The paper offers a comparison of the understanding of the realtion between psychology and philosophy in classical and alternative psychologies. In the "externalistic" vision, connected with the classical psychology, the philosophy is seen mainly as a discipline "outside" of psychology: philosophy is not neither to exert a direct influence on psychology, nor to enter into the the psychological inquiry. This approach implies the priority of empirical experience as well as shoving up the theoretical reflection beyond the framework of psychology. Contrary (...) to that the "internalistic" conception underlines the unity of the theoretical and empirical le_vels of knowledge, which are inseparable and mutually connected. This approach accepts the fact, that the philosophy does exert an influenc on the epistemological processes of psychology and does enter into them. Thus philosophy does not exist only "outside" of psychology as an academic disciplne, but also "inside" it, directly influencing the process of knowledge. (shrink)

The paper examines the concept of "implicit philosophy" as used in the integrated psychotherapy, making clear its content as a "potential philosophy". The author sees its meaning as opposite to the meaning of "explicit philosophy". To use the relationship between implicit and explicit philosophy in an explanation involves a binary conception of philosophy in its narrow and broader senses. The author shows, how the philosophy critically explains certain primal sponatneous genera_lizations in order to offer "secondary reimplications" of new philosophical attitudes. (...) The philosophical work is thus the middle stage of the whole process of proceeding from primary to secondary implicit philosophy. The concept of "implicit philosophy" can be applied also beyond the psychotherapy - e. g. in social philosophy or in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

The Alexandrian theologian Origen wrote that God the Father exceeds the Son in a way that surpasses the Son’s own transcendence of creation, and he apparently did so in order to oppose those who disregarded Jesus’ statement that «the Father is greater than I» . Just a few years after Origen’s death, however, when correction of his Son of God theology was well underway, Arius radicalized the latent subordinationism present in Origen’s thought by placing the Son among created things. The (...) Arian tendency to associate the Son with the created realm can be traced back to the attempts of Methodius of Olympus and Eusebius of Caesarea to counter Origen’s doctrine of eternal creation. Arius claimed that Christ is called «Son» because he is the created instrument of God’s will, and he gained sympathy for this voluntaristic view by citing John 14:28. Here was irrefutable scriptural proof of the metaphysical priority of the Father over the Son who is a separate and yet perfect creature of God. (shrink)

This article examines Athanasius’ argument in his work Contra Arianos, focusing on the reasons for the order in which he addresses the biblical texts he considers. While the choice of which texts to discuss is dictated by the need to consider those texts that were evidently important in the Arians’ own exegetical arguments, the order in which Athanasius discusses them derives from his desire to begin with biblical texts that clearly describe the whole sweep of biblical redemption. Texts (...) such as Philippians 2:5-11 and Hebrews 1-2 describe in some detail the movements of humiliation and exaltation which the Son undergoes as he becomes man, and thus these texts demonstrate the need to apply any given assertion about the Son either to his eternal existence as God or to his temporal existence as man. In such texts, the literary context-the subject of the passage itself-explicitly describes the broader redemptive context. As a result, these texts constitute the starting point from which to develop interpretive principles applicable to other biblical texts in which the redemptive context is not as obvious. The article concludes with reflection on the significance of Athanasius’ starting point: the story of redemption begins not with the Gospels or even with Genesis 1, but with the eternal relationship of Father to Son, a relationship we were created to share and redeemed that we might share it anew. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Beitrag nimmt die unter anderem von Walter Benjamin zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts im Rahmen einer Auseinandersetzung um die konzeptionelle Ausrichtung der Germanistik geäußerte Forderung in Augenschein, dass der spekulative Drang zum Philosophischen mit der verweilenden Aufmerksamkeit fürs Einzelne zu kombinieren sei, um die gleichzeitige Geltung geistesgeschichtlicher Zusammenhänge und historischer Details, von konkretem Gegenstand und allgemeinem Wesen, in den Blick zu bekommen. Am Beispiel von Athanasius Kirchers Traktat Scrutinium physico-medicum von 1658 wird gezeigt, dass es an Benjamins (...) Forderung eine frühneuzeitliche Annäherung gibt, in der die Wahrnehmungsform der spekulativen Aufmerksamkeit zu einer Möglichkeit wird, die Geistesgeschichte als Ergebnis eines Wechselverhältnisses zwischen Fokus und Entgrenzung zu verstehen. (shrink)

