This study seeks to advance the understanding of controversy resolution in science. I take as a case study conceptualization and treatment of ulcer disease. Analysis of causal accounts and effective treatments illustrate the ways in which competing parallel research programs in medicine embody opposing social, political, and economic forces which are bound to the epistemological dimensions of scientific controversy (e.g., standards of evidence, reference, and inference), and which in turn shift perception of the burden of proof. The analysis illustrates the (...) ways in which (1) medical diagnoses create as much as discover useful distinctions and (2) epistemic and non epistemic values divide scientists into competing research programs, as well as (3) the ways in which these structures often effectively prevent scientific controversy closure. (shrink)

A survey of the medical, ethical and legal issues that surround this controversial topic.

The fact that Ludwik Fleck drew his inspiration from medicine has been largely overlooked, with the exception of a few scholars. Although Fleck considered his ideas applicable to all sciences, he always insisted on the specificity of medicine. To illustrate the usefulness of Fleck’s concepts for the history of medicine, three main ideas developed by Fleck are applied to the historical study of diabetes mellitus : first, that different and often divergent pictures of disease coexist within a given culture; second, (...) that scientific ideas circulate between ‘esoteric’ and ‘exoteric’ circles; and third, that scientific concepts are often incommensurable. The author also suggests that Fleck’s epistemology, like other scholars’, is loaded with ethical and political consequences. However, the link between an ‘open’ epistemology and political or ethical questions is more explicit in Georges Canguilhem’s pioneering work on the normal and the pathological . Indeed, Canguilhem and Fleck’s conceptions of disease have much in common, so that we can use Canguilhem’s work to bring out the hidden ethical and political issues in Fleck’s work. (shrink)

Fulford has argued that (1) the medical concepts illness, disease and dysfunction are inescapably evaluative terms, (2) illness is conceptually prior to disease, and (3) a model conforming to (2) has greater explanatory power and practical utility than the conventional value-free medical model. This ‘reverse’ model employs Hare's distinction between description and evaluation, and the sliding relationship between descriptive and evaluative meaning. Fulford's derivative ‘Values Based Medicine’ (VBM) readjusts the imbalance between the predominance of facts over values (...) in medicine. VBM allegedly responds to the increased choices made available by, inter alia, the progress of medical science itself. VBM attributes appropriate status to evaluative meaning, where strong consensus about descriptive meaning is lacking. According to Fulford, quasi-legal bioethics, while it can be retained as a kind of deliberative framework, is outcome-based and pursues ‘the right answer’, while VBM approximates a democratic, process-oriented method for dealing with diverse values, in partnership with necessary contributions from evidence-based medicine (EBM). I support the non-cognitivist underpinnings of VBM, and its emphasis on the importance of values in medicine. But VBM overstates the complexity and diversity of values, misrepresents EBM and VBM as responses to scientific and evaluative complexity, and mistakenly depicts ‘quasi-legal bioethics’ as a space of settled descriptive meaning. Bioethical reasoning can expose strategies that attempt to reduce authentic values to scientific facts, illustrating that VBM provides no advantage over bioethics in delineating the connections between facts and values in medicine. (shrink)

Ludwik Fleck is known mainly for his pioneering studies of science as a social activity. This text investigates a different aspect of Fleck’s epistemological thought—his engagement with normative aspects of medicine and public health and their political underpinnings. In his sinuous professional trajectory, Fleck navigated between two distinct thought styles: fundamental microbiological research and practice-oriented investigations of infectious diseases. Fleck’s awareness of tensions between these two approaches favored the genesis of his theoretical reflections. At the same time, his close observation (...) of medical and epidemiological practices led him to the conclusion that collectively produced scientific facts are situated and fragile. Thought collectives, Fleck explained, can err or yield to external pressures, with potentially disastrous consequences. While Fleck the reflexive experimental scientist has been creatively translated into the science studies idiom, Fleck the reflexive practical microbiologist and public health expert still awaits inspired translation. (shrink)

