This article offers an analysis of the argumentative method of two treatises by Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate and On Providence, the latter of which is preserved only in Arabic translation. It is argued that both texts use techniques from Aristotelian dialectic, albeit in different ways, with On Fate adhering to methods outlined in Aristotle's Topics whereas On Providence uses the ‘aporetic’ method familiar from texts such as MetaphysicsΒ‎. This represents a revision of a previous study of Alexander's (...) method in On Fate by Jaap Mansfeld, which emphasized parallels between that method and the techniques of ancient scepticism. It is, however, suggested that Alexander does reflect developments in epistemology during the Hellenistic period, especially in so far as he ‘upgrades’ the status of endoxa to play something like the role of common conceptions in the dogmatic Hellenistic schools. (shrink)

"Alexander's commentary on Book 1 concerns the definition of Aristotelian syllogistic argument; its resistance to the rival Stoic theory of inference; and the character of inductive inference and of rhetorical argument. Alexander distinguishes inseparable accidents, such as the whiteness of snow, from defining differentiae, such as its being frozen, and considers how these differences fit into the schemes of categories. He speaks of dialectic as a stochastic discipline in which success is to be judged not by victory but (...) by skill in argument. Alexander also investigates the subject of ambiguity, which had been richly developed since Aristotle by the rival Stoic school."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

In the second half of Book One of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle reflects on the application of the formalized logic has developed in the first half, focusing particularly on the non-modal or assertoric syllogistic developed in the first seven chapters. These reflections lead Alexander of Aphrodisias, who was a great exponent of Aristotelianism in the late second century, to explain and sometimes argue against subsequent developments of Aristotle's logic and alternatives and objections to it, ideas associated mainly with his (...) colleague Theophrastus and with the Stoics. The other main topic of this part of the Prior Analytics is the specification of a method for discovering true premises needed to prove a given proposition. Aristotle's presentation is sometimes difficult to follow, and Alexander's discussion is extremely helpful to the uninitiated reader. In his commentary on the final chapter translated in this volume, Alexander provides an insightful account of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's method of division. (shrink)

trans. R. W. Sharples. Alexander addresses a number of questions drawn from a range of topics in Aristotle's works.

Attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias -the leading ancient commentator on Aristotle -the Quaestiones exemplify the process through which Aristotle's thought was organized and came to be interpreted as "Aristotelianism." This volume of R.W. Sharples's translation, together with his earlier translation of Quaestiones 1.1-2.15, makes the Quaestiones available in its entirety for the first time in a modern language. The Quaestiones are concerned with problems of physics and metaphysics, psychology and divine providence. Readers interested in Aristotle's psychological views will find (...) the second half of the Quaestiones particularly valuable. Ten of the problems discussed involve issues raised in Aristotle's On the Soul, including the unity of apperception and the transition from first to second actuality in the act of contemplation. An additional twelve problems relate to aspects of physical theory such as infinity, necessity, and potentiality. Quaestio 2.21 concerns divine providence and helps supplement our knowledge of Alexander's position. A study of the Quaestiones also suggests how interpretations of Aristotle were influenced by doctrines of Hellenistic philosophy. Translated first into Arabic and then into Latin, excerpts from the Quaestiones played a significant role in the transmission of ancient Greek philosophy to the medieval world. (shrink)

To study the influence of divinity on cosmos, Alexander uses the notions of ‘fate’ and ‘providence,’ which were common in the philosophy of his time. In this way, he provides an Aristotelian interpretation of the problems related to such concepts. In the context of this discussion, he offers a description of ‘nature’ different from the one that he usually regards as the standard Aristotelian notion of nature, i.e. the intrinsic principle of motion and rest. The new coined concept is (...) a ‘cosmic’ nature that can be identified with both ‘fate’ and ‘divine power,’ which are the immediate effect of providence upon the world. In the paper it is exposed how the conception of providence defended by Alexander means a rejection of the divine care of the particulars, since the divinities are only provident for species. Several texts belonging to the Middle Platonic philosophers will convince us that such thinkers (and not directly Aristotle) are the origin of the thesis that will be understood as the conventional Aristotelian position, namely that divinity only orders species but not individuals. (shrink)

Alexander's views on universals are, it seems, quite important in the history of western philosophy. When Boethius gives in his second commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge his solution to the problem of universals as he conceived it, he claims to be adopting Alexander's approach. If true, this means that the locus classicus for all western medieval thinkers on this topic is really a rendering of Alexander's teaching. Alexander commented Aristotle’s statement in his On the Soul “The universal (...) animal either is nothing at all or is posterior if it exists”, and this commentary has been translated into Arabic several times in the classical period. In this study the anonymous Arabic translations of Alexander’s commentary has been translated into English. (shrink)

