Abstract:Is it possible to speak about the unspeakable as it is represented in music, lyric poetry, and tragedy? The answer is yes, if we adopt a purely aesthetic perspective. The answer is no, if we adopt the perspective of the transcendental subject as the metaphysical source of music, lyric poetry, and tragedy. In this paper, I conceptualize the nondiscursivity of music, lyric poetry, and Attic tragedy in the philosophical aesthetics of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. I also make a few incidental (...) remarks to Plato's Socrates and Aristotle as well as the Theban plays by Sophocles. (shrink)

In contrast to the discussion of theater in the tradition of Western philosophy from Plato and Aristotle through Rousseau and Diderot to Artaud and Brecht, who either devalued or valorized theatricality, Hegel adopts an intermediate point of view between these two extremes. He neither devalues nor valorizes theatricality, but rather maintains that it constitutes an essential dimension of poetic drama through which it presents its ideal and fictive reality to sense perception. While in pre-modernity dramatic poetry was able to represent (...) and reconcile the conflicts between ethical substantiality and individual subjectivity, it is a completely different matter in moder-nity. In the course of the progressing ethical de-substantialization of individual subjectivity, modern drama tends towards pure theatricality and loses its ability to reconcile ethical conflicts spiritually. (shrink)

. Bildung and the historical and genealogical critique of contemporary culture: Wilhelm von Humboldt’s neo-humanistic theory of Bildung and Nietzsche’s critique of neo-humanistic ideas in classical philology and education. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 50, Bildung and paideia. Philosophical models of education, pp. 662-671.

Dieser Essay versucht nicht nur die Vieldeutigkeiten zu entwirren, die sich um die phänomenologischen Begriffe ,Lebenswelt’ und ,Apriori der Lebenswelt’ ranken, sondern auch eine Phänomenologie der Lebenswelt in Beziehung zu vorwissenschaftlichem Alltagsleben und sinnlicher Wahrnehmung, den mathematischen und geometrischen Naturwissenschaften sowie der eidetischen und phänomenologischen Reduktion der reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie zu umreißen.

Dans cette dissertation, nous tenterons de répondre à deux questions liées. Premièrement, si nous acceptons le principe de Nietzsche sur « l’agrandissement de la vie » comme valeur principale, la vérité et l’expression de la vérité auraient-elles une signification grande, moyenne ou nulle? Dans quel sens Nietzsche soutient-il que la « fausseté d’une estimation n’est pas nécessairement son reproche »? Dans le but de donner une réponse satisfaisante à ces deux questions, il faut d’abord montrer comment Nietzsche, à partir de (...) l’analyse et de la critique d’une théorie habituelle de la vérité , construit sa propre théorie du multiperspectivisme. Dans l’essai intitulé « Vérité et mensonge dans un sens extramoral », nous trouvons le germe de cette théorie que Nietzsche a encore développé dans le recueil d’aphorismes intitulé Par-delà le bien et le mal. Après que nous aurons reconstruit les recherches de Nietzsche sur la théorie habituelle de la vérité et sur sa propre théorie du multiperspectivisme, nous pourrons donner une réponse casuistique aux deux questions citées ci-avant. (shrink)

Unter der Annahme, dass der Orientalismus und Balkanismus nicht einmal rudimentär die reichhaltigen interkulturellen Beziehungen zwischen Europa und dem Mittelmeer erfasst, argumentiert die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit, dass es nötig ist, einen weiteren Diskurs in Ermangelung einer besseren Bezeichnung unter dem Namen Mediterranismus einzubeziehen. Darunter sind kulturelle Imaginationen des Mittelmeeres als philosophische und poetische Denkfigur der europäischen Schriftkultur zu verstehen. Die Hauptaufgabe ist dabei auf der Grundlage der Begriffsgeschichte in Fragmenten und der Deduktion der heuristischen theoretischen Hypothesen eine Rekonstruktion und kontrastive und (...) komplementäre Komparation dieser drei Diskursformationen durchzuführen, unter der Einsicht, dass sie unter den Bedingungen der Moderne bei der europäischen Selbstbesinnung zugleich entgegengesetzt und miteinander verwoben sind. Daher enthalten sie eine ganze Reihe von perzeptiven, affektiven und kognitiven Gegensätzen und Widersprüchen, die gesondert in weiteren Forschungsarbeiten zu untersuchen sind. (shrink)