Fake news and alternative facts have become commonplace in these so-called “post-factual times.” What about medical research - are scientific facts fake as well? Many recent disclosures have fueled the claim that scientific facts are suspect and that science is in crisis. Scientists appear to engage in facting interests instead of revealing interesting facts. This can be observed in terms of what has been called polarised research, where some researchers continuously publish positive results while others (...) publish negative results on the same issue – even when based on the same data. In order to identify and address this challenge, the objective of this study is to investigate how polarised research produce “polarised facts.” Mammography screening for breast cancer is applied as an example. The main benefit with mammography screening is the reduced breast cancer mortality, while the main harm is overdiagnosis and subsequent overtreatment. Accordingly, the Overdiagnosis to Mortality Reduction Ratio is an estimate of the risk-benefit-ratio for mammography screening. As there are intense interests involved as well as strong opinions in debates on mammography screening, one could expect polarisation in published results on OMRR. A literature search identifies 8 studies publishing results for OMRR and reveals that OMRR varies 25-fold, from 0.4 to 10. Two experts in polarised research were asked to rank the attitudes of the corresponding authors to mammography screening of the identified publications. The results show a strong correlation between the OMRR and the authors’ attitudes to screening. Mammography screening for breast cancer appears as an exemplary field of strongly polarised research. This is but one example of how scientists’ strong professional interests can polarise research. Instead of revealing interesting facts researchers may come to fact interests. In order to avoid this and sustain trust in science, researchers should disclose professional and not only financial interests when submitting and publishing research. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between medical technology and liminal states of “undeath” as presented in “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar” and the real-life case of Jahi McMath, who was maintained on life support for over four years following a diagnosis of brain death. Through this juxtaposition, “Valdemar” comes to function as a modern fable, an uneasy herald of medical technology’s potential to create liminal states between life and death. The ability to transgress these (...) boundaries bears a cost, however: both Valdemar and Jahi McMath lose the autonomy to direct their respective narratives. Yet, their utterances “from beyond the grave” highlight the precarious nature of their position and the ethical concerns therein. Poe’s literary performance of “undeath” therefore serves to caution real-life cases in which life support is used to sustain an individual reported to be brain-dead. Such application of life-sustaining technology complicates the fundamental binary of life/death, allowing its subjects to resist textual closure. Even as Poe’s work represents an imaginative interrogation of the scientific enterprise, this nineteenth-century story holds a mirror to contemporary medical practice, inviting a reconsideration of the ethics, language, and power relations surrounding the fraught relationship between death and medical technology. (shrink)

In many countries where human embryo commercialization is banned, and no profit is allowed to be made directly from the transaction of frozen embryos between donor and recipient, there is still considerable opportunity for profiteering in medical fees arising from laboratory and clinical services rendered to the recipient. It is easy to disguise the 'sale' of altruistically donated human embryos through substantially increased medical fees, particularly in a private practice setting. The pertinent question that arises is what would (...) constitute a fair and honest profit margin for the medical professional and health institution in question? A suitable benchmark would obviously be the level of medical fees normally charged to patients for a self-freeze/thaw embryo transfer cycle, after initial failure at their first attempt in ART. This is because the level of medical expertise, clinical and laboratory services required for a donor- and self-freeze/thaw embryo transfer cycle should, in theory, be about the same, although slight variation in treatment can be expected owing to patients' respective medical histories, which results in varying predisposition to medical complications. In any case, the health authority should ensure that there is no gross disparity in the medical fees for both donor- and self-freeze/thaw embryo transfer cycle, as this could mask opportunistic profiteering by medical professionals and, in fact, be a covert form of embryo commercialization. (shrink)

Opponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) maintain that physician withdrawal-of-life-sustaining-treatment cannot be morally equated to voluntary active euthanasia. PAS opponents generally distinguish these two kinds of act by positing a possible moral distinction between killing and allowing-to-die, ceteris paribus. While that distinction continues to be widely accepted in the public discourse, it has been more controversial among philosophers. Some ethicist PAS advocates are so certain that the distinction is invalid that they describe PAS opponents who hold to the distinction as in (...) the grip of ‘moral fictions’. The author contends that such a diagnosis is too hasty. The possibility of a moral distinction between active euthanasia and allowing-to-die has not been closed off by the argumentative strategies employed by these PAS advocates, including the contrasting cases strategy and the assimilation of doing and allowing to a common sense notion of causation. The philosophical debate over the doing/allowing distinction remains inconclusive, but physicians and others who rely upon that distinction in thinking about the ethics of end-of-life care need not give up on it in response to these arguments. (shrink)

