We present here the hypothesis that the unique microenvironmental pH landscape of acid‐base transporting epithelia is an important factor in development of epithelial cancers, by rendering the epithelial and stromal cells pre‐adapted to the heterogeneous extracellular pH (pHe) in the tumor microenvironment. Cells residing in organs with net acid‐base transporting epithelia such as the pancreatic ductal and gastric epithelia are exposed to very different, temporally highly variable pHe values apically and basolaterally. This translates into spatially and temporally non‐uniform intracellular pH (...) (pHi) patterns. Disturbed pHe‐ and pHi‐homeostasis contributes to essentially all hallmarks of cancer. Our hypothesis, that the physiological pHe microenvironment in acid‐base secreting epithelia shapes cancers arising in these tissues, can be tested using novel imaging tools. The acidic tumor pHe in turn might be exploited therapeutically. Pancreatic cancers are used as our prime example, but we propose that this concept is also relevant for other cancers of acid‐base transporting epithelia. (shrink)

Many Europeans are concerned about the living conditions of farm animals because they view animals as beings that possess interests of their own. Against this background the introduction of an animal welfare label is being intensively discussed in Europe. In choosing a market-based instrument to take these concerns into account, normative judgments are made about the formation of preferences, the value system that is implicitly assumed, and the distribution of property rights. From the perspective of classical institutional economics it can (...) be shown that the introduction of a label as an institutional change does not redefine institutions in a way that allows them to consider the interests of animals for their own sake. Rather, the label only redefines the property rights that humans have over animals. The market segregation into privileged and normal animals conflicts with the idea of equality between sentient animals. Within the group of humans only the interests of those who act on markets count. The commodification of their moral concerns assumes that people always decide based on their own interests, which can be traded off. The lexicographical ordering of preferences, which occurs when humans view animals as entities with rights, is not compatible with the normative assumptions of markets. Furthermore, interpreting animal suffering as market failure that can be corrected by labeling impedes a reasoned dialog within the society about the values and beliefs that serve as a basis for preference formation. Thus, an animal welfare label cannot replace a fundamental societal debate about legal standards on animal well-being. (shrink)

Zur Sprache der Humanmedizin muss auch das Vokabular der tierexperimentellen Forschung gezählt werden, deren Paradigma sich im Begriff des ‚Tiermodells‘ ausdrückt. Er ist auch für die außerwissenschaftliche Kommunikation von Versuchsergebnissen charakteristisch. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwiefern der Sprache der Tierversuche selbst ethische Relevanz zukommt, insbesondere, wenn sie in andere Kommunikationszusammenhänge hineinwirkt. Dazu soll zunächst auf Konfliktlinien zwischen wissenschaftlicher Freiheit und dem Anspruch ethisch bewussten Sprachhandelns eingegangen werden. Anschließend ist zu erläutern, inwiefern eine sprachliche Konvention als ‚ethischer bias‘ (...) infrage kommt. Diese Überlegungen werden schließlich beispielhaft auf den Tiermodell-Begriff bezogen, um den Vorwurf einer technisierenden und entindividualisierenden Sprache zu konkretisieren und abschließend ihre Wirkung auf die öffentliche Wahrnehmung von Tierversuchen zu diskutieren. Um die ‚Sprache der Forschung‘ geht es dabei durchgehend in einem weiten Sinne, der auch die Sprache über diese Forschung in philosophischen, (forschungs-)politischen, juristischen, didaktischen und ökonomischen Kontexten miteinschließt. (shrink)

Academic and public debates are increasingly concerned with the question whether and how algorithmic decision-making may reinforce social inequality. Most previous research on this topic originates from computer science. The social sciences, however, have huge potentials to contribute to research on social consequences of ADM. Based on a process model of ADM systems, we demonstrate how social sciences may advance the literature on the impacts of ADM on social inequality by uncovering and mitigating biases in training data, by understanding data (...) processing and analysis, as well as by studying social contexts of algorithms in practice. Furthermore, we show that fairness notions need to be evaluated with respect to specific outcomes of ADM systems and with respect to concrete social contexts. Social sciences may evaluate how individuals handle algorithmic decisions in practice and how single decisions aggregate to macro social outcomes. In this overview, we highlight how social sciences can apply their knowledge on social stratification and on substantive domains of ADM applications to advance the understanding of social impacts of ADM. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the ethics of popularizing moral philosophy. In particular, it addresses the question of whether ethicists engaged in public debates should restrict themselves to acting as impartial informants or moderators rather than advocates of their own moral opinions. I dismiss the idea that being an impartial servant to moral debates is the default or even the only defensible way to publicly exercise ethical expertise and thus, to popularize moral philosophy. Using a case example from the public (...) debate about the human use of nonhuman animals, I highlight the benefits and risks of endorsing an advocate’s and a teacher’s or moderator’s role, respectively. I argue for a general requirement of judgment transparency which entails that the publicly engaged philosopher ought to be clear and consistent about the type of role she takes on, her publicly advanced opinions generally ought to be her professional ones and that she ought to flag her private opinions. I finally show that, despite general concerns about conflicts of interest, exercising ethical expertise and engaging in advocacy, i.e., acting as if one were a moral expert, are not incompatible modes of public engagement for the moral philosopher. (shrink)