In diesem Essay werde ich versuchen, zwei miteinander verknüpfte Fragen zu beantworten. Nimmt man Nietzsches Prinzip der Lebenssteigerung als Grundwert an, würde Wahrheit und die Wahrheit zu sagen einen hohen, mittleren oder keinen Stellenwert haben? In welchem Sinne meint Nietzsche, dass „die Falschheit eines Urteils noch kein Einwand gegen ein Urteil“ ist? Um eine ausreichende Antwort auf diese beiden Fragen zu geben, werde ich darstellen, wie sich auf der Grundlage der Analyse und Kritik der herkömmlichen philosophischen Wahrheitstheorie in seinem Essay (...) unter dem Titel „Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne“ in der Aphorismensammlung Jenseits von Gut und Böse eine vollwertige Theorie des Multiperspektivismus entwickelt. Nachdem Nietzsches Untersuchung des herkömmlichen philosophischen Wahrheitsbegriffs rekonstruiert worden ist, werde ich imstande sein, eine kasuistische Antwort auf die oben erwähnten Fragen zu geben. (shrink)

In this essay, I will try to answer two related questions. Adopting Nietzsche’s principle of the “enhancement of life” as a kind of basic value, would truth and truth-telling have high, medial, or no significance at all? In what sense does Nietzsche think that “the falsehood of a judgment is […] not necessarily an objection to it”?1 In order to give a satisfactory answer to these two questions, I will first illustrate how, from his essay entitled “On Truth and Lies (...) in an Non Moral Sense” to the collection of aphorisms entitled Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche develops his analysis and critique of the conventional philosophical theory of truth into a full-fledged theory of multiperspectivism. Having reconstructed Nietzsche’s inquiry of the conventional concept of truth and his theory of perspectivism, I will be able to give a casuistic answer to the two abovementioned questions. (shrink)

Ovaj članak pokušava ne samo pojasniti višeznačnosti vezane uz fenomenološke pojmove ‘životni svijet’ i ‘a priori svijeta života’ , nego isto ocrtati fenomenologiju svijeta života u odnosu prema predznanstvenom životu i svakdanje percepcije, matematičkim i geometrijskim prirodoslovnim znanostima te eidetičkoj i fenomenološkoj redukciji čiste fenomenologije i fenomenološke filozofije.

This essay attempts to clarify the ambiguities attached to the term ‘the life-world’ and ‘a priori of the life-world’ in the phenomenological sense. It sketches the phenomenology of the life-world with respect to everyday pre-scientific life and perception, the mathematical and geometrical sciences of the natural world, and the eidetic and phenomenological reductions of pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy.

At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multi-national data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from (...) social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar was found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-negligible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic. (shrink)

In his most significant work in the field of philosophy of education, Personhood and Education (1932), Vuk-Pavlović criticizes Schelerʼs claim that love cannot be an educational principle. According to Vuk-Pavlović, this claim is based on Schelerʼs two misconceptions: the first is related to Schelerʼs misunderstanding of education, and the second to his misunderstanding of love. In this text, we examine aspects of Vuk-Pavlovićʼs criticism and ask a broader question about the potentials and limits of love in education. When defining the (...) concept of love, Scheler indeed opposes it to education, which for him implies changing the object of education. In this sense, education is an attempt to change the person being raised. On the other hand, according to Scheler, love means accepting the loved one without trying to change him. Therefore, the purpose of love is not to transform the loved object. However, through a genuine act of love, Scheler claims, change can occur as the appearance of higher values. Schelerʼs criticism of education is based on the understanding of education in the negative sense of imposing external values, where the individuality and value potential of the one being educated is not recognized. With regard to the aforementioned conception of love, one could theorize about a different type of education, which implies love in the sense of the development of one’s self. (shrink)

One of the important questions in the interpretation of Rawls’s philosophy is the connection between the two problems he wrote about throughout his life – justice and legitimacy. In this paper, I take the difference principle as a special feature of Rawls’s theory of justice, while I take the idea of the public reason as a special aspect of his theory of legitimacy, and I try to show that both aspects are connected, that is, that we should not see them (...) as two separate projects. I am trying to show that we should formulate the justification of the difference principle as a justification of a particular socio-economic arrangement rather than as an abstract principle, one that is better than other legitimate arrangements. For Rawls, property-owning democracy and liberal socialism are socio-economic arrangements that realize the difference principle. The main difference between the two systems is that in the first one, private ownership of the means of production is allowed, but it is widely dispersed. In this paper, I try to show how such a system can be publicly justified. The justification that we need to use is precisely the one that Rawls formulates through the idea of the public mind, by referring to the political values contained in our public political culture. (shrink)

