This article is an attempt to define the exact date of Charles Darwin’s loss of faith in God. The English naturalist and evolutionist in his early stages of life was definitely a theist. The author claims that the first doubts concerning the Creator’s existence appeared on board of the HMS Beagle. After returning from his expedition, Darwin dedicated himself to the work on the notes he collected. In these notes Darwin claimed that morality is nothing more than useful behavior transmitted (...) by generations and faith is only an effect of a religious upbringing. According to the author, at the turn of the 1830s. and 1840s. Darwin had already had serious doubts concerning the truthfulness of the Christian doctrine. Finally, Darwin lost his faith after the death of his beloved daughter on 23 April 1851. (shrink)

I critically discuss the contextualist approach to essentialism, which was developed as an explanation of the seeming inconstancy of our essentialist intuitions. The problem is supposed to be that we vacillate a great deal in judging what properties an object has essentially from one occasion to another, which obviously undermines the reliability of our essentialist intuitions. Contextualists solve the problem by combining the metaphysical view that objects have essential properties with the semantic thesis that the term “essentially” is a context (...) sensitive expression. Once we are aware of the context shifting, the conflict of intuitions turns out to be onlyapparent. My aim is to show that contextualism is not the answer that a proponent of essentialism should adopt. First, I outline the contextualist strategy and argue by help of an example that our linguistic practice does not seem to support the contextualist claim that “essentially” is a context-sensitive term. Secondly, the contextualist strategy deals only with the vacillation of intuitions in one person, but offers a very unfavorable explanation of the conflict of intuitions among different persons. Thus, contextualists face the challenge of proving the reliability of essentialist intuitions nevertheless. I conclude with David Lewis’s proposal in order to illustrate that the contextualist approach only provides the appearance, but not the real essentialism. (shrink)

The speech act of inquiry is generally treated as a default kind of asking questions. The widespread norm states that one inquires whether p only if one does not know that p. However, the fact that inquiring is just one kind of asking questions has received little to no attention. Just as in the declarative mood we can perform not only assertions, but various other speech acts, like guesses or predictions, so in the interrogative mood we can also make various (...) speech act types. I propose a speech-act-theoretic account of a distinct kind of question that I label exam questions. According to the proposed account, one performs an exam question p only if (i) one has access to the answer to p, and (ii) one does not officially know whether the hearer knows the answer to p. Exam questions satisfy all the necessary requirements of being a distinct kind of speech act. Additionally, my proposal contributes to the recent expansion of the normative approach to a variety of speech acts. (shrink)

According to the normative approach, speech acts are governed by certain norms. Interestingly, the same is true for classes of speech acts. This paper considers the normative treatment of constatives, consisting of such classes as assertives, predictives, suggestives, and more. The classical approach is to treat these classes of illocutions as species of constatives. Recently, however, Simion (Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context, Oxford University Press, 2021) has proposed that all constatives (i) are species of assertion, and (...) (ii) are governed by the knowledge norm. I defend the classical treatment of constatives and show that Simion’s conclusion is untenable. No taxonomy of speech acts can accommodate such a view. More importantly, we can test whether a particular speech act is an assertion or not. I propose five tests of assertion, the passing of which is a necessary condition for being an assertion. Some constative speech acts fail these tests. Thus, contrary to Simion, not all constatives can be regarded as species of assertion. (shrink)

Black holes entered scientific literature as early as at the end of eighteenth century. They had been known at that time as dark stars, but their concept did not find its way to physics or astronomy, and had been abandoned for more than one hundred years. I shall sketch historical developments and discuss present mathematical and observational status of black holes.

I argue against Milić's (2017) proposal of analyzing “selfless assertions” (Lackey 2007) as proper, i.e., as assertions which satisfy the norm of assertion. In his view, selfless assertions are hedged assertions governed by the knowledge norm. In my critique, I show that Milić does not make a case that selfless assertions constitute such a special class of assertions. Moreover, he does not deliver a clear criterion for differentiating between flat-out assertions and hedged ones. What is more, his proposal leaves some (...) cases of selfless assertions unexplained. The outcome is that we are still left without a satisfactory account of selfless assertions as proper assertions. (shrink)

This book provides an incisive, basic introduction to many-valued logics and to the constructions that are "many-valued" at their origin. Using the matrix method, the author sheds light on the profound problems of many-valuedness criteria and its classical characterizations. The book also includes information concerning the main systems of many-valued logic, related axiomatic constructions, and conceptions inspired by many-valuedness. With its selective bibliography and many useful historical references, this book provides logicians, computer scientists, philosophers, and mathematicians with a valuable survey (...) of the subject. (shrink)

