The article is devoted to the memory of Vyacheslav Semenovich Stepin and Nikita Nikolaevich Moiseev, whose multifaceted work was integrally focused on philosophical, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research of the key ideas and principles of universal human-dimensional evolutionism. Other remarkable Russian scientists V.I. Vernadsky, S.P. Kurdyumov, S.P. Kapitsa, D.S. Chernavsky worked in the same tradition of universal evolutionism. While V.I. Vernadsky and N.N. Moiseev had been the originators of that scientific approach, V.S. Stepin provided philosophical foundations for the ideas of those (...) remarkable scientists and thinkers. The scientific legacy of V.S. Stepin and N.N. Moiseev maintained the formation of a new quality of research into the philosophy of science and technology as well as into the philosophy of culture. This new quality is multidimensional and it is difficult to define unambiguously, but we presume the formation of those areas of philosophical knowledge as constructively oriented languages of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary co-participation of philosophy in the convergent-evolutionary development of scientific knowledge in general. In this regard, attention is paid to V.S. Stepin’s affirmations about non-classical nature of modern social and humanitarian knowledge. Quantum mechanics teaches us that the reality revealed through it is a hybrid construct, or symbiosis, of both mean and object of cognition. Therefore, the very act of cognitive observation constructs quantum reality. Thus, it is very close to the process of cognition in modern sociology and psychology. V.S. Stepin insisted that these principles are applicable to all complex selfdeveloping systems, and such are all “human-dimensional” objects of modern humanities. In all the phases of homeostasis changes, or crises, there is necessarily a share of chaos, instability, uncertainty in the selection process of future development scenarios, which is ineliminably affected by our observation. Therefore, a cognitive observer in the humanities should be considered as a concept of post-non-classical rationality, that is as an observer of complexity. (shrink)

Is it possible to invoke the use of moral responsibility as part of the selection criteria in the allocation of livers for transplant? Criticism has been applied to the difficulties inherent in including such a criterion and also the effect that employing such a judgement might have upon the relationship between the physician and patient. However, these criticisms rely on speculation and conjecture and do not relate to all the arguments put forward in favour of applying moral responsibility. None of (...) the present arguments against using moral responsibility in the allocation of livers for transplant are good enough to warrant its dismissal. (shrink)