The analysis of cognitive-ontological and especially ethical concepts in Nietzscheʼs philosophy shows deprivation as an important component that compromises their status. The emptiness, in the form of purity, inevitably appears during the decomposition of Nietzsche’s thought. Under the influence of perspectivism, epistemology, along with the question of truth, have undergone radical deconstruction. The results significantly affect the existence of morality, values and the notion of good in general. Deprivation appears in values, which leads to pessimism. Pessimistic values move away from (...) the intensity of life instinct. As a reflection of life, man strives and destroys the aspirations for life. The whole reality, on the other hand, is in opposition and thus, necessarily, in dialectic and conflict. Nietzsche, however, does not strive for reconciliation opposites, but requires their enduring, which is, at the same time, overcoming. Conflict between pessimistic and life valuesinevitably arises. Pessimism precedes nihilism, which alternates the notion of truth, meaning, and foundation. In the concluding analysis, it becomes clear how the value creator is placed in relation to the concept of eternal return and overcoming nihilism. Emptiness and lack of sense are replaced by a dynamic and conflicting conception of life, i.e. existence, where the dynamics of life must not be understood in an organic or other bio-morphological sense, but in relation to the individual and his creative potential only in the form of change and reestablishment of reality. This, in turn, means that, ultimately, the focus is on the subject, man as will and his existential acts. (shrink)

In the world of rapid general-social development, due to the emergence of questions about new holders of legal rights and the emergence of new forms of legal rights in general, the discussion about moral and legal rights has always been, is and will be an increasingly topical issue. It is not, however, disputed that law per se, in enabling a wide range of legal rights, has always been centred around the issue of human life and health in the first place. (...) The achievement of human welfare is undoubtedly predicated upon good health, and fostered by a unique “mechanism” – the right to health. Although we live in an era of great glorification of the cult and value of health (healthism), the current epoch raises a series of human-health-focused questions and controversies. However, the primary and very crucial question we can ask ourselves is – what would health even be? Precisely because of the great questionability of the above question, the protection of human health and the exercise of the right to health may represent one of the most challenging matters of law itself. The right to health, as a legal and inclusive right, epitomizes not only the rights asserted by human beings as such, but also environmental and nature protection as an inseparable denominator of the status of human health. Although prominent legal/political philosophers and theorists were pessimist about the realisation and enforcement of the right to (the highest attainable standard of) health, this paper elaborates on the possibility of its realisation, which largely depends on the way in which the concept of health is understood. Health should be understood exclusively as an idea-value category to be aspired to, as a should (sollen), by no means as a pure and categorical reflection of reality (sein). Given the inclusiveness specific to the legal right to health, which undoubtedly contains certain problematic elements, this paper aims to grasp and consider the right to health in its conceptual and normative entirety premised upon the following question: how does law protect human health and its constitutive elements? The same question invokes interesting interdisciplinary (legal and philosophical) points of view. (shrink)

Not the least noticeable is the fact that the ancient Greek compound euthanasia, formed by Francis Bacon, has retained its original terminological form since it was first used in the 17th century. Among all other controversial ethical issues, however, the conceptual notion of euthanasia categorically evokes rather important controversies. The questions that arise in this context are whether there is a definition, or at least a determination, of the term euthanasia and whether we are aware of its use in scientific (...) discourse, what exactly is euthanasia. The paper offers a terminological elaboration of the term euthanasia in a linguistic, but mainly legal and medical-procedural context, in order to examine the coherence in defining the term between these categories and, consequently, to determine the key determinants of euthanasia according to categorical sections. The key facts stated are the primary determination or the possible definition of the term for any further scientific study of euthanasia as one of the most controversial issues within bioethical doctrine. (shrink)

Many experimental brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are currently being medically tested in paralyzed patients. While the new generations of implantable BCIs move rapidly ahead at trying to increase the patients’ well-being, ethical concerns about their potential effects on patients’ psychological dimensions (e.g. sense of agency and control) are growing. An important ethical concern to explore is how BCIs may introduce unprecedented vulnerabilities to implanted individuals.Our chapter shows that, on the one hand, BCIs can empower the sense of self and control, which (...) contribute to well-being. On the other hand, they can introduce unprecedented vulnerabilities, for example, by inducing radical distress, feelings of loss of control, and a rupture of patient identity, which decrease one’s well-being. To investigate a possible solution to this problem we propose to understand the implementation of a BCI system in one’s body through the capability approach. This calls for a careful ethical examination of new morally salient issues prior to seeing an increase in BCI-related psychological effects in an open market. (shrink)