I propose an analysis of lying with uninformative speech acts. The orthodox view states that lying is restricted to assertions. However, the growing case for non-assertoric lies made by presuppositions or conventional implicatures challenges this orthodoxy. So far, the only presuppositions to have been considered as lies were informative presuppositions. In fact, uninformative lies were not discussed in the philosophical literature. However, limiting the possibility of lying to informative speech acts is too restrictive. Firstly, I show that standard, uninformative presuppositions (...) can also be lies. Secondly, I extend this picture into uninformative lies made by declarative statements. To implement my proposal, I do not need a new definition of lying. Recently popular commitment-based definitions of lying are able to properly handle uninformative lies. (shrink)

I analyse Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-brain identity theories. Specifically, he argues against the identity between pain and C-fibres simulation by pointing out the difference between this identity claim and the theoretical identifications, such as ‘Water is H2O’ and ‘Lightning is a motion of electric charges’. Kripke’s argument relies on the assumption that the experience of pains is a simple and homogenous phenomenon, but scientific research shows that it is in fact a quite complex one. We can distinguish at (...) least three components: sensory-discriminative, motivational-affective and cognitive. This discovery makes it possible to reject Kripke’s argument, but it also uncovers a major flaw that is common to all modal arguments against physicalism. They proclaim to answer the fundamental question about the nature of our world by relying on our powers of imagination and without having the relevant factual knowledge. (shrink)

This paper offers a systematic classification and characterization of speech acts and their norms. Recently, the normative approach has been applied to various speech acts, most notably to constatives. I start by showing how the work on the norms of assertion has influenced various approaches to the norms of other speech acts. I focus on the fact that various norms of assertion have different extensions, i.e., they denote different clusters of illocutions as belonging to an assertion. I argue that this (...) has consequences for theorising about norms of other speech acts and generates certain arbitrary divisions. In the central part, I analyse two groups of speech acts. Firstly, ordinary speech acts, like predictions or retractions. Secondly, I indicate how the normative view can be extended to so-called ancillary speech acts, like presuppositions or implicatures. I end with a discussion of possible extensions of the normative approach, focusing on the debate on lying. (shrink)

I provide some considerations on scientific thought experiments, focusing on their epistemic value. First, I outline the distinctive features of scientific thought experiments, provide some historical background and, as an illustration, describe two thought experiments: Galileo's on falling bodies and Stevin's on inclined plane. I take thought experiments in physics as an example from which more general conclusions can be drawn - about thought experiments in other natural sciences, but also in philosophy, mathematics, and other sciences. Further, I present Kuhn's (...) epistemic puzzle as well as some proposed solutions. This closely relates to the question what kind of processes are involved in scientific thought experimenting. The satisfactory answer must consider scientific discoveries. I outline the mental model account as the most promising account since it best incorporates the findings of cognitive science. I conclude with two issues that the account needs to resolve and the role cognitive science can play in this. (shrink)

The bucket experiment in Newton’s Principia is quite simple. Nonetheless, physicists as well as philosophers and historians of science are still debating its purpose and success. I present two interpretations found in the literature. According to the first, Newton tries to prove absolute rotation and thus the existence of absolute space. According to the second, he tries to provide a definition of absolute rotation as it is used in his mechanics. Closely connected to this is his rejection of Descartes’ explanation (...) of rotation and of motion in general. I conclude with a short discussion on whether the bucket experiment can be classified as a thought experiment. (shrink)

The widely accepted view states that an intention to deceive is not necessary for lying. Proponents of this view, the so-called non-deceptionists, argue that lies are simply insincere assertions. We conducted three experimental studies with false explanations, the results of which put some pressure on non-deceptionist analyses. We present cases of explanations that one knows are false and compare them with analogical explanations that differ only in having a deceptive intention. The results show that lay people distinguish between such false (...) explanations and to a higher degree classify as lies those explanations that are made with the intention to deceive. Non-deceptionists fail to distinguish between such cases and wrongly classify both as lies. This novel empirical finding indicates the need for supplementing non-deceptionist definitions of lying, at least in some cases, with an additional condition, such as an intention to deceive. (shrink)