The dominance of the medical-model in American psychiatry over the last 30 years has resulted in the subsequent decline of the “talking cure”. In this paper, we identify a number of problems associated with medicalized psychiatry, focusing primarily on how it conceptualizes the self as a de-contextualized set of symptoms. Drawing on the tradition of hermeneutic phenomenology, we argue that medicalized psychiatry invariably overlooks the fact that our identities, and the meanings and values that matter to us, are created (...) and constituted by our dialogical relations with others. While acknowledging the importance of medical and pharmaceutical interventions, we suggest that it is only by means of the dialogical interplay of the talking cure that the client can both recognize unhealthy and self-defeating ways of being and be opened up to the possibility of new meanings and self-interpretations. (shrink)

Why do we persist in the relentless pursuit of artificial nourishment and other treatments to maintain a permanently unconscious existence? In facing the future, if not the present world-wide reality of a huge number of persistent vegetative state (PVS) patients, will they be treated because of our ethical commitment to their humanity, or because of an ethical paralysis in the face of biotechnical progress? The PVS patient is cut off from the normal patterns of human connection and communication, with a (...) life unlike other forms of human existence. Why the struggle to justify ending a life which, it is said, has suffered an irreversible loss of the content of consciousness? Elsewhere, the authors have addressed the ethical controversies and confusion engendered by ambiguous terminology, misuse of medical facts and the differing interpretations of what constitutes 'effective' treatment: in particular, the issue of whether in fact artificial nutrition and hydration is a medical treatment, or simply part of the obligatory care owed to all patients, permanently unconscious or not. In this paper, we intend to argue that recent analyses of medical futility, its meaning and ethical implications, despite an absence of public consensus, permit some tentative re-evaluation of our ethical obligations to the PVS patient. (shrink)

Intuition is frequently used in medicine. Along with the use of existing medical rules, there is a separate channel that physicians rely on when making decisions: their intuition. To cope with the epistemic problem of using intuition, I use some clues from Wittgenstein's philosophy to illuminate the decision-making process in medicine. First, I point to a connection between intuition as functioning in medicine and Wittgenstein's notions of "seeing as" or noticing "aspects". Secondly, I use Wittgenstein notion of empirical regularities (...) hardened into rules to suggest that there are two stages that should be addressed in the analysis of medical practice: the first concerns the accumulation of cases and the second pertains to the setting a rule based on these cases. I argue further that the medical context is exceptional in that the two stages are intertwined and, and explain the consequences of this fact for the physician's work. Finally, inspired by Wittgenstein's rule-following conundrum, I argue that medicine is particularly prone to difficulties in applying a general rule to a specific case represented by an individual patient. Recourse to intuition is reflects the physicians' efforts to bridge this gap. (shrink)

Please note that a commentary recently published in this journal (Heng; Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:3) includes substantial duplication of Letters to the Editor published in Developing World Bioethics (Heng; Developing World Bioethics 2007, 7:49) and Human Fertility (Heng; Human Fertility 2007, 10: 129-130).

The issues of medical ethics, from moral quandaries of euthanasia and the morality of killing to political dilemmas like fair healthcare distribution, are rarely out of today's media. This area of ethics covers a wide range of issues, from mental health to reproductive medicine, as well as including management issues such as resource allocation, and has proven to hold enduring interest for the general public as well as the medical practitioner. This Very Short Introduction provides an invaluable tool (...) with which to think about the ethical values that lie at the heart of medicine. This new edition explores the ethical reasoning we can use to approach medical ethics, introducing the most important 'tools' of ethical reasoning, and discussing how argument, thought experiments, and intuition can be combined in the consideration of medical ethics. Considering its practical application, Tony Hope and Michael Dunn explore how medical ethics supports health professionals through the growing use of ethics expertise in clinical settings. They also contemplate the increasingly important place of medical ethics in the wider social context, particularly in this age of globalization, not only in healthcare practice, but also policy, discussions in the media, pressure group and activism settings, and in legal judgments. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. (shrink)

Although recent trends in politics and media make it appear that conspiracy theories are on the rise, in fact they have always been present, probably because they are sustained by natural dispositions of the human brain. This is also the case with medical conspiracy theories. This article reviews some of the most notorious health-related conspiracy theories. It then approaches the reasons why people believe these theories, using concepts from cognitive science. On the basis of that knowledge, the article makes (...) normative proposals for public health officials and health workers as a whole, to deal with conspiracy theories, in order to preserve some of the fundamental principles of medical ethics. (shrink)

