No detailed description available for "Analogy".

The central topic of this paper is to study joint intention to perform a joint action or to bring about a certain state. Here are some examples of such joint action: You and I share the plan to carry a heavy table jointly upstairs and realize this plan, we sing a duet together, we clean up our backyard together, and I cash a check by acting jointly with you, a bank teller, and finally we together elect a new president for (...) our country. In these cases the participants can be said to have a joint intention jointly or as a group to carry the table upstairs: the content of the intention involves our performing something together and the pronoun “we” refers to us, viz. you and me and the possible other participants considered together. When we jointly intend to carry the table, each of us can be said to.. (shrink)

The paper studies cooperation as joint action, where joint action can, first, be conceptualized either individualistically in terms of the participants' individual goals and beliefs that the joint action is taken to serve. This is individualistic or ‛I-mode’ cooperation. Special version of it is ‛ pro-group I-mode’ cooperation, where the goals are shared. Second, cooperation can be of the kind where a group of persons act together as a group in terms of the non-aggregative ‛ we’ that they form. The (...) results of the paper support the conjecture that we-mode conceptualization and an account of cooperation is needed to complement the individualistic (pro-group) I-mode account(s) in social science theorizing and experimentation. (shrink)

The privilege against self-incrimination entails that anyone accused of a criminal offence has the right to remain silent. However, waiving the privilege is possible, but such waiver must be voluntary and in accordance with the will of the accused. This article examines the impact of sentence reductions based on confessions on the voluntariness of confessions. I argue that the concept of voluntariness must be interpreted from the perspective of the values and objectives underlying the privilege against self-incrimination. Depending on the (...) perspective chosen (i.e. objectives and values), sentence reductions can be problematic from the standpoint of the privilege against self-incrimination and the voluntariness requirement it entails. However, it should be also noted that moderate incentives can simultaneously promote the realization of these values and objectives, such as material truth. Categorical negative attitude towards all sentence reductions can be detrimental to the values that the privilege and the voluntariness requirement seek to protect. (shrink)

In the paper “We-intentions and Social Action” conceptual issues related to intentional social action are studied. By social actions we here mean actions that are performed together by two or more agents. The central concept of we-intention is introduced and applied to the analysis of simple social practical reasoning. An individualistic analysis of the notion of we-intention is proposed on the basis of the agents’ I-intentions and beliefs. The need and indispensability of we-intentions and we-attitudes in general in a theory (...) of intentional social action is emphasized along with the fact that we-intending leads to action in suitable circumstances. (shrink)

This paper comments on Coleman's account of group action , and his view is compared with the present author's largely complementary view . Some criticisms concerning Coleman's linear system of action are presented. One of the main points made is that a viable theory of social action must make use of a notion of joint intention and that Coleman's theory is deficient on this score.

This short note argues that the basic points Coleman (1993) makes against my critical paper (1993) are incorrect. These points concern the possibility of a single agent holding a corporate goal, the doxastic conditions concerning group action, and 'jointness-effects'.

The paper is a reply to the critical reviews of the author’s A Theory of social Action by Anton Leist, Marvin Belzer, and Julian Nida-Rümelin in this journal. As to Leist’s main criticisms, which concern the notions of social action, social practical reasoning, individualism, and social norms, they are argued to be incorrect and unjustified. Belzer’s criticisms are on the whole well taken, and in fact all of them have been noted by the author in his later work.Belzer does not, (...) however, consider these newest analyses and improvements. Nida-Rümelin presents some comments on the relationships between collective preferences and we- intentions. These points are correct. (shrink)

In this paper an account of communicative action is given from the point of view of communication as a cooperative enterprise. It is argued that there is communication both on the basis of shared collective goals and without them. It is also claimed that people can communicate without specifically formed illocutionary communicative intentions. Finally, the paper compares the account given in the article with Habermas’ theory of communicative action.

The paper gives a conceptual clarification of what the notion of a part of a joint action (project, etc;) involves. The - mutually recognized - division of a joint action into parts can be based on social norms (viz. formal or informal rules, or proper social norms such as conventions or group specific social norms) or it can be based on agreement, coercion, or some analogous social mechanism. The paper also discusses the notions of a we-intention, of the intention to (...) perform an action as one’s part of a joint action, and of an agent’s intentionally performing an action as his part of a joint action. (shrink)

Analytical jurisprudence has been mostly silent on the role of precedent in legal adjudication.

The objective of our article is to show how “quality of evidence” and “imprecision,” as they are defined in Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation articles, may lead to confusion. We focus only on the context of systematic reviews.

