Kant hat bewiesen, dass reine Vernunftnotwendigkeit der einzige nicht zufällige, also unbedingte Geltungsgrund von Ethos und Recht ist. Dazu bedarf Vernunftnotwendigkeit der Anwendung auf die menschliche Praxisdisposition und wird dadurch zum Sittengesetz. Es begründet das untergeordnete Verhältnis von Recht und Moral. Die menschliche Freiheit hat in der Notwendigkeit des Sittengesetzes ihren absoluten Grund und ihr Kriterium. Daher kann es nicht in unserem Belieben stehen, soziale, ethische und rechtliche Regeln aufzustellen, sondern es ist unabweisbare Menschenpflicht, sich nur Regeln zu geben, die (...) dem Sittengesetz gemäß sind. Auch die Geltung staatlicher Gesetze ist von dieser Übereinstimmung abhängig.Kant has shown that pure rational necessity is the single non-contingent and thus unconditional basis for the validity of law and ethics. In addition, rational necessity requires application to human practical disposition and thereby becomes moral law. The moral law provides the basis for the subordinate relationship of law and ethics. Human freedom finds its absolute foundation and its criterion in the necessity of the moral law. Accordingly, it cannot be within our discretion to establish social, ethical, and juridical rules, bur instead it is an imperative duty for human beings to adopt rules that accord with the moral law. The validity of state legislation is also dependent on this accordance. (shrink)

The thesis that Kant's “Rechtslehre” is entirely independent of his transcendental idealism is simply not correct. In fact: the material contents of the “Rechtslehre” follow analytically from the logical explication of the empirical concept of external freedom, whereas the absolute practical validity (“Verbindlichkeit”) of the imperative and of the imperatives of right is based exclusively on the categorical imperative and therefore ultimately on transcendental idealism.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 1 Seiten: 1-8.

_Tracing practical reason from its origins to its modern and contemporary permutations_ The Greek discovery of practical reason, as the skilled performance of strategic thinking in public and private affairs, was an intellectual breakthrough that remains both a feature of and a bug in our modern world. Countering arguments that rational choice-making is a contingent product of modernity, _The Greeks and the Rational_ traces the long history of theorizing rationality back to ancient Greece. In this book, Josiah Ober explores how (...) ancient Greek sophists, historians, and philosophers developed sophisticated and systematic ideas about practical reason. At the same time, they recognized its limits—that not every decision can be reduced to mechanistic calculations of optimal outcomes. Ober finds contemporary echoes of this tradition in the application of game theory to political science, economics, and business management. _The Greeks and the Rational_ offers a striking revisionist history with widespread implications for the study of ancient Greek civilization, the history of thought, and human rationality itself. (shrink)

What did democracy mean before liberalism? What are the consequences for our lives today? Combining history with political theory, this book restores the core meaning of democracy as collective and limited self-government by citizens. That, rather than majority tyranny, is what democracy meant in ancient Athens, before liberalism. Participatory self-government is the basis of political practice in 'Demopolis', a hypothetical modern state powerfully imagined by award-winning historian and political scientist Josiah Ober. Demopolis' residents aim to establish a secure, prosperous, and (...) non-tyrannical community, where citizens govern as a collective, both directly and through representatives, and willingly assume the costs of self-government because doing so benefits them, both as a group and individually. Basic democracy, as exemplified in real Athens and imagined Demopolis, can provide a stable foundation for a liberal state. It also offers a possible way forward for religious societies seeking a realistic alternative to autocracy. (shrink)

Kankhavitarani by Bhadantacariya Buddhaghosa. Edited by K. R. Norman and William Pruitt. Pali Text Society, Oxford 2003. xix, 596 pp. £30.00. ISBN 0 86013 413 X.