The last 14 chapters of book 1 of Aristotle's "Prior Analytics" are concerned with the representation in the formal language of syllogistic of propositions and arguments expressed in more or less everyday Greek. In his commentary on those chapters, Alexander of Aphrodisias explains some of Aristotle's more opaque assertions and discusses post-Aristotelian ideas in semantics and the philosophy of language. In doing so he provides an unusual insight into the way in which these disciplines developed in the Hellenistic era. (...) He also shows a more sophisticated understanding of these fields than Aristotle himself, while remaining a staunch defender of Aristotle's emphasis on meaning as opposed to Stoics concern with verbal formulation. In his commentary on the final chapter of book 1 Alexander offers a thorough discussion of Aristotle's distinction between denying that something is, e.g., white and asserting that it is non-white. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon are valuable sources for both Stoic and early Peripatetic logic, and have often been used as such – in particular for early Peripatetic hypothetical syllogistic and Stoic propositional logic. By contrast, this paper explores the role Alexander himself played in the development and transmission of those theories. There are three areas in particular where he seems to have made a difference: First, he drew a connection between certain passages from Aristotle’s (...) Topics and Prior Analytics and the Stoic indemonstrable arguments, and, based on this connection, appropriated at least four kinds of Stoic indemonstrables as Aristotelian. Second, he developed and made use of a specifically Peripatetic terminology in which to describe and discuss those arguments – which facilitated the integration of the indemonstrables into Peripatetic logic. Third, he made some progress towards a solution to the problem of what place and interpretation the Stoic third indemonstrables should be given in a Peripatetic and Platonist setting. Overall, the picture emerges that Alexander persistently (if not always consistently) presented passages from Aristotle’s logical œuvre in a light that makes it appear as if Aristotle was in the possession of a Peripatetic correlate to the Stoic theory of indemonstrables. (shrink)

This paper discusses two passages from Alexander of Aphrodisias’s commentary on Aristotle’s _ Topics _ that are transmitted in Ps-Jābir’s _ Kitāb al-Nukhab _. It argues that the Arabic translation of Alexander’s commentary may have been made from a fuller version than what came down to us in Greek. Especially since the author(s) of the Jābir-corpus form a tradition different from the school of Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq (d. 873) and authors associated to the ‘Baghdad school’, whose earliest figure (...) is Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 940), the Arabic fragments of Alexander’s commentary preserved in the _ Kitāb al-Nukhab _ promise to shed more light on the early reception of the _ Topics _ and the different contexts in which Aristotelian dialectic was studied in the Islamic world. (shrink)

This paper discusses two passages from Alexander of Aphrodisias’s commentary on Aristotle’s Topics that are transmitted in Ps-Jābir’s Kitāb al-Nukhab. It argues that the Arabic translation of Alexander’s commentary may have been made from a fuller version than what came down to us in Greek. Especially since the author(s) of the Jābir-corpus form a tradition different from the school of Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq (d. 873) and authors associated to the ‘Baghdad school’, whose earliest figure is Abū Bishr Mattā (...) b. Yūnus (d. 940), the Arabic fragments of Alexander’s commentary preserved in the Kitāb al-Nukhab promise to shed more light on the early reception of the Topics and the different contexts in which Aristotelian dialectic was studied in the Islamic world. (shrink)

R. W. Sharples provides a new edition, with introduction and commentary in English, of the Greek text. The Mantissa is a collection of short discussions, transmitted as a supplement to the treatise On the Soul by the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (c.200 AD).The collection includes discussion of a range of topics, among them the nature of soul and intellect, theories of how seeing takes place, issues in ethics, and the nature of fate. The text is based upon a (...) new collation of the principal manuscript, the ninth century Venetus Marcianus graecus 258, and the apparatus corrects Bruns' misreportings of the principal manuscript and of the others that he used. Account has also been taken of the medieval Arabic and Latin versions of some of the sections which circulated independently, notably On Intellect which had a substantial influence on medieval philosophy. The introduction is chiefly concerned with the manuscripts and the relation between them. The commentary is based on the notes to the editor's English translation of the work (London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); however, the commentary also takes into account more recent work on the collection by various scholars. (shrink)

