From the early 1790s until after the turn of the century, a very productive but also controversial exchange took place between Reinhold and Fichte. Though many key aspects of post-Kantian philosophy were discussed, the philosophical confrontation between Reinhold and Fichte is most instructive for the understanding of post-Kantian philosophy. The exchange started when Fichte published his verdict on Reinhold's Elementarphilosophie and disapproved of its fundamental principle. In 1794 Fichte challenged Reinhold by presenting his Wissenschaftslehre. Reinhold was not convinced of Fichte's (...) foundation of philosophy at first, but announced that he accepted the Wissenschaftslehre in 1797. While Reinhold and Fichte officially collaborated in the following three years, tensions concerning fundamental questions were still present. When Reinhold adopted Rational Realism, his relation to Fichte deteriorated and the exchange between the two finally ended. The contributions in the present collection focus on the central systematic issues at the different stages of the confrontation between Fichte and Reinhold, thereby illuminating questions that are essential to the understanding of the evolution of post-Kantian German philosophy. (shrink)

The focus on translational research in clinical trials has the potential to generate clinically relevant genetic data that could have importance to patients. This raises challenging questions about communicating relevant genetic research results to individual patients. An exploratory pharmacogenetic analysis was conducted in the international ovarian cancer phase III trial, AGO-OVAR 16, which found that patients with clinically important germ-line BRCA1/2 mutations had improved progression-free survival prognosis. Mechanisms to communicate BRCA results were evaluated, because these findings may be beneficial to (...) patients and their families. Communicating individual BRCA results was not anticipated during clinical trial design. Consequently, options were not available for patients to indicate their preference for receiving their individual results when they signed pharmacogenetic informed consent. Differences in local requirements, clinical practice, and opinion regarding the ethical aspects of how to convey genetic results to patients are all potential barriers to returning individual BRCA results to patients. Communicating the aggregate BRCA result from this study provided clinical investigators with a mechanism to disseminate the overall study finding to patients while taking individual circumstances, local guidelines and clinical practice into account. This study illustrates the importance of increasing the clarity and scope of informed consent and the need for patient engagement to ensure clinical trial participants can indicate their preference regarding receipt of potentially important individual pharmacogenetic results. This study was registered in the NCT Clinical Trial Registry under NCT00866697 on March 19, 2009, following approval from participating ethics committees. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 1 Seiten: 199-202.

Ding und Begriff stellen den Kern von Peter F. Strawsons Philosophie dar: Worauf beziehen wir uns in unserem alltaglichen Denken und Sprechen und unter welchen Bedingungen konnen wir uns darauf beziehen? Mit dieser Frage, wie wir die Welt begrifflich erfassen, sind eine Reihe von Problemstellungen metaphysisch-ontologischer, epistemologischer, logischer und sprachphilosophischer Natur verbunden. An sie knupfen die hier versammelten Beitrage an. Die systematische Auseinandersetzung mit Strawsons Themen zeigt einige Schwachen seiner Positionen auf, weist aber auch Wege zu moglichen Losungen und bettet (...) Strawsons Philosophieren dadurch in aktuelle Debatten ein.". (shrink)

There is sufficient evidence to believe that variations in the error-related negativity (ERN) are linked to dispositional characteristics in individuals. However, explanations of individual differences in the amplitude of the ERN cannot be derived from functional theories of the ERN. The ERN has a counterpart that occurs after correct responses (correct-response negativity, CRN). Based on the assumption that ERN and CRN reflect an identical cognitive process, variations in CRN might be associated with dispositional characteristics as well. Higher CRN amplitudes have (...) been found to reflect task engagement. In the present study, a simple-choice-reaction task was used to investigate ERN and CRN amplitudes in relation to their score on a conscientiousness scale. The task consisted of a simple rule that required pressing the left or right key when a circle or square appeared, respectively. During alternative conditions that occur infrequently, participants were instructed to violate or reverse the previously established response rules. Smaller ΔERN amplitudes (manifested in almost equal CRN and ERN amplitudes) and a tendency of better task performance from participants scoring high on the conscientiousness scale might indicate a greater focus on the task and higher motivation of responding correctly. In addition, higher Pc amplitudes directly following the CRN indicated that the response monitoring system of less conscientious participants showed a higher disengagement. The role of individual differences in CRN amplitude should be studied in future experiments on performance monitoring. (shrink)

