Although Auguste Comte is conventionally acknowledged as one of the founders of sociology and as a key representative of positivism, few new editions of his writings have been published in the English language in this century. He has become virtually dissociated from the history of modern positivism and the most recent debates about it. Gertrud Lenzer maintains that the work of Comte is, for better or for worse, essential to an understanding of the modern period of positivism. This collection provides (...) new access to the work of Comte and gives practitioners of various disciplines the possibility of reassessing concepts that were first introduced in Comte's writings. Today much of the ordinary business of academic disciplines is conducted under the assumption that the realm of science is essentially separate from the realms of politics and science. A close reading of Comte will reveal how deeply such current ideas and theories were originally embedded in a particular political context. One of his central methodological principles was that the theory of society had to be removed from the arena of political practice precisely in order to control that practice by means of these same sciences. It is in Comte's work that the reader will be able to observe how the forces of social and political reaction began to be powerfully organized to combat the critical forces in its own and later eras. Auguste Comte and Positivism will be of importance to the work of philosophers, sociologists, political theorists, and historians. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Drei Wege" verfügbar.

" Pour devenir un parfait philosophe, il me manquait surtout une passion, a la fois profonde et pure, qui me fit assez apprecier la partie affective de la nature humaine " note Auguste Comte dans ses " Prieres quotidiennes " redigees peu apres 1845, cette " annee sans pareille " au cours de laquelle il rencontre, frequente et voit disparaitre Clotilde de Vaux a laquelle il voue un amour eperdu. Cette relation aussi profonde et intense que physiquement ephemere ne bouleverse (...) pas seulement la vie privee du fondateur du positivisme. La decouverte du role preponderant de l'affectivite dans les relations humaines et sociales inflechit de maniere definitive la doctrine positiviste dont la nouvelle devise devient L'amour pour principe, l'ordre pour base et le progres pour but. L'edifice theorique qu'est le Systeme de politique positive developpe l'idee d'un " nouveau pouvoir spirituel " qui prendra la forme d'une " religion de l'Humanite " a laquelle l'ordre et le progres doivent etre subordonnes, de meme que l'esprit au cur. Ce numero explore sous differents angles les implications de cet inflechissement majeur a l'uvre dans la philosophie positive, et sa complexe actualite. (shrink)

Selections from the most important and representative writings of the philosopher, economist, social reformer and political activist August Cieszkowski (1814 1894).

t. 1.- Cours de philosophie positive. v. 1: Les préliminaires généraux et la philosophie mathématique.--v. 2: La philosophie astronomique et la philosophie de la physique. v. 3: La philosophie chimique et la philosophie biologique.

Orthodoxy holds that the difference between weakness of will and compulsion is a matter of the resistibility of an agent's effective motivation, which makes control-based views of agency especially well equipped to distinguish blameworthy weak-willed acts from non-blameworthy compulsive acts. I defend an alternative view that the difference between weakness and compulsion instead lies in the fact that agents would upon reflection give some conative weight to acting on their weak-willed desires for some aim other than to extinguish them, but (...) not to their compulsive desires. This view allows identificationist theorists of moral responsibility to explain why weak-willed actions, but not compulsive actions, are attributable to agents such that they can, in theory, be praised or blamed for them. After motivating and presenting the view in detail, I show how it has unique resources for explaining the ethics of managing one's compulsions. (shrink)

This article investigates the causal efficacy of social properties, which faces the following puzzle. First, for both intuitive and scientific reasons, it seems social properties have causal import. But, second, social properties are also characteristically extrinsic: to have some social property depends, in typical cases, on what one’s society is like around them. And, third, there is good reason to doubt that extrinsic properties make a genuine causal contribution. After elaborating on these three claims, I defend the following resolution to (...) the puzzle: social causation occurs at the level at which social properties are intrinsic. (shrink)

t. 1. Les religions de l'Inde, et Bulletins des religions de l'Inde (1880-1885) -- t. 2. Bulletins des religions de l'Inde (1889-1902) -- t. 3. Comptes rendus et notices (1872-1886) -- t. 4. Comptes rendus et notices (1887-1898) -- t. 5. Comptes rendus et notices (1899-1911). Bibiliographie. Index général.

The moral responsibility literature frequently relies on both explicit and implicit claims about “ideal” or “normal” agency that import unjustified normative assumptions into our theorizing. In doing so, it both fails to reckon with and misconstrues the reality of agential diversity. In this article I diagnose the root of this problem, which I trace back to the confluence of two factors: the search for fundamental agential capacities, and systemic discrimination toward psychological variance. I then preview three socially and politically important (...) domains of inquiry that have been obscured by this paradigm as a way of motivating the need for and value of applying a neurodiversity perspective to moral responsibility and the ethics of blame. (shrink)

In Almost Over: Aging, Dying, Dead, Frances Kamm seeks to make sense of people’s widely variant choices about which lives they would choose to continue living. She does this by defending the Prudential Prerogative, which, in analogy to the Moral Prerogative, holds that in a fairly wide range of conditions we are under no intrapersonal rational obligation to choose either to die or to live on. I argue against Kamm's case for the Prudential Prerogative in favor of Life Holism, the (...) view that you ought to live the life that would be best for you as an individual when each potential life is considered as a whole. I argue that the features of the Moral Prerogative that make it an attractive principle do not transfer to the Prudential Prerogative, and that Life Holism can better account for the perspectival and non-summative features of the normative phenomena Kamm wants to capture while retaining a tight connection between reasons and goodness. (shrink)

Western cultural norms resulting from patriarchal oppression contribute to the development of eating disorders in women. As represented by various philosophers, social factors can contribute to self-discipline of the body, which characterizes most image-based eating disorders. Critics of fundamental texts argue over the best way to engage in feminist discussion concerning these eating disorders, given that anorectics are often excluded from mainstream discourse. This paper proposes that the feminist community must approach conversations about eating disorders in three steps: recognition, sympathy, (...) and acknowledgement. This is the only way that we can move towards addressing the cultural causes of individual pathologies. (shrink)

The Studies in Religious History and Philosophy cover the entire field of theology, especially the history of Christianity and the philosophy of religion.

In this chapter I argue that choosing to live forever comes with the threat of an especially pernicious kind of boredom. However, it may be theoretically possible to circumvent it by finding ways to pursue an infinite number of projects consistent with one’s personality, taking on endlessly pursuable endlessly interesting projects, or by rekindling old projects once you’ve forgotten about them. However, each of these possibilities is contingent upon having certain traits that you are likely not currently in a good (...) position to assess. I therefore argue that no one is in a good position to be confident about her prospects for living forever. (shrink)