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Individuality, Collectivity and the Intersubjective Constitution of Intentionality.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2020 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 11 (2).details
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Fraternity: Why the Market Need Not Be a Morally Free Zone.Luigino Bruni - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):35-64.details
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Through the agents' minds: Cognitive mediators of social action.Cristiano Castelfranchi - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (1):109-140.details
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Pragmatism’s Instrumental View of Moral Reasoning.D. S. Clark - 2002 - Essays in Philosophy 3 (2):252-268.details
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Epistemologia Coletiva: crença, justificação e conhecimento de grupo.Luiz Cichoski & Leonardo Ruivo - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):508-539.details
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The paradox of social interaction: Shared intentionality, we-reasoning, and virtual bargaining.Nick Chater, Hossam Zeitoun & Tigran Melkonyan - 2022 - Psychological Review 129 (3):415-437.details
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Group intentions as equilibria.Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):95 - 109.details
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Modelling social action for AI agents.Cristiano Castelfranchi - 1998 - Artificial Intelligence 103 (1-2):157-182.details
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Towards a Mechanistically Neutral Account of Acting Jointly: The Notion of a Collective Goal.Stephen A. Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):1-29.details
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Alone Together: Why “Incentivization” Fails as an Account of Institutional Facts.William Butchard & Robert D’Amico - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (3):315-330.details
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Alone Together: Why “Incentivization” Fails as an Account of Institutional Facts.William Butchard & Robert D’Amico - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (3):315-330.details
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Genealogy of collective intentionality.Jaromir Brejdak - 2021 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 11 (2).details
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Joint Action and the Expression of Shared Intentions: An Expanded Taylorian Account.Sean Bowden - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):440-462.details
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Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.details
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Common Knowledge and Reductionism about Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.details
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Joint know-how.Jonathan Birch - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3329–3352.details
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Plural Action.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):25-54.details
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Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team?Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):201-217.details
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Wittgenstein running: Neural mechanisms of collective intentionality and we-mode.Cristina Becchio & Cesare Bertone - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):123-133.details
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On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy.Nicholas Bardsley - 2007 - Synthese 157 (2):141-159.details
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Collective reasoning: A critique of Martin Hollis's position.Nicholas Bardsley - 2001 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 4 (4):171-192.details
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What We Can Intend: Recognition and Collective Intentionality.Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):5-26.details
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Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.details
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Review Essay: Chant, Sara Rachel, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer, Editors. From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. [REVIEW]Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (3):318–331.details
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Planning on a Prior Intention.Facundo Alonso - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (3):229-265.details
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Social Ontology.Brian Epstein - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Cognitive Primitives of Collective Intentions: Linguistic Evidence of Our Mental Ontology.Natalie Gold & Daniel Harbour - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):109-134.details
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Cognitive Primitives of Collective Intentions: Linguistic Evidence of Our Mental Ontology.Daniel Harbour Natalie Gold - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):109-134.details
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A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality.Mattia Gallotti - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):3-30.details
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Restructuring Searle’s Making the Social World.Frank Hindriks - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (3):373-389.details
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Restructuring Searle’s Making the Social World.Frank Hindriks - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (3):373-389.details
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Self-consciousness and intersubjectivity.Kristina Musholt - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):63-89.details
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Joint intention, we-mode and I-mode.Raimo Tuomela - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.details
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Social Groups, Explanation and Ontological Holism.Paul Sheehy - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (2):193-224.details
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Practical knowledge and acting together.Blomberg Olle - 2018 - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-111.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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Understanding What We Ought and Shall Do: A Hyperstate Semantics for Descriptive, Prescriptive, and Intentional Sentences.Preston Stovall - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 215-238.details
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Propaganda, Irrationality, and Group Agency.Megan Hyska - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 226-235.details
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Proxy Assertion.Kirk Ludwig - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations from the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.details
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Mechanistic Explanation, Interdisciplinary Integration and Interpersonal Social Coordination.Matti Sarkia - 2024 - Social Epistemology 38 (2):173-193.details
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A Relational Perspective on Collective Agency.Yiyan Wang & Martin Stokhof - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (3):63.details
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Intention as commitment toward time.Marc van Zee, Dragan Doder, Leendert van der Torre, Mehdi Dastani, Thomas Icard & Eric Pacuit - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence 283 (C):103270.details
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Avatars of the Collective: A Realist Theory of Collective Subjectivities.Frédéric Vandenberghe - 2007 - Sociological Theory 25 (4):295-324.details
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What are goals and joint goals?Raimo Tuomela - 1990 - Theory and Decision 28 (1):1-20.details
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What is cooperation?Raimo Tuomela - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (1):87 - 101.details
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We-intentions, free-riding, and being in reserve.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (1):25 - 52.details
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We-intentions revisited.Raimo Tuomela - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.details
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Collective action, supervenience, and constitution.Raimo Tuomela - 1989 - Synthese 80 (2):243 - 266.details
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