In the field of philosophy, Plato's view of rhetoric as a potentially treacherous craft has long overshadowed Aristotle's view, which focuses on rhetoric as an independent discipline that relates in complex ways to dialectic and logic and to ethics and moral psychology. This volume, composed of essays by internationally renowned philosophers and classicists, provides the first extensive examination of Aristotle's Rhetoric and its subject matter in many years. One aim is to locate both Aristotle's treatise and its subject within the (...) more general context of his philosophical treatment of other disciplines, including moral and political theory as well as poetics. The contributors also seek to illuminate the structure of Aristotle's own conception of rhetoric as presented in his treatise. The first section of the book, which deals with the arguments of rhetoric, contains essays by M. F. Burnyeat and Jacques Brunschwig. A section treating the status of the art of rhetoric features pieces by Eckart Schütrumpf, Jürgen Sprute, M. M. McCabe, and Glenn W. Most. Essays by John M. Cooper, Stephen Halliwell, and Jean-Louis Labarrière address topics related to rhetoric, ethics, and politics. The final section, on rhetoric and literary art, comprises essays by Alexander Nehamas and André Laks. Originally published in 1994. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Die Reihe Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina. Series academica wird von der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften herausgegeben; sie ist der Reihe Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina. Quellen und Studien koordiniert. Durch die Editionen und Quellensammlungen der Series academica sollen Grundlagen für das Studium der Nachwirkung der peripatetischen Philosophie und zur Erforschung der byzantinischen Philosophie- und Bildungsgeschichte gelegt werden; sie schließt an die von Hermann Diels geleiteten Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1882-1909) an. Im (...) Programm der Reihe sind u. a. Editionen von Kommentartexten des Alexander von Aphrodisias, Simplikios, Ioannes Philoponos, Michael von Ephesos, Nikephoros Blemmydes, Georgios Pachymeres, Theodoros Metochites, Georgios Scholarios und Bessarion vorgesehen. Die Reihe steht jedoch auch für Voruntersuchungen zu Editionen und begleitende Abhandlungen offen. Link zu Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina. Quellen und Studien: https://www.degruyter.com/view/serial/CAGB-B. (shrink)

Translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias Commentary on Metaphysics Book I by William Dooley.

The "Supplement" transmitted as the second book of "On the Soul" by Alexander of Aphrodisias is a collection of short texts on a wide range of topics from psychology, including the general hylomorphic account of soul and its faculties, and the theory of vision; questions in ethics ; and issues relating to responsibility, chance and fate. One of the texts in the collection, "On Intellect", had a major influence on medieval Arabic and Western thought, greater than that of (...) class='Hi'>Alexander's "On the Soul" itself. The treatises may all be by Alexander himself; certainly the majority of them are closely connected with his other works. Many of them, however, consist of collections of arguments on particular issues, collections which probably incorporate material from earlier in the history of the Peripatetic school. This translation is from a new edition of the Greek text based on a collation of all known manuscripts and comparison with medieval Arabic and Latin translations. (shrink)

The Arabic tradition knew Alexander’s treatises On Fate and On Providence. Alexander criticizes the Stoic determinism with some peripatetic arguments. In those treatises we can find, at least, two positions: the peripatetic and “libertarian” position represented by Alexander, and Stoic determinism. A very similar discussion can be found in Islamic tradition. As S. Van den Bergh has insisted, Islamic theological schools had some Stoic influences. One of the issues in which we can find some common views is, (...) precisely, the problem of determinism and free will. The aim of this paper is to show that the kasb (acquisition)doctrine of the Islamic theologians Asharites is very similar to Stoic determinism in its compatibilist version: both, Stoics and Asharites, conceive a causal network established by the fate or the providence. From this point of view we have to discuss which is the true agent of the natural and human acts that happen in this world. If the providence guides every act, the natural causality and the free will should be denied. On the one hand, I will present some arguments from the most representative Asharite theologian, al-Ghazali, to support a kind of compatibilist determinism; from the other hand, I will evaluate Averroes peripatetic arguments against determinism. Is Averroes more consistent than Alexander or do we have to conclude that al-Ghazali and the Asharites have stronger arguments in order to support the kasb doctrine? (shrink)

The Arabic tradition knew Alexander’s treatises On Fate and On Providence. Alexander criticizes the Stoic determinism with some peripatetic arguments. In those treatises we can find, at least, two positions: the peripatetic and “libertarian” position represented by Alexander, and Stoic determinism. A very similar discussion can be found in Islamic tradition. As S. Van den Bergh has insisted, Islamic theological schools had some Stoic influences. One of the issues in which we can find some common views is, (...) precisely, the problem of determinism and free will. The aim of this paper is to show that the kasb (acquisition)doctrine of the Islamic theologians Asharites is very similar to Stoic determinism in its compatibilist version: both, Stoics and Asharites, conceive a causal network established by the fate or the providence. From this point of view we have to discuss which is the true agent of the natural and human acts that happen in this world. If the providence guides every act, the natural causality and the free will should be denied. On the one hand, I will present some arguments from the most representative Asharite theologian, al-Ghazali, to support a kind of compatibilist determinism; from the other hand, I will evaluate Averroes peripatetic arguments against determinism. Is Averroes more consistent than Alexander or do we have to conclude that al-Ghazali and the Asharites have stronger arguments in order to support the kasb doctrine? (shrink)

Richard Sorabji, in his introduction to the series, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, of which this volume is a part, claims that these works "represent a missing link in the history of philosophy: the Latin-speaking Middle Ages obtained their knowledge of Aristotle at least partly through the medium of the commentaries. Without an appreciation of this, medieval interpretations of Aristotle will not be understood". If this remark is true of any volume in the series, it is certainly true of this one, (...) which presents R. W. Sharples' translation of the second half of Alexander's Quaestiones, a group of inquiries, 69 in total, on Aristotle's work and thought regarding the nature of providence, the soul, coming-to-be and passing-away, the finiteness of the universe, the nature of magnetism, and other topics. (shrink)

