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Eric Barnes [14]Eric Christian Barnes [5]Eric C. Barnes [1]
  1. Eric Christian Barnes (2014). The Roots of Predictivism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:46-53.
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  2. Eric Christian Barnes (2013). Freedom, Creativity, and Manipulation. Noûs 48 (2).
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  3. Eric Barnes (2009). The Problem of Clean Hands. Essays in Philosophy 10 (1):15.
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  4. Eric Christian Barnes (2008). Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549-557.
    provides a sustained and ambitious development of the basic idea that knowledge is true belief that tracks the truth. In this essay, I provide a quick synopsis of Roush's book and offer a substantive discussion of her analysis of scientific evidence. Roush argues that, for e to serve as evidence for h, it should be easier to determine the truth value of e than it is to determine the truth value of h, an ideal she refers to as ‘leverage’. She (...)
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  5. Eric C. Barnes (2008). The Paradox of Predictivism. Cambridge University Press.
    This account of predictivism has considerable consequences for the realist/anti-realist debate.
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  6. Eric Christian Barnes (2008). Review: Review Article: Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549 - 557.
    Sherrilyn Roush's Tracking Truth provides a sustained and ambitious development of the basic idea that knowledge is true belief that tracks the truth. In this essay, I provide a quick synopsis of Roush's book and offer a substantive discussion of her analysis of scientific evidence. Roush argues that, for e to serve as evidence for h, it should be easier to determine the truth value of e than it is to determine the truth value of h, an ideal she refers (...)
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  7. Eric Barnes (2005). On Mendeleev's Predictions: Comment on Scerri and Worrall. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):801-812.
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  8. Eric Barnes, Neither Truth Nor Empirical Adequacy Explain, Matti Eklund, Deep Inconsistency, Barbara Montero, Harold Langsam, Self-Knowledge Externalism, Christine McKinnon Desire-Frustration, Moral Sympathy & Josh Parsons (2002). INDEX for Volume 80, 2002. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):545-548.
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  9. Eric Barnes (2000). Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reason, Simon Blackburn. Clarendon Press, 1998, 344 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):372-378.
  10. Eric Christian Barnes (1998). Probabilities and Epistemic Pluralism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):31-47.
    A pluralistic scientific method is one that incorporates a variety of points of view in scientific inquiry. This paper investigates one example of pluralistic method: the use of weighted averaging in probability estimation. I consider two methods of weight determination, one based on disjoint evidence possession and the other on track record. I argue that weighted averaging provides a rational procedure for probability estimation under certain conditions. I consider a strategy for calculating ‘mixed weights’ which incorporate mixed information about agent (...)
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  11. Eric Barnes (1996). Social Predictivism. Erkenntnis 45 (1):69 - 89.
    Predictivism holds that, where evidence E confirms theory T, E confirms T more strongly when E is predicted on the basis of T and subsequently confirmed than when E is known in advance of T's formulation and used, in some sense, in the formulation of T. Predictivism has lately enjoyed some strong supporting arguments from Maher (1988, 1990, 1993) and Kahn, Landsberg, and Stockman (1992). Despite the many virtues of the analyses these authors provide it is my view that they (...)
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  12. Eric Barnes (1996). Thoughts on Maher's Predictivism. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):401-410.
    Predictivism asserts that where evidence E confirms theory T, E provides stronger support for T when E is predicted on the basis of T and then confirmed than when E is known before T's construction and 'used', in some sense, in the construction of T. Among the most interesting attempts to argue that predictivism is a true thesis (under certain conditions) is that of Patrick Maher (1988, 1990, 1993). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of predictivism (...)
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  13. Eric Barnes (1995). Inference to the Loveliest Explanation. Synthese 103 (2):251 - 277.
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  14. Eric Barnes (1995). Truthlikeness, Translation, and Approximate Causal Explanation. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):215-226.
    D. Miller's demonstrations of the language dependence of truthlikeness raise a profound problem for the claim that scientific progress is objective. In two recent papers (Barnes 1990, 1991) I argue that the objectivity of progress may be grounded on the claim that the aim of science is not merely truth but knowledge; progress thus construed is objective in an epistemic sense. In this paper I construct a new solution to Miller's problem grounded on the notion of "approximate causal explanation" which (...)
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  15. Eric Barnes (1994). Explaining Brute Facts. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:61 - 68.
    I aim to show that one way of testing the mettle of a theory of scientific explanation is to inquire what that theory entails about the status of brute facts. Here I consider the nature of brute facts, and survey several contemporary accounts of explanation vis a vis this subject (the Friedman-Kitcher theory of explanatory unification, Humphreys' causal theory of explanation, and Lipton's notion of 'explanatory loveliness'). One problem with these accounts is that they seem to entail that brute (...)
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  16. Eric Barnes (1994). Why P Rather Than Q? The Curiosities of Fact and Foil. Philosophical Studies 73 (1):35 - 53.
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  17. Eric Barnes (1992). Explanatory Unification and the Problem of Asymmetry. Philosophy of Science 59 (4):558-571.
    Philip Kitcher has proposed a theory of explanation based on the notion of unification. Despite the genuine interest and power of the theory, I argue here that the theory suffers from a fatal deficiency: It is intrinsically unable to account for the asymmetric structure of explanation, and thus ultimately falls prey to a problem similar to the one which beset Hempel's D-N model. I conclude that Kitcher is wrong to claim that one can settle the issue of an argument's explanatory (...)
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  18. Eric Barnes (1992). Explanatory Unification and Scientific Understanding. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:3 - 12.
    The theory of explanatory unification was first proposed by Friedman (1974) and developed by Kitcher (1981, 1989). The primary motivation for this theory, it seems to me, is the argument that this account of explanation is the only account that correctly describes the genesis of scientific understanding. Despite the apparent plausibility of Friedman's argument to this effect, however, I argue here that the unificationist thesis of understanding is false. The theory of explanatory unification as articulated by Friedman and Kitcher thus (...)
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  19. Eric Barnes (1991). Beyond Verisimilitude: A Linguistically Invariant Basis for Scientific Progress. Synthese 88 (3):309 - 339.
    This paper proposes a solution to David Miller's Minnesotan-Arizonan demonstration of the language dependence of truthlikeness (Miller 1974), along with Miller's first-order demonstration of the same (Miller 1978). It is assumed, with Peter Urbach, that the implication of these demonstrations is that the very notion of truthlikeness is intrinsically language dependent and thus non-objective. As such, truthlikeness cannot supply a basis for an objective account of scientific progress. I argue that, while Miller is correct in arguing that the number of (...)
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  20. Eric Barnes (1990). The Language Dependence of Accuracy. Synthese 84 (1):59 - 95.
    David Miller has demonstrated to the satisfaction of a variety of philosophers that the accuracy of false quantitative theories is language dependent (cf. Miller 1975). This demonstration renders the accuracy-based mode of comparison for such theories obsolete. The purpose of this essay is to supply an alternate basis for theory comparison which in this paper is deemed the knowledge-based mode of quantitative theory comparison. It is argued that the status of a quantitative theory as knowledge depends primarily on the soundness (...)
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