The term ‘speciesism’ was once coined to name discrimination against nonhuman animals as well as the bias that such discrimination expresses. It has sparked a debate on criteria for being morally considerable and the relative significance of human and nonhuman animals’ interests. Many defenses of the preferential consideration of humans have come with a denial of the normative meaning of the term ‘speciesism’ itself. In fact, defenders of the moral relevance of species membership and their critics alike have often used (...) ‘speciesism’ as a merely descriptive technical term for classifying positions in normative ethics. This paper argues that this terminological choice severely impoverishes our ethical vocabulary and moral conceptual scheme. It obscures the considerable common ground among theorists with differing views on the relevance of various properties for moral consideration. It is often overlooked that even most defenders of the preferential treatment of one’s fellow species members have good reason to hold on to the normative notion that ‘speciesism’ was originally meant to be. Two distinct types of concepts are involved when differential treatment along species lines is addressed in a normative and a descriptive way, respectively. The term ‘speciesism’ should be reserved for the normative concept and kept apart from the descriptive term ‘speciescentrism.’ Attempts to redefine speciesism as something that is not wrong by definition are shown to be epistemically and morally harmful for the same reasons attempts to redefine racism and sexism in this way are. (shrink)

O ficcionalismo, geralmente classificado como um tipo de nominalismo, apresenta como perspectiva precípua a tese de que os entes matemáticos são ficções. Para o ficcionalista, o discurso matemático é desprovido de conteúdo. Hartry Field, que é o principal defensor dessa concepção ontológica da matemática, contesta, em Science Without Numbers, a utilização de entes matemáticos na redação de teorias da física, alegando que a defesa mais plausível do realismo ontológico matemático é o argumento da indispensabilidade de Quine-Putnam. O ficcionalismo defendido por (...) Field nos permite, de acordo com Shapiro, classificá-lo no grupo filosofia-primeiro, ou seja, entre os filósofos que defendem que a filosofia deve ser responsável por legislar a respeito da prática matemática. Dessa forma, podemos considerar Field um revisionista epistemológico. Como se sabe, a dependência da ciência moderna em relação ao discurso matemático coloca a tese ficcionalista em xeque. Ainda assim, se partirmos dos pressupostos filosóficos da vertente formalista da filosofia da matemática, que concebe a matemática como constituída de um conjunto de regras sem significado que podem ser manipuladas de maneira puramente sintática, poderemos traçar importantes analogias entre matemática e ficção, tal como também entre metamatemática e metaficção. Para um formalista simpático à tese ficcionalista, o estatuto ontológico da matemática é semelhante ao das regras de um jogo de xadrez. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschaftigt sich mit einem theoretischen Ansatz innerhalb der Semantik, der bisher in Europa wenig Zuspruch fand: die Prototypensemantik. Die Autorin weist nach, dass metaphorische Redewendungen sehr wohl strukturiert und vollstandig mit Mitteln moderner empirischer Forschung analysiert werden konnen. Vor allem soll diese Arbeit als Anstoss verstanden werden, neue Wege in der Semantik zu gehen. Diese ist eine Disziplin, in der eben nicht nur rein sprachwissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse und Methoden Verwendung finden sollten, da sie die Verbindung zwischen Sprache, Mensch (...) und Welt darstellt. Es ist daher notwendig, die Sprache in ihrem 'naturlichen' Zusammenhang zu betrachten.". (shrink)