In this article, I present and explain ten different possible meanings of a chance event – some ontological, some epistemic – and provide examples whenever possible. I describe and illustrate more carefully the view of chance (tychē) expressed by Aristotle in his Physics, a demanding and complex notion, and contrast it to the other senses examined. The etymology of chance also reveals a cross-reference between chance and indeterminism. I draw attention to the fact that most of the definitions of chance (...) on offer need not conflict with causal determinism. (shrink)

The position on the question of divine providence of the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. A.D. 200) is of particular interest. It marks an attempt to find avia mediabetween the Epicurean denial of any divine concern for the world, on the one hand, and the Stoic view that divine providence governs it in every detail, on the other.2As an expression of such a middle course it finds a place in later classifications of views concerning providence.3It is also (...) of topical interest: Alexander's fullest discussion, in his treatiseDe providentia (On Providence)(surviving only in two Arabic versions), has only recently been edited and translated,4although some aspects of his position had long been known from other texts preserved in Greek.5. (shrink)

Many introductions to this field start with the problem of justifying scientific knowledge but Alexander Bird begins by examining the subject matter, or metaphysics, of science. Using topical scientific debates he vividly elucidates what it is for the world to be governed by laws of nature. This idea provides the basis for explanations and causes and leads to a discussion of natural kinds and theoretical entities. With this foundation in place he goes on to consider the epistemological issues of (...) how science arrives at knowledge, favouring a treatment of scientific reasoning based on inference to the best explanation. Drawing on contemporary work in epistemology, Bird argues that scepticism about induction should not be a problem for science and examines the consequences of this position for controversies surrounding the ideas of scientific progress and scientific revolution. Bird's insightful treatment makes Philosophy of Science an ideal text for undergraduate courses. The guides to further reading provided in each chapter help the reader pursue interesting topics and facilitate the use of the book in conjunction with primary sources. (shrink)

The work of the Paduan Aristotelian philosopher Iacopo Zabarella (1533–1589) has attracted the attention of historians of philosophy mainly for his contributions to logic, scientific methodology and because of his possible influence on Galileo. At the same time, Zabarella's views on Aristotelian psychology have been little studied so far; even those historians of Renaissance philosophy who have discussed them, have based their analysis mainly on the psychological essays included in Zabarella's De rebus naturalibus , but have avoided Zabarella's commentary on (...) Aristotle's De anima . This has led to an inaccurate, but widespread, understanding of Zabarella's views. The intention of this article is to provide a systematic analysis of Zabarella's arguments about the (im)mortality of the soul in the context of Aristotelian psychology. Zabarella's view that the soul is mortal according to Aristotle is remarkable for his time, while his elaboration of this position is far more comprehensive than that of Pietro Pomponazzi, the other significant Renaissance thinker who shared the same view. (shrink)

What is honor? Has its meaning changed since ancient times? Is it an outmoded notion? Does it still have the power to direct our behavior? In this provocative book Alexander Welsh considers the history and meaning of honor and dismisses the idea that we live in a post-honor culture. He notes that we have words other than _honor_, such as _respect_, _self-respect_, and personal _identity_, that show we do indeed care deeply about honor. Honor, he argues, is a continuing (...) process of respect that motivates or constrains members of a peer group. Honor’s dictates function as moral imperatives. Surprisingly, little systematic study of the history of honor in Western culture has been attempted. Offering a welcome remedy, Welsh provides a genealogy of approaches to the subject, mining some of the most influential texts of the Western tradition. He rereads with fascinating results the works of Aristotle, Cicero, Shakespeare, Mandeville, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Adam Smith, and others. With a sharp focus on the intersection of honor and ethics in both literature and philosophy, Welsh invites new and constructive debate on a topic of vital interest. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the theory of perceptual cognition laid out by the 7th century Buddhist scholar, Dharmakīrti, in his magnum opus, the Pramāṇavārttika. Like most theories of perception, both ancient and modern, the sensory cognition of ordinary objects is a topic of primary concern. Unlike other theorists, however, Dharmakīrti advances a technical definition of “perception” as a cognition which is both nonconceptual and non-erroneous. Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception is thereby deliberately inclusive of three additional types of “perceptual” cognition, in addition (...) to veridical sensory awareness: the nonconceptual mental apprehension of an immediately-preceding cognition (“mental perception”), the vivid appearance of soteriologically efficacious objects of contemplative practice (“yogic perception”), and the sheer unmediated presence of the contents of cognition—whatever these might be—to the cognizing mind (“reflexive awareness”). Through the logical examination of what it means to be aware of an object, Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the awareness of an object is just the awareness of a phenomenal form or cognitive image produced by that object. Pursuing this analysis further, however, Dharmakīrti argues that the very notion of an object of cognition that exists “externally” or outside the mind is incoherent. Additionally, Dharmakīrti maintains that the phenomenological structure of subject and object—that is, the “first-personal” sense of one’s own cognitions as pertaining to oneself (“for-me-ness”), together with the inseparably concomitant sense that the objects of cognition exist “out there” in an extramental world—is strictly a form of cognitive error. Therefore, because ordinary sensory cognition is inherently structured by this subject-object duality, ordinary sensory cognition must in the final analysis be understood as erroneous. According to Dharmakīrti, in other words, ultimately only the nondual “luminosity” of reflexive awareness is genuinely perceptual, because only reflexive awareness is undistorted by nature. In this way, Dharmakīrti’s epistemology provides a theoretical foundation for the advanced nondual contemplative practices of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, particularly Mahāmudrā and rDzogs chen. (shrink)