ABSTRACTIlya Somin's Democracy and Political Ignorance proposes an original, epistemic argument for decentralizing and downsizing democratic government. Somin's argument does not produce a plausible real-world program for government reform, nor does he exhaust the universe of what voting is for, or possible democratic solutions to the epistemic problem of rational ignorance and cognitive limitation. But his proposal is of considerable interest as an advance in political theory. The historical example of the classical Greek world of decentralized authority and small city-states (...) suggests that democracy does benefit, in epistemic ways, from decentralization, reduced scale, and simplification of procedural rules. The tradeoff is, however, increased responsibility on the part of individual citizens to undertake civic services of various kinds. (shrink)

G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, Athenian Democratic Origins and Other Essays, edited by David Harvey and Robert Parker, with the assistance of Peter Thonemann , pp. vii + 447; £92.00, ISBN 0 19 925517 2.

John R. Wallach, The Platonic Political Art: A Study of Critical Reason and Democracy , xi + 468 pp., $65.00, ISBN 0 271 02075 X ; $25.00, ISBN 0 271 02076 8.

ABSTRACTSchumpeter’s highly influential theory of democracy, developed in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, is less a market-based theory of party competition than it is a theory of strong leadership, modeled after generalship. As such, it is a weak foundation for rebuilding a democratic theory of party politics. Moreover, Schumpeter’s demolition of the “Classical Doctrine of Democracy” knocks down a straw-man theory: a hybrid of Bentham’s utilitarianism and Rousseau’s communitarianism that few contemporary theorists of democracy would be willing to defend.

The relationship between participatory democracy (the rule of and by a socially diverse citizenry) and constitutional liberalism (a regime predicated on the protection of individual liberties and the rule of law) is a famously troubled one. The purpose of this essay is to suggest that, at least under certain historical conditions, participatory democracy will indeed support the establishment of constitutional liberalism. That is to say, the development of institutions, behavioral habits, and social values centered on the active participation of free (...) and equal citizens in democratic politics can lead to the extension of legally enforced immunities from coercion to citizens and noncitizens alike. Such immunities, here called “quasi-rights,” are at least preconditions for the personal autonomy and liberty in respect to choice-making that are enshrined as the “rights of the moderns.” This essay, which centers on one ancient society, does not seek to develop a formal model proving that democracy will necessarily promote liberal constitutionalism. However, by explaining why a premodern democratic citizenry of free, adult, native males—who sought to defend their own interests and were unaffected by Enlightenment or post-Enlightenment ideals of inherent human worth—chose to extend certain formal protections to slaves, women, and children, it may point toward the development of a model for deriving liberalism from democratic participation. Development of such a model could have considerable bearing on current policy debates. (shrink)

Opposing the tendency to read Thucydides as a strong realist, committed to a theory of behaviour that assumes rationality as expected utility maximization, Ned Lebow and Clifford Orwin emphasize Thucydides’ attentiveness to deviations from rationality by individuals and states. This paper argues that Thucydides grasped the principles underlying contemporary prospect theory, which explains why people over-weight small probabilities and under-weight near certain ones. Thucydides offers salient examples of excessive risk-aversion in the face of probable gains and excessive risk-seeking by decision-makers (...) faced with high probability losses. Thucydides suggests that in a democracy, leaders’ rhetoric can limit or exacerbate the political effects of bias in risk assessment. (shrink)

In fourteen scholarly yet delightfully readable essays, Ober solves some ancient mysteries and reveals the secret kinks and passions of famous and obscure historical figures.

The characterization of the world of the ancient Greek city states as relatively poor and economically static has been refuted by recent advances in Greek economic history. The Greek world grew dramatically, compared to other premodern societies, both in population and per capita consumption from the age of Homer to that of Aristotle. By the fourth century BCE the city-state ecology was densely populated, and median consumption was well above bare subsistence. Athenian income inequality can be roughly measured using income (...) and population estimates from late fourth century BCE. This paper argues that, at least in Athens, economic growth was accompanied by historically low levels of income inequality. Both economic growth and low inequality are explained by the development of citizen-centered political institutions. Growth, inequality, and institutions were important parts of the historical context in which Plato and Aristotle wrote. Attending to that context may elucidate some aspects of Greek political philosophy. (shrink)