In medical research, it is not unusual that risks are ruled out without any specification the exact risk that was ruled out. This makes it difficult to balance expected health benefits and risk of harm when choosing between alternative treatment options. International guidelines for reporting medical research results are sufficiently specific when it comes to establishing health benefits. However, there is a lack of standards for reporting on ruling out risks. We argue that transparency is needed, as in the case (...) of non-inferiority trials. The Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials and the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses statements should be revised accordingly. (shrink)

In 1936, Gerhard Gentzen published a proof of consistency for Peano Arithmetic using transfinite induction up to ε0, which was considered a finitistically acceptable procedure by both Gentzen and Paul Bernays. Gentzen’s method of arithmetising ordinals and thus avoiding the Platonistic metaphysics of set theory traces back to the 1920s, when Bernays and David Hilbert used the method for an attempted proof of the Continuum Hypothesis. The idea that recursion on higher types could be used to simulate the limit-building in (...) transfinite recursion seems to originate from Bernays. The main difficulty, which was already discovered in Gabriel Sudan’s nearly forgotten paper of 1927, was that measuring transfinite ordinals requires stronger methods than representing them. This paper presents a historical account of the idea of nominalistic ordinals in the context of the Hilbert Programme as well as Gentzen and Bernays’ finitary interpretation of transfinite induction. (shrink)

The paper discussed and analyzes collective and joint intentions of various strength. Thus there are subjectively shared collective intentions and intersubjectively shared collective intentions as well as collective intentions which are objectively and intersubjectively shared. The distinction between collective and private intentions is considered from several points of view. Especially, it is emphasized that collective intentions in the full sense are in the “we-mode”, whereas private intentions are in the “I-mode”. The paper also surveys recent discussion in the literature concerning (...) the nature of collective and joint intention and defends the author's accounts against criticisms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 11.2 (2003) 185-193 [Access article in PDF] Response to Marja Heimonen, "Music Education and Law:Regulation as an Instrument" Raimo Siltala University Of Helsinki, Finland From a legal point of view, Marja Heimonen's dissertation and the extract published in this issue of PMER, "Music Education and Law: Regulation as an Instrument," presents a most important question: Should music education be regulated by law, and (...) if so, by what kind of legal instruments—by strict legal rules, by softer legal standards, by self-regulation, or by leaving the matter to the laissez-faire and "invisible hand" of the market, where economic efficiency takes over from legal regulation? Heimonen's dissertation is to my knowledge the very first of its own kind, combining elements from music education and the law and, indeed, legal philosophy in an imaginative and highly original manner. Her scholarly position between music education and law is a courageous one because she might invite critical comments equally from the two branches of science involved: the music educational and the legal philosophical one. Yet, she has a gained a profound understanding of the specific needs of music education and of the restrictions of law and legal regulation, and the two-sided approach is really one of the true strengths, and not weaknesses, of the scholarly work. Her approach strives mainly at a broad hermeneutical comprehension of the issue in the humanistic [End Page 185] tradition, but there are other elements involved, as well, related to the analytical or instrumental tradition.There is a large legal comparative part in the treatise, covering approximately one third of the whole thesis, with material drawn from Sweden, England, Germany, and Finland and the system of music education in each. The three legal systems have been chosen with good discretion: one with a common law background (England), one belonging to the Roman-Germanic tradition (Germany), and one from the Scandinavian legal tradition (Sweden), and the Finnish system of music education is then compared to all of them. The Swedish model is based on equal opportunity given to all the applicants with no entrance examinations held and as many willing children accepted to the music schools as is possible. The British system, or rather a "non-system," of music education is privately owned and market-based, with only a few regulations issued by the government and with an emphasis on the visiting peripatetic teachers, voluntary Saturday music schools, and the special schools founded for the musically talented. The German system, like the one in Finland, is based on formal entrance examinations and degrees passed, where both a professional career in music performance and artistic self-expression may be pursued as the primary goal of music education."The Swedes have Abba and Roxette, we the Finns have Kaija Saariaho and Ralf Gothoni"—along with Esa-Pekka Salonen and other world-class conductors, one might add—as Heimonen notes in the text, but why is that so? Does the difference in the outcome, in the sense of a breakthrough either in popular music groups or individual performers in classical music, lie in the system of music education and the legislative ideology at the back of it? Heimonen refuses to give a simple and straightforward answer to that question, declining to place the various systems of music legislation in an order of preference. Instead, she adopts a broadly humanistic and hermeneutical perspective to the issue, where the merits and the disadvantages of each legal system are taken on an individual basis. The Shakespearean question that is so boldly put forth by her, "viz. to regulate or not to regulate," is answered only with reference to a widely humanistic understanding of the complex issue of music education where the intrinsic values of artistic self-expression and the instrumental values of training future professionals in music performance, composing, and conducting, are contrasted with other, but where no winners or losers are identified by her.There would seem to be a connection between a certain legal system and its model of... (shrink)

This volume presents a systematic philosophical theory related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) that depends on group-based collective intentionality is developed in the book. The we-mode approach is used to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, social practices and institutions as well as group solidarity.