In the first paragraph of the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre Fichte gives an extended exposition of his first principle. The aim of the article is to show that, first, this exposition is in fact an argument in favour of the first principle of the Wissenschaftslehre, and, second, that it answers the central point of the sceptical criticism put forward by Jacobi, Maimon and Schulze against Kantian philosophy. In order to corroborate these theses, the central point of the sceptical critique has (...) to be identified in a first step. Next, I examine Fichte’s strategy to meet the sceptical challenge. As a result, only a pre-systematic form of argument is adequate for Fichte to establish a principle that is immune to sceptical doubts, and, therefore, is a suitable starting point for a transcendental deduction. Finally, Fichte’s argument against the sceptics can be reconstructed in the following way: He takes up the central point of the sceptical critique and reformulates it as a criterion for a first principle. He then shows that the criterion is fulfilled by the I, if it is conceived in his own way, i.e. as pure activity.Fichte entwickelt im ersten Paragraphen der Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre eine ausführliche Exposition seines ersten Grundsatzes. Der Beitrag hat zum Ziel zu zeigen, dass diese Exposition ein Argument für das erste Prinzip der Wissenschaftslehre darstellt und dass es ein Argument gegen den zentralen Punkt der skeptischen Kritik an der Transzendentalphilosophie, wie sie Jacobi, Maimon und Schulze formulierten, ist. Um diese Thesen zu untermauern, wird in einem ersten Schritt der zentrale Punkt der skeptischen Kritik identifiziert. Dem folgt eine Untersuchung der Strategie, mit der Fichte der Kritik begegnet, wobei sich eine vorsystematische Argumentation als geeignet erweist, einen ersten Grundsatz aufzustellen, der gegen die vorgebrachten Zweifel resistent und daher als Basis einer transzendentalen Deduktion tauglich ist. Fichtes Argumentation gegen den Skeptizismus kann dann folgendermaßen rekonstruiert werden: Fichte nimmt den zentralen Punkt der skeptischen Kritik auf und formt ihn in ein Kriterium für ein erstes Prinzip um. Er kann dann zeigen, dass das Ich das Kriterium erfüllt, sofern es als reine Tätigkeit aufgefasst wird. (shrink)

The capability of logical systems to express their own satisfaction relation is a key issue in mathematical logic. Our notion of self definability is based on encodings of pairs of the type (structure, formula) into single structures wherein the two components can be clearly distinguished. Hence, the ambiguity between structures and formulas, forming the basis for many classical results, is avoided. We restrict ourselves to countable, regular, logics over finite vocabularies. Our main theorem states that self definability, in this framework, (...) is equivalent to the existence of complete problems under quantifier free reductions. Whereas this holds true for arbitrary structures, we focus on examples from Finite Model Theory. Here, the theorem sheds a new light on nesting hierarchies for certain generalized quantifiers. They can be interpreted as failure of self definability in the according extensions of first order logic. As a further application we study the possibility of the existence of recursive logics for PTIME. We restate a result of Dawar concluding from recursive logics to complete problems. We show that for the model checking Turing machines associated with a recursive logic, it makes no difference whether or not they may use built in clocks. (shrink)

Concluding the deduction of imagination in § 4 of the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte remarks that one lesson of the Wissenschaftslehre is that all reality is a product of imagination. One of the greatest thinkers of the age, Fichte writes, is teaching the same, but calls it a deception of imagination. Fichte’s remark is aimed at Salomon Maimon, and it shows that his deduction shouldn’t be read only as part of the systematic development of the theoretical Wissenschaftslehre, but should (...) also be considered as an argument against a specific kind of scepticism. In order to examine this overlooked anti-sceptical aim in the first Wissenschaftslehre, an overview of the deduction of § 4 with a focus on the systematic role of imagination will first be given. Second, Maimon’s sceptical argument against transcendental philosophy will be explained. In the centre again will stand Maimon’s Humean concept of imagination. Finally, it will be shown in which sense Fichte’s deduction of imagination has to be taken in order to be an adequate response to Maimonian scepticism.An die Deduktion der Einbildungskraft in § 4 der Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre schließt Fichte die Bemerkung an, es werde hier gelehrt, dass alle Realität durch die Einbildungskraft hervorgebracht wird. Einer der größten Denker des Zeitalters – gemeint ist Salomon Maimon – lehre das Gleiche, nur nenne er es eine Täuschung durch die Einbildungskraft. Diese Bemerkung lässt erkennen, dass die Deduktion der Einbildungskraft nicht nur im Dienst der Entwicklung des theoretischen Teils der Wissenschaftslehre steht, sondern dass sie auch im Sinne eines antiskeptischen Arguments verstanden werden muss. Um diesen Aspekt von Fichtes Konzeption der Einbildungskraft genauer zu beleuchten, wird erstens die Deduktion in § 4 mit Blick auf die systematische Rolle der Einbildungskraft dargestellt. Zweitens wird Maimons skeptisches Argument gegen die Transzendentalphilosophie präzisiert, auf das sich Fichte mit seiner Äußerung bezieht, wobei Maimons sich an Hume orientierendes Verständnis der Einbildungskraft im Zentrum steht. Zuletzt wird geprüft, in welchem Sinn Fichtes Deduktion der Einbildungskraft als Antwort auf Maimons Skeptizismus verstanden werden muss. (shrink)