Medical semiotics, as a branch of general semiotics, has never really gained a foothold in either semiotics itself or medical science, despite the fact that the discipline of semiotics traces its roots to the medical domain in the ancient world and especially to Hippocrates. With several key exceptions, such as Jakob von Uexküll in 1909 and in the 1990s with Thomas A. Sebeok, there is no evidence that medical semiotics is a significant and growing area of (...) research either within semiotics or medical practice. The purpose of this book is to revive interest in this field examining the historical and epistemological principles that would make it highly relevant today in the global village where conceptions of disease and health are in constant flux. The book is written it in a non-technical way-that is, no assumptions are made on the part of the reader of technical semiotics. Our hope is that this book will bring out the importance of semiotics to the practice of medicine. It can be considered to be a textbook in the field of medical semiotics, constituting to the best of our knowledge the first of its kind. (shrink)

On September 1, 2023, Texas made important revisions to it its decades‐old statute granting legal safe harbor immunity to physicians who withhold or withdraw life‐sustaining treatment over the objection of critically ill patients’ surrogate decision‐makers. However, lawmakers left untouched glaring flaws in a key safeguard for patients—the transfer option. The transfer option is ethically important because, when no hospital is willing to accept the patient in transfer, that fact is taken as strong evidence that the surrogates’ treatment requests fall outside (...) accepted medical practice. But there are serious shortcomings in how the transfer option is carried out in Texas and many other states, which undermines the ethical usefulness of the process. We identify these shortcomings and recommend revisions to state statutes and professional guidelines to overcome them. (shrink)

The medical decision-making process is currently in flux. Decisions are no longer made entirely at the physician's discretion: patients are becoming more and more involved in the process. There is a great deal of discussion about the ideal of ‘informed consent’, that is that diagnostic and therapeutic decisions should be made based on an interaction between physician and patient. This means that patients are informed about the advantages and disadvantages of a treatment as well as alternatives to the treatment; (...) then, based on this information they can decide whether or not they want to undergo the treatment. However, recent studies show that the realisation of the ideal of ‘shared decision-making’ faces a number of difficulties related to the fact that patients are not provided with complete and accurate information. Using the example of breast cancer screening, this article examines the question of whether, in light of these difficulties, the ideal of informed decision-making is only an illusion or whether concrete steps can be taken towards the realisation of this ideal. (shrink)

_This is a personal account based on many years experience as a medical writer. It considers aspects of medical writing with particular focus on the intellectual and ethical dilemmas it can raise. What makes medical writing both so interesting and so challenging is the fact that it often takes place at the border between different disciplines. For example, it straddles both science and art. Ethical issues also arise at the boundaries between academia and commerce. Until recently there (...) have been few guidelines to help navigate such potentially dangerous territory. I have been privileged to be involved in developing two such guidelines and I describe how I hope the Good Publication Practice guidelines for pharmaceutical companies and the European Medical Writers Association guidelines may improve the practice of this fascinating profession, Medical Writing._. (shrink)

Abstract Medical futility is commonly understood as treatment that would not provide for any meaningful benefit for the patient. While the medical facts will help to determine what is medically appropriate, it is often difficult for patients, families, surrogate decision-makers and healthcare providers to navigate these difficult situations. Often communication breaks down between those involved or reaches an impasse. This paper presents a set of practical strategies for dealing with cases of perceived medical futility at a (...) major cancer center. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s10730-011-9168-3 Authors Colleen M. Gallagher, Section for Integrated Ethics in Cancer Care, Unit 1430, The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, P.O. Box 301402, Houston, TX 77230-1402, USA Ryan F. Holmes, St. Louis University, St. Louis, MO, USA Journal HEC Forum Online ISSN 1572-8498 Print ISSN 0956-2737. (shrink)

Clinical ethics is a relatively new discipline within medicine, generated not so much by the Can we . . . ? questions of fact and prognosis that physicians ...