The paper revisits the old controversy over causality and determinism and argues, in the first place, that non˗deterministic theories of modern science are largely irrelevant to the philosophical issue of the causality principle. As it seems to be the ‘moral’ of the uncertainty principle, the reason why a deterministic theory cannot be applied to the description of certain physical systems is that it is impossible to capture such properties of the system, which are required by a desired theory. These properties (...) constitute what is called ‘the state’ of a system. However, the notion of a state of a system is relative: it depends on a particular theory which one would like to use to describe given kinds of phenomena. This implies that, even in the case where the desired state of a system is fundamentally impossible to be captured, neither ontological nor epistemological determinism may be excluded. Some following critical considerations are also offered with regard to the claim that uncertainty is “rooted in the things themselves”. The cradle of modern discussions about causality and determinism is, of course, quantum mechanics. Because, as it appears, a judgment on deterministic or non˗deterministic character of a theory can be made only after some interpretation of this theory has been given, the paper briefly reminds some chosen interpretations of quantum mechanics (Schrödinger's, probabilistic, statistical, Copenhagen, and the interpretation of quantum ensembles). Many of such interpretations, offered in the past, have now been rejected, and some gained more credibility than the others. Nonetheless, even the claim that indeterminism is irremovable from the description of the micro-world doesn't imply the rejection of the most general formula of the philosophical causality principle. There is no direct implication between theses of the epistemology of scientific knowledge and those of the ontology of the real world. (shrink)

The article examines the figure of the spy—alongside themes related to espionage—as employed in two books by the Northern Irish writer Ciaran Carson : the volume of poems For All We Know and the novel Exchange Place. Carson’s oeuvre is permeated with the Troubles and he has been hailed one of key writers to convey the experience of living in a modern surveillance state. His depiction of Belfast thematizes questions of terrorism, the insecurity and anxiety it causes in everyday life, (...) as well as the unceasing games of appearances and the different ways of verifying or revising identities. In Carson’s later work, however, these aspects acquire greater philosophical depth as the author uses the themes of doubles, spies, and makeshift identities to discuss writing itself, the construction of subjectivity, and the dialogic relationship with the other. Taking a cue from Paul Ricoeur’s and Julia Kristeva’s conceptions of “oneself as another,” the article examines how Carson’s spy-figures can be read as metaphors for processes of self-discovery and identity-formation, tied to the notion of “self-othering.” Carson employs the figure of the spy—who juggles identities by “donning” different clothes or languages—to scrutinize how one ventures into the dangerous territory of writing, translation and love, as well as to reconsider notions of originality and self-mastery. Ultimately, Carson conceptualizes literature as specially marked by deceptions and metamorphoses, defining in these terms the human condition. (shrink)

For decades Ryszard Wójcicki has been a highly influential scholar in the community of logicians and philosophers. Our aim is to outline and comment on some essential issues on logic, methodology of science and semantics as seen from the perspective of distinguished contributions of Wójcicki to these areas of philosophical investigations.

The article reviews the book Elementy etyki lekarskiej [Issues in Physician Ethics], by Tadeusz Biesaga.

Grzegorz W. Kolodko, one of the world's leading authorities on economics and development policy and a key architect of Poland's successful economic reforms, applies his far-reaching knowledge to the past and future of the world economy, introducing a framework for understanding our global situation that transcends any single discipline or paradigm. Deploying a novel mix of scientific evaluation and personal observation, Kolodko begins with a brief discussion of misinformation and its perpetuation in economics and politics. He criticizes the simplification (...) of complex economic and social issues and investigates the link between developments in the global economy and cultural change, scientific discoveries, and political fluctuations. Underscoring the necessity of conceptual and theoretical innovation in understanding our global economic situation, Kolodko offers a provocative study of globalization and the possibility of coming out ahead in an era of worldwide interdependence. Deeply critical of neoliberalism, which sought to transfer economic control exclusively to the private sector, Kolodko explores the virtues of social-economic development and the new rules of the economic game. He concludes with a look at our near and distant future, questioning whether we have a say in its making. (shrink)