In this philosophical exploration, we investigate the concept of robotic moral environment interaction. The common view understands moral interaction to occur between agents endowed with ethical and interactive capacities. However, recent developments in moral philosophy argue that moral interaction also occurs in relation to the environment. Here conditions and situations of the environment contribute to human moral cognition and the formation of our moral experiences. Based on this philosophical position, we imagine robots interacting as moral environments—a novel conceptualization of human–robot (...) moral interaction with an inherent capacity for moral augmentation. To explicate this idea, we first define moral environments as moral systems providing moral affordances. We then intuit and explicate two constitutive conditions of moral environments: the environment’s moral ambiance and its moral atmosphere and compare them with real-life cases of moral environments—the moral landmarks. Based on these explications, we construct several explanatory cases to illustrate robots interacting as moral environments. Lastly, we set to evaluate the ethical challenges and wider social ramifications of using moral environment robots in the public space. (shrink)

The objective of this article was to review existing research to assess the evidence for predictive processing in sign language, the conditions under which it occurs, and the effects of language mastery on the neural bases of PP. This review followed the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses framework. We searched peer-reviewed electronic databases and gray literature. We also searched the reference lists of records selected for the review and forward citations to identify all relevant publications. We searched (...) for records based on five criteria. To reduce the risk of bias, the remaining two authors with expertise in sign language processing and a variety of research methods reviewed the results. Disagreements were resolved through extensive discussion. In the final review, 7 records were included, of which 5 were published articles and 2 were dissertations. The reviewed records provide evidence for PP in signing populations, although the underlying mechanism in the visual modality is not clear. The reviewed studies addressed the motor simulation proposals, neural basis of PP, as well as the development of PP. All studies used dynamic sign stimuli. Most of the studies focused on semantic prediction. The question of the mechanism for the interaction between one’s sign language competence and PP in the manual-visual modality remains unclear, primarily due to the scarcity of participants with varying degrees of language dominance. There is a paucity of evidence for PP in sign languages, especially for frequency-based, phonetic, and syntactic prediction. However, studies published to date indicate that Deaf native/native-like L1 signers predict linguistic information during sign language processing, suggesting that PP is an amodal property of language processing.Systematic Review Registration[https://www.crd.york.ac.uk/prospero/display_record.php?ID=CRD42021238911], identifier [CRD42021238911]. (shrink)

A genesis of media didactics was deconstructed through a theoretical-comparative and historical methodological approach, with the aim of gaining insight into its history and characteristics, defining the discipline, and recent development trends. The study elaborates the role of media in education, schooling, teaching, and learning. The anatomy of the social circumstances of the emergence of certain curriculum innovations and their consequences for global education as well as the development of media didactics is systematically explained. A synthesis of the facts obtained (...) from the analysed concept makes it evident that the development of media didactics was influenced by the concept of instructional technology transferred from the USA, as well as several social and technological factors. Theoretical and practical essence of media didactics is established in the application of various media with the purpose of arranging individualized, i.e., student-centred teaching. Over time, the characteristics and role of media in teaching have changed in accordance with the dominant didactic theories. A crucial challenge for media didactics is foreseen in the form of the application of artificial intelligence in education and schooling. (shrink)

In this paper it is exactly proved that the standard transformations of the three-dimensional (3D) vectors of the electric and magnetic fields E and B are not relativistically correct transformations. Thence the 3D vectors E and B are not well-defined quantities in the 4D space-time and, contrary to the general belief, the usual Maxwell equations with the 3D E and B are not in agreement with the special relativity. The 4-vectors E a and B a , as well-defined 4D quantities, (...) are introduced instead of ill-defined 3D E and B. The proof is given in the tensor and the Clifford algebra formalisms. (shrink)

In contemporary debates about the nature of bioethics there is a widespread view that bioethical decision making should involve certain knowledge of and respect for cultural diversity of persons to be affected. The aim of this article is to show that this view is untenable and misleading. It is argued that introducing the idea of respect for cultural diversity into bioethics encounters a series of conceptual and empirical constraints. While acknowledging that cultural diversity is something that decision makers in bioethical (...) contexts should try to understand and, when possible, respect, it is argued that this cultural turn ignores the typically normative role of bioethics and thus threatens to undermine its very foundations. (shrink)