While there is a shortage of healthcare workers in virtually all countries, there currently exists a pronounced inequality in the distribution of healthcare workers, with a high concentration of healthcare workers in high income countries (HIC) and low concentrations in low‐ and middle‐ income countries (LMIC). This inequality in the distribution of healthcare workers persists, in spite of the fact that HICs enjoy a much lower disease burden than LMICs This inequality raises medical ethical issues related to what obligations (...) health workers from HICs have to correct these imbalances by working in LMICs. While the biomedical principle of Justice, first formulated by Beauchamp and Childress, advocates for healthcare workers to conduct themselves in a manner that is fair and equitable in light of what is due or owed, it does not elaborate on what sort of obligation this places on healthcare workers from HICs to work in LMICs in a bid fairly distribute the availability of healthcare workers. As such, this paper gives a normative argument for why healthcare workers from HICs have a moral obligation to work in LMICs, a concept we call Medical Cosmopolitanism. Following our positive argument, we debunk prominent objections to the concept of Medical Cosmopolitanism and consider ethical, educational and governmental implications of our findings. (shrink)

There have recently been novel applications of medical systematic review guidelines to economic policy interventions which contain controversial methodological assumptions that require further scrutiny. A landmark 2017 Cochrane review of unconditional cash transfer (UCT) studies, based on the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE), exemplifies both the possibilities and limitations of applying medical systematic review guidelines to UCT and universal basic income (UBI) studies. Recognizing the need to upgrade GRADE to incorporate the differences between medical (...) and policy interventions, the GRADE Public Health Project Group (PHPG) was convened to enumerate and address these methodological challenges. However, in light of our analysis of additional methodological challenges that arise for UCT and UBI studies, we argue that the adaptation of medical systematic review guidelines to economic methodology is far from straightforward and is in fact more challenging than claimed by the PHPG. (shrink)

Medical ethics is that branch of applied philosophy which considers issues of values raised by medical practice, and should not be equated with 'principlism'. Clarification of facts/values distinctions is an important part of this work. The notion that medical philosophy can flourish in the hands of medical 'generalists' without specialist philosophers, is misguided. Both must work together to promote right reason and right action in medical education and practice.

When talking about personal identity in the context of medical ethics, ethicists tend to borrow haphazardly from different philosophical notions of personal identity, or to abjure these abstract metaphysical concerns as having nothing to do with practical questions in medical ethics. In fact, however, part of the moral authority for respecting a patient’s self-regarding decisions can only be made sense of if we make certain assumptions that are central to a particular, psychological picture of personal identity, namely, that (...) patients will remain psychologically connected to a certain degree with their future selves. I draw this out, show problems with approaches in medical ethics based on alternate theories of personal identity that do not recognise this, and explore some important implications. Namely, I show how this recognition can better explain the circumstances under which we should respect advance directives and why, and how it can better make sense of patient fears that they will not "survive" personality-altering deep brain stimulation procedures, and provide guidance on approaching patient decisions concerning this type of procedure in a manner that captures and addresses such concerns. (shrink)

Some patients have no chance of surviving if not treated, but very little chance if treated. A number of medical ethicists and physicians have argued that treatment in such cases is medically futile and a matter of physician discretion. This paper is a critical examination of that position. According to Howard Brody and others, a judgment of medical futility is a purely technical matter, and one which physicians are uniquely qualified to make. Although Brody later retracted these claims, (...) he held fast to the view that physicians need not consult the patient or his family to determine their values before deciding not to treat. This is because professional integrity dictates that treatment shouldn't be undertaken. The argument for this claim is that medicine is a profession and a social practice, and thus capable of breaches of professional integrity. Underlying professional integrity are two moral principles, one concerning harm, the other fraud. Both point to the fact that when the odds of survival are very low treatment is a violation of professional integrity. The details of this skeletal argument are exposed and explained, and the full argument is subjected to criticism. On a number of counts, it's found wanting. If anything, professional integrity points to the opposite conclusion. (shrink)

The Patient Preference Predictor (PPP) proposal places a high priority on the accuracy of predicting patients’ preferences and finds the performance of surrogates inadequate. However, the quest to develop a highly accurate, individualized statistical model has significant obstacles. First, it will be impossible to validate the PPP beyond the limit imposed by 60%–80% reliability of people’s preferences for future medical decisions—a figure no better than the known average accuracy of surrogates. Second, evidence supports the view that a sizable minority (...) of persons may not even have preferences to predict. Third, many, perhaps most, people express their autonomy just as much by entrusting their loved ones to exercise their judgment than by desiring to specifically control future decisions. Surrogate decision making faces none of these issues and, in fact, it may be more efficient, accurate, and authoritative than is commonly assumed. (shrink)