The existence of experts raises a host of interesting questions in social, legal, and political epistemology. This article introduces and discusses interested experts – people who are experts on some topic, but who also have a distinct set of values and preferences regarding that topic, so that they are not well-described as “disinterested” parties. Interested experts raise several distinct problems in social, legal, and political epistemology. Some general questions arise: can we rationally or justifiably form beliefs relying on interested expert (...) testimony? Do they constitute knowledge? Under what circumstances? This article focuses on a specific question in legal epistemology: should interested experts be allowed to serve on juries and, if so, should it be permissible for lawyers to strike them from the pool of potential jurors? My hope is that concentrating on this question will provide insight into the more general questions concerning the epistemology of testimony with respect to interested experts, while also providing concrete recommendations for jury reform to improve the epistemic performance of juries. (shrink)

Nobilitas is a study of the history of aristocratic philosophy from ancient Greece to the early twentieth century that aims at providing an alternative to the liberal democratic norms, which are propagated today as the only viable socio-political system for the world community. Jacob reveals that, contrary to popular belief, the social and cultural development of European civilization has, for twenty-five centuries, been based not on democratic or communist notions but, rather on aristocratic and nationalist notions. Beginning with the political (...) philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and continuing through Renaissance and Baroque aristocratic philosophers, the German Idealists, and English and Italian nationalists, the study ends with the transformation of aristocratic philosophy in nineteenth century Germany into racist elitism. As such, the study includes a survey of the philosophical bases of racism and anti-Semitism. These topics have been systematically excluded from academic and political debate since the end of the last Great War. This study is a pioneering work in understanding and changing political ideologies. (shrink)

I examine Alexander of Aphrodisias’ theory of action, addressing the question how his view that human actions are determined by reason accounts for the capacity of doing otherwise. Calling into question the standard view that Alexander frees agents from internal determination, I argue that (1) the capacity of doing otherwise is a consequence of determination by reason, since it enables agents to do something different from what they would have done had they followed external circumstances; and (2) this (...) capacity is compatible with causal determination by reason because as a case of potentiality for opposites, it grants agents the qualified possibility of doing otherwise insofar as their nature as human beings is concerned – a possibility which remains also when their actions are causally determined by reason and by their internal disposition. I show further that these elements of Alexander’s theory of action are ultimately based on his conception of the soul, specifically on his commitment to Aristotle’s view that the human soul is not purely rational, as the Stoics hold, but has nonrational and rational parts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Origen and Prophecy: Fate, Authority, Allegory, and the Structure of Scripture by Claire HallMilanna FritzOrigen and Prophecy: Fate, Authority, Allegory, and the Structure of Scripture by Claire Hall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 195 pp.Origen's (AD 185–255) surviving corpus is studied by scholars across the disciplines of theology philosophy and classics. Drawing from each of these fields, in Origen and Prophecy, Clare Hall applies Origen's self-proposed tripartite exegesis (...) of Scripture, in which verses can be read at a "somatic, psychic, or pneumatic level," to his conceptualization of prophecy [End Page 293] (193). Hall's argument examines the "landscape of pagan, Jewish, and early Christian religiosity" and considers the "whole range of Origen's corpus" in relation to "wider structures and themes in his work" (4, 25). In doing so, Hall presents a compelling analysis embedding Origen's system of exegesis and theology of prophecy within the intellectual history of prophecy in the late classical and early Christian world.In her first few chapters, Hall explores Origen's definitions of prophecy in relation to its Jewish and Greco-Roman influences and his system of scriptural exegesis. Hall remains cognizant of terminology used by classical authors as she describes Origen's word choice, noting, for instance, that he varies his language most when the prophetic validity of the author is in question (9–12). She summarizes Greek, Roman, and Jewish conceptualizations of prophecy, then turns to Scripture and early Christian texts, all of which shape Origen's own "notions of wisdom, knowledge, and prophecy" (20, 29). Hall argues that Origen's On First Principles and homilies on Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers are underlaid by a coherent exegetical system. Further, she explains, Origen's Commentary on the Song of Songs applies this same system to other forms of knowledge, including prophecy, which has a future-telling sense, a moral sense, and a mystical and revelatory sense (27, 50, 39–45). In her analysis, Hall provides insight into the philosophical and theological foundations for the "revelatory potential of allegory" as understood by Origen and other early Christian authors and carefully distinguishes Origen's own beliefs from the tenets of Origenism (30–31). To strengthen her argument, Hall cites a plethora of secondary scholars on Origen, including Caroline Bammel, Gunnar af Hällström, Robert Hauck, and Ilaria Ramelli (18–25).In her next few chapters, Hall unfolds Origen's system of distinguishing between true and false prophets and his advocacy for the unity of prophecy within Scripture in his response to Marcionism (199, 149–52). Chief among Hall's insightful contributions, however, is her treatment of the complex interrelation of prophecy and human autonomy: within Origen's framework, how does providential foreknowledge permit human free choice? To approach an answer, Hall traces the emerging conception of free will as "freedom of decision" among Greek authors such as Aristotle, Chrysippus and the Stoics, the Platonists, the Epicureans, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, who, she argues, laid the groundwork for Origen's "innovative narrative understanding of free will" in the context of "epistemological considerations surrounding prophecy" (55–71, 75). These sections of her book present a striking glimpse into early Christian departure from the Greek classical tradition, and her exploration of Origen's defense of both free will and [End Page 294] divine foreknowledge opens the door to further research on his theology of conversion and the relation between grace and nature (75–85, 91).While the entirety of her work is thought-provoking, some elements of Hall's presentation of Origen's theology may be open to a critical response by patristic scholars. Throughout her work, Hall consistently characterizes Origen's spiritual readings of Scripture—and prophecy—in direct opposition to its literal readings. For instance, she writes that, for Origen, just as "some verses do not have a somatic reading and cannot be taken literally," some prophecies are intended to be read as "stumbling blocks or riddles for the exegete to ponder," rather than accurate or "coherent" predictions of the future (193, 53). Additionally, Hall ties Origen's insights on prophecy in the Old Testament to his depiction of Christ as the "ultimate content of... (shrink)