Disney's Zootopia (2016) is a crime story about the involuntary partnership between Judy Hopps, the first rabbit police officer in the city of Zootopia, and Nick Wilde, a red fox making his living as a con artist. What makes Zootopia a utopia and the city of Judy's dreams is that it appears to be “where anyone can be anything.” Zootopia confronts people with three utopian ideals: of security and social order, of individual self‐determination and fulfillment, and of a just multispecies (...) society. Zootopia begins with the founding myth that tells the story of how the animals overcame an anything‐but‐ideal natural state, in which prey animals lived in constant fear of predators. Zootopia is too much of a metaphor for human ways of life to be a utopian human‐animal society, and too “messy” to count as a metaphoric utopia for humans. (shrink)

While research on object individuation assumes that even very young children are able to perceive objects as particulars, we argue that the results of relevant studies can be explained in terms of feature discrimination. We propose that children start out navigating the world with a feature‐based ontology and only later become able to individuate objects spatiotemporally. Furthermore, object individuation is a cognitively demanding achievement resting on a uniquely human form of enculturation, namely the acquisition of deictic demonstratives. We conclude by (...) outlining empirical expectations for operationalizations of our proposal. (shrink)

Frauke Albersmeier | : In Zoopolis, Donaldson and Kymlicka dismiss the abolitionist, or extinctionist approach in animal rights theory as insufficient in its theoretical foundation and disproportional regarding the means it promotes to prevent domesticated animals from suffering abuse by humans. Among the consequences of their counterproposal—granting domesticated animals citizenship—is an increased pressure to justify any interference with domesticated animals’ reproductive activities. This paper attempts to give such justification with reference to domesticated animals’ specific state of vulnerability, but also (...) takes into account the interest of the mixed society to prevent overly demanding obligations. Even while recognizing existing domesticated animals as citizens, humans might be unable to fully meet their obligation to protect the most dependent of them, and therefore might be justified in conditionally subscribing to “extinctionism” and limiting these animals’ reproduction to the point of their ultimate extinction. Therefore, rather than upholding a strict opposition between extinctionism in any form and a political framework for animal rights, out of reasonable concern for the well-being of domesticated animals in the societies they have been placed in, a qualified extinctionist approach should be incorporated into the political framework developed in Zoopolis. | : Dans Zoopolis, Donaldson et Kymlicka rejettent l’approche abolitionniste, ou extinctionniste, de la théorie du droit des animaux. Ils estiment que ses fondements théoriques sont insuffisants et que les mesures qu’elle promeut pour protéger les animaux domestiques des abus des humains sont disproportionnées. Leur contre-proposition – qui accorde la citoyenneté aux animaux domestiques – a plusieurs conséquences, parmi lesquelles un renforcement de la justification de toutes les formes d’ingérence dans la reproduction des animaux domestiques. Cet article tente de justifier pareille ingérence en raison de l’état particulier de vulnérabilité des animaux domestiques, mais tient également compte du fait que la société mixte a intérêt à éviter l’établissement d’obligations trop exigeantes. Cependant, les humains peuvent accorder aux animaux domestiques existant un statut de citoyen tout en s’avérant incapables de remplir pleinement leur obligation de protéger les plus dépendants d’entre eux. Ils pourraient par conséquent être justifiés de souscrire de manière conditionnelle à « l’extinctionnisme » et limiter la reproduction de ces animaux jusqu’à leur extinction. C’est pourquoi, au lieu de maintenir une opposition stricte entre l’extinctionnisme sous toutes ses formes et l’élaboration d’un cadre politique pour le droit des animaux, l’on devrait, par souci du bien-être des animaux domestiques dans les sociétés dans lesquelles ils vivent, insérer une approche extinctionniste conditionnelle dans le cadre politique élaboré dans Zoopolis. (shrink)

What does the way we clarify and revise concepts reveal about the nature of concepts? This paper investigates the ontological commitments of conceptual analysis and explication regarding their supposed subject matter – concepts. It demonstrates the benefits of a cognitivist account of concepts, according to which they are not items on which the subject operates cognitively, but rather ways in which the subject operates. The proposed view helps to handle alternating references to ‘concepts’ and ‘terms’ in instructions on analysis and (...) explication. Furthermore, its virtue lies not in the capacity to render concepts ‘shareable’ but in its ontological parsimony. (shrink)

Diese Reihe präsentiert innovative Studien in deutscher oder englischer Sprache, die aktuelle Themen der praktischen Philosophie aus analytischer Perspektive behandeln. Dazu gehören Fragen aus den Bereichen der Metaethik, der normativen und der,angewandten' Ethik ebenso wie Fragen der politischen Philosophie, der Rechtsphilosophie und der Handlungstheorie.

