An appropriate kind of curved Hilbert space is developed in such a manner that it admits operators of $\mathcal{C}$ - and $\mathfrak{D}$ -differentiation, which are the analogues of the familiar covariant and D-differentiation available in a manifold. These tools are then employed to shed light on the space-time structure of Quantum Mechanics, from the points of view of the Feynman ‘path integral’ and of canonical quantisation. (The latter contains, as a special case, quantisation in arbitrary curvilinear coordinates when space is (...) flat.) The influence of curvature is emphasised throughout, with an illustration provided by the Aharonov-Bohm effect. (shrink)

Deformation quantisation is applied to ordinary Quantum Mechanics by introducing the star product in a configuration space combining a Riemannian structure with a Poisson one. A Hilbert space compatible with such a configuration space is designed. The dynamics is expressed by a Hermitian Hamiltonian containing a scalar potential and a one-form potential. As a simple illustration, it is shown how a particular type of non-commutativity of the star product is interpretable as generating the Zeeman effect of ordinary Quantum Mechanics.

Classical mechanics is presented so as to render the new formulation valid for an arbitrary temporal variable, as opposed to Newton’s Absolute Time only. Newton’s theory then becomes formally identical (in a precise sense) to relativity, albeit in a three-dimensional manifold. (The ultimate difference between the two dynamics is traced to the existence of the relativistic ‘mass-shell’ condition.) A classical Lagrangian is provided for our formulation of the equations of motion and it is related to one of the known forms (...) of the corresponding relativistic Lagrangian, which is the analogue of the Polyakov Lagrangian of string theory. (shrink)

We investigate a possible form of Schrödinger’s equation as it appears to moving observers. It is shown that, in this framework, accelerated motion requires fictitious potentials to be added to the original equation. The gauge invariance of the formulation is established. The example of accelerated Euclidean transformations is treated explicitly, which contain Galilean transformations as special cases. The relationship between an acceleration and a gravitational field is found to be compatible with the picture of the ‘Einstein elevator’. The physical effects (...) of an acceleration are illustrated by the problem of the uniformly-accelerated harmonic oscillator. (shrink)

Alarmed by Three Mile Island, Love Canal, and other disastrous deployments of new technologies, the public is demanding more voice in the decision-making on technology. To make this possible, it is proposed that metatechnology be evolved that will provide a practical technology for the safe, effective, and economical use of technology. A case history of a specific metatechnology is presented. Here the metatechnology enabled a realistic balancing of the benefits of mass screening of women by mammography against the hazards from (...) the X-rays. By showing that the screening of women under 50 was counterproductive, this metatechnology helped to ban such screening in a program involving a quarter of a million women. The strategic mistake in setting up this and other technological programs was that the decisions were made by the technologists. They benefited the technologists but were not beneficial to the women. One of the potentials of metatechnology is that in its fully computerized versions it could be used directly by the public for decision-making on the deployment of technologies. (shrink)

Pleidooi voor een metafysische visie op hedendaagse sociale en economische problemen.

De 1965 à 1975, des travailleurs immigrés venus seuls – la plupart originaires de Turquie, du Maroc et de l’Europe du Sud – ont participé aux transformations des cultures sexuelles et de genre de l’Europe du Nord. Cependant, à partir du milieu des années 1970, l’arrivée des épouses et enfants venus de leur pays d’origine conduit à un changement d’attitude à l’égard de la liberté sexuelle. Cet article explore, dans le cas des Pays-Bas, ce tournant conservateur chez les travailleurs immigrés (...) lié au regroupement familial. Il propose l’utilisation du fonds de collections photographiques déposées par des immigrant.es à l’Institut d’histoire sociale d’Amsterdam et montre l’intérêt de ces archives personnelles pour écrire une histoire de la sexualité et de l’immigration. (shrink)