In this article I take a loose, functional approach to defining induction: Inductive forms of reasoning include those prima facie reasonable inference patterns that one finds in science and elsewhere that are not clearly deductive. Inductive inference is often taken to be reasoning from the observed to the unobserved. But that is incorrect, since the premises of inductive inferences may themselves be the results of prior inductions. A broader conception of inductive inference regards any ampliative inference as inductive, where an (...) ampliative inference is one where the conclusion ‘goes beyond’ the premises. ‘Goes beyond’ may mean (i) ‘not deducible from’ or (ii) ‘not entailed by’. Both of these are problematic. Regarding (i), some forms of reasoning might have a claim to be called ‘inductive’ because of their role in science, yet turn out to be deductive after all—for example eliminative induction (see below) or Aristotle’s ‘perfect induction’ which is an inference to a generalization from knowledge of every one of its instances. Interpretation (ii) requires that the conclusions of scientific reasoning are always contingent propositions, since necessary propositions are entailed by any premises. But there are good reasons from metaphysics for thinking that many general propositions of scientific interest and known by inductive inference (e.g. “all water is H2O”) are necessarily true. Finally, both (i) and (ii) fail to take account of the fact that there are many ampliative forms of inference one would not want to call inductive, such as counter-induction (exemplified by the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ that the longer a roulette wheel has come up red the more likely it is to come up black on the next roll). Brian Skyrms (1999) provides a useful survey of the issues involved in defining what is meant by ‘inductive argument’. Inductive knowledge will be the outcome of a successful inductive inference. But much discussion of induction concerns the theory of confirmation, which seeks to answer the question, “when and to what degree does evidence support an hypothesis?” Usually, this is understood in an incremental sense and in a way that relates to the rational credibility of a hypothesis: “when and by how much does e add to the credibility of h?”, although ‘confirms’ is sometimes used in an absolute sense to indicate total support that exceeds some suitably high threshold.. (shrink)

"Aristotle was a systematic writer who often cross-referred to the definitions of terms given elsewhere in his work. Book 5 of the Metaphysics is important because it consists of definitions of the main uses of key terms in Aristotle's philosophy, and it is extremely valuable to have a commentary on this important text by Alexander of Aphrodisias, the leading commentator of his school. Alexander provides a detailed commentary on all of the thirty terms analysed in Book 5, weighing (...) alternative interpretations of what Aristotle says one against another, defending Peripatetic views against actual and possible criticisms, and attempting to integrate what is said in Book 5 into the context of the Metaphysics as a whole."--Bloomsbury Publishing. (shrink)

The Stoics identified thephantasiawith the impression (typos) in the soul, or the impressing process (typōsis). Alexander of Aphrodisias engages directly with this account atDe anima68.10–21, and argues against the applicability of the impression in a theory of perception inMantissa10, especially 133.25–134.23. I analyse Alexander’s polemic account atDe anima68.10–21, I demonstrate that it differs from Chrysippus’ criticism of Cleanthes (contrary to some commentators), and I show how it fits in the context of his argument. From this analysis it will (...) emerge how Alexander uses Stoic ideas to form his Aristotelian account. Then, I show that Alexander, by taking ‘typos’ metaphorically, not only prefers the term ‘enkataleimma’ over ‘typos’ in his theory ofphantasia, but he keeps the ‘typos’ terminology only to remain faithful to Aristotle’s use (contrary to some commentators). (shrink)

How do the heavenly bodies physically affect the sublunary world? On this topic, the few fragmentary statements by Aristotle were refined and expanded by his Greek commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. In the Kind-circle adaptations of Alexander and al-Kind-circle's Alexander was closely followed by al-Kind himself exerted a reciprocal influence on the Arabic Alexander, who was largely the product of his own group of translators. The appendix contains English translations from Arabic of two adapted Alexander's treatises.