The article deals with the role of companies in the social market economy. An example of a successful international self-regulatory initiative and its implementation in German chemical industry is discussed.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

We report the results of a vignette study with an online sample of the German adult population in which we analyze the interplay between need, equity, and accountability in third-party distribution decisions. We asked participants to divide firewood between two hypothetical persons who either differ in their need for heat or in their productivity in terms of their ability to chop wood. The study systematically varies the persons’ accountability for their neediness as well as for their productivity. We find that (...) participants distribute significantly fewer logs of wood to persons who are held accountable for their disadvantage. Independently of being held accountable or not, the needier person is partially compensated with a share of logs that exceeds her contribution, while the person who contributes less is given a share of logs smaller than her need share. Moreover, there is a domain effect in terms of participants being more sensitive to lower contributions than to greater need. (shrink)

Perner and Roessler Causing human action: new perspectives on the causal theory of action, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 199–228, 2010) hold that children who do not yet have an understanding of subjective perspectives, i.e., mental states, explain actions by appealing to objective facts. In this paper, we criticize this view. We argue that in order to understand objective facts, subjects need to understand perspectives. By analysing basic fact-expressing assertions, we show that subjects cannot refer to facts if they do (...) not understand two types of perspectivity, namely, spatial and doxastic perspectivity. To avoid conceptual confusion regarding different ways of referring to facts, we distinguish between reference to facts de re and de dicto. (shrink)

Summary In the period between the two World Wars, the Portuguese Geological Survey (Serviços Geológicos de Portugal: PGS) was legally dependent on the General Directorate of Mines and Geological Survey (Direcção Geral de Minas e Serviços Geológicos: GDMGS). Portugal was then living through troubled times, and the PGS struggled with financial problems and a lack of technical personnel. This situation did not allow the PGS to work properly as a scientific institution, and achieve its main function: the making and publication (...) of geological maps and research papers. (shrink)

Die deutschsprachige Rezeption des spanischen Schriftstellers und Philosophen José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) ist durch eine auffallende Diskrepanz zwischen der immensen Bedeutung seines Werkes für das Selbst- und Weltverständnis weiter Kreise der Bevölkerung und eine weitgehende Vernachlässigung der Beschäftigung mit eben diesem Werk durch die Fachwissenschaft gekennzeichnet. Dies ist, kurz gesagt, das Ergebnis dieser Studie, die Ortegas unvergleichlichen Rezeptionserfolg in den deutschsprachigen Ländern, insbesondere in der Nachkriegszeit, anhand von Primär- und Sekundärtexten untersucht. Die Autorin gelangt zu der erstaunlichen Schlußfolgerung, daß (...) gerade die Rezeption Ortegas als Beleg für den Verlust der Lebensbedeutsamkeit dieser Wissenschaft, der Philosophie, betrachtet werden kann. (shrink)

Pretendemos neste artigo analisar a relação entre tragédia antiga e moderna tal qual se apresenta na obra _Ou-Ou_, de Kierkegaard. Assim, analisando o conceito de tragédia na antiguidade e sua mudança na modernidade, afigura-se como problema mostrar de que maneira a reflexão acerca do trágico aponta uma condição para que a arte moderna tenha significado. Levando em conta, então, que a tragédia antiga é caracterizada pela ação no seio do Estado, da família e da religião e que, por outro lado, (...) a tragédia moderna é determinada pela reflexão, procura-se mostrar que o pesar ligado à ação e suas consequências, torna-se angústia ligada à reflexão e à possibilidade de uma vida trágica. Para tal, primeiro analisa-se o conceito de tragédia antiga e moderna de acordo com o exposto por Hegel em seus _Cursos de Estética_, desse modo, pode-se melhor ver de que modo Kierkegaard se apropria do exposto por Hegel, mas também de que maneira diverge deste. Isto feito, será possível ver que enquanto Hegel vê na tragédia uma reconciliação das forças opostas, Kierkegaard acentua o caráter esteticamente ambíguo da mesma, afastando-se de qualquer reconciliação. E que, ao assim fazê-lo, indica que a arte moderna só ganha significado com o renascimento do trágico na modernidade. (shrink)