The Declaration of Geneva is one of the core documents of medical ethics. A revision process was started by the World Medical Association in 2016. The WMA has also used this occasion to examine how the Declaration of Geneva is used in countries throughout the world by conducting a survey of all WMA constituent members. The findings are highly important and raise urgent questions for the World Medical Association and its National Medical Associations : The Declaration (...) of Geneva is only rarely used as an oath text despite the fact that physicians’ oaths are generally widespread. This is not consistent with the intention and claim of the Declaration of Geneva. The article then discusses three questions. Should there be one single binding oath? Which organization should be responsible for such an oath? Which oath is the most obvious candidate? In a globalized world and despite all cultural diversity, the medical profession should have one core moral basis which is binding for physicians all over the world. The most obvious candidate for an oath incorporating this moral basis is the Declaration of Geneva. (shrink)

The fact that monstrous births were not represented in independent learned publications of the eighteenth century, except for the case of hermaphrodites, does not mean that the interest in them had disappeared or that they were no more considered proper objects of inquiry. This paper focuses on the medical understanding of monstrosity at the Royal Society of London. I point to the use of monstrous births in strengthening the authority of medical practitioners and lecturers. I also show some (...) of their uses in providing new questions for the scenes of medical inquiry of the period and as crucial evidence in the understanding of regular physiological phenomena. I discuss some of the reasons why monstrous formations continued to defy an 'Enlightenment' approach to nature based on the search for order and regularity. (shrink)

This article considers the issue of expanded access to innovative treatments in the context of recent legislative initiatives in the United Kingdom and the United States. In the United Kingdom, the supporters of legislative change argued that the common law principles governing medical negligence are a barrier to innovation. In an attempt to remove this perceived impediment, two bills proposed that innovating doctors sued for negligence should be able to rely in their defence on the fact that their decision (...) to innovate was “responsible.” A decision to innovate would be regarded as responsible if it followed a specified process. Although these changes to the law of medical negligence were not passed, this article argues that the idea of a process-based approach was sound. In the United States, a number of states have passed “Right to Try” laws that permit doctors to prescribe and companies to provide investigational products without the need for FDA approval. These laws do not purport to and nor are they able to alter the obligations of individuals and companies under federal law. They are consequently unlikely to achieve their stated aim of expanding access to investigational products. This article argues that they nevertheless have a cogent rationale in so far as they highlight the need for rights-based reform to federal regulations governing access. (shrink)

The concept of medical necessity is often used to explain or justify certain decisions—for example, which treatments should be allowed under certain conditions—as though it had an obvious, agreed-upon meaning as well as an inherent normative force. In introducing this special issue of Clinical Ethics on medical necessity, we argue that the term, as used in various discourses, generally lacks a definition that is clear, non-circular, conceptually plausible, and fit for purpose. We propose that future work on this (...) concept should address three main questions: what medical necessity is (i.e., what makes something medically necessary, as opposed to something else); what the concept does (what ‘work’ is it doing when invoked in different settings); and what should follow, normatively, from the fact that something is indeed medically necessary (on some plausible conception). (shrink)

Background Medical boards and fitness-to-practice committees aim to ensure that medical students and physicians have “good moral character” and are not impaired in their practice of medicine. Method Presented here is an ethical analysis of stalking behavior by physicians and medical students, with focus on the case of Teleka Patrick, MD (a psychiatry resident practicing medicine while under a restraining order due to her alleged stalking behavior). Conclusions While a restraining order is not generally considered a criminal (...) conviction, stalking behavior is clearly unprofessional and a marker of inappropriate character and fitness, yet the reporting obligations for such matters are complex. Medical schools and training programs that fail to assess, record, and report matters of moral conduct such as this potentially allow impaired students to graduate and enter the work force (unless a robust licensing process identifies them). Patrick’s case should be a wake-up call for medical schools and medical boards to better integrate the professionalism domain into their operations. Further, the professionalism of students and doctors need to be integrated into the legal domain, so that those who are unfit to practice are, in fact, prevented from doing so. Guidance for integration is provided. (shrink)