In his 2013 monograph on Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica, Malcolm Wilson has shown both that Aristotle conceived of meteorological phenomena as analogous to the bodily processes of animals, and that for the Stagirite the sublunar world should not be seen as a single body, but rather as composed of many different individuals. However, Wilson did not articulate the relationship between these two theories—that is, he did not answer the following question: how is it possible for the Earth to (...) behave like an animal if it is not a single body? This paper argues that the answer to this question lies in the Aristotelian statement about the different paschein of the Earth and animals. In fact, in the chapter of Meteorology dedicated to climatic changes (1.14), Aristotle, after comparing such changes to the maturing and ageing of living organisms, states that ‘only, in the case of the bodies of plants and animals being affected does not occur in each part separately, but it is necessary for the being to mature and decay all at once, whereas in the case of the Earth this occurs in each part separately, due to cooling and warming’ (351a.28-31). In his commentary, Alexander of Aphrodisias reiterates that the difference between the changes of the Earth and those of living organisms concern the way in which these different subjects undergo affections (pathê). The concept of paschein/pathos is thus fundamental to understanding how Aristotle conceives of biological analogies, which play a key role in his meteorology: as the affections of maturing and corruption show, parallels with organic processes can be found in meteorological phenomena, but always at the level of the individual parts of the Earth. Although the sublunary world can be understood in organic terms, this world is not a ‘cosmic animal’, but rather a multiplicity of ‘regional animals’. To corroborate this thesis, this paper addresses several related questions, including: the mechanics ofenvironmental changes according to Aristotle; the differences between the regions of the Earth; the lexicon used in Meteorology to refer to the transformations of the Earth; the personal notes that Alexander adds to Aristotle’s discussion. Finally, the first modern translation of the relevant section of Alexander’s commentary is also provided here. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the genesis of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. It shows us that the formation of the natural philosophical views of the German philosopher took place not only in a speculative way, in the critical reception of Schelling’s works, but, first of all and for the most part, was predetermined by Hegel’s own interest in natural science and acquaintance with some prominent scientists of that time. The focus of the paper is on the evolution of the first (...) part of Hegel’s natural philosophy: the doctrine of space and time as it presented in some excerpts from two revised lecture notes on the philosophy of nature, read by Hegel in the winter semester of 1821/1822 at the University of Berlin and published as an appendix to the article by Bonzipen. In his article, Bonzipen provides historical information on the fate of these texts, raises the question of their authorship, gives a general outline of Hegel’s thought, and also compares both texts with the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. From his point of view, the revised notes allow partly to illustrate, partly to fill in some gaps in the dialectic of two forms of abstract appearance known on the basis of the Encyclopedia. Bonzipen notes that Hegel’s speculative consideration of space and time is complemented by a discussion with the history of philosophy and the history of mathematics. While reproaching traditional mathematics for being fixed on the quantitative aspect of reality, which does not allow to fully resolve the contradiction between space and time, Hegel at the same time refuses to attempt to build philosophical mathematics that focuses on the consideration of the qualitative certainty of the moments of space and time, declaring that although it is solvable, it is an extremely time-consuming task. This refusal becomes a turning point in the further development of the dialectical doctrine of space and time. (shrink)

As was first pointed out by Gercke, there are close parallels, which clearly suggest a common source, between Apuleius,de Platone1.12, the treatiseOn Fatefalsely attributed to Plutarch, Calcidius'excursuson fate in his commentary on Plato'sTimaeus, and certain sections of the treatisede Natura hominisby Nemesius. Gercke traced the doctrines common to these works to the school of Gaius; recently however Dillon has pointed out that, while Albinus shares with these works the characteristic Middle-Platonic notion of fate as conditional or hypothetical – our actions (...) are free, but once we have acted the consequences of our actions are fated and inevitable – he doesnotshare certain other common features, such as the identification of fate as substance with the world-soul and the hierarchy of three providences. (shrink)

As was first pointed out by Gercke, there are close parallels, which clearly suggest a common source, between Apuleius, de Platone 1.12, the treatise On Fate falsely attributed to Plutarch, Calcidius' excursus on fate in his commentary on Plato's Timaeus, and certain sections of the treatise de Natura hominis by Nemesius. Gercke traced the doctrines common to these works to the school of Gaius; recently however Dillon has pointed out that, while Albinus shares with these works the characteristic Middle-Platonic notion (...) of fate as conditional or hypothetical – our actions are free, but once we have acted the consequences of our actions are fated and inevitable – he does not share certain other common features, such as the identification of fate as substance with the world-soul and the hierarchy of three providences. (shrink)