This paper brings together the discussions on international resource trade and immigration. Following Wenar’s analysis of the resource curse, the aim is to challenge the conventional view on immigration that asserts the right of states to have discretionary control over these policies. The paper shows that more liberal immigration is required as an additional remedial policy to persons harmed in unjust trade. The right to self-determination and territorial rights, which are used as the basis for the exclusion of immigrants, are (...) in the context of this analysis constrained by both attentiveness to harm and the charge of inconsistency. Both rights, which are protected domestically, are violated by the unjust ‘might makes right’ trade rule in the international context, causing harm to people in resource exporting countries. This inconsistency presents a challenge to the moral plausibility of the conventional view in the context of the resource trade. (shrink)

In this paper the Lorentz transformations (LT) and the standard transformations (ST) of the usual Maxwell equations (ME) with the three-dimensional (3D) vectors of the electric and magnetic fields, E and B, respectively, are examined using both the geometric algebra and tensor formalisms. Different 4D algebraic objects are used to represent the usual observer dependent and the new observer independent electric and magnetic fields. It is found that the ST of the ME differ from their LT and consequently that the (...) ME with the 3D E and B are not covariant upon the LT but upon the ST. The obtained results do not depend on the character of the 4D algebraic objects used to represent the electric and magnetic fields. The Lorentz invariant field equations are presented with 1-vectors E and B, bivectors EHv and BHv and the abstract tensors, the 4-vectors Ea and Ba. All these quantities are defined without reference frames, i.e., as absolute quantities. When some basis has been introduced, they are represented as coordinate-based geometric quantities comprising both components and a basis. It is explicitly shown that this geometric approach agrees with experiments, e.g., the Faraday disk, in all relatively moving inertial frames of reference, which is not the case with the usual approach with the 3D bf E and B and their ST. (shrink)

Different approaches to special relativity (SR) are discussed. The first approach is an invariant approach, which we call the “true transformations (TT) relativity.” In this approach a physical quantity in the four-dimensional spacetime is mathematically represented either by a true tensor (when no basis has been introduced) or equivalently by a coordinate-based geometric quantity comprising both components and a basis (when some basis has been introduced). This invariant approach is compared with the usual covariant approach, which mainly deals with the (...) basis components of tensors in a specific, i.e., Einstein's coordinatization of the chosen inertial frame of reference. The third approach is the usual noncovariant approach to SR in which some quantities are not tensor quantities, but rather quantities from “3+1” space and time, e.g., the synchronously determined spatial length. This formulation is called the “apparent transformations (AT) relativity.” It is shown that the principal difference between these approaches arises from the difference in the concept of sameness of a physical quantity for different observers. This difference is investigated considering the spacetime length in the “TT relativity” and spatial and temporal distances in the “AT relativity.” It is also found that the usual transformations of the three-vectors (3-vectors) of the electric and magnetic fields E and B are the AT. Furthermore it is proved that the Maxwell equations with the electromagnetic field tensor Fab and the usual Maxwell equations with E and B are not equivalent, and that the Maxwell equations with E and B do not remain unchanged in form when the Lorentz transformations of the ordinary derivative operators and the AT of E and B are used. The Maxwell equations with Fab are written in terms of the 4-vectors of the electric Ea and magnetic Ba fields. The covariant Majorana electromagnetic field 4-vector Ψa is constructed by means of 4-vectors Ea and Ba and the covariant Majorana formulation of electrodynamics is presented. A Dirac like relativistic wave equation for the free photon is obtained. (shrink)

This article discusses the view that bioethics should become ‘‘culturally sensitive’’ and give more weight to various cultural traditions and their respective moral beliefs. It is argued that this view is implausible for the following three reasons: it renders the disciplinary boundaries of bioethics too flexible and inconsistent with metaphysical commitments of Western biomedical sciences, it is normatively useless because it approaches cultural phenomena in a predominantly descriptive and selective way, and it tends to justify certain types of discrimination.

An apparent paradox is obtained in all previous treatments of the Trouton–Noble experiment; there is a three-dimensional (3D) torque T in an inertial frame S in which a thin parallel-plate capacitor is moving, but there is no 3D torque T′ in S′, the rest frame of the capacitor. Different explanations are offered for the existence of another 3D torque, which is equal in magnitude but of opposite direction giving that the total 3D torque is zero. In this paper, it is (...) considered that 4D geometric quantities and not the usual 3D quantities are well-defined both theoretically and experimentally in the 4D spacetime. In analogy with the decomposition of the electromagnetic field F (bivector) into two 1-vectors E and B we introduce decomposition of the 4D torque N (bivector) into 1-vectors N s , N t . It is shown that in the frame of “fiducial” observers, in which the observers who measure N s and N t are at rest, and in the standard basis, only the spatial components $N_{s}^{i}$ and $N_{t}^{i}$ remain, which can be associated with components of two 3D torques T and T t . In such treatment with 4D geometric quantities the mentioned paradox does not appear. The presented explanation is in complete agreement with the principle of relativity and with the Trouton–Noble experiment without the introduction of any additional torque. (shrink)