Does South Africa need a common moral language? Many people are of the opinion that South Africa finds itself 'after Babel’ and needs a common moral language (1). The author considers some of the arguments of people who disagree with this analysis, because they do not define the problem in this way (2); because they find the language- or Babel-methaphor confusing (3); because they agree with the description of the problem, but not with the suggested solution, namely a common moral (...) language (4); or because they accept the solution, but do not regard it as the proper task of the Christian church to be involved in this search for a common moral language (5). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject by Denis DŽANIĆD. J. HobbsDŽANIĆ, Denis. Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject. Cham: Springer, 2023. x + 236 pp. Cloth, $119.99Denis Džanić’s Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility, despite its superficially historical focus on a specific period of collaboration between Edmund Husserl and his somewhat wayward protégé Eugen Fink, addresses key (...) systematic issues in transcendental phenomenology, namely, how the act of phenomenologizing should be understood in connection with the specific human beings who aim to become phenomenologists, and what the answer to this question tells us about both the genuine subject of phenomenology and the motivation for phenomenologizing. These questions are important for our understanding of not only the historical development of phenomenology but also the practice and goals of phenomenology—specifically, for a conception of phenomenologizing as a project in which we, as particular, historical, empirical figures, might want to engage.Much of the book focuses on laying the groundwork for understanding these complicated issues both historically and systematically. Džanić does an admirable job of tracing the rapidly evolving interactions between Husserl and Fink, both as intellectual collaborators on this philosophical project and as a pair of very human figures who ultimately found themselves pursuing quite different solutions to the problems of the subject and origin of phenomenology. He focuses particularly on the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, Fink’s attempt to extend Husserl’s famous text to include a phenomenology of the act of phenomenologizing itself (including Husserl’s marginal comments on the text), although he draws on a number of other significant texts and manuscripts (mostly Husserl’s, albeit with an extended aside on Heidegger) wherever they are helpful for explicating the complex evolution of Husserl’s thought on the subject. Admittedly, the book thus takes on a challenging task—both because of the difficult nature of this topic and because of the obscurity of the technical terms required to discuss it. However, despite the necessarily enigmatic character of the relevant language, Džanić’s attempts to explore the main outlines of this issue are worthwhile, particularly due to his ability to resist the temptation to view Husserl’s thought here as monolithic.In the early chapters, Džanić explicates in detail the rather complicated solution that Fink proposed to this difficulty, namely, the abandonment (to some extent) of the ultimately human origin of phenomenology in favor of a fundamentally nonhuman (and eventually meontic) conception of the transcendental ego, which generated a great deal of elaborate and (at least in the Sixth Meditation) inadequately supported speculation. For Fink, both the motivation to phenomenologize and the act of phenomenologizing itself ultimately stem from a source that is fundamentally prior to—in a(n onto)logical rather than temporal sense—any empirical ego or empirical act of phenomenologizing, a source that merely “enworlds” itself (in various complicated senses that Džanić does [End Page 145] an admirable job of clarifying) in the apparently anthropologistic, everyday world of individual phenomenologists. Džanić calls this interpretation of phenomenology Fink’s “epistemological anti-humanism,” and it serves as the basis for one potential (radically anti-Heideggerian but nevertheless somewhat disappointing) solution to the question of why we should phenomenologize at all. As Džanić notes, this solution was at least briefly taken up by Fink’s mentor Husserl himself, although the degree to which Husserl actually endorsed this path beyond the level of a fleeting flirtation remains questionable. Ultimately, as Džanić rightly highlights and as becomes abundantly clear in Husserl’s (often rather scathing) notes on Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, he abandoned this interpretation.Accordingly, in the later chapters of the book, Džanić traces Husserl’s ultimate development of a quite different solution to the problems of the origin and motivation of phenomenology—a solution that, unlike his brief foray into Finkian grandeur, views the act of phenomenologizing as essentially rooted in human possibility (that is, as part of the famous lifeworld that features so prominently in Husserl’s work, especially in the Crisis and other late texts). After his collaboration with and... (shrink)

Let your verse be the happy occurrenceSomehow within the restless morning windWhich goes about smelling of mint and thyme...And all the rest is literature.It's not lIterary unless it's depressing. Although this statement is unfounded, I often hear it from beginning students and nonacademics who believe that literature is always dark and dreary, and that literariness is tantamount to depictions of suffering, struggle, and tragedy. I typically respond to such comments in the usual English-professor way, pointing out that literature represents the (...) full range of human experience, and that the subject matter is far less important than the way in which a writer describes it. What is more, I say to such people... (shrink)