What I call medically enabled suicides have four distinctive features: 1. They are instigated by actions of a suicidal individual, actions she intends to result in a physiological condition that, absent lifesaving medical interventions, would be otherwise fatal to that individual. 2. These suicides are ‘completed’ due to medical personnel acting in accordance with recognized legal or ethical protocols requiring the withholding or withdrawal of care from patients (e.g., following an approved advance directive). 3. The suicidal individual acts (...) purposefully to ensure that medical personnel will act on these protocols. 4. These suicides do not involve medical personnel providing aid in dying in the standard sense, either through (a) active voluntary euthanasia, or (b) assistance by means of prescriptions, etc. -/- Regardless of how common medically enabled suicides are, they raise compelling questions at the interface of medicine and individual choice. After first clarifying the concept of medically enabled suicide and exploring some of the reasons why it might be attractive to suicidal individuals, I then investigate two apparent dilemmas that medically enabled suicides raise for medical care providers. The first alleges that medical care providers may not contribute to harming their patients, and so they may not contribute to their patients’ suicides. The second alleges that if care providers, as a matter of personal conscience, believe that suicide is wrong, then they may not be compelled to contribute to their patient’s acting wrongly by assenting to the wishes of a patient pursuing medically enabled suicide. Both dilemmas arise from the fact that while medical personnel are bound by widely accepted precepts of medical ethics to honor the competent wishes of their patients, medically enabled suicides entangle them in their patients’ suicidal plans in ways that result in their contributing to those suicides. I conclude that neither dilemma should be resolved in the direction of medical personnel having the right to refrain from involvement in medically enabled suicides. Thus, while we may find medically enabled suicide distasteful or exploitative, a strong case cannot be made that medical personnel refusing to involve themselves in such suicides is ethically permissible. (shrink)

Some patients have no chance of surviving if not treated, but very little chance if treated. A number of medical ethicists and physicians have argued that treatment in such cases is medically futile and a matter of physician discretion. This paper critically examines that position.According to Howard Brody and others, a judgment of medical futility is a purely technical matter, which physicians are uniquely qualified to make. Although Brody later retracted these claims, he held to the view that (...) physicians need not consult the patient or his family to determine their values before deciding not to treat. This is because professional integrity dictates that treatment should not be undertaken. The argument for this claim is that medicine is a profession and a social practice, and thus capable of breaches of professional integrity.Underlying professional integrity are two moral principles, one concerning harm, the other fraud. According to Brody both point to the fact that when the odds of survival are very low treatment is a violation of professional integrity.The details of this skeletal argument are exposed and explained, and the full argument is criticised. On a number of counts, it is found wanting. If anything, professional integrity points to the opposite conclusion. (shrink)

At the center of medical morality is the healing relationship. It is defined by three phenomena: the fact of illness, the act of profession, and the act of medicine. The first puts the patient in a vulnerable and dependent position; it results in an unequal relationship. The second implies a promise to help. The third involves those actions that will lead to a medically competent healing decision. But it must also be good for the patient in the fullest possible (...) sense. The physician cannot fully heal without giving the patient an understanding of alternatives such that he or she can freely arrive—together with the physician—at a decision in keeping with his or her personal morality and values. In today's pluralistic society, universal agreement on moral issues between physicians and patients is no longer possible. Nevertheless, a reconstruction of professional ethics based on a new appreciation of what makes for a true healing relationship between patient and physician is both possible and necessary. (shrink)

The American term Bioethics has been adopted over the last ten years and the development of Bioethics committees on the American model testifies this influence, even before the official appointment of a National Committee in 1983. This phenomenon acknowledged as the emergence of French bioethics is in fact the final outcome of a long-lasting crisis in the medical profession, in quest for a new style of ethics, breaking with the traditional professional ethics (French Déontologie, through the Ordre des Médecins). (...) Among other factors of conceptual and institutional change, the increase of biomedical research comes first: a major consequence is the sharing of moral responsibilities in decision-making with outsider scientists and finally the involvement of the whole population as potential moral subjects.The designation of these events as the emergence of French bioethics is hardly appropriate for an account of this dramatic shift in ethical norms and roles in medicine. This paper attempts to review the intellectual roots of the recent evolution and to summarize present and prospective trends. (shrink)

At the center of medical morality is the healing relationship. It is defined by three phenomena: the fact of illness, the act of profession, and the act of medicine. The first puts the patient in a vulnerable and dependent position; it results in an unequal relationship. The second implies a promise to help. The third involves those actions that will lead to a medically competent healing decision. But it must also be good for the patient in the fullest possible (...) sense. The physician cannot fully heal without giving the patient an understanding of alternatives such that he or she can freely arrive—together with the physician—at a decision in keeping with his or her personal morality and values. In today's pluralistic society, universal agreement on moral issues between physicians and patients is no longer possible. Nevertheless, a reconstruction of professional ethics based on a new appreciation of what makes for a true healing relationship between patient and physician is both possible and necessary. (shrink)