Against the backdrop of the relations between Alexander of Aphrodisias and Bardaisan and Origen, and of Diodore of Tarsus’ reading of Bardaisan, this article reflects on Bardaisan’s ideas towards free will, fate, and nature in the so-called Book of the Laws of Countries, based on Bardaisan’s Against Fate. With reference to the article by Izabela Jurasz on the comparison between Alexander and Bardaisan, I present the main topics that scholarship debates regarding Bardaisan and argue that Eusebius had already (...) found important parallels between Alexander, Barsaisan, and Origen. Attention is paid to the strong affinities on crucial questions between Bardaisan and Origen, as established by recent research. These two comparisons—between Alexander and Bardaisan and between Origen and Bardaisan—reinforce one another. Bardaisan’s knowledge of parts of Philo’s oeuvre is also brought to the fore as an issue recently explored and in need of further investigation. Lastly, the article focuses on Diodore of Tarsus’ Against Fate, its indebtedness to Bardaisan’s Against Fate and generally his anti-astrological, anti-fatalistic arguments, and its reproach to Bardaisan for maintaining the category of “fate,” albeit Christianized. (shrink)

"Hegel's debts to ancient philosophy are widely acknowledged by scholars, and by the philosopher himself. Roughly half of his Lectures on the History of Philosophy is devoted to ancient philosophy, and throughout his work Hegel frequently frames his positions in relation to the thinkers and movements of antiquity. This volume presents original essays from leading scholars dealing with Hegel's debts to ancient thinkers, as well as his own, often problematic readings of ancient philosophy. While around half of the chapters discuss (...) Hegel's treatment of Aristotle--a topic that has long been at the forefront of scholarship--the other half explore his relationship to such ancient figures as Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Sextus Empiricus, and the Stoics. The essays challenge a number of longstanding scholarly assumptions regarding, for example, Hegel's denigration of the "mythical," his developmentalist approach to ancient thought, his conception of the state in relation to the Greek polis, his "hermeneutic" of the Platonic dialogues, and his use of Aristotelian concepts in arguments concerning the psyche, the body, and their unity and distinction.?"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Though clearly fallacious, the inference from determinism to fatalism (the ``Lazy Argument'''') has appealed to such minds as Aristotle and his disciple, Alexander of Aphrodisias. It is argued here (1) that determinism does entail a rather similar position, dubbed ``futilism''''; and (2) that distinctively Aristotelian determinism entails fatalism for any event to which it applies. The concept of ``fate'''' is examined along the way.

The text argues against the Stoics that the soul is incorporeal and is not in a subject. Pages 127–50 of the Greek text are concerned with vision and reject the different theories of the pre-Socratics. The last part explains how seeing comes about according to Aristotle. Alexander then passes to a study of man’s basic inclinations and of virtue, correcting views of the Stoa. With thirty-seven arguments he shows that virtue alone is not enough for happiness and also reminds (...) the reader that female and male are not different species. The closing sections on luck and fate are preceded by an interesting consideration of what depends on us, that is, those things about which we deliberate. The paragraph on luck sets forth Aristotle’s doctrine of Physics 2; the pages on fate bring together material from Alexander’s De fato: what is in accordance with fate is in accordance with nature. (shrink)

The text argues against the Stoics that the soul is incorporeal and is not in a subject. Pages 127–50 of the Greek text are concerned with vision and reject the different theories of the pre-Socratics. The last part explains how seeing comes about according to Aristotle. Alexander then passes to a study of man’s basic inclinations and of virtue, correcting views of the Stoa. With thirty-seven arguments he shows that virtue alone is not enough for happiness and also reminds (...) the reader that female and male are not different species. The closing sections on luck and fate are preceded by an interesting consideration of what depends on us, that is, those things about which we deliberate. The paragraph on luck sets forth Aristotle’s doctrine of Physics 2; the pages on fate bring together material from Alexander’s De fato: what is in accordance with fate is in accordance with nature. (shrink)

SUMMARY. The works of Alexander of Aphrodisias were written a few decades after the publication of the most successful -astrology hand- book in antiquity, Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos Syntaxis, which attempts to naturalize astrology, i.e. to make it agree with Aristotelian theory of science. A comparison of the doctrines between the Tetrabiblos and some passages of Alexander'p works on fate demostrates a noteworthy con¬vergere of the two scholars, and probably a dependence of the lasi great greek Aristotle's exegete on the (...) theories of Ptolemaic astrology, at least in reference to three points: theory of fate; justification of de- vining as a technical and naturai conjecture about man's fate; ana¬lysis of the stars' influence on the sublunary world in physical and phi¬losophical terms. (shrink)