The present article is a critical assessment of the “Connection Principle” – the principle according to which the two key properties of mental states, intentionality and phenomenality, are necessarily co-instantiated. A theory of mind endorsing some version of this principle assumes that all intentional states are either conscious or otherwise potentially conscious. The Connection Principle, being a subject of much controversy in the past 15 years, has divided the community of philosophers of mind in two, as it were, irreconcilable camps. (...) What poses a special challenge to both friends and foes of the Connection Principle – albeit for different reasons – is a plausible explanation of intentional character of unconscious mental states. We want to point to and comment on certain weaknesses of Searle’s attempt to solve this problem – an attempt drawing on the idea that unconsciousmental states “retain” its “aspectual shape” while unconscious. Eventually, we will venture to show why the notion of aspectual shape cannot play the explanatory role assigned to it by Searle, and why a more restrictive and a more consistent criterion for ascribing intentionality to unconscious states is needed. This new criterion should be sensible to our folk-psychological intuition suggesting that there are dispositional states that play an indispensable causal role in our mental economy and, as such, build a genuine subset of all nconscious, i.e., purely neurophysiological states of our mind/brain. (shrink)

The present article is a critical assessment of the “Connection Principle” – the principle according to which the two key properties of mental states, intentionality and phenomenality , are necessarily co-instantiated. A theory of mind endorsing some version of this principle assumes that all intentional states are either conscious or otherwise potentially conscious. The Connection Principle, being a subject of much controversy in the past 15 years, has divided the community of philosophers of mind in two, as it were, irreconcilable (...) camps. What poses a special challenge to both friends and foes of the Connection Principle – albeit for different reasons – is a plausible explanation of intentional character of unconscious mental states. We want to point to and comment on certain weaknesses of Searle’s attempt to solve this problem – an attempt drawing on the idea that unconsciousmental states “retain” its “aspectual shape” while unconscious. Eventually, we will venture to show why the notion of aspectual shape cannot play the explanatory role assigned to it by Searle, and why a more restrictive and a more consistent criterion for ascribing intentionality to unconscious states is needed. This new criterion should be sensible to our folk-psychological intuition suggesting that there are dispositional states that play an indispensable causal role inour mental economy and, as such, build a genuine subset of all nconscious, i.e., purely neurophysiological states of our mind/brain.U tekstu se želimo kritički osvrnuti na Searleovo “načelovezanosti” – načelo prema kojemu su svojstvo intencionalnosti i svojstvo fenomenalnosti nužno koinstancirana. Svaka teorija uma koja uključuje neku varijantu tog načela polazi od pretpostavke da su sva intencionalna stanja ili svjesna ili potencijalno svjesna. Riječ je o stajalištu koje je polariziralo filozofe uma i u posljednjih petnaestak godina bilo predmetom zanimljivih rasprava. Moglo bi se reći da se prema stavu – bilo eksplicitnom bilo implicitnom – koji neki filozof uma zauzima prema načelu vezanosti može prepoznati opći istraživački program kojemu pripada. I za zagovornike i za protivnike načela vezanosti – doduše iz različitih razloga – osobiti izazov predstavlja objašnjenje intencionalnosti nesvjesnih mentalnih stanja. Cilj nam je ukazati na neke nedostatke Searleova pokušaja da riješi taj problem – pokušaja kojemu u osnovi leži zamisao da nesvjesna mentalna stanja zadržavaju svoju aspektualnost dok su nesvjesna. Konkretno, pokazat ćemo zašto pojam aspektualnosti ne može igrati eksplanatornu ulogu koju mu je Searle namijenio te zašto bi trebalo pronaći neki drugi, restriktivniji i konzistentniji kriterij pripisivanja intencionalnosti potencijalno svjesnim stanjima. Taj bi kriterij, prema našem shvaćanju, trebao biti kompatibilan s pučkopsihološkom intuicijom o postojanju dispozicijskih stanja koja igraju neizostavnu kauzalnu ulogu u našemmentalnom funkcioniranju i koja, kao takva, čine autentičan podskup svih nesvjesnih stanja našeg mozga/uma. (shrink)