Abstractabstract:This article describes William Johnston's (1925–2010) ideas and works as a summary of a wider study about him. The volume of Fr. Johnston's production is quite large, with an astonishingly large international audience and popularity. At the same time, to make oneself a comprehensive view about his thoughts or to place him in the Jesuit map, it is hard to find more than book reviews and short articles about his writings.Irish-born Fr. Johnston was a widely known figure in the field (...) of Buddhist-Christian dialogue. He was able to adopt some of the current trends of the spiritual and religious meditative movements, and represented a form of Christianity that was open to Buddhism, especially in the 70s.He made a lifelong journey to teach prayer and to update the mystical theology with the help of modern religious and psychological trends for the future times. In this article, I describe his main works and his way of being in dialogue with Buddhism. According to him, the goal of man, the true self, was a common denominator between religions. The role of Christ and Christianity among religions was central to him, for all religions mediate implicitly the Christ-reality. Mysticism was his way to see reality, although he himself was no mystic. His solutions to critical theological issues are shallow in places, which indicate an interest elsewhere. I conclude with comments on his label as perennialist. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Sociality offers new ideas and conceptual tools for philosophers and social scientists in their analysis of the social world.

This book develops a systematic philosophical theory of social action and group phenomena, in the process presenting detailed analyses of such central social notions as 'we-attitude' (especially 'we-intention' and mutual belief, social norm, joint action, and - most important - group goal, group belief, and group action). Though this is a philosophical work, it presents a unified conceptual framework that may be useful to social scientists, especially social psychologists, as well as philosophers. The book puts forward and defends a number (...) of systematic philosophical theses, resulting in not only a theory of social action but, more broadly, a philosophical theory of society, or at least those aspects of society with which social psychology is supposed to deal (individuals in groups, groups, joint action, and the like). (shrink)

Doctor-patient interaction has gained increasing attention among sociologists and linguists during the last few decades. The problem with the studies performed so far, however, has been a lack of a theoretical framework which could bring together the various phenomena observed within medical consultations. Mikhail Bakhtin's philosophy of language offers us tools for studying medical practice as socio-cultural semiotic phenomenon. Applying Bakhtin's ideas of polyphonic, context-dependent and open-ended nature of human communication opens the possibilities to develop prevailing theoretical and empirical approaches (...) to the study of medical consultations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 11.2 (2003) 185-193 [Access article in PDF] Response to Marja Heimonen, "Music Education and Law:Regulation as an Instrument" Raimo Siltala University Of Helsinki, Finland From a legal point of view, Marja Heimonen's dissertation and the extract published in this issue of PMER, "Music Education and Law: Regulation as an Instrument," presents a most important question: Should music education be regulated by law, and (...) if so, by what kind of legal instruments—by strict legal rules, by softer legal standards, by self-regulation, or by leaving the matter to the laissez-faire and "invisible hand" of the market, where economic efficiency takes over from legal regulation? Heimonen's dissertation is to my knowledge the very first of its own kind, combining elements from music education and the law and, indeed, legal philosophy in an imaginative and highly original manner. Her scholarly position between music education and law is a courageous one because she might invite critical comments equally from the two branches of science involved: the music educational and the legal philosophical one. Yet, she has a gained a profound understanding of the specific needs of music education and of the restrictions of law and legal regulation, and the two-sided approach is really one of the true strengths, and not weaknesses, of the scholarly work. Her approach strives mainly at a broad hermeneutical comprehension of the issue in the humanistic [End Page 185] tradition, but there are other elements involved, as well, related to the analytical or instrumental tradition.There is a large legal comparative part in the treatise, covering approximately one third of the whole thesis, with material drawn from Sweden, England, Germany, and Finland and the system of music education in each. The three legal systems have been chosen with good discretion: one with a common law background (England), one belonging to the Roman-Germanic tradition (Germany), and one from the Scandinavian legal tradition (Sweden), and the Finnish system of music education is then compared to all of them. The Swedish model is based on equal opportunity given to all the applicants with no entrance examinations held and as many willing children accepted to the music schools as is possible. The British system, or rather a "non-system," of music education is privately owned and market-based, with only a few regulations issued by the government and with an emphasis on the visiting peripatetic teachers, voluntary Saturday music schools, and the special schools founded for the musically talented. The German system, like the one in Finland, is based on formal entrance examinations and degrees passed, where both a professional career in music performance and artistic self-expression may be pursued as the primary goal of music education."The Swedes have Abba and Roxette, we the Finns have Kaija Saariaho and Ralf Gothoni"—along with Esa-Pekka Salonen and other world-class conductors, one might add—as Heimonen notes in the text, but why is that so? Does the difference in the outcome, in the sense of a breakthrough either in popular music groups or individual performers in classical music, lie in the system of music education and the legislative ideology at the back of it? Heimonen refuses to give a simple and straightforward answer to that question, declining to place the various systems of music legislation in an order of preference. Instead, she adopts a broadly humanistic and hermeneutical perspective to the issue, where the merits and the disadvantages of each legal system are taken on an individual basis. The Shakespearean question that is so boldly put forth by her, "viz. to regulate or not to regulate," is answered only with reference to a widely humanistic understanding of the complex issue of music education where the intrinsic values of artistic self-expression and the instrumental values of training future professionals in music performance, composing, and conducting, are contrasted with other, but where no winners or losers are identified by her.There would seem to be a connection between a certain legal system and its model of... (shrink)