In the regime of Anglo-American tort law, every person has a responsibility to comport him- or herself with “due care” in going about day-to-day activities so as not to imperil the health, safety, or general welfare of others. The gold standard for determining what constitutes due care in any particular situation is what a reasonable person, similarly situated, would do. Determinations of due care are necessarily fact specific. Nevertheless, the general objective is to strike an appropriate balance between an unrealistically (...) high standard of caution and one that fails to take into account the known or foreseeable risks of any human endeavor. The same standard applies to individuals regardless of their age, gender, race, and level of education or economic status. The standard also applies to fictional “persons” such as corporations. The usual or prevailing custom and practice in an industry or occupation may provide relevant evidence of what constitutes “due care” in the activities common to it, but that evidence can be effectively overcome or rebutted by competent, credible evidence that the custom and practice either diverges from what it has been asserted to be or that the custom and practice is itself unsafe or otherwise poses an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Until quite recently, a singular exception to this general principle of tort law was made for the medical profession. We will consider this exception in the next section. (shrink)

The correlation between medical ethics and medical law, while seemingly far removed from the context of Eastern Orthodoxy, is in fact of deep theological significance and eschatological prominence and has become increasingly a matter of concern in contemporary Russia. The following study examines different modes of this correlation and their moral implications for the wider society.

Medico-philosophical reflections were developed in the 19th and the 20th centuries by three consecutive generations of Polish physicians, active in what was later named the Polish School of Philosophy of Medicine. The second generation of this school published its own journal, Medical Critique [Krytika Lekarska], from 1897 to 1907. Medical Critique included numerous articles on the nature of medical knowledge, the reductionism versus holism debate in biology and medicine, the importance of teleologically-oriented approaches in medicine, the influence (...) of theories and of a priori ideas on clinical observations and on ‘clinical facts’, the problem of classification of diseases, the normative and ethical dimension of medicine, and the ion relationships between philosophy, history and medicine. The existence of a journal dealing specifically with theoretical reflections on medicine undoubtedly contributed to the propagation of original work in the philosophy of medicine in Poland. (shrink)

Machine learning (ML) systems play an increasingly relevant role in medicine and healthcare. As their applications move ever closer to patient care and cure in clinical settings, ethical concerns about the responsibility of their use come to the fore. I analyse an aspect of responsible ML use that bears not only an ethical but also a significant epistemic dimension. I focus on ML systems’ role in mediating patient–physician relations. I thereby consider how ML systems may silence patients’ voices and relativise (...) the credibility of their opinions, which undermines their overall credibility status without valid moral and epistemic justification. More specifically, I argue that withholding credibilitydue tohow ML systems operate can be particularly harmful to patients and, apart from adverse outcomes, qualifies as a form of testimonial injustice. I make my case for testimonial injustice in medical ML by considering ML systems currently used in the USA to predict patients’ risk of misusing opioids (automated Prediction Drug Monitoring Programmes, PDMPs for short). I argue that the locus of testimonial injustice in ML-mediated medical encounters is found in the fact that these systems are treated asmarkers of trustworthinesson which patients’ credibility is assessed. I further show how ML-based PDMPs exacerbate and further propagate social inequalities at the expense of vulnerable social groups. (shrink)

Surveys of the German public have revealed a high acceptance of social freezing, i.e. oocyte conservation without medical indication. Up to now, there are no investigations available on the experiences and attitudes of health professionals towards social freezing. Between August 2015 and January 2016, we surveyed gynecologists Germany-wide on the topic social freezing. Five gynecologists specialized in reproductive medicine and five office-based gynecologists in standard care were chosen for the survey. The survey was conducted with an explorative, qualitative research (...) design. The demand for social freezing in Germany is low. With regard to their fertility age, most women attend consultations too late, they have only little previous knowledge and false expectations. The gynecologists consider it the duty of society and politics to provide for the compatibility of family and work. They relate late parenthood to disadvantages primarily for the children. A majority of the gynecologists interviewed tend to advise natural reproduction. Social freezing is often mistaken as a kind of fertility insurance. Thus, it is necessary that physicians inform women early about the possibilities and limitations of social freezing. In the first place, social freezing is not a medical or medical-ethical topic. Women consider the method as a possibility to ensure the compatibility of family and work. This compatibility should be mostly perceived as a political topic. It cannot be a medical task to solve this issue. In fact, a debate in society as a whole is necessary that includes all relevant actors. (shrink)