In 1791 Karl Leonhard Reinhold expressed full agreement with Kant’s verdict that appeal to common understanding is not acceptable in philosophy. Only three years later Reinhold presented a philosophical methodology in which common understanding was explicitly assigned an essential function. In my contribution, I shall first reconstruct Reinhold’s account of the relation between common understanding and philosophising reason (Section 2). According to this account, common understanding is supposed to provide a multitude of empirical facts of consciousness. Philosophising reason takes these (...) facts as the starting point of philosophical analysis and establishes their a priori, transcendental grounds. Common understanding and philosophising reason thus fulfil complementary roles: philosophy analyses, explains, and justifies the basic beliefs of common understanding; philosophical claims are, in turn, substantiated through their reference to the facts provided by common understanding. I shall also show that the account of the relation between common understanding and philosophising reason enables Reinhold to deal with some objections against his philosophical system. The appeal to common understanding thus serves the purpose of corroborating the structure and the contents of the Elementarphilosophie. In Section 3, I shall suggest that Reinhold’s introduction of common understanding was not influenced by common-sense philosophy but rather by the Wolffian conception of the relation between common cognition and philosophical cognition. Reinhold accepted the general outline of Wolff’s rationalist conception but adopted it to the framework of critical philosophy. In my concluding remarks (Section 4) I shall briefly indicate that the main characteristics of the account of the relation between common understanding and philosophical reason withstood Reinhold’s later changes of philosophical systems. (shrink)

Recognized as a landmark of twentieth century intellectual history, I and Thou is Buber's masterpiece.

Bd. 1. A-B -- Bd. 2. C-F -- Bd. 3. G-Inn -- Bd. 4. Ins-Loc.

I revisit my article, “Why Immortality Is Not So Bad,” in which I argued that Bernard Williams’s thesis that immortality would necessarily be boring for any human being is false. Here I point out various ways in which Williams’s treatment of the issues has tilted and distorted the subsequent debates.

Many philosophers and psychologists argue that normal adult human beings possess a primitive or 'folk' psychological theory. Recently, however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative. This alternative view says that human bings are able to predict and explain each others' actions by using the resources of their own minds to simuate the psychological etiology of the actions of others. The thirteen essays in this volume present the foundations of theory of mind debate, and are accompanied by (...) an extensive introduction. (shrink)

Taking issue with those who see recent social transformations as an extension of modernity, the author contends that social theory must confront an epochal change from the modern era to a new era of globality, in which human beings can conceive of forces at work on a global scale, and in which they espouse values that take the globe as their reference point. The book begins by assessing the problems of writing about modernity, showing how narratives of an endlessly self-perpetuating (...) modern age were intrinsic to the "modern project," the attempt by Enlightenment philosophers to transform the everyday world in accord with science and logic under the auspices of the nation-state. Now we are beginning to realize that the nation-state and the modern project cannot renew themselves endlessly through expansion. Instead, the author contends, the age has culminated in its own dissolution, and globality has supplanted modernity as the basis for action and social organization. In theorizing the global age, he considers the worldwide environmental consequences of aggregate human activities, the reconception of human security in the age of nuclear weapons, technological advances in communication systems, the rise of a global economy, and the growing reflexivity of global consciousness, as people and groups begin to refer to the globe as the frame for their beliefs. The book concludes by examining the consequences of the Global Age thesis for politics, identifying a new popular construction of the state that the author terms "performative citizenship." In the modern age, the nation-state was the central power and citizens were beneficiaries of that power, with rights and duties. In the global age, citizens respond to the lack of central power by creating, or performing, the state themselves. The global managerial class uses the skills learned in the bureaucracy of the nation-state to bring pressure on national governments in the interests of global economic, environmental, or human-rights issues. (shrink)