This is a systematic philosophical and conceptual study of the notion of a social practice. Raimo Tuomela explains social practices in terms of the interlocking mental states of the agents; he shows how social practices are 'building blocks of society'; and he offers a clear and powerful account of the way in which social institutions are constructed from these building blocks as established, interconnected sets of social practices with a special new social status. His analysis is based on the (...) novel concept of shared 'we-attitudes', which represent a weak form of collective intentionality, and he makes instructive connections to major topics and figures in philosophy and the social sciences. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science, psychology and sociology, and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This introduction argues for competing diachronic and synchronic accounts of melancholy in European and American culture. Taking the pioneering and yet belated work Saturn and Melancholy (1964) of Erwin Panofsky, Fritz Saxl, and Raymond Klibansky as its starting point, this article situates melancholy as at once its own, often local and non-specialist discourse as well as a conceptual web binding together medical, artistic, and social innovations, competitions, and turmoil. As a subject, melancholy demands interdisciplinary study, as Dürer’s print Melencolia (...) I continues to prove. As a locus of methodological innovation, melancholy in the wake of Panofsky, Saxl, and Klibansky continues to yield the alternative genealogies, conceptual histories, and formal artistic vocabularies of this volume’s contributions whether moving backwards from Dürer to Homer or forward to the present day with Lars von Trier and major European novelists. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that fregean approach to semantics, like that of modelling semantics, doesn’t have the conceptual tools to define the notions of truth and reference. The reason is that these programs ignore what Wittgenstein taught us, namely the link between meaning and use. More specifically, I intend to show how a theory of descriptive language can only be constructed by clarifying the connection between the notions of linguistic game, meaning and description. But how can this connection be (...) clarified? Wittgenstein, in the second phase of his thought, had never been interested in a theory of this type, and all his reflections on use and meaning had the sole purpose of “curing” from that essentialist attitude that had characterized the Tractatus, and which still today characterizes almost the whole analytic philosophy. This means that it is not in Wittgenstein's thought that we can find such a theory, but in Moritz Schlick’s works, who attempted to build a theory of linguistic meaning based on the connection between the notions of image, use and verification. (shrink)

This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the author’s earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted conceptual and situational (...) presuppositions but does not require agreement making or joint intention to form a joint intention. The model yields categorical, unconditional intentions to participate in the content of the we-intention and joint intention (viz. shared we-intention upon analysis). The content of a we-intention can be, but need not be a joint action. Thus a participant alone cannot settle and control the content of the intention. Instead the participants jointly settle the content and control the satisfaction of the intention. These and some other features distinguish we-intentions from “action intentions”, viz. intentions that an agent can alone settle and satisfy. The paper discusses weintentions (and other “aim-intentions”) from this perspective and it also defends the author’s earlier account against a charge of vicious circularity that has been directed against it. (shrink)

It is argued in this paper that there can be both normative and nonnormative, merely factual group beliefs. The former involve the whole social group in question, while the latter only relate to the distributions of personal beliefs within the group. The paper develops a detailed theory, called the positional account of group beliefs, to explicate normative, group-involving group beliefs. Normative group beliefs are characterized within this approach in terms of joint acceptances of views by the group members — or (...) their representatives — acting in their right positions and tasks, and in a sense creating group commitments for all the members to accept (and keep accepting) the view in question. Also aggregate accounts of group belief are considered in the paper, especially the shared we-belief approach. Such aggregate accounts purport to account for merely factual group beliefs. (shrink)