Opracowanie ma charakter poglądowo-teoretyczny, powstało bowiem na podstawie przeglądu dostępnej literatury przedmiotu. Publikacja skierowana jest zarówno do naukowców jak i studentów zajmujących się tematyką starzenia się ludności, starości i osób starszych oraz do coraz szerszego grona zainteresowanych tymi zagadnieniami praktyków, w tym polityków i decydentów oraz reprezentantów usług publicznych, przedstawicieli mediów i organizacji pozarządowych. ** The study is illustrative and theoretical in nature, as it was based on a review of the available literature on the subject. The publication is addressed (...) to both scholars and students dealing with the subjects of population ageing, old age, and older adults, as well as to a growing group of practitioners interested in these issues, including politicians and decision-makers as well as representatives of public services, the media, and non-governmental organizations. (shrink)

Although assertions are often characterised as essentially informative speech acts, there is a widespread disagreement concerning how the informativeness of assertions should be understood. This paper proposes the informativeness norm of assertion, which posits that assertions are speech acts that essentially deliver new information. As a result, if one asserts something that is already commonly known, one’s assertion is improper. The norm is motivated by appealing to unique conversational patterns associated with informative and uninformative uses of assertions, an analogy between (...) assertions and inquiries, and a distinction between assertions and uninformative speech acts. By focusing on the normative approach to speech acts, the paper discusses how particular norms of assertion deal with the data supporting the norm of informativeness. To be informative, the speaker must consider the epistemic position of the audience. Since the majority of norms proposed in the literature are speaker-centred, they fail to explain the submitted data. Looking more broadly, focusing on the informativeness of assertions underscores the crucial role of the audience in construing adequate speech act accounts. (shrink)

The development of the method of logical matrices at the turn of 19th Century made it possible to define the concept of many-valued logic. Since the first construction of the system of three-valued logic by ukasiewicz in 1918 several matrix based logics have been proposed, cf. [8]. The aim of the present paper is to touch upon some problems related to the topic, which would permit one to get a viewpoint upon the nature of many-valuedness. First, we show that the (...) multiplication of logical values is not a sufficient condition to obtain a non-two-valued logic. Second, we discuss an ingenious solution by R. Suszko [11] explaining through the sentential identity an ontological nature of non-classical logical values. Next, we present a kind of metalogical relation of inference, so-called q-consequence, being three-valued in its spirit. The last chapter will bring a concise description of two ukasiewicz “manyvalued” systems of modalities and an application of the paradigm of q-consequence to these systems. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that Turri’s (2015a) experimental study concerning selfless assertions is defective and should therefore be rejected. One performs a selfless assertion when one states something that one does not believe, and hence does not know, despite possessing well supported evidence to the contrary. Following his experimental study, Turri argues that agents in fact both believe and know the content of their selfless assertions. In response to this claim, I demonstrate that the conclusions he draws are premature (...) in this regard. More specifically, I criticize his methodology, showing that his study is not only incomplete but also yields contradictory results. In closing, I propose how such a study should be conducted in order to receive comprehensive results. (shrink)

The following article begins with my recollection of the only academic conference on Zdziechowski that was organised still under the communist regime in the autumn of 1984 at the Jagiellonian University and ends with a description of the discussion on the genesis and power of evil, with the participation of Czesław Miłosz and Leszek Kołakowski, which was triggered in Poland immediately after the publication of the last edition of On Cruelty in 1993. On Cruelty was first published in 1928 in (...) the journal Przegla̧d Współczesny [Contemporary Review] in Krakow, a second time in 1938 in the volume of articles In the Face of the End, Krakow 1938, and a third – and so far last – time also in Krakow in 1993. On Cruelty, published three times but so far only in Polish, has never been thoroughly analysed or even discussed, which is why this article focuses on discussing it and related questions about the origins and nature of evil, mainly in Europe and Asia, from the earliest times to the present. Zdziechowski was particularly outraged when the cruelty he condemned was justified by religion, especially Christianity (Catholic and Protestant). From these condemnations, he described the activities of the Inquisition, the witch trials, cruelty to animals, and – in the introduction – the “psychology of cruelty.” At the same time, however, he meticulously listed the names of those political and spiritual leaders in Europe and Asia, theologians and thinkers, who, over many centuries, up to the present day, have resolutely spoken out against evil, including cruelty, within and outside the Church. A separate and important issue is Zdziechowski’s attitude to Tsarist Russia and Bolshevism, as outlined in his work On Cruelty. On the one hand, he pointed out that at least two rulers of Russia before 1917 – Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great – had made major contributions to the history of cruelty in Europe and Asia. But Bolshevism, which Zdziechowski condemned in the strongest terms, was in his eyes not a continuation of pre-1917 Russian despotism, but emanated from the depths of Asia. (shrink)