In this paper I endeavour to bridge the gap between the history of material culture and the history of ideas. I do this by focussing on the intersection between metaphysics and technology—what I call ‘applied metaphysics’—in the oeuvre of the Jesuit scholar Athanasius Kircher. By scrutinising the interplay between texts, objects and images in Kircher’s work, it becomes possible to describe the multiplicity of meanings related to his artefacts. I unearth as yet overlooked metaphysical and religious meanings of the (...) camera obscura, for instance, as well as of various other optical and magnetic devices. Today, instruments and artefacts are almost exclusively seen in the light of a narrow economic and technical concept. Historically, the ‘use’ of artefacts is much more diverse, however, and I argue that it is time to historicize the concept of ‘utility’.Keywords: Jesuit science; Utility; Material culture; History of ideas; Magnetic theology; Light metaphysics; Camera obscura; Technological expressionism; Philosophy of artefacts. (shrink)

Arius maintains that the Father must produce the Son without any pre-existing ingredients (ex nihilo) because no such ingredients are available to the Father. Athanasius denies this, insisting not only that the Father himself becomes an ingredient in the Son, but also that the Son inherits his divine properties from that ingredient. I argue, however, that it is difficult to explain exactly how the Son could inherit certain properties but not others from something he is not identical to, just (...) as it is difficult to explain the precise way that a statue inherits certain properties but not others from the lump of bronze it is made from. (shrink)

In The Kingdom and the Glory, Giorgio Agamben traces a genealogy of the concept of ‘economy’ through the development of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.1 While the more detailed metaphysics of the Trinity—the distinctions between ‘being,’ ‘nature,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘persons’ that drove the debates at Nicea and Chalcedon—were still in the process of development, Agamben argues that the concept of economy formed a kind of ‘placeholder’ for these concepts, holding together the mystery of the Trinity with the seeming ambivalence (...) of the world. Through a series of genealogical twists, this ‘economic’ paradigm in theology turns out to form the basis of modern economic governmentality—the ‘Petersonian’ counterpart to the ‘Schmittian’ shape of modern sovereignty. While Agamben links the language of ‘economy’ in early Trinitarian thought to the problem of the Trinitarian unity, he does so by delinking its use from the economy of salvation. As a result, the later history of the Trinitarian doctrine is characterized (on Agamben’s reading) by an increasing separation of the ‘economy’ and the ‘ontology’ of the Trinity; an inseparable division is opened up in Christian thought between ‘being’ and ‘acting,’ one which haunts Trinitarian doctrine and spills over into the history of Western political, philosophical, and economic thinking. In this paper, I intend to retrace this ‘economic’ lineage, but in order to re-link the questions of the Trinity and salvation; it is clear that the stakes for patristic writers, in working out a Trinitarian theology, were precisely salvation. The lines between heresy and orthodoxy are consistently argued in terms of their relationship to the possibility of salvation—the possibility of a triumph over sin and death. Only once re-situated in this way can the economic ‘theodicy’ of divine administration and the mature formulation of the ‘immanent’ metaphysics of the Trinity be read—as Karl Rahner famously claims—as the same thing. I will proceed first of all by retracing Agamben’s own steps—reconstructing his argument about the centrality of the category of ‘economy’ within Trinitarian theology. Secondly, I will intervene within Agamben’s genealogy at a key juncture, one that is passed over by Agamben’s own text: the Arian controversy. It is with the Arian controversy and the articulation of Nicene Trinitarianism that Agamben locates the break between ‘being’ and ‘activity’ or ‘economy,’ and so it is by re-narrating this controversy that an alternative account of the relationship between these terms in Trinitarian thought can be narrated. Finally, I will draw out a different, intrinsic relationship between Trinitarian ‘being’ and ‘activity’ than the one presumed by Agamben; one in which a relative break is conditioned by a more fundamental soteriological unity. This has, in turn, consequences for how the ‘economic paradigm’—in both its earlier Christian context and in its modern governmental instantiations—operates: the economic-theological paradigm produces the political-theological or ‘ontological’ paradigm of sovereignty to which it is linked. (shrink)

For Athanasius, non-being describes the original state of creatures, and the state that creatures return to when they are not sustained by God. ‘Being’ is a gift given to creatures. Sin, for Athanasius, is creaturely rejection of God and therefore rejection of being itself. This implies that when we sin, humans fall into nothingness and cease to exist, leading to the implication that fallen human nature and personal sin should result in our immediate non-existence. In this paper I (...) describe Athanasius’ position on non-being and sin, and then go on to look at how the theology of Maximus the Confessor may offer a means of understanding the difficulty implied in Athanasius’ work. I look at how Maximus understands being to be transformative, and something that humans grow into. Perfect being which is full communion with God, or absolute non-being are, through Christ, reserved for the time after this life on earth. (shrink)