"A valuable collection both for original source material as well as historical formulations of current problems."-- The Review of Metaphysics "Much more than a mere collection of papers . . . a valuable addition to the literature."-- Mathematics of Computation An anthology of fundamental papers on undecidability and unsolvability by major figures in the field, this classic reference opens with Godel's landmark 1931 paper demonstrating that systems of logic cannot admit proofs of all true assertions of arithmetic. Subsequent papers by (...) Godel, Church, Turing, and Post single out the class of recursive functions as computable by finite algorithms. Additional papers by Church, Turing, and Post cover unsolvable problems from the theory of abstract computing machines, mathematical logic, and algebra, and material by Kleene and Post includes initiation of the classification theory of unsolvable problems. Suitable for graduate and undergraduate courses. 1965 ed. (shrink)

Consciousness is, perhaps, the aspect of our mental lives that is the most perplexing for both psychologists and philosophers. Daniel Dennett has described it as 'both the most obvious and the most mysterious feature of our minds' and attempts at definition often seem to move in circles. Thomas Nagel famously remarked that 'without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless.'. These observations might suggest that consciousness - indefinable and mysterious - falls outside the (...) scope of rational enquiry, defying both scientific and philosophical investigation. In reality, however, the topic has been a focus of psychological investigation since William James and is increasingly vital in philosophical research. This book illustrates the various, interdisciplinary approaches to the problem, providing both pointers to a solution and a summary of the key positions. (shrink)

ISBN-13: 978-0-8229-4317-4 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-8229-4317-4 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Science — Philosophy. 2. Science — Social aspects. 3. Values. 4. Science and civilization. I. Carrier, Martin. II. Howard, Don, professor. III. Kourany ...

Contents Preface General Introduction 1 | Science and Pseudoscience Introduction Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? Imre Lakatos, Science and Pseudoscience Paul R. Thagard, Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience Michael Ruse, Creation-Science Is Not Science Larry Laudan, Commentary: Science at the Bar---Causes for Concern Commentary 2 | Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in Science Introduction Thomas S. Kuhn, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions Thomas S. Kuhn, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and (...) Theory Choice Ernan McMullin, Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science Larry Laudan, Kuhn’s Critique of Methodology Helen E. Longino, Values and Objectivity Kathleen Okruhlik, Gender and the Biological Sciences Commentary 3 | The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Underdetermination Introduction Pierre Duhem, Physical Theory and Experiment W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism Donald Gillies, The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis Larry Laudan, Demystifying Underdetermination *Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, The Duhem Problem Commentary 4 | Induction, Prediction, and Evidence Introduction Peter Lipton, Induction Karl Popper, The Problem of Induction Wesley C. Salmon, Rational Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Criteria of Confirmation and Acceptability Peter Achinstein, Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight? *Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of Induction Commentary 5 | Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian Approaches Introduction Wesley C. Salmon, Rationality and Objectivity in Science *Deborah G. Mayo, A Critique of Salmon’s Bayesian Way *Alan Chalmers, The Bayesian Approach Paul Horwich, Therapeutic Bayesianism Commentary 6 | Models of Explanation Introduction Rudolf Carnap, The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation Carl G. Hempel, The Thesis of Structural Identity Carl G. Hempel, Inductive-Statistical Explanation Peter Railton, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation *Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification *James Woodward, The Manipulability Conception of Causal Explanation Commentary 7 | Laws of Nature Introduction A. J. Ayer, What Is a Law of Nature? Fred I. Dretske, Laws of Nature D. H. Mellor, Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws Nancy Cartwright, Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts? Commentary 8 | Intertheoretic Reduction Introduction Ernest Nagel, Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations Paul K. Feyerabend, How to Be a Good Empiricist *Jerry A. Fodor, Special Sciences Philip Kitcher, 1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences Commentary 9 | Empiricism and Scientific Realism Introduction Grover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities Bas C. van Fraassen, Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism Alan Musgrave, Realism versus Constructive Empiricism Larry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism *Juha T. Saatsi, On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies Ian Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific Realism David B. Resnik, Hacking’s Experimental Realism *Martin Carrier, What Is Right with the Miracle Argument Arthur Fine, The Natural Ontological Attitude Alan Musgrave, NOA’s Ark---Fine for Realism Commentary Glossary Bibliography Name Index Subject Index. (shrink)

Martin Davies; II*—Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 21–46, https://do.

Many philosophers and psychologists argue that out everyday ability to predict and explain the actions and mental states of others is grounded in out possession of a primitive 'folk' psychological theory. Recently however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative. This alternative view says that human beings are able to predict and explain each other's actions by using the resources of their own minds to simulate the psychological aetiology of the actions of the others. This book and (...) the companion volume Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate together offer a richly woven fabric of philosophical and psychological theory, which promises to yield real insights into the nature of our mental lives. (shrink)

Earlier in this century, many philosophers of science (for example, Rudolf Carnap) drew a fairly sharp distinction between theory and observation, between theoretical terms like 'mass' and 'electron', and observation terms like 'measures three meters in length' and 'is _2° Celsius'. By simply looking at our instruments we can ascertain what numbers our measurements yield. Creatures like mass are different: we determine mass by calculation; we never directly observe a mass. Nor an electron: this term is introduced in order to (...) explain what we observe. This (once standard) distinction between theory and observation was eventually found to be wanting. First, if the distinction holds, it is difficult to see what can characterize the relationship between theory :md observation. How can theoretical terms explain that which is itself in no way theorized? The second point leads out of the first: are not the instruments that provide us with observational material themselves creatures of theory? Is it really possible to have an observation language that is entirely barren of theory? The theory-Iadenness of observation languages is now an accept ed feature of the logic of science. Many regard such dependence of observation on theory as a virtue. If our instruments of observation do not derive their meaning from theories, whence comes that meaning? Surely - in science - we have nothing else but theories to tell us what to try to observe. (shrink)

We apply Hrushovski-Fraïssé's amalgamation procedure to obtain a theory of fields of prime characteristic of Morley rank 2 equipped with a definable additive subgroup of rank 1.

The fundamental question whether, or in which sense, science informs us about the real world has pervaded the history of thought since antiquity. Is what science tells us about the world determined unambiguously by facts or does the content of any scientific theory in some way depend on the human condition? "Sokal`s hoax" added a new dimension to this controversial debate, which very quickly came to been known as "Science Wars". "Knowledge and the World" examines and reviews the broad range (...) of philosophical positions on this issue, stretching from realism to relativism, to expound the epistemic merits of science, and to address the central question: in which sense can science justifiably claim to provide a truthful portrait of reality? This book addresses everyone interested in the philosophy and history of science, and in particular in the interplay between the social and natural sciences. (shrink)

Two right-to-die organisations offer assisted suicide in Switzerland. The specific legal situation allows assistance to Swiss and foreign citizens. Both organisations require a report of the person’s health status before considering assistance. This qualitative study explored these reports filed to legal authorities after the deaths of individuals in the area of Zurich. Health status reports in the legal medical dossiers of the deceased were analysed using content analysis and Grounded Theory. From 421 cases of assisted suicide (2001–2004), 350 reports on (...) health status were filed. Many cases contained diagnosis lists only. Other reports had more elaborate reports revealing that some physicians were aware about the patient’s death wish and the intention to solicit assisted suicide. Physicians’ attitudes ranged from neutral to rather depreciative. Few physicians openly referred the patient to the organisations and supported the patient’s request by highlighting a history of suffering as well as reporting understanding and agreement with the patient’s wish to hasten death. In the health status reports five categories could be identified. Some files revealed that physicians were aware of the death wish. The knowledge and recognition of the patient’s death wish varied from no apparent awareness to strongly supportive. This variety might be due to difficulties to discuss the death wish with patients, but might also reflect the challenge to avoid legal prosecution in the country of origin. To require comparable health status reports as requirements for the right-to-die organisations might be difficult to pursue. (shrink)

Biotechnology is one of the fastest-growing areas of scientific, technical and industrial innovation and one of the most controversial. As developments have occurred such as genetic test therapies and the breeding of genetically modified food crops, so the public debates have become more heated and grave concerns have been expressed about access to genetic information, labelling of genetically modified foods and human and animal cloning. Across Europe, public opinion has become a crucial factor in the ability of governments and biotech (...) industries to exploit the new technology. This 2002 book presents the results of a unique cross-national and cross-disciplinary study of the relationship between the development of new biotechnology and public perception, media coverage and policy formulation. It outlines a conceptual framework for understanding these issues and contains a number of empirical studies including studies of the international controversies surrounding the cloning of Dolly the sheep and GM Soya. (shrink)

A corrected and extensively annotated version of the sole meeting between two of the most important figures in twentieth-century intellectual life.